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  April 24, 2009   
 
The Honorable ROBERT C. BYRD 
President Pro Tempore of the Senate, Washington, D.C. 20510 
The Honorable NANCY PELOSI 
Speaker of the House of Representatives, Washington, D.C. 20515 
 
DEAR SENATOR BYRD AND SPEAKER PELOSI: 
 
We are writing to report on the U.S.-China Commission’s March 24 public 
hearing on “China’s Industrial Policy and its Impact on U.S. Companies, Workers and the 
American Economy.”  The Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act 
(amended by Pub. L. No. 109-108, section 635(a)) provides the basis for this hearing, as 
it requires the Commission to report to the U.S. Congress on “the national security 
implications and impact of the bilateral trade and economic relationship between the 
United States and the People’s Republic of China.”   
 
 In the hearing, the Commission examined the adoption by China of a detailed 
industrial policy intended to advance specific economic goals. The Commission heard 
testimony concerning the effects of those industrial policies on the Chinese economy and 
on the economies of China’s major trading partners, particularly the United States. 
Witnesses were asked to consider possible responses by the U.S. government to China’s 
industrial policy, especially in those instances where Chinese policies may violate 
international trade rules or otherwise harm U.S. interests. 
 
 China’s industrial policy is characterized by three main goals: 1. the creation of an 
export-led and investment-led manufacturing sector; 2. the creation of jobs sufficient to 
reliably employ the Chinese workforce; and 3. an emphasis on fostering the growth of 
industries such as manufacturing and high technology products that add maximum value 
to the Chinese economy. China adopts, modifies and abandons other economic policies in 
order to meet these primary goals. For example, low wage jobs in the textile industries 
may be supported by government policies in order to provide employment for minimally 
skilled workers. 
 
 China’s industrial policy is promulgated through a top-to-bottom process that has 
been outlined in 11 successive five year plans adopted by the State Council and 
implemented by the central and provincial governments at the direction of officials of the 
central government and the Communist party. Subordinate and elaborative policies, such 
as the 15-year “National Outline for Medium and Long Term Science and Technology 
Development Planning (2006-2020),” supplement the five year plans.  
 
China has wielded a variety of tools to accomplish its ends. It has variously 
designated “pillar” or “strategic” or “heavyweight” industries of which government is to 
retain ownership or control. In many cases the government pursues policies to 
significantly aid their development. These industries include telecommunications, 
information technology, aviation, automobile manufacturing, construction, energy, and 
 iii
steelmaking, in addition to Chinese banks.  Other industries specially favored by 
governments in China include biotechnology, wholesale marketing, computer chip 
design, and software.1 These industries receive special support from the government, 
including low interest loans and loan forgiveness from government-owned banks at the 
direction of government officials. The government also deploys such indirect subsidies as 
lax enforcement of intellectual property rights and worker protections. Direct aid includes 
subsidized fuel, land, infrastructure improvements, and electricity. China also levies a 
value added tax on imports and rebates the tax on exported goods. While general rebates 
of indirect taxes are permitted by the rules of the World Trade Organization, it 
nonetheless results in a 17 percent tax levied on U.S. imports into China. Serious 
questions have been raised about the trade-distorting impact of the selective use of such 
tax rebates. Unfortunately, WTO panels have ruled repeatedly that attempts by Congress 
over three decades to provide an income tax credit for U.S. exports violate the 
organization’s trade rules. 
 
 China’s industrial policies have had a profound effect on the U.S. economy. The 
trade deficit with China in goods reached $266 billion in 2008, resulting in slower U.S. 
economic growth and fewer jobs here than if the trade relationship were more balanced 
between imports and exports.  Witnesses differed as to the degree that the overall U.S. 
trade deficit would decline if the trading relationship between the two countries were 
brought into balance. But it is significant that the U.S. deficit with China represented 33 
percent of the total U.S. trade deficit with the world and 42.6 percent of the deficit with 
non-oil exporting countries.2   In addition, it is not just the size of the deficit that 
policymakers should examine, but the changing nature of its composition. The United 
States in 2008 ran a record $72.7 billion trade deficit with China in advanced technology 
products. 
 
In addition, export-led growth policies pursued by China and other Asian nations 
have inevitably led to excess capacity in many products, notably steel and automobiles, 
which has contributed to declining jobs and production in many market-oriented 
countries, including the United States. Witnesses were unanimous in their conclusion that 
the undervalued Chinese currency serves as an indirect subsidy to Chinese exporters by 
lowering the final cost of their exported products and as a hindrance to U.S. companies 
attempting to export to China since the undervalued Chinese currency makes U.S. exports 
relatively more expensive. 
  
China has manipulated the process of setting industry-wide standards in order to 
benefit its indigenous industries and to protect them from foreign competition.  That has 
been the case with China’s telecommunications industry, one of four industries that the 
Commission examined in depth in the hearing. Others included nanotechnology, 
optoelectronics, and information technology. These four industries also were 
beneficiaries of China’s practice, plainly identified in its 11th five year plan, of 
encouraging the transfer of foreign technology to China.  
                     
1 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, testimony of  George Haley, University of New 
Haven,  New Haven, Connecticut, March 24, 
2  Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. 
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As part of this effort, China has been successful in attracting U.S. corporations to 
locate some of their production and research facilities there, but also in transferring 
technologies to their Chinese joint venture partners.   
  
China is investing heavily in the computer and telecommunication sectors. It has 
reorganized and consolidated the telecommunications industry into three giant service 
providers while at the same time restricting the entry of foreign providers to the Chinese 
market. While these companies are largely operating in the domestic market, they hold 
considerable potential as international competitors to U.S. and European 
telecommunications companies.  In fact, state-owned and state-invested enterprises 
account for about 23 percent of China’s exports while foreign-invested enterprises 
account for more than 55  percent of China’s total exports in 2008, according to one 
witness, citing figures released by China’s  government.  3 
 
Witnesses offered a number of suggestions to counter the effects of China’s 
industrial policy and to improve America’s ability to compete. Among them were 
methods to counter China’s underpriced currency, subsidies to favored industries, 
intellectual property theft, and the use of indigenous standards to block U.S. products. 
Witnesses also emphasized the need to place a stronger emphasis on education in the 
United States, particularly in science and technology. The Commission will evaluate 
these and other recommendations obtained during its hearings and incorporate them in its 
recommendations to Congress that will be contained in its 2009 Annual Report to 
Congress to be published in November 2009.  
  
 Thank you for your consideration of this summary of the Commission’s hearing.  
We note that the full transcript of the hearing plus the prepared statements and supporting 
documents submitted by the witnesses can be found on the Commission’s website at 
www.uscc.gov, and that these can be searched by computer for particular words or terms.  
Members of the Commission are available to provide more detailed briefings. We hope 
these materials will be helpful to the Congress as it continues its assessment of U.S.-
China relations and their impact on U.S. security.  
 
 Sincerely yours, 
               
                    Carolyn Bartholomew   Larry M. Wortzel, Ph.D. 
                            Chairman                                           Vice Chairman 
 
 cc: Members of Congress and Congressional Staff 
 
 
                     
3 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, testimony of  Terry Stewart, Stewart and 
Stewart, Washington, D.C., March 24, 2009 
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CHINA'S INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND ITS IMPACT 
ON U.S. COMPANIES, WORKERS AND THE 
AMERICAN ECONOMY 
 
 
 
TUESDAY, MARCH 24,  2009 
 
  
 
 
 
 
U.S. -CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The Commiss ion met  in  Room 236,  Russel l  Senate  Off ice  
Bui ld ing,  Washington,  DC at  9 :02 a .m. ,Chairman Carolyn 
Bar tholomew,  Vice  Chairman Larry  M.  Wortze l ,  and Commiss ioners  
Pat r ick  A.  Mul loy,  and Danie l  M.  Slane  Hear ing Cochairs ) ,  pres id ing.  
  
 
   
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN CAROLYN 
BARTHOLOMEW 
   
 HEARING COCHAIR SLANE:  Good morning,  everyone.   
Welcome to  today 's  hear ing on "China 's  Indust r ia l  Pol icy  and i t s  
Impact  on  U.S.  Companies ,  Workers ,  and the  American Economy."  
 Today 's  hear ing wi l l  be  cochai red  by Commiss ioner  Pat r ick  
Mul loy and me.   Congress  has  g iven our  Commiss ion the  responsibi l i ty  
to  moni tor  and inves t iga te  the  nat ional  secur i ty  impl ica t ions  of  
b i la tera l  t rade  and economic  re la t ions  between the  Uni ted  Sta tes  and 
China .  
 We ful f i l l  our  mandate  by conduct ing hear ings  and under taking 
re la ted  research,  as  wel l  as  sponsor  independent  research.   We a lso  
t ravel  to  Asia  and receive  br ief ings  f rom other  U.S.  government  
agencies  and depar tments .   We produce  an  annual  repor t  and provide  
recommendat ions  to  Congress  for  legis la t ive  and pol icy  changes .  
1
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
 This  i s  the  th i rd  hear ing f rom the  2009 repor t ing  year ,  a  year  
wi th  a  new adminis t ra t ion  in  Washington.   The new adminis t ra t ion  wi l l  
have  to  deal  wi th  a  lo t  of  cr i t ica l  i ssues  in  2009,  a long wi th  the  wors t  
economic  cr is is  the  wor ld  has  seen in  the  pas t  60  years .  
 I 'd  l ike  to  welcome our  panel is ts  and kindly  ask  tha t  each speak 
for  no  more  than seven minutes .   This  wi l l  a l low the  maximum t ime for  
ques t ions  and answers .  
 Now,  I 'd  l ike  to  in t roduce  Commiss ioner  Mul loy.  
 
OPENING STATEMENT OF COMMISSONER PATRICK A.  
MULLOY, HEARING COCHAIR 
 
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  Thank you,  Mr.  Chairman.   
 I 'm very  p leased to  have  the  oppor tuni ty  to  cochai r  today 's  
impor tant  hear ing.   I  a lso  want  to  thank members  of  Congress  who 
have been very  suppor t ive  of  the  work of  th is  Commiss ion.  
 Oftent imes ,  we have members  come and tes t i fy  to  s tar t  off  the  
hear ing,  but  there 's  so  much going on in  the  Congress  r ight  now that  i t  
was  d i f f icul t .   But  some of  them sent  over  s ta tements  for  inc lus ion in  
the  record .  
 Let  me read f rom Congressman Mike Michaud who is  the  head of  
the  House  Trade  Working Group.   He te l l s  the  Commiss ion:  
 “Your  work has  been invaluable  to  those  in  Congress  who are  
concerned about  the  economic ,  pol i t ica l  and secur i ty  impl ica t ions  of  
the  U.S.  re la t ionship  wi th  the  People 's  Republ ic  of  China .”  
 Senator  Sherrod Brown wi l l  be  coming by la ter  th is  af ternoon to  
make a  s ta tement .  
 S ince  taking power  in  October  1949,  China 's  communis t  
government  has  pursued an  indust r ia l  pol icy .   I t  wasn ' t  very  successful  
in  the  beginning because  i t  was  t ry ing to  do i t  wi th in  China .   Deng 
Xiaoping in  '78  decided that  they needed to  seek fore ign technology,  
fore ign inves tment ,  and fore ign markets .  
 Back in  1981 when I  f i rs t  went  to  China ,  there  were  hardly  any 
cars  on  the  s t ree t .   Today,  China  may make more  automobi les  than the  
Uni ted  Sta tes  of  America .   So something i s  working over  there ,  and i t ' s  
qui te  evident  tha t  th is  pol icy  has  impl ica t ions  for  the  Uni ted  Sta tes  of  
America .  
 So,  today,  we want  to  explore  the  overa l l  na ture  of  China 's  
indust r ia l  pol icy  and we want  to  look a t  the  ro le  tha t  fore ign d i rec t  
inves tment  and China 's  use  of  incent ives  to  a t t rac t  fore ign inves tment  
have  p layed in  bui ld ing the i r  s t ra tegic  and pi l la r  indust r ies .  
 We want  to  thank our  wi tnesses  who have a l l  submit ted  very  
good tes t imony.   The commiss ioners  have  had a  chance  to  read i t ,  and 
2
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
we' l l  take  i t  in to  account  both  in  today 's  hear ing and then when we 
wri te  our  annual  repor t  for  the  Congress .   So we apprecia te  your  being 
here .   Now le t  me turn  i t  back to  my cochai rman,  Commiss ioner  Slane .  
 
OPENING STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER DANIEL M. SLANE 
HEARING COCHAIR 
 
 HEARING COCHAIR SLANE:  Thanks .   Thank you,  everyone,  
for  coming,  and we want  to  express  our  apprecia t ion  to  the  Senate  
Armed Services  Commit tee  for  providing today 's  hear ing venue,  and a  
specia l  thanks  to  our  s taf f  for  the  grea t  job  they d id  in  put t ing  th is  
hear ing together .  
 A t ranscr ip t  of  today 's  hear ing wi l l  be  publ ished on our  Web 
s i te ,  which is  uscc .gov,  and today 's  wr i t ten  tes t imony wi l l  be  pos ted  on 
the  Web s i te  as  wel l ,  and by the  end of  November ,  our  2009 Annual  
Repor t  wi l l  appear  on  the  Web s i te  and in  the  form of  a  bound paper  
copy.   Today 's  hear ing wi l l  provide  a  weal th  of  informat ion for  tha t  
annual  repor t .  
 For  those  of  you who wi l l  be  wi th  us  the  ent i re  day,  I ' l l  note  tha t  
there  wi l l  be  a  break for  lunch a t  1 :00 p .m. ,  and we wi l l  resume 
prompt ly  a t  two.   There 's  a  snack bar  and carry-out  in  the  basement  of  
the  Russel l  Senate  Off ice  Bui ld ing.   There 's  a lso  a  cafe ter ia  in  the  
basement  of  the  Dirksen Bui ld ing tha t  i s  connected  to  the  Russel l  
Bui ld ing by a  long hal lway,  and I  have  to  warn  everybody that  the  
microphones  are  a lways  on so  p lease  don ' t  embarrass  yourse l f .  
 Now le t  me in t roduce  our  f i rs t  panel .   Our  f i rs t  panel  for  today is  
going to  address ,  among other  th ings ,  the  evolut ion  of  indust r ia l  pol icy  
in  China .   In  par t icular ,  we ' re  in teres ted  in  hear ing about  China 's  p i l la r  
and s t ra tegic  indust r ies  in  genera l .  
 Alan Wolff  leads  Dewey & LeBoeuf 's  In ternat ional  Trade  
Pract ice  Group which represents  c l ients  involved in  some of  the  most  
impor tant  t rade  i ssues  of  our  day.  
 Mr.  Wolff  has  a  long and dis t inguished career  in  in ternat ional  
t rade  tha t  inc ludes  over  25  years  as  a  Managing Par tner  wi th  Dewey 
Bal lant ine .  Before  tha t ,  Mr.  Wolff  worked as  Genera l  Counsel  and 
Deputy  U.S.  Trade  Representa t ive  for  the  Car ter  adminis t ra t ion .  
 George  Haley is  a  Professor  of  Indust r ia l  Market ing  a t  the  
Univers i ty  of  New Haven where  he  teaches  in  the  Graduate  and 
Execut ive  Programs.  
 Dr .  Haley is  a lso  the  founding Direc tor  of  the  Center  for  
In ternat ional  Indust ry  Compet i t iveness .   Dr .  Haley  i s  an  exper t  on  
emerging and indust r ia l  markets  inc luding the  h is tor ica l ,  cul tura l  and 
legal  environments  in  which the  Chinese  bus iness  s t ra tegy is  
3
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
formula ted .  
 Clyde Pres towi tz  i s  founder  and Pres ident  of  the  Economic  
St ra tegy Ins t i tu te  which deals  wi th  in ternat ional  t rade  pol icy ,  
economic  compet i t iveness ,  and the  ef fec ts  of  g lobal iza t ion .  
 Pr ior  to  founding ESI ,  Mr.  Pres towi tz  served as  a  Counselor  to  
the  Secre tary  of  Commerce  in  the  Reagan adminis t ra t ion .   Mr.  
Pres towi tz  regular ly  wri tes  for  leading publ ica t ions ,  inc luding the  New 
York Times ,  the  Washington Post ,  For tune  and Foreign Affa i rs ,  and 
wrote  a  great  book on China .  
 Thank you.  
 We ' l l  s ta r t  wi th  Mr.  Wolff .  
 
PANEL I:   OVERVIEW OF CHINA’S PILLAR AND STRATEGIC 
INDUSTRIES 
 
STATEMENT OF MR. ALAN WM. WOLFF 
PARTNER, DEWEY & LEBOEUF LLP 
WASHINGTON, DC 
 
 MR.  WOLFF:   Good morning and thank you to  Commiss ioners  
Slane  and Mul loy and the  o ther  commiss ioners  th is  morning.  
 I  apprecia te  the  oppor tuni ty  to  be  before  you th is  morning.   
There  i s  too  l i t t le  focus  on indust r ia l  pol icy  in  th is  country ,  the  
indust r ia l  pol ic ies  of  o ther  countr ies .   We were  not  very  wel l  focused 
on what  the  Europeans  were  doing wi th  Airbus .   We as  a  country  were  
not  very  focused on what  the  Japanese  were  doing wi th  e lec t ronics  and 
a  number  of  o ther  indust r ies ,  and tha t  was  to  our  cos t ,  I  th ink,  as  a  
country  and to  our  indust r ia l  base .  
 I  th ink tha t  the  work you are  doing i s  ext raordinar i ly  impor tant .   
This  subjec t  i s  impor tant  for  China  as  wel l  because  there  i s  a  
misa l locat ion  of  resources  tha t  takes  p lace  wi th  indust r ia l  pol icy  tha t  
the  Chinese  should  be  focused on as  wel l .  
 There  i s  no  def in i t ion  of  “pi l la r  indust r ies”  as  a  gener ic  te rm in  
tha t  each Chinese  munic ipal i ty ,  every  province ,  has  a  ser ies  of  
indus t r ies  tha t  i t  t rea ts  as  p i l la r  indust r ies .   I  th ink tha t  looking a t  
autos ,  s tee l ,  and the  indust r ies  tha t  a re  c i ted  in  the  Medium and Long-
Term Science  and Technology Plan ,  the  15-year  p lan  f rom the  Minis t ry  
of  Science  and Technology in  China ,  tha t  would  be  a  pre t ty  good l i s t .   
And the  speci f ic  projec ts  and sec tors  are  l i s ted  in  my tes t imony.  
 There  are  very  e labora te  papers  tha t  a re  being issued by the  
Minis t ry  of  Science  and Technology and other  Chinese  minis t r ies ,  
which in  ef fec t  crea te  what  the  Chinese  government  sees  as  the  
necessary  suppor t  for  the i r  p i l la r  indust r ies ,  the i r  s t ra tegic  indust r ies .  
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 For  my tes t imony,  I 've  misappropr ia ted  Deng Xiaoping 's  saying 
tha t ,  " I  don ' t  care  i f  i t ' s  a  whi te  ca t  or  a  b lack ca t ;  i t ' s  a  good ca t  as  
long as  i t  ca tches  mice ."  
 In  fac t ,  I 'm us ing i t  in  the  reverse  of  the  way he  was  us ing i t  
because  "black"  to  h im was  capi ta l i sm,  and to  me "black"  i s  what  
might  be  WTO inconsis tent  or  cause  a  problem for  China 's  t rading 
par tners .  
 So  there  i s  a  dual i ty  to  Chinese  pol ic ies .   They fa l l  in to  two 
ca tegor ies :  
 There  are  pol ic ies  tha t  we have  to  match—namely the  emphasis  
on  sc ience ,  technology,  engineer ing,  math  educat ion .   Clear ly ,  tha t  i s  
in  the  Pres ident ' s  Budget ,  and i t  i s  in  the  s t imulus  package,  and i t  i s  
something that  you can ' t  faul t .  
 Sc ience  and technology parks .   The Chinese  have a  vas t  number  
of  these .   They are  very  large .   I f  you look a t  what  Research Tr iangle  
d id  for  Nor th  Carol ina ,  which was  a  phenomenal  success- - for  Nor th  
Carol ina  was  49th  in  the  country  in  terms of  per  capi ta  GDP,  and is  
now in  the  upper  ranks  as  a  resul t  of  Research Tr iangle  Park ,  in  la rge  
par t ,  and the  resul t ing  a t t rac t ion  of  indust ry .  
 My f i rs t  t r ip  to  China  inc luded a  lec ture  I  gave  a t  Pudong 
Univers i ty  in  1988.   I f  you look across  the  r iver  f rom Shanghai ,  
Pudong was  jus t  an  empty f ie ld .   I t  i s  no  longer  empty.  
 Of  the  b lack pol ic ies ,  of  the  three  areas  which I  chose  as  
examples- -one  i s  product  s tandards  us ing as  an  i l lus t ra t ive  prac t ice  
encrypt ion.   I t  i s  going to  be  a  major  cause  of  f r ic t ion  between the  
Uni ted  Sta tes  and Japan and Europe ,  on  the  one  hand,  and China  on the  
o ther .   The use  of  s tandards  i s  going to  be  very  t rade-dis tor t ing .   We 
a l ready exper ienced the  WAPI,  Wire less  LAN,  example  as  a  problem,  
but  we are  going to  have very  ser ious  problems going forward.  
 China  has  declared  tha t  i t s  MLPS,  Mul t i -Level  Protec t ion  
System,  in  which i t  grades  the  level  of  encrypt ion tha t  i s  necessary ,  
making banking and f inance  a  level  three ,  tha t  requires  Chinese  
indigenous  technology,  indigenous  patents .  
 I f  we did  tha t  the  same th ing,  China  wouldn ' t  be  t rading wi th  the  
Uni ted  Sta tes  to  any great  extent .   I f  we jus t  sa id ,  wel l ,  we want  
everything coming in to  th is  country  in  a  whole  var ie ty  of  areas  to  have  
American technology and American patents ,  then i f  we rec iprocated  
what  China  i s  saying tha t  i t  wi l l  do-- the  regula t ions  are  not  fu l ly  in  
ef fec t  ye t - -China  would  have major  t rade  problems wi th  the  Uni ted  
Sta tes .  
 I  a lso  have looked a t  informat ion technology equipment  and 
looked a t  the  means  tha t  China  uses  to  exclude  fore ign compet i tors  
f rom i t s  market ,  and i t ' s  not  jus t  the  use  of  subs id ies .   I t  i s  an  
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indust r ia l  organiza t ion ,  not  qui te  l ike  kei re tsu ,  but  there  are  
re la t ionships  which provide  a  very  ser ious  protec t ion .   So the  problem 
is  a  combinat ion  of  subs id ies  as  wel l  as  protec t ion .  
 A th i rd  example  I  gave  was  o i l  country  tubular  goods .   One could  
have chosen something e lse ,  but  we a t  our  f i rm s tudied  th is  product  
sec tor  in  some deta i l .   I t  was  a  pr imary indust ry  of  concern  to  China .   
I t  got  enormous pol icy  suppor t - -many bi l l ions  of  dol lars  of  subs idy 
and protec t ion .   And the  resul t  i s  tha t  the  Uni ted  Sta tes  indust ry  wi l l ,  
in  fac t ,  suffer  in jury  a t  some point  i f  i t  hasn ' t  a l ready.  
 And i t  inc ludes ,  as  we saw in  Europe,  debt - to-equi ty  swaps ,  not  
perhaps  d iss imi lar  f rom what  we ' re  doing wi th  AIG,  except  for  one  
th ing,  and tha t  i s  our  in tent  i s  not  to  have  AIG emerge  dominant  in  the  
wor ld  as  the  leading f inancia l  services  provider ,  whereas ,  what  the  
Chinese  are  doing,  as  the  Europeans  d id  in  pas t  t imes ,  i s  t ry  to  have  
the i r  indust r ies  emerge  as  dominant  suppl iers .  
 In  te rms of  the  impl ica t ions  of  China 's  pol ic ies ,  one  s tudy tha t  
we did  recent ly  indica tes  tha t  the  resul ts  a re  very  mixed,  tha t  
American semiconductor  producers ,  for  example ,  a re  not  increas ing the  
locat ion of  the i r  R&D locat ion to  China  very  much because  of  
concerns  over  in te l lec tual  proper ty .  
 Whi le  the  semiconductor  execut ives  responding to  our  survey 
didn ' t  say  th is ,  I  would  sugges t  tha t  i t  was  not  jus t  the  lack  of  
in te l lec tual  proper ty  protec t ion ,  i t  was  government  pol icy  tha t  was  a  
mat ter  of  concern .   So China  i s  having,  I  would  say ,  mixed resul ts .    
 In  sum,  I  th ink our  government  has  to  know more .   You are  
performing an  ext raordinar i ly  impor tant  ro le  in  tha t  process ,  but  I  
th ink the  Commerce  Depar tment  and other  agencies  in  the  U.S.  
government  should  spend a  good deal  more  a t tent ion  on what 's  going 
on abroad that  reshapes  our  economy.  
 Thank you.  
 [The s ta tement  fo l lows:]  
 
Prepared Statement  of  Mr.  Alan Wm. Wolff  
Partner,  Dewey & Leboeuf  LLP 
Washington,  DC 
 
 
[This testimony is not intended to represent the views of Dewey & LeBoeuf or its clients.]  
 
The invitation to this hearing listed ten specific questions which I will attempt to address in the context of 
the work that I and our firm has done to date:   
 
There is no single, permanent definition in China of a "pillar industry."  Beijing municipal authorities 
announced in 2008 that for it tourism would be a pillar industry in the post-Olympics period.  The same for 
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Xinjiang.  Coal mining is Shanxi's pillar industry.  Automobile manufacturing is said to be the pillar 
industry for the Chinese economy.  Also biotechnology.  For Chongqing, information technology.  For 
Nanchang, the semiconductor industry.  But also pillar industries for all or part of China are variously: 
petrochemicals, non-ferrous metals, insurance, telecommunications, banking, wholesale, and utilities.  So 
to some extent, being a "pillar industry" is synonymous with being "important enough to be supported by 
central, provincial or local government policy".   
 
As the focus at this Hearing is the impact on United States industries and workforce of China's supportive 
policies, a more relevant class of China's pillar industries for today's discussion are those that are now or 
will in the future offer competition to American industries.  Aside from automobiles, which are likely to 
arrive on these shores from China in the not terribly distant future in large numbers as they did from Japan 
and Korea, I would turn to the Medium and Long Term Science and Technology Plan of the Ministry of 
Science and Technology (MOST) for guidance as to areas of primary interest.  A key aspect of the Medium 
and Long Term S & T Plan it to make intensive investments in “strategic products".   
 
Under China's S&T Plan, key projects cover a number of priority sectors:  
 
– core electronic components,  
– high-end general chips and basic software;  
– the technology for manufacturing extremely large integrated circuits;  
– new-generation broadband wireless mobile telecommunications;  
– high-end numerical controlled machine tools and basic manufacturing technology;  
– development of large oil and gas fields; 
– large nuclear power plants with advanced pressurized water reactor, high-temperature 
gas-cooled reactors;  
– control and treatment of pollution in water bodies;  
– nurturing new, genetically modified biological species;  
– development of important new drugs;  
– control and treatment of major contagious diseases such as AIDS and viral hepatitis; 
– large aircraft; high-resolution earth observing system;  
– manned space flights; and  
– lunar exploration projects. 
 
Detailed, elaborate papers address the policies which are believed to be necessary to achieve the 
project goals.  Over ninety-nine of these papers have been planned, called “Guiding Opinions”. A sampling 
indicates the breadth of their coverage:  
 
• Accelerating Creation of Independent, ‘Well-known’ Chinese Brands; 
• Supporting Technology Innovation of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises; 
• Issuance of Corporate Bonds for Qualified High-Tech Enterprises; 
• Regulation on Management of Start-up Investment Funds and Debt Financing ability of 
Start-ups; 
• Suggestions on Establishing and Improving Regional Intellectual Property; 
• Standardizing Foreign Acquisition of Key Chinese Enterprises in the Equipment 
Manufacturing Industry; 
• Building Research-orientated Universities; 
• Promoting the Development of State Supported High and New Technology Industry 
Development Zones; 
• Establishing Guidelines and Funding for Venture Capital Investment; 
• Creating Tax Policies  Supporting the Development of Start-Ups; and 
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• Establishing ‘Green Channels’ for High-level Talents Who Have Studied Abroad to 
Return to China. 
 
The comprehensiveness of these papers is remarkable by any measure.  They are designed to at least equal 
the results achieved by more evolved market economies that have had a head start of decades and in some 
cases of over a century.  This requires China to acquire a financial, educational and legal infrastructure in 
record time to support an economy whose growth is to be based on innovation.   
 
How much intervention and of what kind? 
 
I don't care if it's a white cat or a black cat. 
It's a good cat so long as it catches mice. 
Deng Xiaoping 
 
A key question everywhere is what kind of state interventions best serve national interests and are deemed 
constructive by a country's trading partners.  Globalization has put all nations into one world economy with 
fewer national barriers separating one trading partner from another.  The origins of the current economic 
crisis stem in part from an excessive rate of savings in some countries, most prominently China, and in too 
high a propensity to borrow (and invest poorly) among other countries, most prominently, the United 
States.  Global imbalances may have their roots in relative rates of savings, but combined with industrial 
policies, they have a differential impact on various sectors of each economy.  Promotion of a given sector 
by one country will not in fact result in a win-win result as seen from the vantage point of those companies 
located in another country who are trying to compete in that same sector.  (Ask Boeing about Airbus.) 
 
Chinese government policies have a dual nature -- that is that there are promotional policies which are 
broadly considered to be acceptable by China's trading partners (white cat analogues) and other Chinese 
policies that are a matter of real concern (black cat analogues).  About this latter category, a key question is 
whether the policies which harm others are in fact good for China.  Another question is whether each black 
cat measure is consistent with China’s WTO commitments, including those contained in its Protocol of 
Accession.  In the category of black measures fall inadequate protection of intellectual property, national 
standards that act to insulate the Chinese market from the rest of the world, potential use of competition 
policy as an industrial policy tool, discriminatory government procurement, and subsidization that 
excessively distorts trade and investment patterns. 
 
Taking the most recent past first, it is worth focusing on the much-praised series of Chinese stimulus 
packages.  China has put into place a series of measures that appears to be intended to preserve, as 
governments wish to do, maximum benefits at home.  China’s Ministry of Industry and Information 
Technology (MIIT) currently plans to assist its electronics and information industries: electronics, 
telecommunications and Internet; via a number of key projects:  integrated circuit, flat panel display, TD-
SCDMA, digital TV, computer and next generation Internet, software and information service.  According 
to reports, the measures to be used include direct state financial support, tax breaks, and measures to 
expand domestic demand.  The Shanghai IC Industry Association is seeking additional investment from the 
government in IC companies.  For the mobile phone and household electrical appliance industries, it is 
expected that there will be lower tax rates, additional subsidies, cash grants and increased state-bank 
lending.   
 
Foreign industry concerns center on aspects of China's stimulus package that go beyond limited subsidies 
to encompass measures which limit competition: by emphasizing procurement by government and state-
owned enterprises of products incorporating indigenous Chinese intellectual property, requirements for 
government purchases of software that is only interoperable with Chinese software, further emphasis on 
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use and development of indigenous standards and use of exclusive information security standards.  None of 
these concerns are new.   
 
a. the drive toward indigenous innovation. 
 
We must aim to be at the forefront of the world's S&T development, speed up the building of a 
national innovation system, and strengthen an original innovation capability.”  . . . 
Hu Jintao 
 
One of the chief driving forces of Chinese policy, aside from maintaining a strong growth rate annually for 
the sake of political stability and the welfare of its people, is the desire to build an independent 
technological base.  For the last three decades, China relied heavily for its economic development on 
foreign direct investment, and still welcomes it with some limitations.  Relying on foreign investment and 
imported technology has not been abandoned, but the emphasis has shifted, as noted in the National 
Development and Reform Commission’s 11th Five Year Plan for Use of Foreign Investment:  
[We shall] encourage foreign enterprises -- especially large-scale multinationals --  to transfer 
the processing and manufacturing processes with higher technology levels and higher added 
value and research and development organizations to China, … to develop a technology spillover 
effect, and strengthen the independent innovation ability of Chinese enterprises. [emphasis 
supplied] 
… [T]he overall strategic objective of use of foreign investment in China is to…change the 
emphasis in use of foreign investment from making up the shortage of capital and foreign 
exchange to introducing advanced technologies…   
This emphasis is in turn captured and amplified in a wide variety of documents emanating from the various 
ministries: 
Fundamental Principles: firstly, to combine the import of advanced technologies and the 
optimization of importing structure and raise the proportion of proprietary and patented 
technologies in product designing and manufacturing process;  
It says much about China’s success in its economic development strategy that it can stress home-grown, 
that is, indigenous innovation.  Some of the policies that foster innovation are positive ("white cat") and 
others are negative ("black cat"), that is, trade and investment distorting, and possibly WTO inconsistent. 
 b. Positive (white cat) policies – 
1.  Human capital and the S & T Workforce 
 
China graduates each year nearly 600,000 engineers.  Much is made of this phenomenal output of 
engineers, and other STEM graduates.  And much should be.  These are impressive numbers.  It is true that 
studies by Duke, McKinsey, Cao and Simon, indicate China’s educational system:   
 
? is outdated, suffers from having a Marxist focused curriculum, 
? emphasizes depth over breadth, 
? has a quantitative over qualitative focus, 
? does not nurture creativity  
? leads to “transactional vs. dynamic engineers”, and 
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? produces a shortage of “innovative” engineers. 
 
But it cannot be concluded that of this vast population of annual graduates in engineering there is not a 
very talented top tier that is fully internationally competitive.  Shocking evidence of this fact is seen in U.S. 
data showing that more than half Ph.D. candidates in engineering at present in U.S. universities are 
graduates from Chinese universities. 
 
2. Science and Technology Parks  
 
In creating S&T parks, China is emulating none other than the United States' experience.  Menlo Park was 
the first research park, dating back to 1958, followed by Stanford Park, Research Triangle in North 
Carolina and then Waltham, Massachusetts, each in the 1950s.  It is hard to read that description of 
Research Triangle Park today without thinking also of Pudong.  In 1988, Pudong was a large empty field 
across the Huangpu River from Shanghai.  Today Pudong contains a High Tech Park and the Zhangjiang 
Life Science Cluster, the latter comprised of 25 square kilometers, seventeen of which are developed.  As 
of 2005, there were 110 research and development institutions and 3600 companies in the technology park, 
with more than 140 of them foreign. The park’s total output exceeds 11.122 billion yuan, up 190% from 
the previous year.  The park employs 100,000.   
 
China announced six years ago that it would build 100 national university science parks by the end of 
2005.  More than half that number appears to exist today.  "The university-based science parks, by joining 
with local governments and companies, were playing a positive role in speeding up the industrialization of 
academic research results, and pushing forward reform of the school teaching and management systems" 
according to one Ministry of Education official.  China's parks are said to average in area about 150% of 
the size of America's largest park, Research Triangle. 
 
Zhongguancun Science Park in Beijing covers four times the area of the Pudong Zhangjiang Park, about 
100 square kilometers, with some 400,000 professionals and support staff, and 6000 companies, with 
production of well over $14 billion yearly.  It is heavily in IT, especially internet, and views itself as 
China's Silicon Valley.  Suzhou Industrial Park developed in conjunction with the Government of 
Singapore, by the end of June 2008, attracted over3299 foreign enterprises, including 77 Fortune 500 
MNCs with cumulative contractual foreign investment of USD 33.96 billion, and domestic companies with 
total contractual investment of RMB 129.57 billion.  
 
The impact of China’s science and technology parks on China’s trading partners is hard to gauge.  For one 
thing, foreign firms have a very substantial presence in the parks.  Secondly, just as Mao was said to have 
replied when asked what he thought the impact of the French Revolution: “It is too early to tell.”  What 
may emerge could be a number of Chinese “pillar” biotech and other high tech industries. 
 
3.  Taxation 
 
While tax schemes can easily cross into black categories, the simple, nonpreferential corporate tax rate in 
China is substantially lower than that of the United States:  25% v. 39%.  Rob Atkinson of the Information 
Technology and Innovation Foundation, citing World Bank data, lists the effective corporate tax rates as 
China 15.7% and United States 32.0%.  The U.S. effective corporate tax rate before all the specific 
advantages that China may accord a favored investment is just slightly over double the U.S. effective rate. 
 
b. Distortive (black cat) policies 
 
Having as a goal the promotion of a more innovative economy and series of industry is laudable.  The 
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promotion of indigenous technologies may be less trade and investment distorting, such as through science 
parks (again abstracting the idea of a park away from that of a subsidy), but there are measures that can 
cross a line and give rise to claims of market closure.   
 
1. Product standards and encryption 
 
One of the clearest statements of the relationship between standards setting and achieving indigenous 
innovation was issued by the Shanghai Municipal Government in September 2004: 
 
? [We shall] actively promote the formulation and implementation of technical standards 
with self-owned intellectual property rights and translate that technological advantage 
into a marketplace advantage to maximize the benefits of intellectual property rights.  
 
This kind of statement issued by a sub-national government is unique to China.  Its meaning is clear, and it 
deserves to be taken seriously.   
 
Further, as the State Council's Medium and Long Term Policy for Science and Technology notes:   
 
? [We shall] actively take part in the formulation of international standards, and drive the 
transferring of domestic technological standards to international standards…  
 
Taken together, these statements are a reasonable indication of the central tenets of Chinese standards 
policies at the domestic and international levels.  As articulated here, the Chinese government is not 
seeking technology neutrality, or market driven outcomes, either through its domestic standard-setting 
activities or through its participation in the establishment of international standards.  It is seeking 
commercial advantage.  WAPI (WLAN Authentication and Privacy Infrastructure) was an extreme 
example.  Product standards work hand in had with "accreditation measures" to provide a protected market 
for products having independent innovation.   
 
Since a substantial portion of leading edge procurement in China will occur under the auspices of the 16 
key projects set out in the Medium and Long Term S & T plan, and much of the Chinese economy is state-
owned, state-invested or otherwise highly state-influenced, which products are accredited may prove to be 
extraordinarily important in gaining or maintaining access to the Chinese market.  It is worth mentioning in 
this connection that as part of its Protocol of Accession to the World Trade Organization, China pledged to 
have its state-owned enterprises procure only on a commercial basis.    
 
An example of a seemingly coordinated approach that relies on standards setting, government procurement, 
and other policies, is the current Chinese government approach to encryption policy.  Over the past year, 
various Chinese government agencies have issued new policies related to encryption technology and/or 
information security that will, if implemented, have a potentially profound impact on foreign information 
technology (IT) companies seeking to do business in China.   
 
What is best for China and various Chinese interests, commercial and otherwise?  The point of departure 
should be that setting a standard should not drive innovation, rather: innovation (creating something unique 
and in demand in the market) should drive the setting of standards.  Misguided standards policies can not 
only interfere with Chinese goals but can do great damage done to non-Chinese companies as well.   
 
2.  Information technology equipment  
 
One study that our Trade Group produced looked at a major Chinese competitor that I will call "CTC".  
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CTC frequently underpriced its U.S. and European competition by 50 percent.  This could not be explained 
by natural cost advantages:  Equipment and components were priced at world levels; labor-cost advantages 
exist but not to necessary degree to explain the differential; and capital costs would be expected to be 
higher than those of competitors, reflecting higher risk of new entrant. 
 
CTC’s profitability was not driven by parent-company operations.  Indeed, profits had been reported to be 
higher than cash flow.  Normally, income from operations is less than cash flow from operations.  CTC’s 
cash from operations could not explain the profits.  We found that a significant portion of CTC’s financing 
operations and profit sources occurred in its subsidiaries.   
 
Part of the answer lay in Chinese government programs that promoted the Chinese information technology 
sub-sector through provision of R&D, favored procurement, provision of financing, requirements for local 
content, and other forms of assistance. 
 
CTC was formed from elements of the People’s Liberation Army.  Important to its early viability was a 
very large contract from the PLA to provide services.  In the early 1990s, the CTC continued to depend 
heavily on PLA contracts for both equipment and maintenance.  Within a few years, non-PLA sales began 
to increase.    
 
China’s president pledged that: 
 
The State shall become strongly involved [in the industry] to ensure its healthy development and 
make China’s competitive product when turning to the outside world. 
 
In the mid-1990s: CTC began the practice of creating local joint ventures (LJVs) with local governments 
and local information technology entities.  This is a pattern whose significance is not initially fully 
understood by its foreign competition.   
 
China's Vice Premier of the State Council visits CTC, accompanied by the presidents of the four 
commercial banks, and hears of CTC’s financing problems.  Instructions follow.  Merchants Bank “begins 
widespread cooperation” with CTC and introduces a novel “buyers credit” program (perhaps not so 
different than Japan’s financing the leasing of Japanese made computers nearly a generation earlier as 
Japan struggled to overcome foreign products’ competitiveness in the Japanese market).  
 
 
 
CTC named in 9th Five-Year Plan.  Provincial and local government support for CTC is granted.  In 1998, 
China Construction Bank provides increase in buyers’ credit.  In 1999, the Central government issues 
“encouragement guidelines” for service providers to source domestically.  During this same period, the 
Central government begins the practice of directly assisting CTC win overseas contracts.  
 
In 2000, China’s 10th Five-Year Plan explicitly targets the principle equipment produced by CTC for 
“accelerated” development.  It provides US$450 million to CTC in buyers' credits, and US$23 million for 
research.  Within the next few years a Chinese government-owned “policy bank,” provides CTC with a 
three-year revolving domestic buyers' credit.2000-03.  Another “policy bank” provides CTC with US$145 
million in long-term loans. 2001 
 
In 2004, China’s Ministry of Information Industries (MII) and the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) 
“hammer out” a set of policies designed to encourage domestic IT and information technology firms to 
expand overseas.   The same year a policy bank provides CTC with US$10 billion to “finance overseas 
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expansion.”  Government officials state that a given percentage of equipment in China’s next-generation 
systems must be locally produced.  Chinese authorities “encourage” service providers to source from 
participants in science and technology development programs.   
 
CTC presents itself as having no government ties.  But the Central Government controls the service 
providers and the provincial governments control the projects for which procurement is required.   
 
Now, let us revert to a peculiar set of corporate relationships that affect procurement in the Chinese market 
for CTC’s products, and affect some third country procurement.   
 
Each Provincial government forms a joint venture with the domestic Chinese competitor, CTC.  The co-
owned JV will bid for the provincial contract to supply goods and services.  The purpose of this structure is 
described as follows:  CTC has numerous local joint ventures to establish “communities with aligned 
interests” to “prevent the entrance of competitors by exclusion.”   
 
The joint venture receives cash in the form of investment by the provincial government and also revenues 
from the provincial project in which it is a successful bidder.  The JV in turn provides a revenue stream to 
CTC, the joint venture partner.  CTC did not have to rely exclusively on its revenues from selling 
equipment to the JV.  This explains the mystery first cited in this section, profits being higher than revenue 
from sales of equipment.  
 
In addition to the above, with respect to expanding sales in third country markets, the Chinese government 
purchases equipment from CTC to make donations to foreign developing countries.  The Central 
government also provides, through government-controlled banks, buyers’ credits to these foreign national 
information technology service provider customers.  In some cases, the winning bidder in a third country 
transaction is a CTC JV partly owned by the foreign purchasing authority, replicating what takes place at 
home in China.  In 2006, .a major Chinese policy bank provided an additional US$1.5 billion loan, the 
same institution that gave CTC the $10 billion buyer's credit previously.   
 
It is clear that this state support alters the conditions of competition in world markets.   
 
3. Oil country tubular goods. [This section, on OCTG, is an edited version the work 
of Tom Howell and Bill Noellert of Dewey & LeBoeuf.]  
 
The socialist system is better than the capitalist system in terms of fundamental political and 
economic systems, as  public ownership is superior to private ownership …  In 1999 China’s steel 
output was 786 times that in the early years of the PRC …  What did we rely on?  We relied on the 
Party’s leadership and the socialist system. 
 
OCTG include drill pipe used in exploration; tubing (the tubes through which oil and gas pass to the 
surface); and casing, the circular pipe which encloses and protects tubing and forms a structural retainer for 
the walls of an oil or gas well.  OCTG are required to provide access to oil and gas deposits located in 
earth, rock and ocean environments.  OCTG are of central importance to some degree of energy 
independence of China, the United States and Canada.  As depletion rates have increased in Canada and 
the United States the amount of gas and oil found per foot drilled has declined. Most of the remaining oil 
and gas deposits in the United States and Canada now lie deep below the surface of the earth or ocean and 
can be accessed only through intensive use of OCTG, which are designed to perform in extreme 
environments.  To offset high depletion rates, drill rig operators are drilling more wells and using more 
intensive drilling techniques.  As a result a large portion of the total world market for OCTG is attributable 
to drilling activity in the United States and Canada.   
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Chinese government policies and measures created a large and expanding industry to produce OCTG.  The 
government of China has placed a high priority on expanding the indigenous OCTG industry to eliminate 
imported products in its domestic market and to establish a major presence in export markets.  China has 
already installed more production capacity for OCTG than it needs to meet its domestic needs, and 
additional projects to add capacity are under way.   
Due to the state-backed expansion of OCTG capacity in China, Chinese production of OCTG has grown 
from under 1 million tons in 1999 to 5.5 million tons in 2006 -- the year-over-year growth rate in Chinese 
output between 2005 and 2006 was 53.8 percent.  China already produces more OCTG than it consumes 
and will add an estimated 3.2 million metric tons of new OCTG capacity between 2007 and 2009 -- enough 
to supply 90 percent of the U.S. OCTG market at the 2006 apparent consumption level of 3.56 million 
metric tons.  The result of Chinese production rapidly outpacing consumption has been a large increase in 
Chinese net exports of OCTG.  As recently as 2002 China was a net importer of over 230,000 metric tons 
of OCTG.  By 2006 Chinese net exports were 849,000 metric tons, a change in net exports of OCTG of 
over 1 million metric tons in just four years.  . 
China has rapidly emerged as the principal exporter of OCTG to the United States, accounting for 54.7% 
of U.S. imports in 2008.  China’s share of the U.S. OCTG market tripled in two years, from 6.3 percent in 
2004 to 19.3 percent in 2006, and Chinese export volume continued to increase throughout 2006 so that its 
share of the U.S. market in December 2006 stood at 30 percent.  As existing known reserves of oil and 
natural gas in the United States are depleted, the energy sector must drill deeper and operate in more 
extreme environments to develop new sources of oil and gas.  As a result, energy extraction efforts in the 
United States will become even more OCTG-intensive than they are today.  If present trends continue, the 
prospect exists that the United States could become dependent on China to supply the basic equipment 
upon which its aspirations for energy independence are based.   
The growth of China’s steel industry, including the OCTG sub-sector, is entirely a reflection of decisions 
by central and regional government planners.  Government organizations have defined objectives for 
establishment and expansion of specific steel enterprises pursuant to short, medium and long term plans for 
the economy.  The enterprises tasked with carrying out these plans are themselves overwhelmingly state-
owned entities.  Government officials have marshaled the financial, technological and infrastructural 
resources to ensure that the plans have been carried out.  Foreign steel producers have frequently provided 
technical and financial support, enabling China to create world class steel. 
Financial support has been channeled to the steel industry primarily through the banking system, which is 
owned and controlled by the government of China.  The government sets interest rates at levels that are 
lower than would exist in a market economy, giving rise to an excess demand for credit.  Government 
officials direct the banks to channel their loans to enterprises and projects that are given priority in 
government plans.  Because steelmaking projects have enjoyed such priority, financing has seldom proven 
an obstacle to industry expansion.   
Many of China’s steel mills would have faced difficulties surviving without repeated bailouts and infusions 
of government financial support.  Billions of dollars of steel enterprises’ debts have been written off to 
equity, taxes have been forgiven and new loans extended.  Numerous so-called “debt-to-equity swaps” 
converted steel mill debts held by government banks into “equity” held by government asset management 
organizations.  Because in most cases the government had an ownership interest of 100 percent in the mills 
prior to the swaps, its ownership interest did not increase in these firms. 
The OCTG industry has benefited from all of the financial support measures applicable to the steel industry 
generally.  With one exception, all of the major OCTG producers are state-owned enterprises.  Outside of 
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Tianjin Pipe Group Corporation, a stand-alone pipe and tube producer specifically created by the 
government to end China’s import dependency in pipe and tube products, all of China’s principal OCTG 
producers are subsidiaries within steel industrial groups that have figured prominently in the five year 
plans of the central government and the five year plans of the governments of the regions in which they are 
located.   
The Chinese steel industry reportedly has been shielded from many of the competitive pressures that 
normally confront privately-owned enterprises operating in a market economy and relying on market-based 
commercial financing.  Prices have reportedly been stabilized through agreements among enterprises 
establishing output quotas and minimum prices.  Compliance with such arrangements has reportedly been 
enforced by the government, which threatened to cut off bank loans to enterprises that do not adhere to 
price and output controls.  In recent years China’s OCTG producers have reportedly met periodically to 
stabilize market prices and “avoid vicious competition.” 
 
The steel industry has also been protected from external competition.  The government of China has 
maintained the goal of replacing imported steel with domestic production since the mid-1980s and a 
succession of tax rebate measures has been implemented to create incentives for domestic users to favor 
domestic steel.  Imports have been restricted through non-transparent administration of an import licensing 
system, the existence of which has been denied by the Chinese government.  Imports have also reportedly 
been limited through government-to-government and industry-to-industry agreements establishing 
quantitative limits on Chinese steel imports.  In the OCTG subsector, the government’s efforts to replace 
imports with domestic production have been highly successful, with imports as a percent of domestic 
consumption plummeting from 82 percent in 1994 to 8 percent in 2006.  
Protection of enterprises from competition almost inevitably leads to excess capacity, particularly when 
coupled with subsidized, low-risk financing.  China’s principal steel enterprises do not confront investment 
risks that face private firms operating in normally functioning markets.  Rather, they have found that when 
they fall into a loss position and/or confront depressed prices, the state is likely to intervene to bail them 
out and to help them raise prices. 
China’s restraints on internal competition increase the risk of dumping in export markets.  Given the sheer 
size of China’s steel industry, the impact on international markets could be significant.  China’s steel 
exports have already begun to affect external markets, and China has in recent years agreed to limit its steel 
export volume to a number of major world markets, including the European Union and Korea.  Chinese 
steel producers have also reportedly been asked by their Japanese counterparts to restrict export volume to 
Japan and have given assurances that Chinese steel “will not massively flow” into Japan.  These measures 
could have a funneling effect on Chinese exports toward markets where such restrictions do not exist, such 
as the United States and Canada.  
While dramatic expansion of China’s OCTG capacity raises obvious concerns with competing foreign 
OCTG producers, it should also be raising concerns with Chinese policymakers.  Expansion on this scale, 
driven by government policy decisions, is not in China’s long run interest for several basic reasons:  
• Government-directed investment leads to major resource misallocation and acts as a drag on 
economic growth. 
• The creation of large-scale overcapacity results in the establishment of trade barriers abroad. 
• Domestic adjustment to overcapacity is a painful and potentially destabilizing process. 
• Excessive investments in heavy industrial sectors exacerbate environmental problems.  
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Excessive investments in heavy industries, which tend to produce a higher proportion of local pollutants 
and greenhouse gasses than other sectors, place an unnecessary burden on the environment in the regions 
where the investments take place.  This can ultimately spill over into domestic and international criticism  
The competitive equation: The effect of China’s policies 
 
a. Policies to which objection is less likely to be taken. 
 
Some government policies are unobjectionable – such as the promotion of STEM education.  Others will 
raise questions about their consistency with China's international obligations.  The impact of China’s 
promotional policies will differ dramatically by sector, and each major industry sector deserves individual 
consideration.  There are some bottom line judgments that can be made, however.   
 
As one of China's goals is to enhance the international competitive position of many of its pillar industries 
by attracting both foreign investment and technology, it is useful to consider whether China is being 
successful in this regard through its use of financial incentives.  Here the picture is mixed.  While many 
foreign companies have research facilities in China, presumably many R&D facilities are end-product 
design centers which are placed in China to be close to the companies' manufacturing plants.  These 
facilities are unlikely to generate core technologies.   
 
It is difficult to track transfer of technology.  Some transfers are no doubt negotiated as part of individual 
investment deals.  Some is just follow the movement of engineers from jobs in foreign companies to jobs 
with indigenous Chinese companies.  What one can track, through surveys, is the location of R&D 
expenditures by an industry.  In a study recently completed by our International Trade Group for the 
Semiconductor Industry Association, we found through our survey of major U.S. semiconductor producers 
that the growth in U.S. company R&D outlays was almost negligible in China over the last several years.  
The primary growth in these expenditures was in Europe (thought to be primarily Central Europe) and in 
"rest of world", which in this case did not include China. 
 
Even though the financial incentives were higher in China as a percent of R&D spending, the survey found 
that "the perceived inadequacy of intellectual property protection in China has limited U.S. industry R&D 
spending in that country significantly." Direct cash benefits did not overcome other locational factors.   
 
Most companies surveyed indicated that they would not locate their most advanced and critical 
R&D activities in China, despite encouragement and even pressure by the government to do so, 
and regardless of the availability quality and size of incentives, due to concerns about the 
inadequacy of intellectual property protection in that country.  While intellectual property 
protection issues occasionally arise in other jurisdictions, industry respondents indicated that in 
general sufficient safeguards could be devised to permit certain R&D activities to take place.  No 
jurisdiction other than China was identified as particularly problematic from this perspective.  
While most of the incentives in China consist of direct financial support, the tax treatment for 
R&D is favorable.  The Dewey Semiconductor R&D study notes that: 
 
Under China's law of taxation in effect in 2007, qualifying semiconductor manufacturers were 
entitled to receive a 5-year tax holiday with respect to corporate income tax beginning in the first 
year the business was profitable, and another 5 years of taxation at half the applicable rate 
pursuant to Several Policies to Encourage the Development of the Software and Integrated 
Circuit Industry (Circular 18, June 24, 2000).  Although a new Enterprise Income Tax Law came 
into effect in 2008, that law provides a five-year transition period for businesses receiving 
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preferential treatment under the old regime.  In addition, the new law provides that firms 
qualifying as high-technology companies are entitled to a permanent reduced rate of 15 percent.  
In addition, qualifying semiconductor manufacturers are entitled to a full exemption from income 
tax for five years from the first year of positive accumulated earnings and a 50 percent reduction 
for the following five years under the new law.  This combination of tax abatements has led 
Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation [not a U.S. company] which has been 
operating in China as its principal locus of operations since 2000 to disclose in 2007, “Our 
income tax obligations to date have been minimal.” 
 
This favorable treatment for investors is on top of a general corporate tax rate that is, as noted previously, 
lower than that in the United States, and a rate that has been decreasing over time.  Nevertheless, there is 
no significant allocation of the total U.S. semiconductor R&D being redirected to China. 
 
 There are a number of factors affecting the attractiveness of China as a destination for foreign 
direct investment.  In overall ranking of countries in terms of global-based innovation competitiveness, the 
Atkinson Study (Information Technology & Innovation Foundation, February 2009) using a wide variety 
of measures – including higher education, number of researchers, amount spent of corporate and 
government R&D venture capital, broadband deployment, business climate, FDI, GDP/adult, etc.— places 
the United States 6th and China 33rd.  But before complacency sets in among Americans, the Atkinson 
Study also notes that China, of the 40 countries (including the EU) reviewed, moved its score up most over 
the last decade and that the United States least.   
 
 Of the various general measures of where investment should be located, among the most telling, 
the U.S. ranks 5th in business climate and China ranks 36th.  This comports with our firm's study regarding 
location of American semiconductor R&D expenditures.  Availability of talent is a factor: Atkinson looks 
at the percent of the workforce (adults age 25-34) with graduate degrees – 39% for the U.S., 9% in the case 
of China.  This would be more compelling as an explanation were it not for the fact that China's population 
is 3.4 times that of the United States.  So in fact the absolute numbers in the adult workforce with advanced 
degrees in the two countries could be about the same.  In terms of availability of qualified workforce, the 
constraint in China may not necessarily be supply, although on this, the data is mixed.  Atkinson notes that 
in 2006 the United States had 9.7 researchers per 1,000 employed, while China had only 1.5.  (But the 
percent change for China for the period 1999-2006 was 111% while the gain for the United States was only 
8%.) 
 
With respect to semiconductors, as process R&D tends to be associated with place of production 
(this may well be true for other R&D-intensive industries as well), it is important to note that, overall, the 
share of worldwide wafer fabrication capacity in the United States has declined from 42 percent in 1980 to 
16 percent in 2007, reflecting the growth of indigenous semiconductor industries in several Asian 
countries.  China has increased its share of global production to about 8%, and the trend is clearly upward. 
 Location of fabrication facilities is closely linked to available financial incentives.  .   
 
 The Dewey & LeBoeuf study looked solely at U.S. semiconductor company placement of R&D, 
and while this may be a good proxy for foreign investment in China of R&D funds, it is not an indicator of 
Chinese company and government investment in R&D generally.  According to the Atkinson Study, in 
terms of corporate investments in R&D as a percent of GDP, the U.S. outranked China -- 1.7% to 1.0%, 
but it should be noted that China had increased its corporate R&D by 160% during this period while the 
U.S. figure had dropped by 5%.  Looking at government R&D as a percent of GDP (in 2006), Atkinson 
found the U.S ranked 4th at 0.76% with China in 19th place at 0.35% of GDP expended on R&D.  But 
China had increased its expenditure ratio for R&D by 20% in the seven years covered by the study, while 
the U.S. increased its investment in R&D by only 1%.  The bottom line is that China is improving its 
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position relative to the United States by many measures, although the United States has a substantial lead at 
present.   
 
 The likely policy response to the above-outlined Chinese policies is to match them or exceed 
them, not to complain of them.   
 
b. Policies of Concern. 
Break the technological monopoly of developed countries . . . . Assist domestic enterprises in 
obtaining information on international technology market. . . . .[S]upport and encourage them to 
apply for domestic and overseas patents for re-innovated technologies; (Issued by several 
ministries, Shang Fu Mao Fa [2006] No.13),  
There is a fair amount of transparency in China, dramatically better than it was ten years ago.  
This allows one to get a sense of a number of policies that should be of concern not only to foreign 
competitors seeking to sell in China, invest in China or who will be or are competing with Chinese goods 
in third country markets.  Some policy directions may well be harmful to Chinese development and China's 
goal of greatly increased "indigenous innovation" as well.  
 
 Among the policy tools that should be of greatest concern are: 
 
• The creation of exclusionary standards that can wall off the Chinese market, creating 
national champions that are not internationally competitive, potentially diminishing 
China's rate of GDP growth if Betamax-style standards impair the degree to which IT, for 
example can contribute to the rate of GDP growth.  To be enhance economic 
development, standards must be market-driven not market constraining.  
 
• An intellectual property system that frightens off multinational companies from 
developing the latest technologies in labs based in China while risking ending up 
fostering what is many cases may be second-tier indigenous technological development.   
 
• Potential use of the new antimonopoly law to protect domestic competitors rather than to 
enhance competition.   
 
• Subsidies that excessively distort trade and investment.  An example was the 
discriminatory VAT rebate for domestic manufacture of semiconductors which practice 
China terminated to be consistent with its WTO obligations.    
 
• The temptation to force technology transfer which causes companies to shy away from 
placing the latest technologies in China.  WAPI was one example.   
 
• Buy-Chinese policies to attempt to foster "indigenous innovation", placing a bet that a 
more SOE-like form of industrial organization might work. 
 
The bottom line 
 
China policy makers have to a surprising degree opened its economy to foreign investment and 
market forces and this has led to an extraordinary level of economic growth.  The central question going 
forward is whether China will opt for more state-planning in guiding investment and technology and 
whether this can be successful.  The United States is sometimes aware that in its own history, when it had a 
national goal, the manned-space flight program or the Manhattan project, for example, it could force the 
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pace of technological development and that this has had major commercial effects as well.  But the U.S. let 
the market direct the commercial outcomes.  Early semiconductor development is attributed to government 
support, but it is the commercial market that is driving technology today and has done so for decades. 
China must find an appropriate balance.  Walling itself off would prove not only contentious with its 
trading partners, on whose markets China must depend for prosperity and growth, but harm its continued 
development.   
 
 Much needs to be corrected about U.S. domestic policies in education and support for basic R&D. 
 There will be areas where the United States should be watching what China is doing, and perhaps re-
innovate (incrementally improve upon) what China has re-innovated of America's – and here I am thinking 
of research parks and emphasis on STEM education.  There are other initiatives some of which are outlined 
above that bear watching for other reasons because United States commercial interests may be seriously 
adversely affected, as may Chinese economic development and growth.    
  
The impact on the rest of the world of China’s enormous effort to move forward on so many 
fronts will be hard to gauge until the policies have been in place for some time.  As Mao was said to have 
replied when he was asked what he thought the impact of the French Revolution was, “It is too early to 
tell.”  It is not too early to tell what the impact is currently and is likely to be with respect to Chinese world 
market share of oil country tubular goods, for example.  It may not be too speculative as to what the effects 
are going to be of Chinese automobile production, just as an extrapolation of U.S. experience with Japan 
and Korea (even accounting for numerous differences among those countries).  What will happen with 
international competition in biotech, new energy products, software, other information technology 
products, large commercial aircraft and other areas of Chinese national priority?  Much depends on the 
policies chosen by China and the responses chosen by the United States.  Too little attention is being given 
by the U.S. government to these developments. 
 
I have found on more than one occasion that there is more pluralism among Chinese ministries 
and other parts of the Chinese policymaking process than one would expect.  A debate is possible in 
Beijing and in the provinces and municipalities between those seeking an autarkic path of development and 
those who still see an advantage in being a magnet for leading edge foreign investment and for more 
market-oriented solutions.  It would be a profound error to be absent from that debate. 
 
 
 HEARING COCHAIR SLANE:  Thank you,  Mr.  Wolff .    
 Dr .  Haley.  
 
STATEMENT OF GEORGE T.  HALEY, PhD 
PROFESSOR & DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL 
INDUSTRY COMPETITIVENESS,  COLLEGE OF BUSINESS,  
UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAVEN, NEW HAVEN, CONNECTICUT 
 
 DR.  HALEY:  I 'd  l ike  to  thank the  commiss ioners ,  the  
Commiss ion,  i t s  cochai rs ,  Messrs .  Pat r ick  Mul loy and Danie l  Slane ,  
and the  Commiss ion s taf f  for  the  oppor tuni ty  to  present  th is  tes t imony 
today.  
 The ques t ions  before  the  Commiss ion are  impor tant  to  the  fu ture  
economic  wel l -being of  the  Uni ted  Sta tes .   In  th is  s ta tement ,  I ' l l  
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address  what  the  Chinese  p i l la r  indust r ies  inc lude ,  d iscuss  the  impact  
of  pol icy ,  and analyze  the i r  compet i t ive  effec ts  and ramif ica t ions  for  
U.S.  compet i t iveness .  
 P i l la r  indust r ies  are  chosen on the  bas is  of  four  cr i te r ia :  they ' re  
whether  an  indust ry  contr ibutes  to  defense ,  to  job  crea t ion ,  to  
technology acquis i t ion ,  or  to  compet i t ive  advantage .  
 The fo l lowing 16 indust r ies  const i tu te  p i l la r  indust r ies  for  China  
as  promulgated  in  China 's  Tenth  and 11th  Five-Year  Plans :  
 Aerospace;  autos  and auto  par ts ;  banking and insurance;  
b io technology;  computer  chip  des ign and manufacture ;  comput ing and 
computer  hardware;  informat ion technology;  i ron  and s tee l ;  logis t ics ,  
sh ipping and s torage;  machinery  and mechanical  equipment ;  o i l  and 
pet rochemicals ;  sof tware ;  te lecommunicat ions  and te lecom equipment ;  
u t i l i t ies  and power  equipment ;  wholesa l ing  and re ta i l ing;  and the  
bui ld ing of  s t ra tegic  brand equi ty .  
 The cent ra l  government  offers  specia l  incent ives  for  fore ign 
companies  to  enter  China  in  some of  the  p i l la r  indust r ies .   For  
ins tance ,  autos  and auto  par ts ,  te lecom equipment ,  b io technology,  
computer  chip  des ign and manufacture .  
 In  many indust r ies ,  provincia l  and local  munic ipal  governments  
a lso  offer  incent ives .   The government  of  Shenzhen,  for  ins tance ,  i s  
of fer ing ten  b i l l ion  yuan in  subs id ies  to  informat ion technology 
indust ry .  
 In  some ins tances ,  such as  s tee l ,  the  logis t ics ,  sh ipping and 
s torage  indust ry ,  and more  recent ly  in  the  acquis i t ion  of  leading 
brands ,  fore ign companies  exper ience  barr iers  and regula tory  obs tac les  
to  ent ry .  
 China 's  suppor t  of  i t s  p i l la r  indust r ies  has  had dramat ic  ef fec ts  
on  U.S.  indust r ies  and the  U.S.  economy.   S tee l  indust ry  i s  an  indust ry  
which China  began inves t ing  in  ear l ier  than most .   Hence ,  Table  2  
f rom my wri t ten  s ta tement  which focuses  on the  s tee l  indust ry  provides  
a  lens  to  unders tand the  ef fec ts  tha t  China 's  pol ic ies  and i t s  p i l la r  
indust r ies  are  now having and wi l l  have  in  the  fu ture .  
 From 2003 to  2007,  per iods  of  economic  growth in  both  U.S.  and 
China ,  U.S.  s tee l  product ion grew f rom 93.7  mi l l ion  metr ic  tons  to  
97.2 .   China 's  s tee l  product ion,  on  the  o ther  hand,  more  than doubled 
f rom 222.3  mi l l ion  metr ic  tons  to  489 mi l l ion .  
 In  2008,  China 's  product ion grew addi t ional ly  to  502 mi l l ion  
metr ic  tons ,  th is  even though China 's  economic  growth ra te  shrank 
substant ia l ly .  
 Addi t ional ly ,  Chinese  s tee l  expor ts  to  the  Uni ted  Sta tes  have  
increased dramat ica l ly .   In  2008,  Chinese  s tee l  expor ts  to  the  U.S.  
were  20 t imes  what  they were  in  2003.  
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 Converse ly ,  U.S.  s tee l  indust ry  employment  fe l l  f rom 108,200 
employees  to  97,540 in  2007,  or  by  10,660 employees ,  which is  9 .9  
percent  of  the  workforce .  
 With  the  s tee l  indust ry 's  mul t ip l ier  of  3 .3 ,  tha t  means  tha t  
35 ,178 U.S.  workers  los t  the i r  jobs .  
 Labor  cos ts  cannot  expla in  th is  t rend.   Whi le  Chinese  hour ly  
labor  cos ts  are  1 /20th  of  the  Uni ted  Sta tes  in  the  s tee l  indust ry ,  U.S.  
s tee lworkers  are  12 t imes  more  product ive .    
 Transpor t  cos ts  to  the  U.S.  more  than make up for  the  
d i f ferent ia l .   Where  labor  cos ts  are  a  major  fac tor ,  U.S.  companies  wi l l  
not  be  able  to  compete .   Where  they are  minor  fac tors  such as  in  the  
s tee l  indust ry ,  they wi l l  suffer  the  same fa te  as  the  s tee l  indust ry .  
 China 's  pol ic ies  wi l l  l imi t  the  growth of  U.S.  indust r ies ,  l imi t  
the  growth and creat ion of  U.S.  jobs ,  and l imi t  U.S.  indust r ies  to  
h igher  va lue-added products  and to  those  where  perceived qual i ty  i s  a  
deciding fac tor  in  the  purchase  decis ion.  
 Chinese  banks  are  used by the  government  in  var ious  ways .   
They provide  low cos t  loans  to  both  bus inesses  and consumers .   For  
example ,  low cost  consumer  loans  are  now being offered  for  the  
purchase  of  automobi les  wi th  1 .6  l i te r  engines  and smal ler .  
 They ' re  being offered  to  farmers  for  the  purchase  of  vehic les  
wi th  engines  smal ler  than 1 .3  l i te rs .    
 They supplement  the  government  spending.   The government  i s  
only  funding 25 percent  of  i t s  economic  s t imulus  p lan ,  for  ins tance .   
Banks  and local  governments  are  funding the  balance .   Banks  were  a lso  
ordered to  make f ive  t r i l l ion  yuan or  $732 bi l l ion  in  new loans  to  
suppor t  the  economic  recovery  p lan .  
   Other  ways  tha t  Chinese  companies  benef i t  a re  through tax  
rebates ,  fac i l i ta t ion  of  government  expor t  documenta t ion ,  government  
subs id ies  of  normal  bus iness  expenses  l ike  research,  qual i ty  contro l ,  
product  and technology development ,  subs id ized energy cos ts ,  
government-engineered indust ry  consol idat ion ,  share  pr ice  
s tabi l iza t ion ,  and subsidiza t ion  of  grand equi ty  bui ld ing ef for ts .  
 Chinese  pol ic ies  wi l l  a ffec t  g lobal  markets .   Global  markets  wi l l  
have  an  overa l l  reduct ion  in  pr ice ,  but  t remendous  pr ice  ins tabi l i ty  
wi l l  occur  due  to  government  pol ic ies  and changes  in  them.  
 Subsidized const ruct ion  of  excess  capaci ty  wi l l  cause  severe  
pr ice  compet i t ion  and force  consol idat ion  and c losures  wi th in  non-
Chinese  indust r ies ,  provoking job losses  inherent  in  such ac t ions ,  and 
per iodic  skyrocket ing of  cos ts  for  raw mater ia ls ,  commodi t ies ,  and 
inputs  to  indust r ies ,  as  has  happened in  recent  years  wi th  i ron  ore ,  
coal ,  o i l  and gra ins .  
 Only  two days  ago,  the  Financia l  Times  repor ted  tha t  s tockpi l ing  
21
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
of  copper  by China  Sta te  Reserves  Bureau has  dr iven up copper  pr ices  
by 35 percent  in  the  las t  three  months .  
 The U.S.  wi l l  be  compet i t ive  in  some indust r ies ,  but  only  i f  
severa l  changes  are  made to  U.S.  indust ry  and pol icy .   There  wi l l  have  
to  be  substant ia l  consol idat ion  in  U.S.  indust r ies .   I t  must  occur  to  
gain  economies  of  sca le  to  match Chinese  sca le  and help  offse t  
Chinese  subsid ies  and pol ic ies .  
 Substant ia l  inves tment  must  occur  in  product  and process  
innovat ion.   Ver t ica l  in tegra t ion  up the  supply  chain  must  occur  to  
cont ro l  cos ts  and increase  re l iabi l i ty  of  supply .   The market  must  
perceive  qual i ty  advantages  in  the  U.S.  products .   
 Changes  take  p lace  in  t radi t ional  U.S.  government  pol ic ies  such 
as  ant i t rus t  and the  acceptabi l i ty  of  col labora t ion  between compet i tors  
in  the  same indust ry .   And the  market  perce ives  a  brand equi ty  
advantage  in  the  U.S.  product .  
 In  summary,  g iven the  extent  of  Chinese  subsid ies  and suppor t  
for  i t s  p i l la r  indust r ies  and leading brands ,  U.S.  indust ry  wi l l  face  
substant ia l  d i f f icul ty  compet ing in  low labor  input  indust r ies  and be  
unable  to  compete  in  h igh labor  input  indust r ies .   US.  jobs  wi l l  be  los t .  
 U.S.  indust r ies  and consumers  wi l l  be  faced wi th  genera l ly  lower  
pr ices ,  but  per iodic  bouts  of  severe  pr ice  ins tabi l i ty ,  especia l ly  in  raw 
mater ia l  and commodi ty  cos ts .  
 F inal ly ,  as  more  Chinese  brands  become c lass i f ied  as  leading 
brands ,  U.S.  companies  wi l l  be  prevented  f rom enter ing increas ingly  
large  por t ions  of  the  Chinese  economy.  
 [The s ta tement  fo l lows:]  
 
Prepared Statement  of  George T.  Haley,  PhD 
Professor  & Director ,  Center  for  Internat ional  Industry 
Competi t iveness ,  Col lege  Of  Business ,  Univers i ty  of  New Haven,  
New Haven,  Connect icut  
 
I thank the Commission, its Co-Chairs, Messrs. Patrick Mulloy and Daniel Slane, and the Commission’s 
staff for the opportunity to present this testimony today. 
The questions before the Commission today are important to the future economic wellbeing of the United 
States.  In this statement, I will address what the Chinese pillar industries include, discuss the impact of 
policy, and analyze their competitive effects and ramifications for U.S. competitiveness 
The Pillar Industries: 
What pillar or strategic industries has China currently chosen to support? What criteria did China use to 
choose these Industries?  Does the government of China offer special incentives to attract foreign 
investment to build such industries? 
 
China chooses pillar or strategic industries on the following criteria: 
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• Defense 
• Job creation 
• Technology acquisition 
• Competitive advantage 
 
Several industries fall under more than one criterion.  Table 1 lists the pillar industries under their different 
criteria, and in some instances, under more than one criterion.  The following industries constitute pillar or 
strategic industries for China as promulgated in China’s 10th and 11th five year plans: 
 
? Aerospace 
? Autos & auto parts 
? Banking & insurance 
? Bio-technology 
? Computer chip design & manufacture 
? Computing & computer hardware 
? Information technology 
? Iron & steel 
? Logistics, shipping and storage 
? Machinery and mechanical equipment 
? Oil & petrochemicals 
? Software 
? Telecommunications & telecom equipment 
? Utilities & power equipment 
? Wholesaling & retailing 
? Strategic brand equity 
 
In addition to standard subsidies such as direct cash transfers to no-cost loans, etc., the central government 
has started offering subsidies in support of brand equity or support to specific brands of products.  The 
central government does offer special incentives for foreign companies to enter China in some of the pillar 
industries, for instance autos & auto parts, telecom equipment, bio-technology, information technology and 
computer chip design & manufacture.  In many instances, provincial and local municipal governments 
offer incentives.  In some instances, such as with the steel industry and the logistics, shipping and storage 
industries, and more recently in the acquisition of leading brands, foreign companies experience barriers 
and regulatory obstacles to entry. 
 
Policy Impact: 
What impact has China’s support of its pillar industries had on U.S. industries and the U.S. economy?  
How are state-owned banks used to support China’s industrial policy?  How do state-owned enterprises 
benefit from Chinese industrial policies? 
 
The impact of Chinese governmental support has been varied and in some instances, quite dramatic.  Table 
2, which focuses on the steel industry, provides a lens for understanding these impacts.  From 2003 to 
2007, a period of economic growth in the U.S., especially in the construction industry, U.S. domestic steel 
production increased from 93.7 million metric tons to 97.2 million.  When the recession hit in December 
2007, 2008 U.S. production dropped to 91.5 million.  The period from 2003 through 2007 also constituted 
a period of economic growth in China, and once again, especially in the construction industry.  However 
growth in Chinese capacity and production of steel far outstripped growth in demand.  Chinese steel 
production between 2003 and 2007 more than doubled from 222.3 million metric tons to 489 million, with 
double digit growth in each year.  With the onslaught of the worldwide recession, growth moderated 
23
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
substantially downward to 2.6 percent, but Chinese steel production rose to 502 million metric tons, 
regardless of the fact that the Chinese construction industry’s growth has slumped to 7.1 percent, little 
more than half its growth rate of 2006, and not nearly enough to offset the growth in steel making capacity. 
  
 
Table 2 also presents the extraordinary growth in Chinese steel exports to the U.S.  Chinese steel exports to 
the U.S. in 2008 were twenty times its exports to the U.S. in 2003. Differences in relative labor costs 
between the two countries cannot explain this growth in exports. Though Chinese labor costs per hour in 
the steel industry are roughly one twentieth that of U.S. labor, labor represents only about ten percent of 
the total costs for steel.  [Haley, U.C.V. (2008) Shedding light on energy subsidies in China:  An analysis 
of China’s steel industry from 2000-2007, Alliance for American Manufacturing.]  Additionally, U.S. labor 
productivity in the steel industry is 12.1 times the labor productivity in the Chinese steel industry.  Finally, 
Table 2 demonstrates that from 2003 to 2007, the U.S. steel industry lost 10,660 employees, or 9.9 percent 
of its workforce.  Given the steel industry’s job multiplier of 3.3, this represents a total loss to the economy 
of 35,178 jobs.   
 
Chinese banks advance governmental policy in a number of ways.  Presently, China’s banks reinforce the 
government’s effort to reignite the economy in two ways.  First, Chinese banks have the government-
mandated goal of providing a minimum of 5,000 billion Yuan (US$731.6 billion) in new loans.  Second, 
the government looks to the banks for a significant amount of the funding for its 4 trillion Yuan (US$585 
billion) stimulus package.  The Beijing government will fund only one quarter of the stimulus package, and 
local governments and banks will fund the balance.  Additionally, when it wants to stimulate a specific 
industry, such as autos, the government instructs the banks to offer extremely low-cost loans.  In the late 
1990’s and early part of this decade, China stimulated the growth in the auto industry, and thus the growth 
of foreign direct investment from Western and Japanese auto companies, in this fashion.  When the 
government later decided to raise interest rates, Western companies could not meet sales or profitability 
projections.  Today, China has decided on a policy of stimulating sales of vehicles with small engines, less 
than 1.6 litres, and is offering low-interest loans, the elimination of a five-percent vehicle-buying tax, and 
for farmers buying trucks or cars with engines of 1.3 litres or less, additional subsidies of 5 billion Yuan 
($730 million) payable in lump-sum amounts, have been allocated.  These subsidies and tax rebates are 
over and above the subsidies and other support measures the government is giving its auto companies 
during the present economic crisis. 
 
The Chinese government has often subsidized state-owned enterprises without having the subsidies tracked 
to operating companies’ books. Common practices include transferring the state-owned enterprise’s best 
assets to an operating company subsidiary which then lists on a Chinese stock exchange.  When the 
government decides that a company requires a subsidy, it makes a direct cash transfer, or a low-cost bank 
loan to the unlisted parent company, which then transfers the funds to its listed subsidiary.  In this way, the 
subsidy never appears on the listed company’s books.  
 
State-owned enterprises benefit in many other ways.  The State Council has allocated 10 billion Yuan ($1.5 
billion) in special funds to the auto industry over the next three years to support technology innovation, and 
the development of new-energy and electric vehicles and their parts.  In addition, while not indicating the 
amount of funding, the State Council also announced that it would speed up the building of bases for the 
export of autos, support the building of brand equity and recognition of Chinese auto companies, and 
mandate a general enhancement of credit arrangements for the purchase of autos (January 14, 2009). 
 
Examples of other benefits include the stabilization of share prices by the State-owned Assets Supervision 
and Administration Commission (SASAC); industry consolidation plans developed, mandated and 
supervised by SASAC (logistics, storage and shipping industry); funding of capital asset projects (utilities 
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and power industry); funding of technology development and quality enhancement projects (auto, 
aerospace, bio-technology, steel and telecommunications industries, among others); and funding, 
regulatory support and cultural pressure (by naming them “time honored brands”) in support of brand 
building for specified Chinese products both overseas and domestically (autos - Chery, appliances - Haier, 
computers - Lenovo, liquor - Maotai, candy – White Rabbit Milk Candy, and a host of other products). 
 
American companies will still be able to compete in many industries globally; however, their market 
shares, costs, profitability and employment levels will be affected.  Questions will arise on the long-term 
viability of some second-tier companies.  The U.S. is not a low-cost producer.  To be competitive, U.S. 
companies must contend on the basis of quality and brand equity.  Hence, the Chinese government’s efforts 
to subsidize technology acquisition, quality control and brand equity constitute direct attacks on the U.S. 
companies’ market positions and competitive advantages.  This, in concert with the Chinese government’s 
naming the wholesaling and retailing industries together with the logistics, storage and shipping industry as 
pillar industries, and moving to consolidate them into more efficient cross-nodal logistics and 
transportation giants, raises grave concerns.  Competitive advantages of distribution and channel 
management often pose the most formidable challenges for companies to overcome.  The Chinese 
government’s industrial policies have focused on the backbone of the value chain and distribution channel. 
 Efficiency in the value chain and distribution channels will give Chinese companies significant advantages 
in China’s export markets that it does not presently have, and may deny U.S. companies equal access to 
Chinese markets.  This same issue created a difficult competitive environment for many U.S. companies in 
Japan. 
 
Competitive Effects: 
How are China’s industrial policies likely to affect global markets and American competitiveness?  What 
developments can we expect to see over the next five years? 
 
China’s policies will probably contribute to severe disruption in global markets.  Though the Chinese 
policies tend to reduce consumer prices, they do so in anti-competitive fashions.  The use of government 
subsidies to control costs in Chinese industry, and to promote the acquisition of competitive advantages in 
brands and technology, creates situations where foreign companies cannot compete and are forced into 
closure. 
 
The global steel industry reflects the effects of Chinese industrial policies.  Due to the tremendous 
overbuilding of capacity and significant government subsidies from both central and local authorities, 
China is dominating world trade and production in steel.  Over twenty U.S. steel companies have closed 
down operations, creating over 50,000 lost jobs in the U.S. alone.  Globally and in the U.S., the steel 
industry has entered a period of consolidation that has caused more job losses as companies shed 
employees that have become superfluous.  Chinese policies have also lead to Chinese auto-production 
capacity burgeoning to more than twice Chinese demand.  To make profits, Chinese and foreign producers 
alike in China have to export and to fight for global market share.  U.S. producers have slashed prices, cut 
U.S. based capacity and shifted production and employment overseas to remain price competitive.   
 
Over the next five years, the story should repeat globally in the other targeted industries.  The government 
is encouraging Chinese companies to increase capacity and skills in desired product-markets of all the 
pillar industries.  Chinese building of chip fabs has contributed to a growing overcapacity in chip 
production, accentuated by the present world-wide recession, which has hit the computer industry and its 
suppliers particularly hard.   The central and local governments’ incentives to draw investment and to build 
local competitors in the pillar industries, generally also build significant excess capacity. The excess 
capacity in turn forces both Chinese and global markets into severe price competition, creates razor-thin 
margins, and shifts competitive advantage to China and other countries willing to subsidize significantly 
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their industries.  The government is investing heavily in building brand equity for Chinese brands.  
However, I do not believe these efforts will have significant effects within five years, given the 
government’s inability to enforce quality and safety standards on many Chinese manufacturers.  I do 
believe that in the longer term, the Chinese government’s brand-building efforts will pose a significant 
threat to American interests in particular, due to the position of our products in world markets.   Though 
not true in all product markets, generally, customers see American brands as more mass-market than 
European and Japanese brands.  This market position makes U.S. products more vulnerable to Chinese 
brand building than their European and Japanese counterparts. 
 
U.S. Competitiveness: 
Will U.S. companies be able to compete with Chinese state-owned companies that are able to tap 
government resources – including tax abatements, discounted land purchases, low-rate financing, and 
other subsidies?  What role does forced technology transfer from U.S. to Chinese companies play in 
China’s industrial policy? 
 
U.S. companies can compete in some industries and market segments. However, the companies will have 
to initiate significant changes in industry structure, in their corporate strategy (focusing on innovation, 
especially process innovation), possibly in U.S. government policy, and their margins for error will be 
razor thin.  The steel industry, an industry that the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
took an early interest in developing, provides a good template for the future. 
 
The Chinese government has invested heavily in developing its steel industry since the 1990’s.  As has 
been demonstrated in several studies by both independent researchers and the International Trade 
Commission (ITC), China’s steel industry has been the recipient of significant subsidies and other 
government support.  Hence the steel industry provides a good starting point for investigating what 
companies from the U.S. and other industrialized countries must do if they are to survive, if not prosper, in 
the face of a Chinese onslaught.  
 
Industry structure:  The steel industry provides examples of the structural changes in response to global, 
mostly Chinese, competition over the past ten to fifteen years.  First, tremendous consolidation has 
occurred in both the U.S. and global steel industry.  Globally, steel giants of previously unimaginable size, 
such as Arcelor-Mittal, have arisen.  In the U.S., three giants dominate the steel industry - US Steel, Nucor, 
and Arcelor-Mittal’s U.S. subsidiary.  However, the U.S. giants are medium-sized by global standards, 
each less than 1/5th the size of Arcelor-Mittal, and less than 2/3d the size of each of the next three largest 
steel companies.  US Steel is smaller than four different Chinese steel companies, Nucor smaller than five. 
 Table 3 lists the 15 largest steel companies with their production capacity.  To compete globally, further 
consolidation is desirable among U.S. steel companies.   
 
Second, both product and process innovation have surged.  Companies have developed super-light, super-
strong steels and introduced these products into new vehicles.  Super-light, super-strong steel allows the 
auto industry to replace more costly aluminum in autos, producing a lower-cost, structurally stronger 
vehicle with the same enhanced fuel efficiency achieved with aluminum.  In the U.S., a joint research 
program between the American Iron and Steel Institute, the U.S. Army and Ford Motors developed the 
super-strong, super-light steel.  However, Australia achieved much the same through a pre-competitive 
cooperative agreement, where companies in the same industries collaborate on research to develop 
technologies that are more costly or riskier than a single company can reasonably afford.  Thus, the 
industry can focus on research crucial to its survival, but not necessarily of immediate interest to elements 
of national defense.  Recognizing the success and potential threat of such strategies, China’s State Council 
has declared that it will allocate special funds in its capital budget to promote the steel industry’s 
technological progress, adjust its product mix, and raise the quality of Chinese steel (January 14, 2009).  
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Third, the steel industry around the world has attempted to gain direct control over supply of raw materials 
to control costs.  Lakshmi Mittal has pointed to acquisition of raw materials as a primary goal of Arcelor-
Mittal, as have Tata-Corus and the Chinese companies and government.  Raw material costs have 
fluctuated wildly for much of the past decade, with demand and prices increasing significantly due to 
China’s, and more recently, also to India’s economic growth.  By controlling sources of their own raw 
materials such as iron ore and coal, steel companies can reduce their costs and risk of doing business.  
Mexico’s HYLSA (now owned by Techint of Argentina), which controls its own mines, and which for the 
last 15 years of its independence, had been the most profitable steel company in North America, provides a 
good example of the benefits of vertical integration. 
 
Logistics, storage and shipping:  These services form the backbone of value chains and distribution.  
Recognizing their importance to competitive advantage, SASAC has declared its determination to 
consolidate its logistics industry to make it much more efficient.  It manifested this determination when in 
July of 2008 it consolidated over twenty logistics and trading companies under the umbrella of one of its 
asset-management corporations, the China Chengtong Group.  SASAC places enormous importance on 
gaining efficiency and competitive advantage in logistical systems. Indeed, China Chengtong is one of the 
first two asset management corporations that SASAC created; the other is the State Development 
Investment Corporation (SDIC).  The SDIC manages SASAC’s holdings in power, coal and fertilizers.  
Prior to this merger of logistics and trading companies, SASAC had arranged the merger of three shipping 
companies (in April, 2008).  With these mergers, among others, the number of companies that the national 
(Beijing) SASAC oversees drops to 130. 
 
Innovation and technology:  U.S. companies will have to engage in constant product and process 
innovations just to survive, as they will not be able to compete on price.  As has been mentioned several 
times, the PRC is investing heavily in technological innovation and quality enhancement in virtually all of 
its pillar industries.   With much of their R&D expenses paid for by the government, a major element in the 
cost of new products and technologies is being minimized for Chinese companies.  The development and 
design of a new auto costs Western auto companies anywhere from 2 ½ to 7 billion dollars.  When the 
Chinese government covers the Chinese companies’ quality and technological enhancement costs, it 
subsidizes the costs involved in making an auto suitable for global markets.   
 
Brand equity:  The PRC government and SASAC have recognized the importance and the power of 
branding.  A recognized, high quality brand name provides one of the greatest competitive advantages a 
company can develop.  Beijing has established a China Branding Strategy Committee to coordinate the 
governmental efforts to boost recognition of Chinese brands.  Sun Bo, the Director of the Quality 
Management Department of the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine 
recognized the economic value of brands when he said, “Branding is a decisive factor in the world’s 
economic development, and in some cases, an established world brand’s overall value is even bigger than 
that of a middle-sized country.”  [Xie Chuanjiao, December 21, 2006, China Daily.]   The government 
started its efforts to build a brand friendly business environment in China in 2001.  Preliminary efforts 
dealt with educating business persons to recognize their competitors’ copyrights, and went on to establish 
rankings of over 6000 branded Chinese products.  The government has created a system whereby 
companies can apply for favored status for their brands.  Beijing has declared some entirely domestic 
brands as “time-honored brands” making them cultural icons of the Chinese people.  Favored brands that 
are also being exported, garner governmental support through export-tax rebates and facilitation of their 
export paperwork and documentation.  In a recent policy statement (March 9, 2009), the Chinese 
government put on par the direct financial support for the export of favored, branded products with the 
support it gives to high-tech and agricultural products. Coca-Cola’s recently (March 2009) failed attempted 
to acquire Huiyuan, a Hong Kong listed company that boasts a 42 percent share of the domestic market in 
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pure fruit juices, illustrates the importance of brand equity for China: China’s Ministry of Commerce did 
not want Coca-Cola to acquire the brand rights of Huiyuan and expressed concerns about the loss of a 
leading brand.  
 
Government policy:  Historically, U.S. government policy has sought to limit its major companies’ size 
and monopoly power, and to prevent cooperative arrangements between manufacturers in their strategic 
activities.  To compete against huge Chinese companies supplemented by Chinese government subsidies 
and other supportive policies, U.S. companies will either have to acquire equal size, compete on brand 
equity, compete on significantly superior product quality or technology, or focus on small market 
segments.  U.S. major companies will have to become at least as large as their Chinese competitors to 
attain equal economies of scale and to minimize price differentials.  They would need to offset as much as 
possible the Chinese companies’ additional advantages in subsidies and government support through 
superior management and productivity.  Unless they develop truly significant cost reductions through 
innovations in production processes, they are unlikely to compete on price.  U.S. industry will have to rely 
on superior quality and technology because of the Chinese industries’ habitual tendencies to overbuild 
capacity and to drive down prices through over supply at the products’ larger, mass-market segments.  To 
do this, the government must establish policies to encourage R&D, especially production-process R&D, or 
face the prospect of continuing job losses in industry after industry. 
 
Conclusions: 
The margin for error for U.S. companies will become slimmer, and the potential for error will significantly 
increase.  Thus risks of failure and job losses will become far greater.  Research has shown that business 
competitiveness drawing exclusively on research and innovation becomes riskier as difficulties arise in 
developing the right products for markets.  U.S. companies will also have difficulty competing in industries 
where the market cannot perceive, or does not value, differences in quality between U.S. and Chinese 
goods. Under those circumstances, U.S. companies cannot compete on any basis with China’s heavily 
subsidized industries.  Industries where the U.S. is presently highly competitive, pharmaceuticals, 
processed foods, electronics and agricultural goods, are industries where consumers have difficulty 
discerning quality. Consequently, Chinese industrial policies on pillar industries will probably affect these 
industries.  
 
Direct subsidies to Chinese industries hinder U.S. companies’ abilities to compete in mass markets where 
low price constitutes the primary strategy.  These direct Chinese subsidies combine with indirect Chinese 
subsidies to utilities and other industrial suppliers, as has occurred with Chinese power companies.  On 
February 23, 2009, for example, SASAC allocated 12.67 billion Yuan ($1.9 billion) to five power 
companies.  Its stated reasons included providing assistance to the power companies to support disaster 
reconstruction.  However, opportunity costs come into play and if the government funds construction of 
new facilities in disaster-affected areas, capital for other building projects becomes more feasible. The 
government’s funding policies reduce the power companies’ costs across the board, and hence allow the 
power companies to pass on those reduced costs to all its customers.   Another recent directive issued by 
SASAC on December 26, 2008, indicated that SASAC would require that power companies provide at 
least 50 percent of the capital for new projects.  Previously, in a clear indication of just how heavily 
subsidized they were, state-owned power companies provided as little as 2 percent of the investment for 
new projects.  The new state-owned capital management budget appropriated 54.78 billion Yuan ($7.7 
billion) for capital investment and management, of which 27 billion Yuan ($3.8 billion) funds new projects 
and complements key state-owned enterprises’ capital.  Once again, because of chain cost reductions, these 
subsidies to supplier industries, such as the power industry, help not only the state-owned enterprises that 
directly receive the funds, but their customers as well, and harm the interests of U.S.-based producers and 
workers. 
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Table 1 
Pillar Industries by Chinese Governmental Criteria 
 
Defense & Security     Job Creation 
Aerospace      Auto & Auto parts 
Computer chip design & manufacture  Computer chip design & manufacture 
Computing & computer hardware   Iron & steel  
Iron & steel      Machinery & mechanical devices 
Oil & petrochemicals     Information technology  
Software       
 
Technology & Skill Acquisition   Competitive Advantage 
Bio-technology     Logistics, shipping & storage 
Computer chip design & manufacture  Banking & Insurance 
Computing & computer hardware   Brand equity 
Information technology    Machinery & mechanical equipment 
Software      Wholesaling & retail 
Telecommunications     Utilities & power equipment 
 
 
Table 2 
Steel Production   in Millions of Tonnes* 
 
 US Annual    China     Annual       World Annual        US Steel Ind. US 
Imports 
  Change         Change   Change        Employment from 
China** 
2008 91.5  - 6.8 %     502     + 2.6 %        1,329.7 - 1.2 %    N/A  7,449.5 
2007 97.2 - 1.4 %     489     + 15.7 %      1,345.6 + 7.6 %    97,540  4,357.8 
2006 98.5 + 3.8 %     418.8     + 18.5 %      1250.4 + 10.0 %   95,350  4,199.7 
2005 93.9 - 5.8 %     349.4     + 24.6 %      1136.5 + 6.3 %    94,510  2,153.7 
2004 99.7 + 6.4 %     280.4     + 26.1 %      1068.9 +10.2 %    96,620  1,866.6 
2003 93.7  + 2.2 %     222.3     + 22.4 %        970.0 + 7.3 %  100,210     371.4 
2002 91.6 + 1.7 %     182.2     + 22.4            904.1 + 7.6 %  108,200     369.8 
2001 90.1      148.9               839.9   
*Source:  SteelontheNet; J. G. Trench (2004); China Daily on Line; World Steel Association; US Census 
Bureau 
**in $100,000’s US 
 
 
Table 3 
The Largest Steel Companies, 2008 
 
1. 116.4 Mton ArcelorMittal (Global)  
2. 35.7 Mton Nippon Steel (Japan)  
3. 34.0 Mton JFE (Japan)  
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4. 31.1 Mton POSCO (South Korea)  
5. 28.6 Mton Shanghai Baosteel Group Corporation (China)  
6. 26.6 Mton Tata Steel (India / Global)  
7. 23.6 Mton LiaoNing An-Ben Iron and Steel Group (China)  
8. 22.9 Mton Shagang Group (China)  
9. 22.8 Mton HeBei Tangshan Iron & Steel Group (China)  
10. 21.5 Mton United States Steel Corporation (United States)  
11. 20.2 Mton Wuhan Iron and Steel (China)  
12. 20.0 Mton Nucor Corporation (United States)  
13. 18.6 Mton Gerdau (Brazil)  
14. 17.9 Mton Gruppo Riva (Italy)  
15. 17.3 Mton Severstal (Russia)  
Source:  World Steel Association 
 
 HEARING COCHAIR SLANE:  Thank you,  Dr .  Haley.  
 Mr.  Pres towi tz .  
 
 
STATEMENT OF MR. CLYDE V.  PRESTOWITZ 
PRESIDENT, ECONOMIC STRATEGY INSTITUTE 
WASHINGTON, DC 
 
 MR.  PRESTOWITZ:   Thank you.   Let  me add my thanks  a lso  to  
the  Commiss ion for  i t s  invi ta t ion  to  tes t i fy ,  and le t  me a lso  
congratu la te  the  Commiss ion on the  f ine  work tha t  i t  has  been doing.  
 Recent ly ,  I  was  in  China  a t  a  banquet ,  and my seatmate  a t  the  
table  and I  were  d iscuss ing the  aerospace  indust ry ,  and he  expla ined to  
me that  in  the  fu ture ,  China  would  not  be  buying a i rp lanes  f rom 
Boeing,  and I  asked why?   And he  sa id ,  wel l ,  because  China  wi l l  make 
them i t se l f .  
 And that  led  to  a  d iscuss ion in  which he  made the  comment  tha t  
China  i s  a  b ig  country  wi th  a  lo t  of  resources ,  and i t  can  make 
everything.   And I  was  s t ruck by the  compar ison wi th  ear l ie r  
conversa t ions  I 'd  had in  Japan years  ago when the  Japanese  would  say  
tha t  they were  a  smal l  country  and wi th  no natura l  resources  and they 
had to  expor t  to  l ive ,  and therefore ,  they had to  make pre t ty  much 
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everything,  too .  
 I  was  th inking,  wel l ,  in  Asia ,  i f  you ' re  smal l  you 've  got  to  make 
everything,  and i f  you ' re  b ig ,  you got  to  make everything.   This  i s  by  
way of  saying that  what  we 're  see ing in  China  i s  not  new.  
 We've  seen the  adopt ion,  beginning wi th  Japan in  the  1950s  and 
then proceeding wi th  the  Asian  Tigers ,  Korea ,  Taiwan,  Singapore ,  and 
now we 're  a t  the  las t  Tiger  or  maybe the  Dragon wi th  China .  
 Al l  of  them have adopted so-cal led  "ca tch-up"  expor t - led  growth 
s t ra tegies  which have  common character is t ics .   They a l l  focus  on p i l la r  
indust r ies .   In  Japan,  they ca l l  them target  indust r ies .   In  Korea ,  they 
ca l l  them s t ra tegic  indust r ies ,  but  they ' re  pre t ty  much a lways  the  same 
indust r ies- -s tee l ,  autos ,  machinery ,  e lec t ronics ,  aerospace ,  e t  ce tera .  
 And i t ' s  no  surpr ise  tha t  they ' re  the  same indust r ies  because  
those  are  the  indust r ies  tha t  typica l ly  are  character ized  by economies  
of  sca le ,  rapid  growth in  product iv i ty ,  increas ing technology in tens i ty ,  
and leading to  h igher  product iv i ty  in  nat ional  economies  and higher  
s tandards  of  l iv ing,  and i t ' s  worked.   I t  worked in  Japan,  i t ' s  worked in  
the  Tigers ,  and i t ' s  working now in  China .  
 The e lements  of  th is  involve  undervalued currencies ,  var ious  
k inds  of  tax  and inves tment  incent ives  to  guide  inves tment  in to  target  
indust r ies ,  and an  enormous focus  on expor ts  coupled wi th  essent ia l ly  
compulsory  domest ic  savings  ra tes  a t  levels  around 50 percent .   50  
percent  saving levels  have  never  been a t ta ined in  the  West  except  in  
war t ime,  and so  you can look upon these  as  k ind of  s t ra tegic  levels  of  
saving.  
 They resul t  a lmost  inevi tably  in  excess  capaci ty  in  indust ry  
because  inves tment  in  those  indust r ies  i s  favored.   Those  indust r ies  
bui ld  enormous  capaci ty  and the  resul t  typica l ly  i s  g lobal  excess  
capaci ty ,  which resul ts  in  dumping,  par t icular ly  in to  the  most  open 
markets ,  typica l ly  the  U.S. ,  but  a lso  the  UK and other  re la t ive ly  open 
markets ,  and tha t ,  of  course ,  leads  to  t rade  f r ic t ion .  
 Both  Alan and Dr .  Haley have  a l ready,  I  th ink,  de ta i led  what  
happens  in  par t icular  indust r ies .   We know that  in  the  target  indust r ies  
of  the  pas t ,  U.S.  companies  have been pushed out .   I  chuckle  
f requent ly  when I  hear  d iscuss ion of  Japan 's  " los t  decade ."   We ta lk  as  
i f  Japan los t  the-- tha t  i t s  indust r ia l  pol ic ies  d idn ' t  work,  and tha t  may 
or  may not  be  t rue  a t  some macro  level .  
 But  I  note  tha t  the  Uni ted  Sta tes  doesn ' t  make much in  the  way 
of  DRAMs anymore  or  machine  tools ,  and a  wide  var ie ty  of  consumer  
e lec t ronics ,  the  U.S.  indust ry  i s  not  present  because  i t  got  pushed out  
as  a  resul t  of  the  indust r ia l  pol ic ies  of  Japan and the  Tigers ,  and now 
the  Chinese  indust r ia l  pol ic ies  are  having the  same effec t .  
 But  I 'd  l ike  to  focus  on two addi t ional  points  and impacts  of  
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indust r ia l  pol icy  tha t  I  th ink haven ' t  been adequate ly  brought  forward.  
 One of  them is  the  accumulat ion  of  chronic  current  account  surpluses .  
 The expor t - led  growth s t ra tegy,  the  ca tch-up s t ra tegy,  the  neo-
mercant i l i s t  growth s t ra tegy,  inevi tably  resul ts  in  the  accumulat ion  of  
la rge  current  account  surpluses .   We 've  seen th is  in  Japan.   We've  seen 
i t  in  the  case  of  Taiwan,   S ingapore .   We're  see ing i t  now also  in  the  
case  of  China .  
 And those  surpluses ,  of  course ,  a re  balanced by large  current  
account  def ic i t s  in  the  U.S.  and other  re la t ive ly  open markets ,  and tha t  
imbalance  i s  not  benign.   That  imbalance  under l ies  the  current  
economic  cr is is  tha t  we ' re  suffer ing.   In  fac t ,  i t  i s  the  main  cause  of  
the  current  economic  cr is is  tha t  we ' re  suffer ing.  
 And in  order  to  ge t  out  of  th is  cr i s i s ,  i t  wi l l  not  be  poss ib le  for  
those  imbalances  to  pers is t ,  which sugges ts  tha t  not  only  does  there  
have  to  be  an  enormous adjus tment  in  the  U.S.  economy,  but  i t  
sugges ts  tha t  the  cont inuat ion  of  the  ca tch-up expor t - led  growth 
s t ra tegy on a  la rge  sca le  by  o ther  la rge  countr ies  wi l l  prevent  the  
ext r ica t ion  of  the  wor ld  f rom the  current  economic  cr is is .  
 The  f ina l  point  I 'd  l ike  to  make is  tha t  China 's  indust r ia l  pol ic ies  
have a  somewhat  d i f ferent  twis t .   In  the  case  of  Japan and Korea ,  for  
example ,  fore ign inves tment ,  fore ign d i rec t  inves tment ,  in to  those  
economies  was  rea l ly  res is ted .   And even today,  fore ign companies  
have  l i t t le  inves tment  in  those  economies .  
 China ,  on  the  o ther  hand,  has  not  only  welcomed but  has  fos tered  
and promoted fore ign di rec t  inves tment ,  and has  done so  as  a  way of  
ef fec t ing  technical  t ransfer .   And in  doing so  has  used var ious  carro ts  
in  the  form of  tax  incent ives  and capi ta l  grants  and so  for th  to  a t t rac t  
the  inves tment ,  but  a lso  has  been in  a  unique pos i t ion ,  because  of  the  
large  s ize  and increas ingly  huge potent ia l  of  i t s  own market ,  to  take  
the  pos i t ion  v is -a-vis  fore ign companies  tha t  i f  they want  to  be  in  the  
Chinese  market  and enjoy i t s  potent ia l ,  they need to  inves t  there ;  they 
need to  t ransfer  technology there .  
 And so ,  in  a  way,  China  has  been able  to  capture  s igni f icant  
inves tment  and I  would  say  s igni f icant  mind share  of  the  CEOs of  
g lobal  companies .   In  fac t ,  in  a  perverse  phenomenon,  i t  seems that  in  
a  democrat ic  socie ty  l ike  the  Uni ted  Sta tes ,  the  head of  a  major  g lobal  
company is  a  very  impor tant  pol i t ica l  p layer .   The head of  a  major  
g lobal  company here  in  Washington has  inf luence  here  in  Washington 
and we can say  i s  inf luent ia l  in  not  only  economic  but  in  the  
Washington pol i t ica l  scene .  
 In  Bei j ing ,  however ,  the  same CEO tends  to  be  deferent ia l  
because  of  the  fac t  he 's  not  a  p layer ;  he  or  she  i s  not  a  p layer  
pol i t ica l ly .   They ' re  a  suppl icant .   And so ,  in  a  funny way,  th is  
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indust r ia l  pol icy  a lso  has  broader  pol i t ica l  impl ica t ions ,  and i t  goes  in  
the  d i rec t ion  ac tual ly  of  g lobal  companies  becoming more  responsive  
to  the  wishes  and the  pol ic ies  of  the  author i tar ian  regimes  than to  
those  of  the  democrat ic  regimes .  
 And I  th ink those  are  two impor tant  impacts  of  the  d ichotomy 
between American neoclass ica l  economics  and Asian  ca tch-up expor t -
led  economics  tha t  we need to  be  aware  of .  
 Thank you.  
 [The s ta tement  fo l lows:]  
 
Prepared Statement  of  Mr.  Clyde V.  Prestowitz 
Pres ident ,  Economic Strategy Inst i tute  
Washington,  DC 
 
I’d like to thank the Commission for the opportunity to speak today on the China’s industrial 
strategy and its effect on the United States.  
I have been watching China since the early 1980s and understand the important impacts it has had 
on the U.S. economy. From 1981-86, I was Assistant Secretary of Commerce, responsible for the 
Department of Commerce’s East Asian and China trade offices and leader of the first U.S. trade mission to 
China.  Under President Clinton, I was vice-chairman of the President’s commission on trade and 
investment in Asia and since then have been a frequent visitor and witness to China’s incredible growth.  
Since the late 1970s, China has gradually opened the doors of its economy to the outside world. 
Since then China has experienced rapid and indeed extraordinary growth.  This growth has been achieved 
in part through the Chinese government’s adherence to a “catch-up,” export-led growth strategy similar to 
that of Japan and the so-called Asian Tigers – Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore. Not only has the government 
turned country into an export giant, it has become an export leader in certain strategic industries. At the 
beginning of February 2009, the Chinese State Council unveiled plans to bolster ten pillar industries that 
have been most affected by the current economic crisis. So far, detailed rescue plans have been released for 
the automobile, steel, shipbuilding, machinery-manufacturing, electronics, information, textile and 
petrochemical industries. The support policies include expanding available credit for businesses, export 
rebates and tax rebates on imported components, and assistant in updating production technology.  
 To one unacquainted with China’s industrial policies, this list of industries may seem at odds with 
a country that, while growing rapidly, is still relatively poor and whose main comparative advantage is its 
abundant labor supply. Products like consumer electronics or semiconductors are typically associated with 
much higher wage countries. In fact, the basket of goods produced in China is analogous in its 
technological advancement to that produced in a country with three times the per capita income.  [Rodrick, 
Dani.  “What’s so special About China’s Exports?”  NBER Working Paper, January 2006, Pg 4]  These 
industries were targeted and pursued not because they complement China’s natural strengths, but because 
they can provide positive externalities in areas like education, science, technology or national security.  
The growth potential in each of these areas was obviously significant; consumer electronics is an industry 
that did not exist in China circa 1982 but within 20 years, consumer electronics has become the country’s 
largest industry, representing over 3 percent of Chinese GDP and 15 percent of total world output in the 
industry.  [2008 USTR Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance, pg 6]   
  A key component of this strategy is achieving technology transfers by attracting foreign 
companies in the high-technology field to set up production and assembly facilities in China.  Access to the 
Chinese market in some sectors requires foreign companies to enter into joint ventures with domestic 
manufacturers.  Approval to enter into a joint venture may rest solely on the ability of a company to 
provide technology, and future improvements to that technology.  Foreign companies do not always get the 
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freedom to select their joint venture partner, and may wind up working with a competitor – a competitor 
who will potentially have access to patents, production methods, and other intellectual property. In the case 
of consumer electronics, companies like Lenovo became the production partner for IBM’s ThinkPad 
computers and once technology is transferred, become global powerhouses in their own right. 
Unlike Korea and Japan, China has explicitly made inducing technology transfer via foreign 
investment a building block of its economic development.  Thus China offers large capital grants and 
substantial tax abatement to selected foreign companies if they invest in China.  Not only does China 
provide state support for its domestic and international industries through tax rebates and other types of 
funding, it also acts as gatekeeper in selecting which industries it will champion, and whether or not 
foreign companies may be selected to enter the market through a joint venture.  China also uses moral 
suasion as a means of inducing foreign companies to invest and to transfer technology. This gives the 
Chinese government tremendous control over its market, and immediate access to technology it otherwise 
would have to develop independently. 
For domestic businesses, state-owned banks undoubtedly play a major role in development.  
Within China there is no formal bond market, and thus no way for businesses to raise funds except through 
bank lending.  The Chinese state-owned banks are providing loans based on government policies, 
funneling funds into strategic industries. This phenomenon does not look to end any time soon, as the most 
recent stimulus announcement calls for dramatically increased levels of credit for pillar industries.   
Chinese industrial policy inevitably provides special treatment for domestic industries. Chinese 
industrial policy goes beyond identifying strategic industries in its domestic economy; it sometimes 
artificially prevents competition among its domestic producers, restricts foreign producer participation in 
certain domestic markets, and provides Chinese producers special advantages as exporters on the 
international market.  China currently limits market access for some foreign goods and services, such as 
iron ore and auto parts, restricts exports through the use of quotas, license fees and minimum export prices, 
and implements unique national standards in high technology areas.  The result of these policies is that 
China shores up its less competitive businesses, protecting them from any domestic or international 
competition, and promotes select industries that it wishes to make a pillar of its economy. [2008 USTR 
Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance, pg 6]  Foreign investment in these industries is also 
controlled, through vague and arbitrarily enforced business laws.  As a result, manufacturers in the United 
States often cannot export their goods to China, and are effectively shut out of the world’s largest market.  
U.S. producers that do export to China may be faced with local content requirements or taxes. 
A good example of how global markets may be affected is in raw materials.  China is a key 
producer of several raw materials, such as coke.  Exports of coke, used for making steel, are limited to 12 
million metric tons per year. There is also a 40% duty on all coke exports.  China produced around 350 
million metric tons in 2007, and all but 12 million were sold domestically.  Not only does this limit the 
supply available to foreign downstream producers, but it also affects the world price.  In 2008, the price per 
metric ton in China was $350, whereas the world price was $750.  This $400 difference gives Chinese steel 
producers a competitive advantage over international producers.  [2008 USTR Report to congress on 
China’s WTO Compliance, pg 36]   
Applying this pattern across other industries, it is easy to see how China takes advantage of 
market forces for the benefit of its producers. The affect on global markets, particularly on U.S. and other 
producers, is detrimental at best and catastrophic at worst. These policies could easily put smaller 
producers out of business, pricing them out of the market. If this trend were to continue, over the next five 
years what we will see are smaller businesses in the United States, and eventually larger ones, pushed out 
of the market. Our consumers will be paying artificially high prices for goods. The breadth of American 
industries involved that use raw materials from China – including steel, semiconductors, ceramics, aircraft, 
and medical imagery – means that hardly any sector of our economy will remain unaffected. 
China presents a great challenge to the United States in terms of remaining competitive.  China 
has an almost inexhaustible supply of inexpensive labor, highly trained scientists and engineers, and a 
comprehensive competitiveness strategy.  But actually, China’s industrial policy is less significant than 
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America’s lack of a strategy and its inability to maintain a highly trained work force; to interest and 
educate our students in the sciences and engineering; and to increase R&D efforts. For years our strategy 
has been not to have a strategy on the false assumption that market forces would always work to our 
advantage. 
The next five years will be a critical time for the United States with respect to addressing 
competitiveness not only vis-à-vis China, but in general.  If the United States does not get serious about 
making things in America and encouraging productive investment in America, it will not matter what 
impact China’s policies have on the world market. The most level playing field will not make the United 
States more competitive if we cannot create or produce innovative goods. 
We are certainly at a disadvantage when it comes to Chinese state-owned companies and their 
access to government resources.  Looking at the steel industry again, domestic Chinese producers receive 
subsidies, tax rebates, and loans at low or zero interest.  The “Steel and Iron Industry Development Policy” 
established by the National Development and Reform Commission provides for direct subsidization of the 
steel industry, in the form of tax refunds discounted interest rates, funding for research, restriction of 
foreign investment, and export credits. The steel industry as a whole receives a 50% income tax reduction. 
The government allocated $6 billion in 2000 for upgrades within the industry, and to transform capacity.  
[“Specialty steel industry describes countless Chinese subsidies and their impact on capacity” The Free 
Library 16 April 2007. 20 March 2009 <http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Specialty steel industry describes 
countless Chinese subsidies and...-a0181486550>.]  When currency manipulation is thrown into the mix, 
China has devised a policy to make its domestic steel industry almost impervious to outside market forces. 
China is now the world’s largest stainless steel producer, and its capacity continues to grow.   
These direct and indirect subsidies make it difficult for any foreign producers to compete with 
China. It is imperative America respond so as to ensure competitive industrial capability in the United 
States. 
I have already addressed China’s policy of forced technology transfer.  It is a critical element of 
China’s support for its strategic industries and has allowed the country to climb the value-added production 
ladder much more quickly than might otherwise be possible. China has stated that its new aim is to achieve 
independent innovation. By 2020, it wants to establish its own science and research teams, and perform 
innovative research in manufacturing, information technologies, aerospace, and defense.  It has also 
announced that it is going to double R&D expenditures as a percentage of GDP.  Although this should 
reduce the reliance China places on technology transfers, it will not eliminate it. Nor will these changes 
occur quickly. U.S. companies are still at the mercy of these forced technology transfers.  Furthermore, 
they are frequently victims of trademark infringement and other forms of intellectual property theft.  
The United States needs to be vigilant in responding to various Chinese policies and practices.  
But even more importantly, the United States needs to make sure that it is doing all it can to remain 
competitive, whether we are competing on a level playing field or not.  This requires that we invest in 
domestic infrastructure and in R&D, that we invest in the education of our students, that we train a skilled 
workforce, and that we encourage investment in America by offering the same incentives as China and 
other countries.   Although it is true that China stacks the deck in its favor, we cannot use Chinese 
industrial policy as a scapegoat for our own failings. 
 
 
Panel  I :   Discuss ion,  Quest ions  and Answers  
 
 HEARING COCHAIR SLANE:  Thank you very  much.    
 Commiss ioner  Wortze l  has  a  ques t ion .  
 VICE CHAIRMAN WORTZEL:  Gent lemen,  thank you for  being 
here  and for  your  thoughtful  remarks  and wri t ten  tes t imony.  
 I  have  a  ques t ion for  each of  you,  and we have f ive  minutes ,  so  I  
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hope you can keep wi th in  the  t ime per iod.    
 For  Mr.  Wolff ,  i f  you can ident i fy  measures  tha t  appear  to  be  
means  to  br ing about  market  c losures ,  what  remedies  would  you 
recommend? Can we turn  to  the  WTO?  Or  are  there  uni la tera l  or  
mul t i la tera l  remedies  tha t  you would  recommend? 
 I ' l l  jus t  run  through a l l  three  because  there 's  one  each i f  I  could .  
 I s  tha t  a l l  r ight?   Thank you.  
 For  Dr .  Haley,  when you see  a  par t icular  province  in  China  
put t ing  emphasis  on  one  of  a  number  of  p i l la r  indust ry  technologies  or  
indust r ies ,  can  you te l l  whether  the  provincia l  leadership  made tha t  
decis ion on i t s  own or  whether  the  cent ra l  government  was  involved in  
tha t  decis ion?   Are  they spl i t t ing  i t  a round? 
 And then for  Mr.  Pres towi tz ,  th is  i s  my weakes t  a rea ,  and over  
the  years  you 've  been here  I 'm learning,  but  could  you descr ibe  the  
adjus tments  you would  recommend in  the  U.S.  economy and the  
measures  tha t  Congress  might  be  able  to  enact  to  encourage  the  
adjus tment  tha t  you th ink the  U.S.  economy needs?  
 Mr.  Wolff .  
 MR.  WOLFF:   Thank you.    
 The remedies  would  have to  inc lude  a  var ie ty  of  approaches .   
Some aspects  of  what  China  i s  doing wi l l  be  WTO inconsis tent .   There  
have  been cases  tha t  have  been brought .   But  in  a  whole  var ie ty  of  
areas ,  the  WTO disc ip l ines  are  rea l ly  inadequate .   In  the  case  of  
product  s tandards ,  i t  i s  very  d i f f icul t  to  prevai l .   In  subs id ies ,  i f  i t  i s  a  
domest ic  subs idy,  they are  not  prohibi ted  unless  they subst i tu te  for  
impor ts ,  and tha t ' s  the  in tent .   So  the  WTO has  i t s  l imi ta t ions  a l though 
there  wi l l  be  cases  brought .  
 Bi la tera l  negot ia t ions .   I t  depends  on leverage .   In  the  pre-WTO 
world ,  there  was  a  lo t  more  leverage  than there  i s  today because  of  
b inding dispute  se t t lement .   In  the  long- term,  what  Hank Paulson was  
t ry ing to  do wi th  respect  to  changing the  savings  ra te  in  China ,  i s  a  
wor thy objec t ive ,  but  i t  i s  not  going to  save  us  in  the  next  decade or  
two.   But  i t  has  to  be  worked on as  wel l .  
 So  i t ' s  going to  take  a  whole  ser ies  of  approaches ,  but  one  th ing 
I  emphasized in  my tes t imony is :   knowledge i s  very  impor tant ,  and 
Clyde i s  r ight ,  tha t  there 's  a  d ivergence  of  in teres t  be tween CEOs of  a  
mul t ina t ional  company and the  U.S.  government 's  percept ion of  U.S.  
na t ional  in teres ts ,  and there  has  to  be  an  independent  base  of  
knowledge and an  abi l i ty  to  proceed even i f  some in  the  Uni ted  Sta tes  
might  not  want  us  to  proceed.  
 VICE CHAIRMAN WORTZEL:  Thank you.  
 DR.  HALEY:  Okay.   I t  depends on the  indust ry .   Somet imes  the  
consol ida t ion  in to  par t icular  provinces  i s  led  by the  cent ra l  
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government ,  such as  today,  the  cent ra l  government  i s  t ry ing to  lead  the  
consol idat ion  of  the  auto  indust ry  and the  s tee l  indust ry  in to  speci f ic  
provinces .   At  o ther  t imes ,  i t ' s  led  by the  provincia l  or  the  munic ipal  
government  i t se l f  such as  IT in  Shenzhen today.   That ' s  the  choice  of  
the  provincia l  and munic ipal  governments .  
 VICE CHAIRMAN WORTZEL:  Thank you.  
 MR.  PRESTOWITZ:   Wel l ,  I  th ink the  adjus tment  tha t  has  to  be  
made in  the  U.S.  i s  pr imar i ly  psychologica l .   I  th ink tha t  for  a  long 
t ime we have been forming our  pol icy  on the  bas is  of  the  assumpt ion 
tha t  g lobal iza t ion  and the  t rend of  g lobal iza t ion  i s  in  the  d i rec t ion  of  
the  neol ibera l  and neoclass ica l  f ree  t rade  economic  premises  in  which 
we have largely  based on our  pol icy .  
 And i t  seems to  me tha t  i t ' s  evident  tha t  tha t ' s  not  the  case ;  
we 've  jus t  had so  much exper ience  in  the  opposi te  d i rec t ion .   So i t  
seems to  me tha t  the  f i rs t  th ing tha t  we need to  do to  adjus t  i s  to  
recognize  tha t  there  i s  an  a l ternat ive  form of  g lobal iza t ion  out  there  
and tha t  i t  doesn ' t  mesh wel l  wi th  our  premises .  
 Now,  i f  I  were  Congress ,  what  would  I  do?  I  th ink the  f i rs t  rea l ly  
cr i t ica l  e lement  i s  currency.   The ca tch-up s t ra tegy is  a lways  
character ized by a  conscious  d i rec ted  ef for t  to  undervalue  the  
expor ter ' s  currency.   And I  th ink there  needs  to  be  a  response  to  tha t .  
 The G-20 meet ing is  coming up quickly .   That  i s  a  good f i rs t  
p lace  for  the  Uni ted  Sta tes  to  begin  ins is t ing  tha t  there  be  a  rese t  of  
currencies .   Now,  I  ac tual ly  th ink tha t  the  Chinese  proposal  tha t  
appeared in  the  press  yes terday to  move towards  a  new in ternat ional  
currency is  a  good idea .   I  th ink we should  embrace  i t .  
 The  fac t  tha t  the  dol lar  i s  the  sole  or  more  or  less  the  sole  g lobal  
currency,  and tha t  i t ' s  a  f loa t ing  currency,  means  tha t  i t  can  be  
manipula ted .   I t  a lso  means  tha t  we can be  i r responsible .   I t  means ,  for  
Americans ,  savings  don ' t  mat ter ,  a t  leas t  in  the  re la t ive ,  in  the  shor t  to  
medium term.  
 So I  th ink th is  i s  a  Chinese  idea  we should  embrace  and begin  
moving toward a  new in ternat ional  regime wi th  an  in ternat ional  
currency or  a  basket  of  currencies  ra ther  than jus t  based on the  dol lar .  
 Second point ,  I  would  have  a  war  ches t .   Every  day,  I  p ick  up the  
newspaper  and I  see  another  major  g lobal  corpora t ion  has  announced a  
b ig  inves tment  in  China  or  in  Singapore  or  in  Is rae l  or  someplace ,  and 
f requent ly  these  inves tments  are  being made by the  h ighes t  tech  of  
companies  tha t  a re  capi ta l  in tens ive ,  not  labor  in tens ive .   You can ' t  
a rgue  tha t  they ' re  making th is  inves tment  in  China  because  of  low 
labor  cos ts .  
 And yet  they make the  inves tment .   You scra tch  you head;  why is  
tha t?   And the  answer  a lmost  a lways  i s  because  they ' re  ge t t ing  a  tax  
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hol iday,  they ' re  ge t t ing  a  capi ta l  grant ,  they ' re  ge t t ing  o ther  f inancia l  
incent ives  tha t  a re  not  be ing matched by anything in  the  Uni ted  Sta tes .  
 I  would  l ike  to  have  a  war  ches t  wi th  which the  U.S.  can match 
those  offers  and use  tha t  to  negot ia te  some in ternat ional  d isc ip l ine .   
We 've  done th is  in  the  pas t  in  the  case  of  expor t  subs id ies ,  in  which in  
the  la te  1980s  we did  have  a  war  ches t  in  order  to  encourage  
negot ia t ion  of  d isc ip l ine  on subsidies  in  the  Uruguay Round,  and i t  
worked to  some extent .   I t  wasn ' t  perfec t ,  but  i t  worked to  some extent .  
 So  I 'd  l ike  to  have  a  war  ches t .  
 We have a  new Secre tary  of  Commerce  being vet ted  I  th ink now 
by the  Congress .   And i f  I  were  on the  Senate  commit tees  ta lk ing to  
the  new Secre tary  of  Commerce ,  I 'd  ask  h im,  what 's  your  a t t i tude  
towards  inves t ing  in  America?    
 The Pres ident  has  sa id  he  wants  to  crea te  green jobs .   Has  
anybody,  has  the  Congress ,  has  anybody,  done an  ac tual  analys is  of  
what  the  impl ica t ions  for  jobs  are  of  the  Pres ident 's  proposals  for  
inves tment  in  green technology?  
 I  can  te l l  you tha t  pre l iminary  analys is  by  my Ins t i tu te  indica tes  
tha t  the  more  we spend on green technology,  the  b igger  our  current  
account  def ic i t ,  our  t rade  def ic i t ,  wi l l  become because  we don ' t  make 
the  s tuff ;  we don ' t  make the  wind turbines  and windmil ls  and solar  
panels  and so  for th .  
 And so  a  ques t ion  i s  i f  we ' re  going to  begin  inves t ing  in  these  
technologies ,  a re  we going to  do i t  in  such a  way as  to  encourage  and 
induce  the  movement  of  tha t  product ion and tha t  technology in to  the  
Uni ted  Sta tes?   I s  the  Secre tary  of  Commerce  going to  be  conscious  of  
tha t?  
 I  th ink tha t  the  crea t ion  in  the  Congress  of  some--you have a  
Congress ional  Budget  Off ice  tha t  k ind of  does  independent  analys is  of  
the  impl ica t ions  of  budget  and f i sca l  proposals .   You could  crea te  an  
independent  congress ional  t rade  off ice  or  congress ional  indust ry  
impact  of f ice  to  ac tual ly  look a t  the  l ike ly  impact  on  the  U.S.  
economy,  on inves tment ,  on  the  current  account  def ic i t ,  of  var ious  
measures  being proposed.  
 We negot ia ted  in  the  la te  1990s  to  br ing China  in to  the  World  
Trade  Organizat ion  and to  g ive  China  MFN,  Most  Favored Nat ion,  
t rea tment .  
 Do you rea l ize  tha t  no  one  in  the  Congress  and that  no  one  in  the  
adminis t ra t ions  a t  tha t  t ime ever  d id  an  analys is  of  what  the  
impl ica t ions  for  the  U.S.  current  account  def ic i t  would  be  of  br inging 
China ,  grant ing China  those  pos i t ions?   The analys is  was  jus t  never  
done.   I t  wouldn ' t  have  been hard  to  have  ant ic ipated  tha t  we were  
l ike ly  to  have  huge t rade  def ic i t s  wi th  China  and to  have  ant ic ipated  
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the  impl ica t ions  of  tha t  in  te rms of  our  present  cr i s i s .   That  analys is  
was  never  done.  And so  I 'd  l ike  the  Congress  to  have that  k ind of  
abi l i ty .  
 Thank you.  
 VICE CHAIRMAN WORTZEL:  Thank you.  
 HEARING COCHAIR SLANE:  Commiss ioner  Wessel .  
 COMMISSIONER WESSEL:   Thank you,  gent lemen,  for  being 
here ,  for  your  long- term help  to  th is  Commiss ion.   You 've  a l l  he lped 
us  throughout  the  years  tha t  we 've  been in  opera t ion ,  and we 
apprecia te  i t .  
 In  many ways ,  th is  appears  to  be  a  debate  tha t  we had in  the  '80s  
wi th  SEMATECH, a  number  of  o ther  indust r ia l  pol icy  arguments ,  the  
ques t ion  of  the  r i se  of  Japan,  e t  ce tera .   You ta lked about  the  " los t  
decade,"  and now people  don ' t  th ink tha t  many of  the  concerns  tha t  we 
had about  Japan were  wel l - founded.  
 Now we 're  being to ld  tha t  we are  overreact ing  to  the  r i se  of  
China ,  tha t  we should  not  be  as  concerned about  the i r  development  
path .  
 Three  or  four  years  ago,  the  Depar tment  of  Commerce  wi th  NIST 
and others  in  government  h ighl ighted  tha t  we had three  sunr ise  
indust r ies  tha t  we should  be  looking a t  the  fu ture .   We should  not  be  
worr ied  as  much about  the  broad-scale  indust r ies  l ike  s tee l ,  autos ,  e t  
ce tera .   Those  had become worldwide  indust r ies ,  but  our  br ight  s tars  
were  b io tech,  optoelec t ronics ,  and nanotech.  
 I  th ink we 've  now seen tha t  China  e i ther  through the  p i l la r  
indust ry  programs or  o ther  sc ient i f ic  inves tments  has  chosen those  
indust r ies  as  the  br ight  s tars  on  the i r  hor izon as  wel l .  
 What  should  we look to  here  in  the  U.S.  to  make sure  tha t  we ' re  
going to  have  a  h igh and r i s ing  s tandard of  l iv ing?   And is  the  current  
f ramework for  analys is  and regula t ion  of  our  re la t ionship  wi th  China  
and others ,  the  WTO, e t  ce tera ;  i s  i t  suff ic ient  to  meet  the  current  
pressures?  
 Why don ' t  we go down the  l ine?  
 MR.  WOLFF:   The Uni ted  Sta tes  has  done a  phenomenal  job  of  
innovat ing,  and one  chal lenge tha t  we are  confronted  wi th  in  an  era  in  
g lobal iza t ion ,  where  th ings  can be  done anyplace ,  i s  whether  the  jobs  
tha t  a re  associa ted  wi th  innovat ion ac tual ly  take  p lace  here .    
 And c lear ly  they are  not ,  to  the  extent  tha t  one  would  l ike ,  and 
par t  of  the  problem is  tha t  the  p laying f ie ld  i s  somewhat  skewed,  
imbalanced.   I t ' s  not  jus t  because  of  speci f ic  subs id ies  to  a  par t icular  
indust ry ;  i t  i s  because  of  a  ser ies  of  our  pol ic ies  and others '  pol ic ies  
tha t  c rea te  advantages  to  going offshore  or  going e lsewhere ,  producing 
e lsewhere .   
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 Somet imes  going offshore  i s  jus t i f ied  by jus t  be ing c lose  to  one 's  
end market ,  and you ' re  expected  to  par t ic ipate ,  and there  i s  some of  
what  Clyde sa id  of  be ing seen to  be  a  good corpora te  c i t izen  and more  
responsive  perhaps  in  a  more  autocra t ic  se t t ing  than e lsewhere .  
 But  i f  the  taxat ion  ra tes  on  business  are  d i f ferent  f rom the  
Uni ted  Sta tes ,  and we have much higher  ra tes  than anyplace  e lse  
abroad pre t ty  much,  and the  ef fec t ive  tax  ra te  i s  even more  
dramat ica l ly  d i f ferent .   That  sa id ,  we are  not  going to  get  in to  a  
negot ia t ion  where  we say  to  o thers  you must  ra ise  your  tax  ra tes .  
 I t ' s  l ike  the  o ld  value-added tax  argument  f rom 1947 through the  
'60s ,  where  i f  the  Uni ted  Sta tes  wanted to  change i t s  tax  sys tem,  we 
were  welcome to  do so .   Others  were  not  going to  change the i r  tax  
sys tems.  
 So we have,  I  th ink,  severa l  th ings  we have to  work on.   One is  
make the  Uni ted  Sta tes  a  very  a t t rac t ive  p lace  to  do bus iness .   I  noted  
in  my tes t imony tha t  i t ' s  sor t  of  shocking that  of  our  Ph.D.  candidates  
in  th is  country  s tudying in  U.S.  univers i t ies  in  engineer ing,  over  ha l f  
of  them are  f rom Chinese  ins t i tu t ions  meaning tha t  chances  are  they go 
back to  China .  
 We wi l l  push them back to  China  under  our  immigra t ion  laws,  
which i s  jus t  an  ac t  of  insani ty .   Those  tha t  d idn ' t  want  to  re turn ,  we 
wi l l  te l l  them you have to  re turn .   We ought  to  make th is  country  a  
beacon for  innovat ive ,  ta lented  people ,  and we 're  doing the  absolute  
reverse ,  which i s  jus t  c razy.  
 So our  own pol ic ies  in  educat ion and immigra t ion ,  taxat ion ,  have  
to  be  looked to ,  as  wel l  as  levels  of  funding of  federa l  R&D, bas ic  
R&D, and some of  tha t  i s  be ing looked to  in  the  s t imulus  package and 
in  the  Pres ident ' s  Budget .  
 The other  th ing we have to  do i s  pay c lose  a t tent ion  to  what  
China  i s  doing and what  o thers  are  doing.   What  i s  objec t ionable  may 
not  be  WTO inconsis tent ,  but  may s t i l l  be  objec t ionable ,  and we have 
to  use  whatever  leverage  we can to  get  a  change in  pol icy  tha t  i s  not  
harmful  to  U.S.  in teres ts .   Par t  of  the  leverage  i s  making an  
in te l lec tual  case  tha t  some th ings  are  bad for  China 's  own development  
of  i t s  economy.   That  won ' t  cut  much wi th  respect  to  autos  or  b io tech 
or  o ther  areas  in  which emphasis  i s  be ing placed now so  we have to  
f ind  o ther  leverage .  
 One las t  th ing I 'd  say  i s  tha t  the  imbalance  has  f ina l ly  been 
discovered,  as  Clyde has  noted ,  as  be ing a  problem for  th is  country .   
Others  have  f inanced our  inves tments  and our  housing bubble  and the  
l ike ,  and our  consumer  credi t ,  but  the  imbalance  i s  ac tual ly  made out  
of  goods  and services  when i t ' s  a  current  account  imbalance ,  and tha t  
has  an  ef fec t  on  the  shape of  our  economy.  
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 And the  d i f ference  between-- there  may be  a  few others- -but  the  
d i f ference  between Clyde Pres towi tz  and Tim Gei thner  i s  tha t  Tim 
Gei thner  i s  worr ied  about  the  macro  imbalance ,  whereas ,  we have to  be  
worr ied  about  the  ef fec ts  on  individual  indust r ies ,  and as  a  government  
we 're  not .  
 COMMISSIONER WESSEL:   Can the  o ther  wi tnesses  respond 
quickly?  
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  Go ahead.   Sure .  
 DR.  HALEY:  Okay.   Wel l ,  I  th ink there  are  two th ings .   Number  
one ,  I  th ink i t ' s  absolute ly  insane  tha t  the  Uni ted  Sta tes  g ive  up on 
indust r ies  so  quickly .   I f  you jus t  consider ,  for  ins tance ,  the  going 
back to  the  era  when automobi les  and s tee l  were  supposedly  no longer  
val id  concerns  for  the  U.S. ,  i f  you look a t  S i l icon Val ley ,  an  economic  
s tudy was  conducted,  and the  economic  prof i le  of  Si l icon Val ley ,  
which is  supposed to  be  the  great  champion of  U.S.  jobs ,  was  the  
economic  prof i le  of  a  th i rd-world  country  wi th  a  very  smal l  group of  
super- r ich ,  a  somewhat  la rger  but  s t i l l  smal l  group of  upper  middle  
income people ,  and then a  huge mass  of  individuals  who s imply  could  
not  af ford  to  l ive  in  tha t  area  based upon the  income they received.  
 So I  th ink one  of  the  th ings  i s  we have to  qui t  g iv ing up on our  
indust r ies .   I t  would  help  our  indust ry  t remendously ,  for  ins tance ,  i f  
the  most  advanced product ion fac i l i t ies  for  automobi les  were  ac tual ly  
in  the  Uni ted  Sta tes ,  but  GM's  most  advanced product ion fac i l i ty  
happens  to  be  in  Shanghai  ins tead of  in  Detroi t .   So  tha t ' s  one  of  the  
th ings .  
 I  th ink U.S.  pol icy  has  to  emphasize  the  impor tance  of  
technology,  the  impor tance  especia l ly  of  process  technology,  which i f  
you look a t  innovat ion,  process  technology genera tes  a  much greater  
re turn  on inves tment  both  to  the  company and to  socie ty  than does  
product  innovat ion.  
 So we have to  emphasize  the  re tent ion of  innovat ion for  the  
Uni ted  Sta tes  both  in  new sunshine  indust r ies  and in  our  o ld  
t radi t ional  Rust  Bel t  indust r ies .  
 The o ther  th ing i s  we have to  promote  innovat ion,  per iod.   There  
have  to  be  tax  benef i t s  to  innovat ion.   I t ' s  been shown that  they ' re  
ext remely  ef fec t ive  in  crea t ing  innovat ion wi th in  indust ry ,  and there  
has  to  be-- I  don ' t  know how legal  i t  would  be  a  penal ty  f rom moving 
technology and innovat ion offshore .  
 MR.  PRESTOWITZ:   The old  wor ld  i s  looking a t  b io tech,  
nanotech,  advanced e lec t ronics ,  te lecommunicat ions .   We jus t  
completed  a  survey of  leading compet i t ive  countr ies ,  and whether  i t ' s  
S ingapore  or  Is rae l  or  China  or  Japan,  a l l  of  them have ident i f ied  
expl ic i t ly  and have  crea ted  programs to  achieve  leadership  in  those  
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indust r ies  because  for  the  obvious  reason tha t  they ' re  a l l  cons idered to  
be  indust r ies  of  the  fu ture  wi th  potent ia l  h igh product iv i ty .  
 Right  now,  a l l  of  the  incent ives  for  an  American-based company 
are  pre t ty  much to  leave  or ,  to  put  i t  a  d i f ferent  way,  the  incent ives  are  
tha t  i f  you ' re  an  American-based company or  i f  you ' re  any based 
company,  you would  l ike  to  have  a  c lose  re la t ionship  wi th  MIT,  
Stanford ,  Cal tech,  and some of  the  major  U.S.  univers i ty  centers  
because  those  are  s t i l l  the  p laces  where  the  leading-edge R&D is  be ing 
done,  and they are  not  adequate ly  but  s igni f icant ly  suppor ted  by U.S.  
government .   That 's  where  a  lo t  of  U.S.  government  R&D money goes .  
  
 So  you want  to  have a  re la t ionship  there ,  and you want  to  have 
your  s tudents  there ,  and,  as  Alan pointed  out ,  China  has  been very  
successful  in  ge t t ing  the i r  s tudents  there ,  and then you a lso  want  to  
have  the  abi l i ty  to- - typica l ly  these  th ings  require  a  lo t  of  capi ta l .   So  
you want  to  go someplace  where  you can get  f ree  capi ta l ,  and most  
countr ies  who are  focusing on these  indust r ies  have  a t  the  nat ional  
level ,  not  a t  the  provincia l  level - - they may have i t  there ,  too--but  a t  a  
na t ional  level ,  they have  a  sys tem of  tax  incent ives ,  capi ta l  grants ,  
labor  t ra in ing,  inf ras t ructure  provis ion,  and so  for th ,  tha t  ef fec t ively  
reduce  the  cos t  of  capi ta l  for  an  ent repreneur  or  a  g lobal  inves tor .  
 Third ly ,  par t icular ly  in  the  case  of  China ,  where  you have a  very  
large  popula t ion ,  a l ready a  la rge  market ,  in  some indust r ies  the  larges t  
market  in  the  wor ld ,  and potent ia l ly  in  most  indust r ies  the  larges t  
market  in  the  wor ld ,  so  would  have access  to  tha t  market ,  and as  a  
g lobal  company,  then you respond to  the  pressures ,  the  incent ives ,  tha t  
the  people  who control  tha t  market  put  before  you,  and typica l ly ,  those  
are  to  a t t rac t  you in to  tha t  market .  
 But  the  key under ly ing e lement ,  as  you know so  wel l ,  Mike 
Wessel ,  i s  tha t ,  on  the  one  hand,  in  a  Singapore ,  in  an  Is rae l ,  in  a  
China ,  in  a  Japan,  you have a  nat ional  leadership ,  both  pol i t ica l  
leadership ,  economic  leadership ,  bus iness  leadership ,  academic  
leadership ,  which bel ieves  tha t  what  a  country  makes  mat ters .   They 
bel ieve  tha t  having these  capabi l i t ies  i s  impor tant  to  the i r  long- term 
welfare .  
 We don ' t  have  that  in  the  U.S.   And so  we need,  in  my view,  we 
need to  have  a  d i f ferent  mind-se t ,  and having a  d i f ferent  mind-se t ,  we 
then need to  th ink about  these  incent ives .  
 There  are  a  lo t  of  American incent ives ,  tax  incent ives ,  tha t  
ac tual ly  make i t  advantageous  to  inves t  outs ide  the  U.S. ,  so  a t  a  
minimum, as  Pres ident  Obama has  sugges ted ,  we ought  to  change those  
k inds  of  tax  incent ives .  
 I  a lso  th ink tha t  we need to  begin  to  th ink a  l i t t le  b i t  about  th is  
42
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
educat ion e lement .   On the  one  hand,  i t ' s  r ight  now the  case  tha t  a  very  
large  percentage  of  Ph.D.  candidates  a t  leading American univers i t ies  
are  non-Americans .   In  the  pas t ,  they tended to  come here  and s tay  
here .   Increas ingly ,  they are  going back.  
 And so ,  on  the  one hand,  we probably  should  th ink about  
incent ives  to  keep them here .   Some people  have  sugges ted  g iv ing 
anyone who graduates  wi th  a  Ph.D.  f rom a  leading U.S.  univers i ty  a  
green card  wi th  the i r  Ph.D.  cer t i f ica te .  
 But  I  th ink there 's  a lso  something e lse  we need to  th ink about ,  
and tha t  i s ,  not  the  only  reason,  but  one  reason why our  univers i t ies  
are  so  fu l l  of  non-American s tudents  i s  because  the  non-Americans  pay 
the  fu l l  cos t .   I t ' s  advantageous  to  the  univers i ty  f inancia l ly  to  have  
non-Americans .   But  i f  the  non-Americans  increas ingly  are  going to  go 
back,  then tha t  sugges ts  tha t  we ' re  going to  have to  s taf f  our  R&D 
centers  and our  corpora te  management  centers  of  the  fu ture  wi th  
Americans  or  wi th  more  Americans .  
 But  then tha t  means  we need to  t ra in  more  Americans ,  and so  
somehow we need to  wres t le  wi th  the  ques t ion of  how do we get  more  
Americans  in to  these  univers i t ies  and what  are  the  incent ives  there  for  
a l l  of  the  p layers?   
 So I  th ink those  are  a  couple  of  good points .  
 COMMISSIONER WESSEL:   Thank you.  
 HEARING COCHAIR SLANE:  Commiss ioner  Reinsch.  
 COMMISSIONER REINSCH:  Given our  popula t ion  growth,  
maybe we need to  address  the  ques t ion of  how we get  more  Americans ,  
per iod,  because  I 'm not  sure  you can address  your  problem wi thout  
focusing on that .  
 But  in  any event ,  as  a lways ,  you guys  have very  in teres t ing  
comments  and I  th ink we a l l  apprecia te  them.   The good ques t ions  have  
a l ready been asked so  I 'm going to  ask  infer ior  ques t ions  and ask  you 
jus t  to  put  up  wi th  me.  
 What  I  hear  you saying,  I  th ink,  i s  wi th  respect  to  what  we 
should  do about  th is ,  you ' re  sugges t ing  th ings  tha t  fa l l  in to  two large  
ca tegor ies .   One is  we a t tack  the i r  game through WTO rules ,  through 
negot ia t ion ,  through other  tools  tha t  we have or  might  be  able  to  
conceive ,  or ,  a l te rnat ive ly ,  we play  the i r  game through crea t ing  the  
same kinds  of  incent ives  a t  leas t ,  perhaps  not  barr iers ,  but  tax  
incent ives ,  innovat ion subsid ies ,  or  th ings  l ike  tha t ,  tha t  we 've  jus t  got  
f in ished cr i t ic iz ing them for .   Okay.   I  guess  the  ques t ion  i s  can  we do 
both  of  those  th ings  a t  the  same t ime wi th  a  s t ra ight  face  and get  away 
wi th  i t?   That  might  be  the  bes t  s t ra tegy.   And/or  i s  one  of  those  two 
large  bags  more  impor tant  than the  o ther?  
 Alan,  do  you want  to  begin?  
43
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
 MR.  WOLFF:   I  th ink i t  rea l ly  has  to  be  a  combinat ion  of  
crea t ing  a  ser ies  of  incent ives  tha t  promote  new indust r ies ,  and ac t ions  
agains t  t rade  and inves tment  d is tor t ions  crea ted  by China’s  pol ic ies .   
We pre tend tha t  we haven ' t  done i t  here ,  tha t  i s  in tervened in  our  
economy,  when,  in  fac t ,  we 've  done i t  throughout  our  h is tory .   This  
h is tory  goes  back to  agr icul ture .   And we have to  do more  of  the  same.  
 Secre tary  Chu,  Secre tary  of  Energy,  yes terday tes t i f ied  tha t  
Nat ional  Labs  have  in  the  las t  year  made enormous s t r ides  in  b iofuels ,  
in  breaking down cel lu lose ,  in  creat ing  ar t i f ic ia l  gasol ine  and diese l ,  
a l l  enormously  impor tant .   Al l  these  sor ts  of  th ings  have come out  of  
our  Nat ional  Labs  in  the  pas t .   They have to  in  the  fu ture .   And the  
benef i t s  of  innovat ion do tend to  a t  leas t  pause  in  th is  country  before  
they go abroad.   
 I  th ink tha t  there  have  to  be  o ther  suppor t ive  pol ic ies  tha t  keep 
the  benef i t s  of  innovat ion here .   How targeted  those  incent ives  wi l l  be  
depends  on nat ional  pr ior i t ies .   Can we do some of  these  th ings  and 
wi th  a  s t ra ight  face  a t tack  fore ign prac t ices?   I  th ink  we wi l l  t ry  to  
make our  pol ic ies  less  d is tor t ive  and put  more  on the  bas ic  research 
s ide  ra ther  than on commercia l iza t ion .  
 There  are  a lso  l ines  tha t  should  not  be  crossed.   I f  the  U.S.  
government  mandated  d iscr iminatory  product  s tandards  and provided 
tha t  a  expor ter  to  th is  market ,  i f  i t  wanted  to  have  encrypt ion  in  i t s  
products  sent  in to  the  Uni ted  Sta tes  of  any kind-- there  i s  encrypt ion in  
everything tha t ' s  Wi-Fi  and wire less  communicat ion ,  i f  i t  were  
required  to  only  have American technology,  tha t  would  be  a  major  
barr ier .  
 I  don ' t  th ink we are  going to  do tha t .   And we have to  res is t  the  
Chinese  doing i t ,  because  they wi l l  cause  enormous d is rupt ions  to  our  
indust r ies .  I  th ink we 're  headed for  major  conf l ic ts  wi th  China ,  and we 
have not  seen anything yet .  
 COMMISSIONER REINSCH:  Do e i ther  of  the  o thers  want  to  
comment?  
 DR.  HALEY:  Wel l ,  f i r s t  of  a l l ,  I  guess  I  do  th ink one  way to  
look a t  i t  was  the  way the  ques t ion  was  phrased.   However ,  the  o ther  
way to  look a t  i t  would  be  tha t  we would  argue  for  the  ideal  and a t  the  
same t ime unt i l  tha t  ideal  comes about ,  comes in to  exis tence ,  defend 
our  nat ional  in teres ts ,  which i s  what ,  a f ter  a l l ,  the  government  i s  
supposed to  do.  
 I  don ' t  th ink i t ' s  an  i ssue  of  being in  any way hypocr i t ica l  about  
th ings .   But  i f  someone is  point ing a  gun towards  between your  eyes ,  
then you 'd  l ike  to  have  one  to  point  back.   And i t  should  be  a  
negot ia t ing  p loy.   I t  should  be  a  negot ia t ing  s tance  on our  par t  tha t  
unt i l  tha t  ideal  comes about ,  we wi l l  make,  fo l low the  same pract ices  
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as  o ther  countr ies .  
 COMMISSIONER REINSCH:  Wel l ,  I  would  never  accuse  
anybody of  hypocr isy .   Clyde.  
 MR.  PRESTOWITZ:   I 'd  look a t  in  k ind of  three  baskets .   Let  me 
preface  my comment  by saying tha t  I  th ink we rea l ly  need to  t ry  to  
remove the--what 's  the  r ight  word-- the  pejora t ive  or  the  moral i s t ic  
e lement  f rom th is  d iscuss ion.  
 For  a  long t ime we 've  been ta lk ing f ree  t rade  versus  protec t ion  
and that  f ree  t rade  i s  the  good guys  and the  protec t ionis ts  are  bad 
guys ,  and they don ' t  do  i t  our  way.   I  th ink we 're  a l l  in  a  g lobal  
economy.   Everybody has  in teres ts ,  and we make cer ta in  agreements ,  
as  in  the  WTO, and i t ' s ,  I  th ink,  perfec t ly  acceptable  tha t  i f  countr ies  
s ign up for  WTO rules ,  then they should  p lay  by WTO rules .  
 I  expect  o ther  countr ies  to  f i le  complain ts  agains t  us ,  as  the  
Mexicans  have jus t  done in  the  case  of  NAFTA, when we 're  v io la t ing  
the  ru les .   And I  don ' t  th ink we should  have any hes i ta t ion  about  
ins is t ing  tha t  o ther  countr ies  p lay  by the  WTO rules  i f  they ' re  not .  
 But  I  th ink tha t  a  major  par t  of  th is  d iscuss ion,  a  problem in  th is  
d iscuss ion is  tha t  the  WTO is  in  many respects  la rgely  i r re levant .   The  
kinds  of  th ings  tha t  we ' re  deal ing wi th  are  not  covered by the  WTO.  
Inves tment  incent ives  are  not  covered by the  WTO.  Currencies  are  not  
covered by the  WTO.  But  tha t ' s  the  whole  game or  most  of  the  game.    
 And so  le t ' s  p lay  by WTO when we 're  in  the  WTO realm,  but  
when we 're  not  in  the  WTO realm,  then we have to  look a t  o ther  i ssues .  
 So,  le t ' s  look a t  the  ques t ion  of  currencies  and f inancia l  incent ives .   
There  are  some vague IMF agreements  tha t  have  not  been enforced,  but  
we 've  been among those  who have been unenforcers .  
 But  in  the  case  of  the  currencies  and inves tment  incent ives ,  
you ' re  in  a  rea lm in  which there 's  a  grea t  deal  of  room for  d iscuss ion 
and negot ia t ion ,  and you ' re  in  a  rea lm in  which the  behavior  of  a l l  the  
p layers  rea l ly  has  a  huge impact .  
 Again ,  coming back to  th is  cr i s i s  tha t  we ' re  in ,  we ' re  in  th is  
cr i s i s  because  we have not  adequate ly  deal t  wi th  the  currency and the  
f inancia l  inves tment  incent ive  i ssues .   And i t  seems to  me the  cr is i s  
should  g ive  us  a  grea t  incent ive  to  deal  wi th  them,  and in  doing so ,  
there 's  rea l ly  k ind of  no  guidel ine  about  how you deal  wi th  them.  
 I  th ink tha t  th is  i s  an  area  where  in ternat ional  d iscuss ion i s  very  
impor tant  because  I  th ink some countr ies  are  engaging in  pol ic ies  tha t  
a re  des t ruct ive  to  them as  wel l  as  to  the  sys tem wi thout  necessar i ly  
rea l iz ing  i t .    
 And then,  f ina l ly ,  I  th ink tha t  there  i s  a  ca tegory  where  there  i s  
an  acceptable ,  even laudable ,  a rea  for  government  ac t iv i ty .   Suppor t  of  
research and development ,  suppor t  of  technica l  educat ion ,  these  are  
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th ings  tha t  I  th ink are  unobject ionable .   I  don ' t  th ink we should  be  
somehow cr i t ic iz ing China  because  they ' re  suppor t ing  technologica l  
development  in  par t icular  areas .  
 I  th ink here  the  ques t ion  i s  what  are  we doing?   And I  th ink tha t  
an  impor tant  s tep  in  get t ing  towards  a  more  re levant  d iscuss ion i s  to  
recognize  tha t  much of  the  debate  unt i l  now has  been based on a  rea l ly  
s impl is t ic  economic  model .   I t  has  been based on a  model  tha t  pos i t s  
f ree ,  perfec t ly  compet i t ive  markets ,  a  model  tha t  pos i t s  no  economies  
of  sca le ,  a  model  tha t  pos i t s  f ixed exchange ra tes .  
 The model  tha t  we base  our  d iscuss ion on is  not  the  model  tha t  
we l ive  on,  and i f  we begin  to  have th is  d iscuss ion in  the  context  of  
recogniz ing tha t  imperfec t  compet i t ion ,  rapid  technologica l  change,  
crea tes  an  ent i re ly  d i f ferent  economic  s t ructure  and dynamic  requir ing ,  
therefore ,  a  much more  nuanced and sophis t ica ted  se t  of  pol icy  
measures ,  I  th ink that  we would  be  far  ahead.  
 COMMISSIONER REINSCH:  Thank you.    
 I f  we have a  second round,  put  me down.   I 've  got  another  
ques t ion .  
 HEARING COCHAIR SLANE:  Commiss ioner  Videnieks .   
 COMMISSIONER VIDENIEKS:   Good morning,  gent lemen.    
 My ques t ion  i s  bas ica l ly  about  tax  incent ives .   Mr.  Wolff ,  you 
ment ioned tha t  the  effec t ive  ra tes  of  taxat ion  are  something l ike  13 or  
14 percent  in  PRC and 40 something in  the  U.S.  corpora te  income tax  
ra tes .  
 I t ' s  my unders tanding the  ques t ion  rea l ly  should  go to  the  
taxable  base .   The corpora te  re turns  I 've  seen usual ly  show minimal  
income.   So i t  wouldn ' t  mat ter  much what  the  ra te  would  be  i f  the  
income is  minimal .   R&D is  deduct ib le  as  a  bus iness  expense  and is  
not  taxed as  far  as  par t icular  corpora t ions  are  concerned.   
 So my ques t ion  i s :  do  we know what  the  taxable  base  i s  for  a  
typica l  Chinese  corpora t ion?   Because  i t ' s  my unders tanding-- I 've  been 
out  of  the  game for  awhi le- - tha t  ours ,  tha t  ac tual ly  the  income,  the  
corpora te  income,  i s  not  very  h igh typica l ly  on a  U.S.  corpora te  
income tax  re turn .   That  i s  the  ques t ion  for  a l l  the  panel is t s ,  as  you 
wish .  
 MR.  WOLFF:   The f igure  I  c i ted  was  a  World  Bank f igure  tha t  
was  across- the-board  and not  by  sec tor ,  and i t  was  about  a  two- to-one 
ra t io ,  jus t  the  base  ra te ,  and tha t  was  the  effec t ive  ra te .   30  in  the  U.S.  
to  15 percent .   Of  course ,  i t  d i f fers  markedly  by indust ry ,  d i f fers  by  
company.  
 However ,  in  China ,  there  are  a  ser ies  of  incent ives  added to  tha t .  
 There  are  in  the  U.S. ,  too ,  but  in  China  they are  far  more  targeted  so  
tha t  you locate  in  an  indust r ia l  park ,  sc ience  and technology park ,  and 
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in  China  the  f i rs t  f ive  years ,  there  inves tor  pays  zero  tax ,  which i s  a  
far  be t ter  ra te  than e i ther  the  aforement ioned ra tes ,  and then a  hal f - tax  
going forward except  i f  the  inves tment  i s  in  cer ta in  h igh- tech areas  in  
which the  ra te  never  exceeds  15 percent .  
 So  i f  there  i s  an  indust r ia l  pol icy  tha t  chooses  par t icular  k inds  of  
ac t iv i ty ,  th is  wi l l ,  in  fac t ,  lower  the  corpora te  tax  ra te  dramat ica l ly .    
 We 're  going to  have  an  in teres t ing  debate  in  the  Congress  th is  
year .   Pres ident  Obama sa id  the  Uni ted  Sta tes  ought  not  to  confer  an  
incent ive  for  f i rms to  go abroad.   He sa id  tha t  one  cannot  expla in  to  
the  American people  why that  takes  p lace .   And an American company 
CEO's  response  would  be  “ i f  I re land has  a  12 percent  tax  and the  
Uni ted  Sta tes  has  a  30  some odd percent  tax ,  why is  i t  unfa i r  for  me to  
take  advantage  of  tha t  lower  tax?”   
 I  th ink tha t  what  one  can see  how debate  i s  to  be  shaped –  
centered  on what  taxat ion  does  to  the  compet i t iveness  of  U.S.  
corpora t ions .   There  i s  a  d ivergence  between those  who are  seeking to  
maximize  economic  ac t iv i ty  in  the  Uni ted  Sta tes  and those  who are  
t ry ing to  maximize  the  compet i t iveness  of  individual  companies .  
 COMMISSIONER VIDENIEKS:   But  my quest ion bas ica l ly  was  
i f  R&D gets  a  f ree  r ide  in  a  U.S.  corpora te  income tax  re turn ,  which i s  
obviously  not  as  good as  get t ing  a  f ive-year  hol iday f rom taxat ion.   
But  any comment  on tha t?  
 DR.  HALEY:  Wel l ,  one  th ing that  I  would  emphasize  about  
R&D, maybe i t  does  get  a  f ree  r ide  on the  tax ,  corpora te  tax  ra te ,  but  i t  
a l so  crea tes  the  grea tes t  re turn  on inves tment  of  any corpora te  
ac t iv i ty .   
 The problem wi th  R&D is  tha t  i t  not  only  crea tes  the  grea tes t  tax  
re turn  on inves tment ,  and th is  i s  both  to  the  company and to  socie ty ,  i t  
a l so  i s  the  most  inconsis tent  re turn  on inves tment .  
 For  ins tance ,  whi le  over  the  long term i t  has  a  very  good re turn  
inves tment  for  the  corpora t ion ,  in  60  percent  of  years  research has  
shown that  i t  ac tual ly  loses  money for  the  corpora t ion .  
 Now when China  i s  subs id iz ing and doing th is  research for  the i r  
companies ,  they ' re  taking away that  uncer ta in ty  out  of  the i r  ba lance  
sheet  and the i r  prof i tabi l i ty .   What  the  U.S.  needs  to  do in  order  to  
counter  tha t  absolute  cash  t ransfer  bas ica l ly  on R&D is  to  f ind  some 
way to  reduce  tha t  uncer ta in ty  for  corpora te  management  so  they fee l  
f reer  to  make the  inves tments  on  a  long- term consis tent  bas is .  
 And the  key is  reducing that  uncer ta in ty ,  and i f  tha t - -because  of  
the  grea ter  re turn  on inves tment  to  socie ty ,  which R&D genera tes ,  I  
th ink  i t ' s  a  legi t imate  cause ,  a  legi t imate  fac tor  for  the  government  to  
consider  providing ext ra  benef i t s  for  R&D. 
 COMMISSIONER VIDENIEKS:   Thank you,  s i r .  
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 MR.  PRESTOWITZ:   Wel l ,  I  don ' t  rea l ly  d isagree  wi th  Alan or  
Dr .  Haley .   I  was  jus t  s i t t ing  here  th inking as  you were  making your  
comment  about  Tim Gei thner  has  jus t  announced his  p lan  for  removing 
toxic  asse ts ,  and there 's  a  huge government  subs idy e lement  there ,  and 
I 'm th inking i f  we subsidize  R&D the  way we subsidize  f inance  in  th is  
country ,  we might  be  bet ter  of f .  
 MR.  WOLFF:   Can I  add jus t  one  quickly?  
 HEARING COCHAIR SLANE:  Sure .  
 MR.  WOLFF:   R&D is  deduct ib le .   There  i s  not  a  100 percent  
credi t  so  there  i s  some degree  of  tax ,  and the  credi t  tha t  we have i s  
incrementa l  and i t ' s  not  permanent .   So  a  company cannot  p lan  on 
having i t .   I t  i s  renewed every  two years  because  tha t  i s  what  Congress  
wishes  to  do .   So there  are  l imi ts  to  the  benef i t  for  R&D—but  i t  i s  not  
tha t  i t ' s  complete ly  tax  f ree .  
 COMMISSIONER VIDENIEKS:   Wel l ,  i t ' s  deduct ib le  as  a  cos t  of  
doing business .  
 MR.  WOLFF:   True .  
 COMMISSIONER VIDENIEKS:   Whether  i t ' s  cont rac ted  out  or  
done in-house .  
 MR.  WOLFF:   Yes .  
 COMMISSIONER VIDENIEKS:   And the  effec t ive  tax  ra te  i s  
based upon income shown,  the  net  income shown f inal ly  af ter  cos ts ,  so  
I  don ' t  qui te  unders tand your  point .  
 MR.  WOLFF:   Wel l ,  i t ' s  not  tax  f ree .   I t  i s  a  deduct ion,  not  a  
credi t .   I t ' s  not  100 percent  credi t .  
 COMMISSIONER VIDENIEKS:   Thank you.  
 HEARING COCHAIR SLANE:  Commiss ioner  Mul loy.  
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  Thank you,  Mr.  Chairman.  
 Dr .  Haley,  I  th ink you sa id  tha t  GM has  the i r  more  advanced 
R&D in  Shanghai .   Somebody made that  s ta tement .   Was i t  you?  
 DR.  HALEY:  I t s  most  advanced product ion fac i l i ty .   However ,  
they are  making a  major  inves tment  in to  an  R&D lab in  China  today.   
I t ' s  over  $5  b i l l ion  they ' l l  be  put t ing  in to  i t .  
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  My ques t ions  are  going to  be  
bui l t  a round my own observat ion.   When I  went  to  China  for  the  f i rs t  
t ime in  1981,  they d idn ' t  have  essent ia l ly  an  automobi le  indust ry .   
There  were  very  few cars  around.   People  were  on bicycles ,  and then 
you go back now,  and they ' re  probably  making more  cars  there  than 
we 're  going to  be  making here .   So i t ' s  an  enormous change in  jus t  28  
years .  
 When I  look a t  the  WTO agreement  wi th  China ,  my 
unders tanding i s  tha t  i f  an  American company ships  a  car  to  China ,  and 
we agreed to  th is ,  they face  a  25 percent  ta r i f f  on  tha t  i tem going in to  
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China.   But  when China  ships  a  car  here ,  i f  they did ,  and I  th ink they 
wi l l ,  they face  a  2 .5  percent  ta r i f f .  
 So  how do you as  pol icymakers  th ink something l ike  tha t  got  
in to  a  t rade  agreement  and what  was  dr iv ing tha t?  
 And then I  have  a  second par t :   The  Pres ident  in  h is  recent  
s ta tement  to  the  Congress  sa id  ‘we are  commit ted  to  the  goal  of  a  
re tooled ,  re imagined auto  indust ry  tha t  can  compete  and win .   Mil l ions  
of  jobs  depend on i t .   The nat ion  tha t  invented the  automobi le  cannot  
walk  away f rom i t .”  
 That  may be  a  goal .   Do you th ink our  present  pol ic ies  are  going 
to  enable  us  to  accompl ish  tha t  goal?   So I  ask ,  f i rs t ,  how do you th ink 
tha t  k ind of  th ing got  in  a  t rade  agreement?  Secondly ,  can  we achieve  
the  goal  the  Pres ident  se t  going on the  road we 're  going?  
  MR.  WOLFF:   I  don ' t  know what  the  tar i f f  i s  in to  China  on 
autos ,  but  my assumpt ion i s  tha t  U.S.  t rade  negot ia t ing  s t ra tegy is  
dr iven to  a  very  large  extent  by  the  pr ivate  sec tor .   I f  someone f rom a  
U.S.  bus iness  comes in  and says  we can rea l ly  se l l  whatever  i t  might  
be  tha t  we s t i l l  make in  th is  country .  We' l l  come up wi th  an  example  
sooner  or  la ter .   But  le t ’s  say  we could  rea l ly  se l l  tha t  i tem,  then the  
U.S.  t rade  negot ia tor  wi l l  probably  make tha t  a  pr ior i ty .   On the  o ther  
hand,  i f  the  American car  companies  say ,  wel l ,  our  model  has  a lways  
been to  manufacture  abroad ra ther  than to  expor t ,  so  tha t  would  not   be  
a  U.S.  negot ia t ing  pr ior i ty .   I  know that  when I  was  in  government  and 
negot ia t ing ,  cer ta in ly  Ford  wasn ' t  in  favor  of  us  get t ing  the  tar i f f  down 
in  Europe,  thank you very  much;  i t  wanted the  tar i f f  as  h igh as  
poss ib le  because  i t  was  a l ready manufactur ing in  Europe.   I t  wanted to  
keep the  Japanese  out .  
 And there  i s  the  case  of  Motorola .   When we t r ied  to  get  zero  
tar i f fs  on  semiconductors ,  we 'd  come in to  a  t rade  minis ter ' s  of f ice  to  
get  ta r i f fs  e l iminated , ,  and there  would  be  the  Motorola  people  
fo l lowing us  to  say  keep the  tar i f f  up ,  don ' t  go  to  a  zero  tar i f f ,  because  
we are  a l ready inves ted  here .    
 So  there  i s  a  d ivergence  of  v iews between the  government ,  again ,  
and the  pr ivate  sec tor .   My s t rong suspic ion i s  - -wi thout  knowing-- that  
i f  there  i s  a  ta r i f f  in  China  tha t ' s  subs tant ia l  on  autos ,  and i t  wasn ' t  a  
U.S.  negot ia t ing  pr ior i ty ,  then i t  was  shaped,  the  U.S.  pol icy  was  
shaped or  s t ra tegy was  shaped by the  U.S.  car  companies  themselves .  
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  Let ' s  take  tha t  one  across .   Dr .  
Haley.  
 DR.  HALEY:  I  th ink the  problem is  tha t  when China  was  being 
looked a t  for  ent ry  to  the  WTO, the  U.S.  pol icy  goal  i t se l f  was  get t ing  
i t  in to  the  WTO.  Because  of  tha t ,  U.S.  pos i t ions  rea l ly  gave away too 
much in  order  to  ge t  i t  in to  the  WTO. 
49
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
 I  th ink another  i ssue  i s  tha t  American negot ia tors  over  
h is tor ica l ly  have  jus t  been ro t ten .   I f  you go back in to  h is tory ,  the  
value  added tax  i s ,  you can refund or  rebate  the  value  added tax ,  but  
you cannot  rebate  the  income tax  on products  expor ted .   We don ' t  have  
a  value  added tax .   We gave tha t  away to  the  ent i re  wor ld .  
 And so  I  th ink our  negot ia tors  have  qui te  f requent ly  jus t  been 
out -negot ia ted .   Our  pol icy  goals  have  somet imes  been wrong.   I f  
China  wanted in to  the  WTO, tha t  should  have  been the i r  job  to  get  
themselves  qual i f ied ,  not  our  job  to  get  them accepted .  
 And for  Mr.  Wolff ,  our  papercl ip  indust ry  i s  present ly  under  
very  ser ious  a t tack  by Chinese .    We s t i l l  make paperc l ips .  
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  Clyde.  
 MR.  PRESTOWITZ:   I 'm sure  that  Dr .  Haley meant  to  except  two 
former  U.S.  t rade  negot ia tors  f rom the  ro t ten  ca tegory .   Alan sounds  
l ike  the  voice  of  exper ience  on th is ,  and I  th ink what  he  says  resonates  
wi th  me,  and I  th ink,  Dr .  Haley,  a lso  i t ' s  t rue  tha t  in  the  case  of  China  
get t ing  in to  the  WTO, but  in  many cases ,  the  U.S.  negot ia t ing  pr ior i ty  
has  been more  a  geopol i t ica l  pr ior i ty  than an  economic  pr ior i ty .  
 In  the  pos t -war  per iod,  pos t -World  War  I I  per iod,  the  U.S.  has  
f requent ly  made t rade  concess ions  in  order  to  achieve  some broader  
geopol i t ica l  objec t ive .  
 Let  me add one,  one  th i rd  thought  here ,  and tha t  i s  tha t  the  
concepts  of  most  favored nat ion and nat ional  t rea tment ,  on  which a l l  
of  the  negot ia t ion  of  the  pas t  50  years  or  more  has  been based,  a re  o ld-
fashioned concepts .   They,  again ,   made for  a  much more  s imple  age .   
They sound fa i r  and square ,  but  they ' re  k ind of  inherent ly  unequal .  
 So,  for  example ,  in  the  case  of  the  tar i f f  you ' re  ta lk ing about ,  we 
agreed to  g ive  China  most  favored nat ion  t rea tment .   So we have a  
two-and-a-hal f  percent  ta r i f f  for  the  most  favored nat ions  so  China  
gets  tha t  automat ica l ly ,  and they agreed to  g ive  us  MFN,  and they have 
a  25 percent  ta r i f f  for  everybody,  and so  they ' re  t rea t ing  us  the  way 
they t rea t  everybody e lse .   And so  what  are  you complaining about?  
 And nat ional  t rea tment  i s  k ind of  the  same th ing.   We agree  to  
g ive  our  t rading par tners ,  to  t rea t  the  economic  ac tors  of  our  t rading 
par tners  who are  opera t ing  in  th is  country  the  way we t rea t - -  
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  Domest ic .  
 MR.  PRESTOWITZ:   - -our  economic  ac tors ,  which means  they 
can go to  cour t ,  ge t  an  in junct ion agains t  the  U.S.  government ,  have  
pol i t ica l  ac t ion  commit tees ,  lobby the  Congress ,  and so  for th .  
 And our  t rading par tners  agree  to  g ive  us ,  to  t rea t  our  economic  
ac tors  the  same way they t rea t  the i r  own,  but  f requent ly  the  way they 
t rea t  the i r  own is  to  throw them in  ja i l  i f  they d isagree  wi th  the  
government .   But ,  we ' re  be ing t rea ted the  same way.   So what  are  you 
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complaining about?  
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  Very helpful .  
 MR.  WOLFF:   Can I  jus t  ask  to  add something,  jus t  to  defend 
t rade  negot ia tors  for  a  moment?   I  represented  and s t i l l  do  represent  
the  semiconductor  indust ry  in  the  U.S.   In  the  access ion of  China ,  
there  were  hal f  a  dozen th ings  we wanted,  a l l  of  which the  U.S.  
government  got .  
 We wanted to  get  zero  tar i f fs  on  ent ry  in to  China  and we s t i l l  
produce  most  of  the  chips  in  the  Uni ted  Sta tes .   Most  of  the  value  i s  
s t i l l  in  the  Uni ted  Sta tes .   We wanted ant idumping that  was  on a  
nonmarket  economy bas is ,  and tha t  was  got ten  in  the  agreement .   
Protec t ion  of  in te l lec tual  proper ty ,  we got  as  much as  one  could  get  in  
tha t  par t icular  area .  
 One th ing we rea l ly  d id  add was  tha t  s ta te-owned enterpr ises  
would  purchase  on a  commercia l  bas is ,  something tha t  i s  be ing ignored 
now in  government  procurement  ta lk  wi th  China ,  but  the  fac t  i s  tha t  
th is  was  a  major ,  major  ge t  by  the  Uni ted  Sta tes  and Europe f rom 
China .   So t rade  negot ia t ions  are  not  a l l  negat ives  in  te rms of  resul ts .  
 But  the  degree  of  pr ior i ty  put  on  some of  these  th ings  by the  
negot ia tors  rea l ly  depends  upon pr ivate  sec tor  coming in  and say  we 
can rea l ly  se l l  some s tuff  f rom the  U.S.  i f  you only  get  tha t  
concess ion.  
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  Thank you.  
 MR.  PRESTOWITZ:   Pat ,  I 'd  l ike  to  jus t  add a  word in  defense  
of  t rade  negot ia tors  as  wel l .   I 'd  l ike  the  record  to  show that  as  a  
young Foreign Service  off icer  working a t  the  American Embassy in  the  
Hague in  1967 when the  VAT,  the  European VAT,  was  being 
in t roduced,  I  wrote  a  cable  to  the  Sta te  Depar tment  predic t ing  tha t  th is  
was  going to  be  a  t rade  problem for  the  Uni ted  Sta tes .  
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  Thank you,  Clyde.  Thank you,  
panel ,  and i f  we have t ime,  we ' l l  come back.  
 HEARING COCHAIR SLANE:  One of  the  th ings  tha t  I  f ind  i s  
tha t  U.S.  mul t ina t ional  corpora t ions  doing bus iness  in  China  res is t  or  
even undermine  pol ic ies  tha t  we ' re  t ry ing to  in t roduce  here  to  correc t  
the  s i tua t ion .  
 And my ques t ion  i s  do  you fee l  tha t  many U.S.  mul t ina t ional  
corpora t ions  doing business  in  China ,  the i r  days  are  numbered?  
 MR.  WOLFF:   I  th ink they are  under  threa t ,  in  fac t .   I  defer  to  
Dr .  Haley wi th  respect  to  autos ,  but  my sense  i s  tha t  when we see  a  
wave of  autos  coming f rom China ,  they are  not  going to  bear  American 
brands-- there 's  not  going to  be  GM or  - -  Chrys ler  i s  gone now from 
China ,  but  i t ' s  not  going to  be  Ford  or  GM cars  tha t  a re  coming in to  
th is  country  f rom China  in  large  numbers .   I t  wi l l  be  Chinese-owned 
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automobi les .  
 I  th ink there  are  a  whole  ser ies  of  pol ic ies  tha t  a re  very ,  very  
damaging potent ia l ly  to  U.S.  h igh- tech companies  in  par t icular ,  but  
those  who have inves ted  th inking China  are  going to  face  some very ,  
very  ser ious  problems.  
 We look a t  the  in te l lec tual  proper ty  i ssue  as  consis t ing  of  the  
fac t  tha t  there  are  not  enough t ra ined judges ,  tha t  there  i s  not  
enforcement  in  every  par t  of  China .   That  i t  i s  par t  of  the  problem.   I t  
i s  not  a l l  of  the  problem.   There  i s  a  h i jacking of  in te l lec tual  proper ty  
regula t ion  for  o ther  pol icy  purposes  tha t  i s  going to  prove very  
damaging to  American companies  as  wel l  as  to   Europeans  and 
Japanese  companies .  
 For  these  16 large  projec ts  l i s ted  in  the  Minis t ry  of  Science  and 
Technology Plan ,  the  Chinese  government  says  g ive  preference  to- - i t ' s  
more  than give  preference--buy products  tha t  have  indigenous  
innovat ion,  meaning Chinese  patents .   That  means  potent ia l ly  tha t  
American companies  producing in  China  who own patents  tha t  are  
regis tered  in  China  may not  be  able  to  supply  those  large  projec ts .   
These  projec ts  represent  what  i s  going to  be  a  lo t  of  procurement  in  
China .  So I  th ink our  companies  are  a t  r i sk .  
 HEARING COCHAIR SLANE:  Dr .  Haley.  
 DR.  HALEY:  I  th ink that  U.S.  companies ,  and European 
companies ,  and Japanese  companies- -opera t ing  in  China  are  a lways  a t  
r i sk .   The Chinese  government  doesn ' t  rea l ly  recognize  the  r ights  of  
pr iva te  enterpr ise .   I t ' s  not  jus t  inc identa l ly  the  U.S.  and Japanese  and 
European companies  a t  r i sk ;  i t ' s  a lso  China 's  pr iva te  companies  a t  r i sk .  
 The emphasis  wi l l  a lways  be  on bui ld ing the i r  s ta te-owned 
enterpr ises ,  on  crea t ing  technology that  i s  owned and control led  by the  
Chinese  government ,  e i ther  through i t s  research labs  or  through i t s  
s ta te-owned enterpr ises .   And that  they view the  acquis i t ion  of  fore ign 
technology as  probably  the  pr imary focus  of  the i r  bus iness  ac t iv i t ies ,  
and so  U.S.  companies  wi l l  be  a t  r i sk ;  they have  been a t  r i sk ;  they 
have been heavi ly ,  heavi ly  hur t .  
 I f  you jus t  look a t  Qualcomm's  h is tory  in  China ,  and what  
Chinese  pol icy  and regula tory  decis ions  d id  to  i t s  s tock value  over ,  
say ,  the  pas t  ten  years ,  i t ' s  amazing tha t  any company would  want  to  
ac tual ly  get  in to  China  and give  the  government  tha t  k ind of  hold  and 
author i ty  over  them.  
 MR.  PRESTOWITZ:   I 'd  make two points .   One is  when we say 
"our  companies ,"  I  th ink tha t  the  managers  of  many of  our  companies  
don ' t  th ink of  themselves  as  American companies .   I  th ink they th ink 
of  themselves  as  g lobal  companies ,  and I  th ink tha t  to  a  very  
s igni f icant  extent ,  many of  what  we ca l l  "our  companies"  have  become 
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Chinese  companies .   That  i s  to  say  they are  very  much under ,  more  
under  the  inf luence  of  Chinese  pol icy  than they are  under  the  inf luence  
of  American pol icy .  
 Having sa id  tha t ,  jus t  before  Chr is tmas ,  I  was  in  Hong Kong.   I  
had dinner  wi th  an  o ld  Chinese  f r iend of  mine ,  and he  made an  
in teres t ing  comment .  He sa id ,  Clyde,  we now have a l l  the  fore ign dogs  
in  a  kennel ,  and we 're  going to  beat  the--exple t ive  dele ted--out  of  
them.  
 HEARING COCHAIR SLANE:  Thank you.   
 Larry .  
 VICE CHAIRMAN WORTZEL:  Yes .  
 HEARING COCHAIR SLANE:  We're  going to  go around for  the  
second round.   Commiss ioner  Wortze l .  
 VICE CHAIRMAN WORTZEL:  My f i rs t  ques t ion  rea l ly  deals  
wi th  taxat ion;  I  th ink you 've  a l l  ment ioned the  benef i t s  of  taxat ion  
pol icy  and have offered  measures  to  a t t rac t  or  re ta in  indust ry .  
 Dr .  Haley ac tual ly  spoke of  res t r ic t ive  measures .   So i f  U.S.  
mul t ina t ionals  have  d i f ferent  in teres ts  than the  Uni ted  Sta tes  
government ,  i s  i t  reasonable  to  l imi t  the  abi l i ty  of  U.S.  companies  to  
d ivers i fy  tha t  research and manufactur ing as  a  na t ional  in teres t?  
 And second,  Congressman Michaud 's  le t ter ,  and Commiss ioner  
Mul loy read the  opening paragraph-- I 'm going to  read the  f ina l  
paragraph of  tha t  le t ter  and ask  you to  comment  on i t .  
 He,  Michaud,  i s  ta lk ing about  a  le t ter  tha t  he  organized by 54 
col leagues ,  s igned by 54 col leagues ,  and he  says :  
 We urged Pres ident  Obama to  hal t  negot ia t ions  recent ly  launched 
by former  Pres ident  Bush to  es tabl ish  a  new U.S. -China  b i la tera l  
inves tment  t rea ty .   Whi le  many in  Congress  have  echoed Pres ident  
Obama's  ca l l  for  ending exis t ing  loopholes  tha t  promote  off -shor ing,  
b i la tera l  inves tment  t rea t ies- -and I ' l l  add " inherent ly"- -provide  new 
protec t ions  to  ass is t  U.S.  f i rms '  re locat ion  of  inves tment  and jobs  
offshore .  
 So would  you share  tha t  recommendat ion to  Pres ident  Obama 
that  there  should  not  be  any fur ther  work on a  b i la tera l  inves tment  
t rea ty?  
 MR.  WOLFF:   The model  b i la tera l  inves tment  t rea ty  i s  one  tha t  
we negot ia ted  wi th  Rwanda.   China  i s  not  a  smal l  Afr ican country .   I t ' s  
not  a  smal l  country  a t  a l l .   The  U.S.  i ssues  and problems are  very  
d i f ferent  wi th  China  than they are  wi th  any other  country ,  any other  
t rading par tner .  
 I  am in  favor  of  having a  b i la tera l  negot ia t ion  wi th  China ,  and i t  
may be  tha t  a  b i la tera l  inves tment  t rea ty  i s  the  way to  go,  but  i t  has  to  
be  reformula ted  to  cover  the  i ssues  tha t  you people  a t  th is  
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Commiss ion,  the  commiss ioners ,  look a t  and hear  about  on  a  regular  
bas is .  
 I t  has  to  address  America’s  rea l  concerns ,  which the  s tandard  
b i la tera l  inves tment  t rea ty  rea l ly  does  not .  
 DR.  HALEY:  Insofar  as  the  negot ia t ions  are  concerned,  I  don ' t  
th ink there 's  anything wrong wi th  negot ia t ing .   I  th ink the  impor tant  
th ing would  be  what  agreement  comes out  of  i t .   I  th ink a lso  there 's  a  
poss ib i l i ty  tha t  qui te  f requent ly  U.S.  negot ia tors  fee l  th is  pressure  to  
ac tual ly  come to  an  agreement ,  whereas  the  Chinese  don ' t .  
 And so  hold  the  negot ia t ions  and i f  nothing comes of  i t ,  i t ' s  jus t  
f ine .   There 's  no  worry  about  tha t .   There 's  no  rea l  need to  come to  an  
agreement  tha t  i sn ' t  sa t i s fac tory  to  the  U.S.  
 Insofar  as  the  f i rs t  par t  of  the  ques t ion ,  deal ing  wi th  the  i ssue  of  
companies  being global  or  perceiv ing themselves  in  g lobal ,  and the  
reasonableness  of  t ry ing to  change tha t  percept ion and behavior  
insofar  as  the i r  inves tment  pol ic ies  go ,  I  th ink the  key point  here  i s  
tha t  the  U.S.  government  i s  not  a  g lobal  government ;  i t  i s  a  U.S.  
government .  
 And i t s  pol ic ies  wi th  respect  to  i t s  corpora t ions  should  be  
pol ic ies  which seek to  improve the  pos i t ion  of  U.S.  socie ty  in  genera l  
through i t s  corpora t ions .  
 And the  second point  and a  rea l ly  impor tant  i ssue  tha t  too  many 
people  forget  in  pol icy  d iscuss ions  i s  tha t  i t ' s  not  jus t  the  g lobal  
corpora t ions .   Job crea t ion  in  the  Uni ted  Sta tes  i s  pr imar i ly  through 
smal l  and medium-size  enterpr ises ,  and the i r  in teres ts  have  been 
ignored hugely ,  wi thout  any doubt .   Thei r  in teres ts  have  been largely  
ignored.  
 And pol icy  should  s tar t  taking tha t  in to  considera t ion .   
Pol icymakers  should  s tar t  taking in to  considera t ion  tha t  i t ' s  the  smal l  
and medium-size  enterpr ises  tha t  c rea te  jobs  in  the  Uni ted  Sta tes ,  and 
tha t  the i r  in teres ts  should  come to  the  foref ront ,  not  the  g lobal  
companies  necessar i ly ,  but  the  smal l  and medium-size  enterpr ises .  
 MR.  PRESTOWITZ:   Yes ,  wi th  regard  to  g lobal  companies ,  I  
don ' t  th ink you can const ra in  g lobal  companies  and te l l  them you have 
to  do X,  Y and Z in  the  U.S. ,  but  I  th ink we ought  to  maybe reor ient  
ourse lves  a  l i t t le  b i t .  
 I f  Sony wanted to  move i t s  R&D center  to  the  Uni ted  Sta tes ,  I 'd  
love  i t .   Rather  than th inking in  terms of  we have to  keep these ,  quote ,  
"American companies"  here ,  I  th ink we should  be  th inking in  terms of  
we need to  be  doing what  Singapore  and China  and others  do,  and that  
i s  th inking about  how do we get  these  guys  to  inves t  here?  
 How do we br ing the  R&D here?   This  i s  a  very  a t t rac t ive  p lace  
to  do bus iness ,  the  Uni ted  Sta tes .   I t  has  a  lo t  of  p luses .   But  does  the  
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Pres ident  of  the  Uni ted  Sta tes  or  the  Secre tary  of  Commerce  ever  p ick  
up or  the  Secre tary  of  Treasury  ever  p ick  up the  phone and ta lk  to  a  
CEO and say,  what  are  your  inves tment  p lans?   What  are  you guys  
th inking?   
 How are  you th inking about  expanding over  the  next  20  years?   
Gee,  i t  would  be  n ice  i f  you could  do that  in  the  U.S.   And that  
d ia logue doesn ' t  take  p lace  in  the  Uni ted  Sta tes .   I t  takes  p lace  in  
every  o ther  major  country  except  poss ib ly  the  UK.  
 As  far  as  b i la tera l  inves tment  t rea ty  i s  concerned,  i t  depends  on 
what  you negot ia te .   And I  th ink i t ' s  t rue ,  tha t  we have had in  the  pas t  
k ind of  a  negot ia te  for  the  sake  of  negot ia t ing  tendency,  and a lso  again  
a  th ing to  consider  i s  tha t  when we get  in to  a  negot ia t ion  wi th  a  
country  l ike  China ,  i t  a lmost  automat ica l ly  i s  not  jus t  an  economic  
negot ia t ion;  i t  has  geopol i t ica l  over tones .   I f  the  negot ia t ion  fa i l s ,  
does  th is  hur t  our  re la t ions  wi th  China?  
 So I  th ink we need to  before  enter ing negot ia t ions  th ink 
careful ly  about  the  whole  context  of  the  negot ia t ion ,  but  the  main  
th ing rea l ly  i s  you can negot ia te  a  good deal  or  a  bad deal ,  but  a  lo t  of  
i t  depends  on where  you ' re  s tar t ing  f rom.  
 And,  i t  comes back to  th is  fundamenta l  ques t ion  of  what  are  the  
premises  of  the  American in ternat ional  economic  pol icy?   I  would  
argue  tha t  the  premises  for  a  long t ime have been a t  odds  wi th  the  
rea l i ty  of  the  wor ld .  
 HEARING COCHAIR SLANE:  Commiss ioner  Wessel .  
 COMMISSIONER WESSEL:   Thank you,  gent lemen,  and you 've  
g iven a  lo t  of  food for  thought .    
 Let  me ques t ion ,  George ,  your  comment  about  the  negot ia tors  as  
wel l  for  a  d i f ferent  reason,  because  I  th ink our  negot ia tors  have  done 
what  they 've  been to ld  to  do,  and the  fac t  i s  tha t  the  pr ior i t ies  of  our  
government  are  misplaced.  
 When the  NAFTA negot ia t ions  were  contemplated  back in  the  
la te  '80s ,  ear ly  '90s ,  Mexico conducted  99 sec tor  surveys--a lcohol ic  
beverages ,  autos ,  agr icul ture ,  machine  tools ,  up  and down the  l ine--
wi th  the i r  pr iva te  sec tor ,  wi th  both  the i r  companies  and the  unions ,  
and sa id  where  are  our  s t rengths ,  where  are  our  weaknesses ,  what  can 
we expor t ,  where  do we have gaps  here ,  and what  are  the  chal lenges?   
We did  none of  tha t  here .   
 The  comment  was  made ear l ie r  - - I  th ink i t  was  you,  George-- tha t  
the  goal  was  get t ing  China  in  the  WTO, not  necessar i ly  sub-goals .   
There  were  some wi th  aggress ive  indust r ies  backed up by Congress  
tha t  achieved gains  on whether  i t  was  Sect ion 421 or  some of  the  
semiconductor  i ssues .   
 But  we seem to  have  a  rea l  d isconnect  here  in  terms of  what  our  
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nat ional  pr ior i t ies  are .   The group tha t  was  refer red  to  tha t  
Congressman Michaud has  been working wi th ,  who wrote  a  le t ter - -he  
heads  up the  House  Trade Working Group;  there 's  a  counterpar t  in  the  
Senate  as  wel l - -has  asked for  a  review.   Let  us  de termine  rea l ly  what  
our  pr ior i t ies  should  be  before  we cont inue  on the  path  we 're  on.  
 As  you look a t  China ,  what  are  our  pr ior i t ies  r ight  now?  Where  
are  the  major  impediments  to  our  having a  be t ter  s i tua t ion  in  t rade?   
Roughly  25,  as  I  recal l ,  percent  of  China 's  expor ts  come to  the  U.S.   I  
th ink four  or  f ive  percent  of  the  U.S.  expor ts  go to  China .   That  
changes ,  of  course ,  on  a  monthly  bas is  but  not  by  much.  
 So we have substant ia l  leverage .   China  needs  us  a  lo t  more  than 
we need them in  terms of  economic  success .    
 I f  you were  able  to  look a t  th is  af resh ,  what  today would  you se t  
as  our  pr ior i t ies  in  te rms of  going in to  China ,  and can we in  the  
context  of  our  current  WTO and other  commitments  t ry  and rebalance  
the  equat ion?  
 DR.  HALEY:  Fi rs t  of  a l l ,  one  of  the  problems I  th ink we have 
wi th  China  i s  tha t  to  a  grea t  extent  the i r  agreements  don ' t  mean very  
much.  They can turn  around and order  the i r  corpora t ions  to  fo l low 
speci f ic  pol ic ies .  
 I f  you look a t  what 's  going on today,  SASAC in  China  is  
increas ing i t s  inf luence  and power  on a  dai ly  bas is .   Las t  year ,  they 
forced the  consol idat ion  of  20  logis t ics  and s torage  companies  in  
China  in to  a  government-owned ent i ty .    
 COMMISSIONER WESSEL:   Let  me s top you there  i f  I  can  
because  you ra ise  an  impor tant  point  about  the  success  and the  
enforcement ,  but  both  Alan and Clyde were  involved in  the  
semiconductor  agreements ,  as  I  reca l l ,  wi th  Japan in  the  1980s ,  where  
we,  in  fac t ,  had market  success  or ienta t ion  bui l t  in to  the  agreement ,  
meaning tha t  we analyzed the  markets  and we sa id  our  expecta t ions  are  
in  these  areas .  
 I f  the  Chinese  welsh  on a lmost  every  deal ,  and then we have to  
go through a  lengthy process  to  determine  whether ,  in  fac t ,  they ' re  
ac tual ly  breaking the  law,  i t ' s  hard  to  get  not  only  t ransparency and 
get  the  fac ts ,  but  our  own mul t ina t ionals  are  of ten  unwil l ing  to  
par t ic ipa te  for  fear  of  re t r ibut ion  in  the  Chinese  market .  
 Should  we have success  or ienta t ion  bui l t  in to  our  agreements ,  
tha t  we expect  cer ta in  success ,  and i f  not  our  government  i s  going to  
look a t  tha t  on  a  regular  bas is  and then use  tha t  as  indica tor  of  whether  
the  agreement  i s  working or  not?  
 DR.  HALEY:  Yes .  
 COMMISSIONER WESSEL:   Alan?   Clyde?  
 MR.  WOLFF:   Again ,  the  U.S.  government  i s  heavi ly  dependent  
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on the  pr ivate  sec tor  for  input  in  se t t ing  negot ia t ing  objec t ives  - -  
maybe not  in  as  organized way as  Mexico was  wi th  respect  to  i t s  
negot ia t ing  pr ior i t ies ,  but  i t  does  t ry  to  be  responsive  to  what  the  
pr ivate  sec tor  br ings  in  as  problems.  
 My faul t  wi th  the  U.S.  government  i s  tha t  i t  doesn ' t  have  a  
suff ic ient  in te l l igence-gather ing and analys is  appara tus  tha t ' s  devoted  
to  th is  sor t  of  th ing.  
 I  th ink tha t  the  WTO disc ip l ines  to  the  extent  they exis t  ac tual ly  
have  worked wel l  where  they do exis t .   Where  there  was  a  
d iscr iminatory  value  added tax  rebate  on semiconductors ,  the  U.S.  
chal lenged i t  under  the  WTO rules ,  and the  Chinese  wi thdrew the  
rebate  because  the  U.S.  government  brought  a  WTO case .  
 There  was  an  ant idumping case  wi th  respect  to  paper  products  
the  Chinese  brought .   The case  had no bas is ,  and the  U.S.  sa id  “we wi l l  
take  you to  the  WTO,”  and over  the  weekend af ter  USTR conveyed that  
message ,  the  Chinese  government  canceled  the  case  agains t  the  
American companies .  
 So where  there  are  d isc ip l ines ,  the  Chinese  have ,  a t  leas t  in  the  
ear ly  per iod,  the  f i rs t  few years  of  WTO membership ,  sought  to  l ive  up 
to  those  d isc ip l ines .  
 Our  problem is  the  k ind of  economy we 're  deal ing wi th ,  as  was  
the  case  wi th  Japan ear l ier  and is  the  case  in  d i f ferent  ways  wi th  
China ,  i s  jus t  d i f ferent  than the  under ly ing assumpt ions  of  the  WTO, 
as  Clyde was  saying.  
 The d isc ip l ines  on s tandards  and the  d isc ip l ines  on subsid ies  are  
two areas  in  which the  WTO rules  are  very  weak.   With  respect  to  the  
China’s  Ant i -monopoly  law,  there  are  no in ternat ional  ru les .   There  are  
no  in ternat ional  d isc ip l ines  on compet i t ion  pol icy .   That  wi l l  prove  
problemat ic .  
 And on the  major  i ssue  of  currency,  I  don ' t  have  an  answer ,  but  I  
have  a  s t rong fee l ing  the  Chinese  are  not  going to  a l low the  RMB to  
apprecia te  very  much in  the  near  te rm for  obvious  domest ic  reasons ,  
and some form of  in ternat ional  pressure  i s  going to  have  to  be  brought  
to  bear ,  as  in  the  Plaza  Accord  sor t  of  s i tua t ion  in  '85 ,  to  br ing about  
some degree  of  change.  
 I  wouldn ' t  abandon the  U.S.  dol lar ’s  ro le  as  a  reserve  currency 
any too quickly  because  ac tual ly  we have a  fa i r  amount  of  debt  out  
there  tha t  we want  to  cont inue  to  service  tha t  debt  and have  a  
cont inual  inf low of  capi ta l .  
 U.S.  pol icymakers  have  had di f f icul ty  in  the  pas t  deal ing wi th  
less  formal  k inds  of  market  res t r ic t ions ,  d is tor t ions .   The Koreans  had 
"Buy Korean"  pol ic ies  tha t  kept  us  out  for  years  and plus  s tandards ,  a  
number  of  o ther  measures  and pol ic ies .  
57
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
 The  Japanese  had s imi lar  pol ic ies .   The Chinese  are  moving in  
tha t  d i rec t ion  or  have  moved in  tha t  d i rec t ion ,  and we don ' t  have  a  way 
of  counter ing them yet .   We have to  develop those .  
 COMMISSIONER WESSEL:   Thank you.  
 MR.  PRESTOWITZ:   Yes .   I  th ink we should  have,  i f  we go in to  
a  negot ia t ion  tha t ' s  supposed to  be  a  market  opening negot ia t ion ,  one ,  
we ought  to  be  doing some kind of  market  analys is .   We ought  to  have  
some idea  of  the  compet i t iveness  of  our  indust ry  and therefore  based 
on that  some expecta t ion  of  what  th is  indust ry  could  do in  an  open 
market .  
 And I  th ink tha t  the  problem,  as  Alan sa id ,  i s  tha t  when you 're  
deal ing  wi th  an  expor t - led ,  a  country  tha t  has  an  expor t - led  growth 
s t ra tegy,  i t ' s  l ike  p laying basebal l .   Two teams are  p laying di f ferent  
games.   One team is  p laying footbal l  and one  team is  p laying basebal l ,  
and so  i t ' s  very  hard  for  them to  p lay  together .  
 We have in  the  pas t  been in  denia l  and we have to ld  ourse lves  
tha t  they ' re  p laying our  game or  they pre t ty  soon wi l l  p lay  our  game,  
and the  WTO rules  are  k ind of  or iented  towards  our  game.  
 I  th ink we need to  recognize  when we 're  deal ing  wi th  th is  k ind 
of  an  economy,  i t ' s  not  the  same game.   We should  have some 
expecta t ions ,  and I  th ink tha t  we should  not  hes i ta te  to ,  i f  those  
expecta t ions  are  not ,  do  not  appear  to  be  on thei r  way to  some kind of  
rea l iza t ion ,  then I  th ink we ought  not  to  hes i ta te  to  take  those  mat ters  
to  the  WTO and use  the  nul l i f ica t ion  and impairment  c lauses  or  
whatever  in  order  to  k ind of  provide  some disc ip l ine  on tha t .  
 But ,  I  th ink,  look,  there 's  a  much,  much bigger  game afoot  here ,  
and tha t  i s  tha t  in  the  current  cr is i s ,  which was  largely  caused by the  
g lobal  imbalances ,  the  expor t - led  game is  not  going to  work in  the  
fu ture  as  i t  has  in  the  pas t .   I t ' s  not  going to  be  poss ib le ,  and so  as  we 
look to  the  fu ture ,  any resolut ion of  th is  cr i s i s  i s  going to  have  to  
resul t  in  a  smal ler  U.S.  def ic i t  and a  smal ler  Asian  surplus ,  meaning 
tha t  the  U.S.  i s  going to  have  to  somehow ei ther  expor t  more  and 
impor t  less  or  produce  more  domest ica l ly  what  i t  consumes or  some 
combinat ion.  
 Asia  i s  going to  have to  consume more  of  what  i t  produces ,  
expor t  re la t ive ly  less ,  consume re la t ive ly  more ,  and tha t  k ind of  
overr id ing impera t ive  sugges ts  tha t  we need to  be  having very  ser ious  
d iscuss ions  wi th  China ,  but  not  jus t  wi th  China .   This  i s  not  jus t  a  
China  th ing.   There  are  even a  number  of  non-Asian countr ies  tha t  
have  chronic  surpluses ,  Germany being one of  them.  
 And there  needs  to  be  a  fundamenta l  d iscuss ion about  the  
inadequacies  of  the  t rade  ru les  and the  currency ru les  tha t  have  led  us  
to  th is  mess  and how to  get  out  of  i t ,  and inevi tably  tha t ' s  going to  
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resul t  in- - i t  has  to  resul t  in  ser ious  th inking about  how do we a t t rac t  
more  inves tment  here?   How do we produce more  s tuff?  
 As  I  sa id  ear l ie r ,  r ight  now the  greener  we get ,  the  b igger  our  
t rade  def ic i t  ge ts .   Wel l ,  tha t  can ' t  be ,  and so  I  th ink tha t ' s  where  we 
have to  go.  
 COMMISSIONER WESSEL:   I  agree  that ' s  where  we have to  go.  
 I  don ' t  necessar i ly  have  your  conf idence  tha t  pol ic ies  are  going to  
change to  get  us  there .   But  thank you.  
 MR.  PRESTOWITZ:   But ,  Mike,  I  agree  wi th  Alan,  the  Chinese  
are  not  going to  a l low the  renminbi  to  apprecia te .   And so  i f  you 
accept  tha t ' s  the  case-- le t ' s  put  i t  th is  way.   As  they current ly  s tand,  
the  Chinese  in  my view are  not  going to  a l low the  renminbi  to  
apprecia te .  
 But  i f  there  i s  no  renminbi  apprecia t ion ,  then you can ' t  break 
th is  pa t tern .   But  i f  you don ' t  break th is  pa t tern ,  we a l l  go  down the  
tubes ,  and so  somehow this  pa t tern  has  to  get  broken.   And i t ' s  going 
to  require ,  I  th ink,  ge t t ing  ourse lves  out  of - -so  much of  th is  d iscuss ion 
is  about  f ight ing the  las t  war .    
 So  much of  th is  d iscuss ion is  about  th ings  tha t  happened in  the  
1930s ,  in  the  1940s ,  and not  about  the  wor ld  tha t  we l ive  in .   We 've  
jus t  got  to  get  ourse lves  out  of  tha t  mind-se t  and in to  the  rea l  wor ld .  
 HEARING COCHAIR SLANE:  My quest ion is  can we effect ively  
develop an  indust r ia l  pol icy  wi thout  modifying or  wi thdrawing f rom 
the  WTO?  Mr.  Wolff?  
 MR.  WOLFF:   There  are  many gradat ions  of  indust r ia l  pol icy .   
One par t  of  indust r ia l  pol icy  would  be  our  tax  sys tem.   We ta lked 
about  ear l ie r  our  educat ion ,  immigra t ion  pol ic ies  and the  th ings   tha t  
a re  fos ter ing bas ic  R&D in  th is  country ,  which rea l ly  every  o ther  
country  wants  to  emula te  and most  of  them are  doing so .   So we 
cer ta in ly  can do a  number  of  th ings  tha t  can  make our  country  more  
compet i t ive  as  a  p lace  to  locate  product ive  ac t iv i ty .  
 Then there  are  more  targeted  programs,  and the  WTO rules  are  
rea l ly  not  tha t  res t r ic t ive  in  regulat ing  suppor t  of  indust r ies .   That  may 
be  a  def ic iency f rom the  point  of  v iew of  offense  (going af ter  o ther’s  
measures  in  the  WTO),  but  i t  may be  a  s t rength  in  terms of  defense .   
For  example ,  i f  we want  to  say  we are  going to  be  energy independent ,  
and we 're  going to  subsid ize  b iofuels  to  a  very  large  extent ,  tha t  i s  not  
going to  be  l ike ly  to  be  something tha t  would  be  WTO inconsis tent ,  or  
a t  leas t  i t  would  be  WTO defens ib le .  
 So there  are  many th ings  tha t  we could  do to  promote  American 
indust ry  tha t  would  not  cause  us  to  even consider  for  a  moment  having 
to  wi thdraw from the  WTO. 
 DR.  HALEY:  I  th ink another  th ing we can do is  ac tual ly  look a t  
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some other  countr ies  and how they 've  had success .   Very  s imi lar  in  
economic  phi losophy,  for  ins tance ,  i s  Aust ra l ia .   In  Aust ra l ia ,  
indust r ies  and companies  wi th in  indust r ies  are  able  to  form what  they 
ca l l  precompet i t ive  coopera t ive  agreements  where  they can work 
together  for  the  development  of  h igh-r isk  projec ts ,  technologies  tha t  
they wouldn ' t  be  able  to  do on the i r  own as  individual  companies .  
 That  in  the  Uni ted  Sta tes  today would  be  i l legal .   So I  th ink we 
could  change our  pol ic ies  and our  laws jus t  a  l i t t le  b i t  to  promote  
speci f ic  behaviors  tha t  would  benef i t  us .   I  don ' t  necessar i ly  th ink tha t  
would  be  indust r ia l  pol icy ,  but  there 's  a  whole  hos t  of  l i t t le  tweaks  to  
our  own laws and pol ic ies  tha t  we can under take .  
 MR.  PRESTOWITZ:   Wel l ,  the  answer  i s  absolute ly  yes .   We 
have pursued a l l  k inds  of  indust r ia l  pol ic ies  ourse lves  under  the  WTO. 
 The In ternet  i s  an  indust r ia l  pol icy ,  and what  we do in  aerospace ,  
tha t ' s  an  indust r ia l  pol icy .  
 Much of  what  the  Defense  Depar tment  does  i s  an  indust r ia l  
pol icy .   What  the  FCC does  i s  an  indust r ia l  pol icy .   And most  of  the  
wor ld 's  countr ies  who are  members  of  the  WTO have fu l l - f ledged 
indust r ia l  pol ic ies .   I  don ' t  see  any inconsis tency.  
 HEARING COCHAIR SLANE:  Thank you.  
 Commiss ioner  Reinsch.  
 COMMISSIONER REINSCH:  Thank you.  
 Clyde 's  r ight .   This  country  has  a  long and honorable  h is tory  of  
indust r ia l  pol icy .   I t ' s  become a  bad word in  the  las t  20  years ,  and we 
keep f ight ing  the  same bat t le  over  and over  and over  again .   I  suspect  
for  the  next  few years  our  s ide  wi l l  win ,  but  I  a lso  suspect  i t ' s  not  
going to  be  permanent .   I t  keeps  coming back.  
 Let  me ask  a  ques t ion  about  tax  pol icy  because  we have been 
c i rc l ing  on tha t  for  some t ime.   I  th ink Alan made a  very  good point  
tha t  whi le  there  c lear ly  are  tax  subs id ies  tha t  a re  among other  th ings  
WTO i l legal ,  some of  which we 've  successful ly  countered,  the  bas ic  
fac t  tha t  our  corpora te  ra te  i s  36  percent ,  and somebody e lse 's  i s  ten ,  
does  not  necessar i ly  mean tha t  they ' re  subs id iz ing when as  a  mat ter  of  
na t ional  pol icy  tha t ' s  what  they 've  decided to  do.  
 The ques t ion  tha t  I 'd  l ike  you to  speak to  d i rec t ly  i s  whether  the  
Uni ted  Sta tes  needs  to  make a  larger  change in  i t s  approach to  
taxat ion.   We 're  one  of  a  handful  of  countr ies  in  the  wor ld  tha t  taxes  
on the  bas is  of  wor ldwide income which,  in  turn ,  then forces  us  to  do a  
whole  bunch of  th ings  for  equi ty  reasons ,  l ike  the  fore ign tax  credi t  
and deferra l ,  in  order  to  avoid  double  taxat ion  and other  problems.   
Those  correc t ive  ac t ions  then become targets  for  amendments  in  order  
to  achieve  o ther  pol icy  in teres ts .  
 Would we be  bet ter  off  i f  we went  to  a  te r r i tor ia l  sys tem of  
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taxat ion  l ike  the  Europeans  do as  wel l  as  most  of  the  res t  of  the  wor ld  
and a lso  as  par t  of  tha t  ins t i tu ted  a  VAT and a  VAT rebate?   
 Anybody want  to  go f i rs t?  
 MR.  WOLFF:   Clear ly ,  I  th ink going to  a  value  added tax ,  a  
na t ional  sa les  tax ,  would  be  benef ic ia l  to  product ive  ac t iv i ty  in  th is  
country .  We subsidize ,  through the  payment  on our  expor ts  of  taxes  
abroad when our  goods  enter  a  fore ign market ,  the i r  socie ty  and the i r  
socia l  cos ts ,  and they ' re  re l ieved of  those  on the i r  expor ts .   Thei r  
products  coming in to  th is  country  are  re l ieved of  the i r  socia l  cos ts  and 
don ' t  bear  ours .   So there 's  a lways  been a  d isadvantage .  
 And the  reason we did  tha t  was  not  necessar i ly- -probably  no one  
read Clyde 's  cable  i s  one  of  the  problems.   But  another  i s  tha t  we were  
used to  border  adjus tments  for  s ta te  taxes :  I f  there  was  an  expor t  f rom 
a  s ta te ,  i t  does  not  bear  sa les  tax  in  the  neighbor ing s ta te  and vice  
versa .  
 So to  those  people  in  1947,  a t  the  t ime i t  seemed natura l ,  to  
adopt  tha t  sys tem.    
 I  would  convene a  panel  of  corpora t ions .   I 'd  take  Clyde 's  point  
tha t  you 'd  have  Sony and Siemens  and IBM and a l l  g lobal  companies ,  
and you 'd  say  what  would  make you locate  more  of  your  product ive  
ac t iv i ty  in  the  Uni ted  Sta tes?   And I 'd  tes t  some proposi t ions .   They 
might  have  to  have  the i r  tax  d i rec tors  wi th  them.  
 But  I  don ' t  know that  tha t  debate wi l l  ac tual ly  take  p lace  because  
we ' l l  have  an  “end deferra l  and le t ' s  not  end i t”  debate .   We won ' t  have  
rea l ly  a  fu l l - f ledged debate  as  to  what  are  the  range of  tax  incent ives  
and dis incent ives .   How does  the  tax  sys tem play  on locat ion  of  
product iv i ty  inc luding R&D?  Where  does  i t  go?   Why does  i t  go  
there?   
 Actual ly ,  there  are  answers  to  the  ques t ions .   The i ssue  i s  wi l l  
the  ques t ions  be  asked?   So I  don ' t  know ful ly  the  answer ,  but  I  know 
that  our  tax  ra tes  are  h igher ,  tha t  they are  d isadvantageous ,  and tha t  
product ive  ac t iv i ty  i s  moving out  of  th is  country .   We have o ther  
fac tors  tha t  tend to  move i t  back in ,  l ike  our  univers i t ies .   People  want  
to  be  c lose  to  them.   That  advantage  may not  las t  forever .  
 COMMISSIONER REINSCH:  I  th ink the  fu l l  debate  comes 
around every  four  or  f ive  years  l ike  c lockwork.   I  th ink you ' re  r ight ,  
th is  wi l l  not  be  the  year  for  i t ,  but  i t  wi l l  happen again  sooner  or  la ter .  
  
 Do e i ther  of  the  o ther  two want  to  comment?   Or  I 've  got  another  
ques t ion .  
 MR.  PRESTOWITZ:   Wel l ,  I 'm wi th  you.   I  th ink we ought  to  
have a  value  added tax .   I  th ink we ought  to  have  ter r i tor ia l  taxing 
ra ther  than global  taxing.   I  th ink we ought  to  conform here  to  the  
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global  prac t ice .  
 COMMISSIONER REINSCH:  Alan,  jus t  le t  me jus t  ask  you a  
f ina l  th ing,  jus t  to  comment  on one  of  Clyde 's  points .   Do you th ink 
MFN and nat ional  t rea tment  are  dead or  should  be?  
 MR.  WOLFF:   They should  not  be .   I  would  not  re t rea t  f rom our  
current  t rading sys tem.   I  would  t ry  to  make i t  work to  our  advantage ,  
and there  are  enough except ions  to  MFN that  rea l ly  have  to  be  counted  
in  the  process .   I  don ' t  l ike  the  prol i fera t ion  of  regional  agreements ,  
and when there  i s  a  pan-Asian  agreement  tha t  wi l l  be  very ,  very  
des t ruct ive  f rom the  v iewpoint  I  th ink of  U.S.  economic  ac t iv i ty .  
 COMMISSIONER REINSCH:  Pan-Asian  agreement  tha t  excludes  
us  or  one  tha t  inc ludes  us?  
 MR.  WOLFF:   That  excludes  us .  
 COMMISSIONER REINSCH:  Okay.  
 MR.  WOLFF:   Actual ly  there  are  lo ts  of  of f ic ia ls  in  Tokyo and 
in  Bei j ing  who th ink exclus ive  regional  Asian  agreement  would  be  
very  good.   I  th ink i t  would  be  very bad f rom our  perspect ive  and a  
very  ser ious  threa t .   So we have to  work to  counter  i t .  
 And nat ional  t rea tment  works  to  our  advantage  and is  essent ia l  
to  the  ru les-based sys tem,  I  would  not  abandon i t ,  would  enforce  i t .  
 COMMISSIONER REINSCH:  Thank you.  
 HEARING COCHAIR SLANE:  Commiss ioner  Blumenthal .  
 MR.  PRESTOWITZ:   I  wasn ' t  sugges t ing  abandoning i t .   I  was  
jus t  sugges t ing  tha t  i t ' s  not  good enough.  
 COMMISSIONER BLUMENTHAL:  Thank you a l l  very  much.  
 I  don ' t  agree  tha t  we,  Mr.  Pres towi tz ,  in  the  examples  you gave,  
tha t  those  were  examples  of  indust r ia l  pol icy ,  l ike  the  In ternet .   We 
were  t ry ing to  solve  very  d iscre te  na t ional  secur i ty  problems,  packet  
swi tching and dis t r ibuted  communicat ions ,  tha t  had spinoffs  
af terwards ,  and i t  was  the  ingenui ty  of  our  ent repreneurs  af terwards  to  
f igure  out  how to  commercia l ize  those .   But  tha t  was  the  rea lm of  
defense  nat ional  secur i ty ;  tha t  was  not ,  in  my mind,  an  indust r ia l  
pol icy .  
 The other  point  I  would  make is ,  sure ,  we can say  the  Chinese  
won ' t  devalue  the i r  RMB, but  we ' re  a lso  in  a  s ta te  where  we ' re  about  to  
be  borrowing a  lo t  more  for  years  to  come.   So we 're  incent iv iz ing 
each o ther  to  do  the  exact  same th ing tha t  we 've  been doing for  the  las t  
few years  by our  own pol ic ies  as  wel l  as  by  the i r  own pol ic ies .   
There 's  no  incent ive  as  long as  we keep borrowing a t  th is  pace  and 
speed.  
 I  jus t  wonder  about  indust r ia l  pol icy ,  the  Chinese  have  a  lo t  of  
p lans ,  and we 've  a l l  wr i t ten  about  them,  but  i s  indust r ia l  pol icy  even 
working in  China?   I s  there  a  na t ional  champion tha t  i s  even c lose  to  
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compet ing?   
 I  be l ieve  Mr.  Wolff ,  ment ioned,  and I  th ink he 's  absolute ly  
correc t ,  tha t  in  the  semiconductor  indust ry ,  most  of  the  value  i s  kept  in  
the  Uni ted  Sta tes .   There  i s  no  one  even c lose  to  compet ing wi th  our  
top  companies ,  Apple  and In te l ,  and tha t  had very  l i t t le  to  do  wi th  
indust r ia l  pol icy  unless  you ca l l  cer ta in  taxat ion  pol ic ies  and 
ent repreneur ia l  environment ,  and so  for th ,  an  indust r ia l  pol icy .  
 I 'd  jus t  ca l l  tha t  an  economic  pol icy .   But  the  ques t ion  i s ,  “are  
nat ional  champion pol ic ies  in  China  working?”   They ta lk  about  
na t ional  champions .   They ta lk  about  companies  tha t  a re  going to  be  
brand names and compet i t ive  wi th  the  Apples  and Del ls  and In te l ’s  of  
the  wor ld ,  but  i s  there  anything on the  hor izon tha t  wi l l  even be  
compet i t ive?  
 I t ' s  one  th ing to  have  p lans ;  i t ' s  another  th ing to  ac tual ly  see  
compet i tors  in  the  h ighes t  va lue  indust r ies  ac tual ly  coming down the  
p ike .  
 MR.  WOLFF:   I 'd  say  tha t  you make an  excel lent  point .   We have 
not  seen many Chinese  nat ional  champions  yet .   I  th ink,  Huawei  i s  
one ,  and there  are  a  few other  Chinese  companies  tha t  a re  
in ternat ional ly  compet i t ive ,  but  you do not  have  to  be  successful  in  
crea t ing  a  compet i t ive  nat ional  champion to  do a  grea t  deal  of  damage 
to  o ther  countr ies’  companies .  
 In  the  DRAM f ight  tha t  Clyde and I  were  involved in  d i f ferent  
aspects  of  the  Japanese  caused enormous damage to  American 
producers  wi thout  necessar i ly  ending up wi th  a  dominant  share ,  and i t  
wasn ' t  a  good pol icy  for  anyone.  
 The Koreans  came a long and they were  very  good a t  making 
DRAMS, and so  were  the  Taiwanese ,  but  in  the  meant ime these  
indust r ia l  pol ic ies  d id  a  lo t  of  damage to  our  companies .   So the  fac t  
tha t  they d idn ' t  c rea te  the  wor ld 's  dominant  DRAM producer  d id  not  in  
tha t  ins tance  mean that  they had not  in  any event  caused us  damage.  
 COMMISSIONER BLUMENTHAL:  I  take  your  point .   I  th ink 
i t ' s  a  good one,  but  tha t ' s  a  d i f ferent  se t  of  analys is  than saying the  
response  to  China 's  indust r ia l  pol icy  or  Japan 's  indust r ia l  pol icy  i s  to  
have one of  our  own.   I t  should  be  get t ing  people  to  abandon the  
pursui t  of  damaging indust r ia l  pol ic ies .  
 Even in  the  case  of  Japan and Korea ,  both  of  which are  looked a t  
as  the  models  of  indust r ia l  pol icy .   You have fa i r ly  s tagnant  economies  
tha t  a re  in  worse  shape than our  own.   They ' re  so  dependent  on thei r  
na t ional  champions  tha t  you can ' t  spur  smal l  bus iness  or  
ent repreneurship  there  e i ther .  
 I  jus t  don ' t  buy the  premise  tha t  indust r ia l  pol icy  has  worked in  
any one of  these  countr ies  or  would  par t icular ly  work here ,  and again  
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i t ' s  one  th ing--we ' l l  wai t  and see  wi th China ,  but ,  the  idea  tha t  Huawei  
i s  going to  very  soon ca tch  up to  our  leading te lecom in  terms of  the  
value  they crea te  i s ,  I  th ink,  i s  far fe tched.  
 MR.  WOLFF:   But  i f  you look a t ,  again ,  going back to  Japan for  
a  moment ,  Honda was  not  a  crea t ion  of  the  Japanese  government ,  and 
i t  was  not ,  i t  was  not  a  company MITI  wanted to  see  succeed,  and i t  
d id  anyway.  
 COMMISSIONER BLUMENTHAL:  Right .  
 MR.  WOLFF:   But  i t  benef i t ted  f rom s tandards  pol ic ies  tha t  
prevented  access  to  the  Japanese  market .   Having a  protec ted  home 
market  was  an  advantage .   Nissan and Toyota  benef i t ted  a  grea t  deal  
f rom protec ted  home market .   So a  country  can have  an  indust r ia l  
pol icy  tha t  you could  say  i s  misguided to  some degree ,  but  which 
crea ted  very  s t rong compet i tors .  
 And wi th  respect  to  our  react ion,  i f  you were  looking for  a  
market -or iented  resul t ,  the  Uni ted  Sta tes  forced Japanese  inves tment  to  
come to  th is  country  because  we put  t rade  res t r ic t ions  in to  ef fec t .   So  
the  Uni ted  Sta tes  in tervened as  wel l  in  response  to  Japan’s  
in tervent ions .    
 In  th inking about  indust r ia l  pol icy  af fec t ing  autos ,  there  i s  
another  example .   The Canadians  obta ined inves tment  f rom our  car  
companies ,  p lants  crea ted  nor th  of  the  border ,  by  ins is t ing  on a  degree  
of  local  content .   I t  was  not  in  a  formal  U.S. -Canada agreement ,  i t  was  
s ide  le t ters  to  the  1965 Auto  Agreement  tha t  forced inves tment  to  go 
nor th  of  the  border .   This  was  not  because  American car  companies  
necessar i ly  wanted to  inves t  in  Canada.  
 So indust r ia l  pol icy  does  crea te  employment .   The pol icy  may be  
misguided,  but  i t  a lso  shapes  our  economy when others  engage in  
indust r ia l  pol icy ,  and we a t  leas t  need to  know what 's  going on and 
counter  i t  to  some degree .  
 COMMISSIONER BLUMENTHAL:  Thank you.   I 'm out  of  t ime 
so  thanks .  
 HEARING COCHAIR SLANE:  Al l  three  of  you have been 
enormously  helpful ,  and we rea l ly  want  to  thank you for  taking the  
t ime to  come before  us .  
 We ' l l  s tand adjourned for  ten  minutes .  
 [Whereupon,  a  shor t  recess  was  taken. ]  
 
PANEL II:   CHINA’S USE OF INCENTIVES TO ATTRACT 
INVESTMENT INTO ITS PILLAR AND STRATEGIC INDUSTRIES 
 
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  We're  going to  now s tar t  our  
second panel ,  and we have asked th is  panel  to  focus  on "China 's  Use  of  
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Incent ives  to  At t rac t  Inves tment  in to  i t s  P i l la r  and St ra tegic  
Indust r ies ."   
 But  a lso  are  there  th ings  wi th in our  own corpora te  s t ructure  tha t  
causes  them to  be  a t t rac ted  to  the  incent ives  to  move product ion,  R&D, 
other  th ings ,  in to  China?  
 We're  very  for tunate  to  have  wi th  us  today three  panel is ts  who 
wi l l  of fer  very  good ideas  on what  i s  happening to  us  and what  we 
should  be  t ry ing to  do to  cope wi th  i t .  
 Dr .  Ralph Gomory is  a  research professor  wi th  the  Stern  School  
of  Business  a t  New York Univers i ty .   He 's  a  member  of  the  Nat ional  
Academy of  Science ,  the  Nat ional  Academy of  Engineer ing,  and he 's  
e lec ted  to  the  Counci ls  of  those  socie t ies .  
 He had bus iness  exper ience  wi th  IBM and he  worked as  Pres ident  
and now the  Pres ident  Emeri tus  of  the  Alf red  P.  Sloan Foundat ion.   
 I 've  had the  pr iv i lege  of  working c lose ly  wi th  Dr .  Gomory on 
some of  these  i ssues  over  the  las t  few years .  
 Terry  Stewar t  i s  the  Managing Direc tor  of  the  law f i rm Stewar t  
and Stewar t .   Mr .  Stewar t  has  been of  grea t  ass is tance  to  th is  
Commiss ion in  helping us  unders tand issues  through the  years .   His  
prac t ice  focuses  on a  var ie ty  of  in ternat ional  t rade  mat ters .   But  he 's  
a lso  an  adjunct  professor  of  law a t  tha t  premier  law school  Georgetown 
Univers i ty .  
 F inal ly ,  we have Richard  McCormack,  who is  the  Edi tor  and 
Publ isher  of  Manufactur ing & Technology News.   That  i s  a  publ ica t ion  
which he  crea ted  in  1994.   I t ' s  read by execut ives  of  indust ry ,  
government ,  and academia  on f ive  cont inents .  
 He makes  tha t  publ ica t ion  avai lable  to  us  a t  the  Commiss ion,  and 
i t  a lways  has  grea t  informat ion tha t  helps  us  th ink about  the  i ssues  tha t  
are  fac ing our  nat ion .  
 So we had the  f i rs t  panel ,  and that  was ,  to  those  of  us  who are  
in teres ted  in  these  i ssues ,  l ike  Caruso,  and the  s tory  i s  tha t  Al  Jolson 
had to  appear  af ter  Caruso,  and when he  s tood up,  he  sa id  "You a in ' t  
heard  nothing yet ."   So tha t ' s  the  way I  look on th is  panel .   This  i s  our  
Jolson panel ,  and I  th ink they ' re  going to  make us  th ink we haven ' t  
heard  anything yet .  
 Dr .  Gomory,  i f  you ' l l  begin .  
 
STATEMENT OF DR. RALPH E.  GOMORY, RESEARCH 
PROFESSOR, NYU STERN SCHOOL OF BUSINESS AND 
PRESIDENT EMERITUS,  ALFRED P.  SLOAN FOUNDATION 
NEW YORK, NEW YORK 
 
 DR.  GOMORY:  Thank you very  much,  Commiss ioner  Mul loy.    
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 I t ' s  a  grea t  p leasure  for  me to  be  here .   This  i s  my,  I  th ink,  
second appearance  before  th is  group,  and especia l ly  to  be  here  wi th  
Pat r ick  Mul loy wi th  whom I  have  worked and cont inue  to  work over  a  
per iod of  many years .  
 So  le t  me s tar t  abrupt ly- -a l l  r ight - -wi th  the  fo l lowing s ta tement :  
We must  rea l ize  tha t  in  the  modern  g lobal iz ing wor ld  the  in teres ts  of  
many of  our  g lobal  corpora t ions  have d iverged f rom the  in teres ts  of  
the  nat ion .  
 In  par t icular ,  China  i s  wise ly  exploi t ing  the  fac t  tha t  the  
capabi l i t ies  of  today 's  g lobal  corpora t ions  are  avai lable  to  the  b idder  
who offers  the  h ighes t  prof i t .  
 By the  way,  my voice  i s  a  l i t t le  hoarse .   I f  you can ' t  hear  me,  
g ive  me a  s ignal .   Okay.  
 As  par t  of  the  economic  development  of  China ,  China  has  made 
i t  prof i table  for  American companies  to  develop product ion fac i l i t ies  
in  China ,  and more  recent ly ,  to  expand R&D as  wel l .   The resul t  i s  to  
crea te  in  China ,  and as  par t  of  the  Chinese  GDP,  fac i l i t ies  and jobs  
involving the  most  current  methodology.  
 And of ten  the  output  of  these  fac i l i t ies  goes  to  the  U.S.  market ,  
and there  wi th  the  ef fec t  of  subs idies ,  low labor  cos ts ,  and up- to-date  
methodology,  they can of ten  outcompete  U.S.  f i rms who are  ac tual ly  
working and crea t ing  value  in  the  Uni ted  Sta tes .  
 Why does  th is  mat ter?   I t  mat ters  because  i t  i s  corpora t ions  and 
other  bus inesses  tha t  enable  people  to  par t ic ipate  in  the  product ion of  
the  goods  and services  tha t  a re  consumed in  the  modern  wor ld .   And i t  
i s  corpora t ions  and bus inesses  tha t  enable  people  to  earn  a  share  of  the  
value  they produce  to  take  home and to  suppor t  themselves  and the i r  
fami l ies .  
 Today,  most  of  the  goods  we consume cannot  be  made a t  home or  
by  individuals .   Whether  i t ' s  cars  or  te lephone service ,  they are  
complex.   They require  la rge  organiza t ions  to  crea te  them,  and th is  i s  
d i f ferent  f rom the  pas t .   To l ive ,  most  people  today must  be  par t  of  an  
organiza t ion  tha t  makes  or  d is t r ibutes  the  complex goods  and services  
tha t  people  use  today,  and being par t  of  such an  organizat ion  i s  what  
people  must  do  to  earn  a  l iv ing and suppor t  themselves  and the i r  
fami l ies .  
 Therefore ,  having product ive  organiza t ions  tha t  enable  people  to  
contr ibute  h igh value  i s  what  makes  a  prosperous  nat ion .   But  
g lobal iza t ion ,  on  the  o ther  hand,  has  made i t  poss ib le  for  U.S.  
corpora t ions  to  pursue  the i r  prof i t s  by  moving the i r  grea t  capabi l i t ies  
abroad,  but  in  crea t ing  the i r  prof i t s  in  th is  way,  they are  crea t ing  
product ive  jobs  abroad ins tead of  fu l f i l l ing  tha t  absolute ly  v i ta l  
funct ion in  the  U.S.  
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 In  response  to  th is ,  we need to consider  a  U.S.  na t ional  economic  
s t ra tegy tha t  inc ludes  incent ives  for  companies  to  have  or  crea te  h igh 
value-added jobs  in  the  Uni ted  Sta tes ,  and i f  we want  h igh value-added 
jobs ,  le t  us  reward our  companies  for  producing such jobs  whether  they 
do tha t  through R&D or  advanced technology or  by jus t  p la in  American 
ingenui ty  appl ied  in  any se t t ing  whatsoever .  
 As  an  example  of  th is ,  the  corpora te  tax  ra te  could  be  sca led  by 
the  value  tha t  i s  added per  fu l l - t ime employee  by the  workers  of  
corpora t ions  opera t ing  in  the  Uni ted  Sta tes .   This  would  be  a  tax  a imed 
a t  resul ts .   That  i s  to  say  h igh value-added jobs ,  not  a t  means  of  
ge t t ing  there .   I t  would  be  very American.   Anyone whose  company,  
la rge  or  smal l ,  has  h igh value-added per  person would  benef i t ,  and 
those  who are  unproduct ive  would  see  the i r  prof i t s  heavi ly  taxed.  
 I t  could  be  made revenue neutra l ,  and i t  would  be  an  incent ive  to  
f ind  new and bet ter  ways  to  do th ings  in  every  indust ry ,  not  in  a  
chosen few,  and in  every  business .  
 But  there  i s  one  o ther  ef fec t  f rom the  g lobal iz ing wor ld  tha t  we 
must  deal  wi th  in  addi t ion  to  th is :  the  effec t  of  the  mercant i l i s t  
pol ic ies  of  o ther  na t ions .  
 China ,  in  par t icular ,  i s  loaning us  the  money to  buy the i r  
underpr iced goods  wi th  a l l  the  des t ruct ive  ef fec ts  tha t  go  wi th  tha t  
approach,  and th is  has  been a  major  contr ibutor  to  the  imbalance  of  
t rade  we now have.  
 With  the  a id  of  China  and of  o ther  countr ies ,  but  China  f i rs t ,  we 
are ,  in  ef fec t ,  l iv ing beyond our  means .   We are  impor t ing  more  value  
than we expor t  and we are  consuming more  value  than we crea te .   This  
i s  not  a  sus ta inable  path  for  th is  or  for  any nat ion .  
 On the  o ther  hand,  i f  t rade  i s  ba lanced,  the  value  of  goods  
impor ted  i s  matched to  the  value  of  goods  expor ted  f rom the  country ,  
and those  expor ted  goods  and services  are  provided by corpora t ions  
tha t  produce  in  the  U.S.  
 Balanced t rade  i s  therefore  necessary  i f  we are  to  contro l  our  
own economic  des t iny  and i t  i s  a t ta inable ,  as  a  proposal  put  forward by 
Warren Buffe t t ,  I  th ink,  c lear ly  shows.  
 Let  me summarize .   We need to  change our  sys tem to  bet ter  a l ign  
the  goals  of  corpora t ions  and the  aspi ra t ions  of  the  people  of  our  
country .   In  addi t ion ,  in  a  g lobal iz ing wor ld  where  nat ions  pursue  the i r  
own in teres ts  wi th  mercant i l i s t  pol ic ies ,  we must  ba lance  t rade  or  we 
wi l l  not  contro l  our  own des t iny .  
 There  i s  not  one  but  ra ther  many ways  to  move in  these  
d i rec t ions ,  but  we must  s tar t  by  rea l iz ing  the  fundamenta l  na ture  of  the  
problem we face ,  and i f  we do this ,  we wi l l  f ind  not  one  but  many 
ways  to  make progress .  
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 Thank you a l l  very  much.  
 [The s ta tement  fo l lows:]  
 
Prepared Statement  of  Dr.  Ralph E.  Gomory,  Research Professor ,  
NYU Stern School  of  Business  and Pres ident  Emeritus ,  Alfred P.  
Sloan Foundation 
New York,  New York 
 
 
 
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee: 
[The views expressed here are solely my own and do not present the views of any of these 
organizations]  
Thank you for the opportunity to take part in this hearing. The subjects that we are to discuss today are 
the ones in which I have been involved in one way or another for much of my working life. For almost 
20 years I was the head of the research effort of a major international corporation (IBM), and had the 
opportunity to see at first hand the transformation of an Asian nation (Japan) from being relatively 
undeveloped technologically and economically to having a major worldwide impact in computers, 
semiconductors, electronics and automobiles. For the next 18 years I was the head of a major 
foundation (Alfred P. Sloan Foundation), deeply interested in science, technology, and economics. In 
addition, through most of my working life I have been an individual researcher in the areas of applied 
mathematics and economics.  Today I am a Research Professor at New York University’s Stern School 
of Business. 
While the transformation of Japan in the 1970’s and 1980’s shows the possibility of rapid economic 
development in a nation that was relatively undeveloped, what we are seeing in China - the situation 
with which we are concerned today - is markedly different from the Japanese model. The Japanese 
government successfully fostered economic and technological growth with government-sponsored 
efforts to develop Japanese technology and Japanese companies within Japan, often testing these 
companies in the restricted Japanese market and then, when they deemed these companies competitive, 
helped them on a path to worldwide markets.  During this time, U.S. corporations often struggled 
against significant obstacles to have major facilities in Japan or to gain Japanese market share.  
 
The Chinese government on the other hand, has chosen a different path. To develop the industries it 
deems important for China, it will sometimes subsidize wholly Chinese companies. It will also 
sometimes also subsidize American- or partly American-owned companies. In this way, China can 
make it profitable for these companies to develop production facilities in China and, more recently, to 
expand R&D as well. The result is to create in China, and as part of the Chinese GDP, facilities that 
access and practice the most current methodology and R&D. Often the output of these facilities goes 
to the U.S. market. There, with the effect of subsidy, low labor costs, or up-to-date methodology – or 
all three – they can often outcompete U.S. firms actually working in the United States. 
 The result is that U.S. companies are contributing to the development of China and simultaneously 
contributing to the loss of jobs and destruction of industries in the United States.  Nevertheless, they 
are doing these things in the pursuit of the widely accepted corporate goal of maximizing profits. 
 We must therefore realize that in the modern globalizing world, the interests of many of our global 
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corporations and the interests of the nation have diverged.  
To put these developments into perspective a bit of history helps.   
A Historical View  
 For a very long time most of the work of the world was done on farms or in small shops.  An 
individual could learn the printing trade or shoe making and graduate to his own shop; a family could run a 
farm. In both cases an individual or very small groups of people could grow crops or make shoes that could 
be sold to others and thus have the money to supply what was not made at home.  
 But today the goods we consume cannot be made at home; they are complex and require large 
organizations to create them. You cannot manufacture a car in your garage; it takes a large-scale 
organization to do it. The food you eat is not produced by a family on a nearby farm, but is made by large 
organizations on highly mechanized farms with machinery produced by other large organizations. The food 
itself then travels on highly organized transportation networks to get to huge outlets, where nearby you can 
pick up a refrigerator made by another large organization or a television set that no individual or small 
group could ever build.  
 The same is true of services: there is no way to build your own telephone service. And even 
medicine, one of the last strongholds of the individual practitioner, is rapidly agglomerating into large-
scale enterprises. 
A person must now be part of an organization that makes or distributes the complex goods and 
services that people buy today. Being part of an organization is what people must do to earn a living and 
support themselves and their families. The fundamental social role of corporations and other businesses is 
to enable people to participate in the production of the goods and services that are consumed in the 
modern world; this is what enables people to earn a share of the value produced for themselves and their 
families. 
 
The Divergence of the Profit Motive and the Fundamental Role  
As I mentioned above, globalization has now made it possible for U.S. global corporations to 
pursue their profits by building capabilities abroad.  Instead of investing alongside U.S. workers and using 
their investment and R&D to increase their productivity, corporations today can produce goods and 
services abroad using low-cost labor, and import those goods and services into the United States.  But in 
creating their profits this way, they are building up the GDP of other countries while breaking their once-
tight links with America’s own GDP.  
Economists will sometimes argue that this development of capabilities abroad is good for the U.S. 
economy as a whole. For one thing, we get cheaper goods. That is certainly true, but it is also true that if 
we lose our superior capabilities in many areas and are less competitive, we have less to trade for those 
goods, so that eventually the cheaper goods become expensive in real terms.  I do not intend to repeat 
today the arguments that are spelled out in the book on global trade and its consequences that I co-authored 
with Professor Will Baumol.  
I would like to point out, however, that the view that the industrial development in your trading 
partner can be harmful to your total GDP is not new. There is a long history of well-known economists 
making that observation, most recently Paul Samuelson.  [See References 1-6]   What Professor Baumol 
and I have added to that long history in our book Global Trade and Conflicting National Interests is the 
realization the benefits of your trading partner’s economic development occur in the early stages of its 
development, and as your partner becomes more fully industrialized and is no longer confined to low 
value-added industries, further development is harmful to your GDP.  
 
This result, which we derive rigorously from the most standard economic models, corresponds to 
the intuitive notion that we do well when we lose low-wage jobs and not well when we start losing high-
wage or high-tech jobs. We are losing high-wage and high tech jobs today; this conforms to the notion that 
we have reached the point of conflict between corporate and country goals. 
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Aligning Country and Company 
As we have seen above, China has a national strategy aimed at the rapid increase of its GDP. As 
part of that strategy the country aligns corporate goals with national goals. China has made it profitable for 
foreign (often U.S.) corporations to create high value-added jobs in China.  They do this by offering tax 
and other incentives that make it profitable for corporations to locate high value- added jobs in China. 
They are exploiting the fact that the capabilities of today’s global corporations are available to the bidder 
who offers the highest profit.  
 
We need to consider a U.S. national economic strategy that includes incentives for companies to 
have high value-added jobs in the United States. If we want high value-added jobs, let us reward our 
companies for producing such jobs - whether they do that through R&D and advanced technology, or by 
just plain American ingenuity applied in any setting whatsoever.   
The Asian countries have done this often by individual deals with individual companies. We have 
neither the tradition nor the knowledge nor the inclination in the U.S. government to do that.  An approach 
that is better suited to what the United States can do would be to use the corporate income tax. We have 
already used the corporate income tax to spur R&D, so why not apply it to directly reward what we are 
aiming at - high value-added jobs.  
For example, the corporate tax rate could be scaled by the value that is added per full-time 
employee, by the workers of corporations operating in the United States. A company with high value-add 
per U.S. employee would get a low rate, a company with low value-add per U.S. employee would get a 
high rate. This tax could be made revenue-neutral by having a high tax rate for unproductive companies 
balance a low (or even negative) tax rate for productive companies.  Depending on the rates, it could be as 
strong or as weak an incentive as desired. This is quite doable, as value-add is measurable. Indeed, it is 
measured today in Europe as the basis for the value-added tax. 
This would be a tax aimed at results not means. It would not be for big companies particularly or 
for small. It would not be for high-tech or low tech. It would be very American, anyone whose company, 
large or small, has high value add per person would benefit; those who are unproductive would see their 
profits heavily taxed. It would be an incentive to find new and better ways to do things in every industry. 
Critics of this or any change may say that our national economic strategy is, in fact, to leave 
markets alone and take whatever those markets produce. They may also suggest that this is the best 
possible economic strategy.  But “free market” is not a single, simple concept. Do we mean free markets 
with or without anti-trust laws? With or without child-labor laws? Do we want financial markets with 
virtually no supervision? Different restrictions and policies will produce different results all coming from 
“free markets”; as will different tax policies or special loans for special industries, and so on and so on.  
After the recent debacles perhaps it is time to think seriously about what kind of free markets we really 
want. 
Controlling our own Destiny – the Need for Balanced Trade    
 If we were alone in the world, we could adopt whatever internal policies we wanted, for example 
the tax mentioned above to encourage productivity, and companies who wanted to produce in the U.S. 
would have no choice but to conform. But we are not alone in this globalizing world. And today many 
companies have found it advantageous to move production and R&D abroad. Driven by foreign subsidies 
and underpriced currencies so many have done this that we have a huge and unsustainable balance of 
payments deficit. 
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China in particular is loaning us the money to buy their underpriced goods with all the destructive 
effects that go with that. This had been major contributor to the imbalance of trade which is not a 
sustainable path for this or any nation. We are in effect living beyond our means, importing more value 
than we export, consuming more value than we create.  Warren Bufffet in a Fortune article [Reference 11]  
 accurately compared us to a rich family living beyond its means by steadily selling off pieces of the family 
estate.  
If we change our tax structure to reward those who create value here in the United States there 
would also be nothing to prevent U.S. companies from leaving the country, and continuing to send in 
goods and services from abroad, thus continuing  the imbalance of trade and further weakening the 
productive capabilities of the country. 
 On the other hand, if trade is balanced, the value of goods imported is matched to the value of 
goods exported from the country; those exported goods and services are provided by corporations that 
produce in the U.S. and comply with the U.S. standard of what a corporation should be. Balanced trade is 
therefore necessary if we are to control our own economic destiny 
It is worth mentioning that balanced trade is one of the standard conditions of an economic 
equilibrium, although it gets less press than another condition “comparative advantage” With balanced 
trade, trade can get sorted out. Companies that are in the U.S. and conform to its policies balancing by their 
exports whatever is imported. But if we do nothing to rebalance trade we are at the mercy of the 
mercantilist policies of foreign countries whose policies can flood us with their goods, create increasing 
indebtedness, and destroy our industries. 
That is why balancing trade is essential for controlling our own economic destiny.   
Balancing Trade 
There is of course a long list of approaches to balancing trade, ranging from jawboning to tariffs.  
I do not attempt to list them here. But I do want to single out one simple approach advanced and advocated 
by Warren Buffet, however, could really make a difference. It is well described in his 2003 article in 
Fortune [Reference 11].  This approach, in contrast to import quotas or tariffs aimed at imports from 
particular countries, creates a free market in import certificates. It would balance trade and would give us 
control over own economic destiny.   
Since the import certificate approach is a major departure from the past it should be introduced 
gradually. But we should take this approach seriously.  In fact, a bill based on the Buffet approach was 
introduced in the Senate in a past Congress by Senators Dorgan and Feingold. This approach has also been 
the subject of a careful study by the Economic Policy Institute that ended by endorsing this approach.  
 Conclusion 
We need to change our system and better align the goals of corporations and the aspirations of the 
people of our country. This is not an idle dream; it has happened before. The growth we had in America in 
the decades after WWII and before 1970 was both rapid and well distributed. Americans of almost every 
stripe benefited.  
To improve our situation today we must realign the interests of global corporations with those of 
the country.  Just the realization that the goals of our country and of major corporations are no longer 
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aligned is an important first step. That realization has consequences of its own, for example it should affect 
the way that Congress should listen to the advice it gets from global corporations.   
However if we are clear on the necessity of aligning country and company we will find ways to do 
it. We have given a few examples of changes that could push in that direction.  If we look in that direction 
we will find more and better ways to do this. 
In addition, in a globalizing world where nations pursue their own interests with mercantilist 
policies, we must balance trade if we are to control our own destiny.  Fortunately, there is at least one way 
to do that: the Buffet proposal. 
We might well ask: can we change the fundamental motivations of our corporations, whether 
through taxation or other means? Can this be done? In this connection it is interesting to hear the remarks 
of two recent G.E. CEO’s. 
On the subject of government incentives, the present-day G.E. CEO, Jeffrey Immelt, recently 
stated [See Interview in Reference 10]. 
 
If the U.S. government "…wants to fix the trade deficit, it's got to be pushed…GE wants to be an 
exporter. We want to be a good citizen. Do we want to make a lot of money? Sure we do. But I think at the 
end of the day we've got to have a tax system or a set of incentives that promote what the government 
wants to do." 
His predecessor, Jack Welch, the G.E. chief executive who ushered in the reign of shareholder 
value maximization a quarter-century ago, told the Financial Times in March [Reference 12] that 
“shareholder value is the dumbest idea in the world.” 
Both are starting to sound a little bit like their distinguished G.E. predecessor Reginald Jones who 
argued in the 1970’s that corporate leaders must balance shareholder concerns against the interests of 
employees, American industry, and the nation, a view that was endorsed by the Business Roundtable in 
1981 
Perhaps the time has come to move in that direction. 
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 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  Thank you.  
 Mr.  Stewar t .  
 
STATEMENT OF MR. TERENCE P.  STEWART, ESQ. 
STEWART AND STEWART, WASHINGTON, DC 
 
 MR.  STEWART:  Thank you.   
 I t ' s  a  grea t  p leasure  to  be  here ,  and I  apprecia te  be ing invi ted .   
You have in  f ront  of  you both  a  paper  and a  summary of  the  paper ,  and 
I  wi l l  t ry  to  l imi t  my remarks  to  the  topic  of  what  the  effec ts  have  
been of  the  incent ives  tha t  have  been provided in  China .   Al l  countr ies  
obviously  provide  incent ives  for  people  to  inves t  in  the i r  country .  
 There  are  a  combinat ion  of  fac tors  in  China  tha t  have  permit ted  
rapid  fore ign inves tment ,  not  the  leas t  of  which i s  the  large  popula t ion  
and a  rapidly  growing economy,  which has  a t t rac ted  a  lo t  of  fore ign 
inves tment  for  the  natura l  purpose  of  t ry ing to  provide  goods  and 
services  to  tha t  economy.  
 You 've  heard  over  the  years  f rom many companies  and many 
indust r ies  tha t  there  are  a lso  government  pressures  tha t  a re  des igned to  
see  tha t  people  who are  supplying the  market  supply  the  market  f rom 
wi th in ,  i .e . ,  tha t  there  was  inves tment  tha t  comes in .  
 There  a lso  has  been a  lo t  of  tes t imony here  in  pr ior  hear ings  
about  the  fac t  tha t  formal ly  or  informal ly  there  are  requirements  to  
expor t .   I f  you look a t  Annex 1  in  my paper ,  what  you wi l l  f ind  i s  the  
impor t  s ta t i s t ics  and expor t  s ta t i s t ics  of  the  Chinese  government  
broken down by type  of  expor t  or  impor t  ent i t ies  so  tha t  you can see  
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what  s ta te-owned enterpr ises  versus  fore ign enterpr ises  do.   
 I  a lso  inc luded tha t  par t icular  exhibi t  in  one  of  the  handouts  tha t  
you should  have in  f ront  of  you.   I f  you look a t  the  f ront  page  of  the  
handout ,  what  you wi l l  see  i s  tha t  s ta te-owned enterpr ises  are  about  18  
percent  of  China 's  expor ts .   Now,  depending on the  sec tor ,  i t  wi l l  go  
s igni f icant ly  h igher  or  s igni f icant ly  lower ,  but  for  the  overa l l  
economy,  18 percent .  
 The main  dr iver  of  expor ts  out  of  China  has  been fore ign-
inves ted  enterpr ises  which account  for  roughly  38 percent  of  a  to ta l  
expor ts  in  2008 of  more  than $545 bi l l ion .   They are  a lso  the  larges t  
source  of  impor ts  in to  China ,  429.  
 So when one looks  a t  the  t rade  i ssues  and one  looks  a t  the  t rade  
imbalance ,  the  s igni f icant  par t  of  the  t rade  imbalance  f lows from the  
pr iva te  sec tor ,  whether  the  fore ign- inves ted  ent i t ies  or  whether  the  
Chinese  ent i t ies ,  as  opposed to  the  s ta te-owned enterpr ises .   
 That  doesn ' t  mean the  s ta te-owned enterpr ises  don ' t  a f fec t  the  
overa l l  economic  condi t ions  and the  percept ion of  cos t  of  doing 
bus iness  in  China ,  but  i t  does  mean tha t  a t t rac t ing  fore ign inves tment  
has  been successful  in  China  in  terms of  dr iv ing the i r  expor t  machine .  
 One then needs  to  look a t  what  has  tha t  meant  in  the  Uni ted  
Sta tes?   I f  you look a t  Annex 2 ,  what  you wi l l  see  i s  for  these  s t ra tegic  
indust r ies  and p i l la r  indust r ies- - I  th ink i t ' s  a  14-year  review of  t rade  
data- -China  expor ts  to  the  U.S. ,  U.S.  expor ts  to  China ,  and the  t rade  
balance--and what  you wi l l  f ind  in  a lmost  everyone of  the  sec tors  i s  a  
rapidly  deter iora t ing  t rade  balance ,  which means  tha t  in  those  sec tors ,  
where  they have had a  pol icy  of  promot ing grea ter  in ternal  growth in  
China  and promot ing expor ts ,  in  fac t ,  they have been successful ,  
somet imes  very  successful ,  o ther  t imes ,  somewhat  successful .  
 Commiss ioner  Blumenthal  referenced semiconductors .   
Semiconductors  i s  an  area  where  to  date  they have  not  been ter r ib ly  
successful  and is  one  of  the  few areas  where  there  cont inues  to  be  a  
la rge  net  t rade .  
 You heard  ear l ier  in  the  f i rs t  panel  about  some of  the  s t ruc tura l  
i ssues ,  and when you look a t  what  i s  i t  tha t  the  Uni ted  Sta tes  can do to  
address  the  chal lenges  of  major  t rading par tners  tha t  we face  such as  
wi th  China ,  there  cer ta in ly  are  th ings  tha t  we can do domest ica l ly .  
 You had discuss ions  of  the  tax  sys tem and the  fac t  tha t  under  
exis t ing  WTO rules ,  we penal ize  ourse lves  by the  nature  of  our  tax  
sys tem.   When i t  s tar ted  off ,  the  d iscr iminat ion  agains t  the  U.S.  was  
minor ,  in  the  range of  about  two percent  for  a  few countr ies .  
 Today,  i t  runs  up as  h igh as  25 percent .   I t  i s  probably  one  of  the  
larges t  s ingle  d isadvantages  we impose  on ourse lves  and tha t  we 
accept  the  sys tem imposing on us  d i f ferent ia t ion  in  tax  sys tems.  
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 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  That 's  the  VAT system you 're  
ta lk ing about?  
 MR.  STEWART:  That 's  the  indi rec t  tax  sys tem which most  
countr ies  do  through a  value  added tax;  tha t ' s  correc t .  
 You a lso  have  the  i ssue  tha t  was  d iscussed ear l ier  wi th  regard  to  
the  currency.   Currency is  an  impor tant  i ssue  on which there  are  IMF 
rules  and there  are  WTO rules ,  ne i ther  se ts  of  those  ru les  have  great  
tee th ,  and cer ta in ly  i t  has  been a  long t ime s ince  the  Uni ted  Sta te  used 
i t s  t rade  remedies  to  go af ter  what  were  perceived to  be  misa l igned 
currencies .  
 I f  you go back to  the  1950s ,  1930s ,  you would ,  in  fac t ,  f ind  that  
h is tor ica l ly  the  Uni ted  Sta tes  deal t  wi th  misa l igned currencies  under  
our  countervai l ing  duty  law.   We haven ' t  done tha t  in  50 or  70  years ,  
and there  are  ques t ions  under  the  current  WTO as  to  whether  or  not  
tha t  would  be  val id ,  but  i t  i s  an  important  i ssue  tha t  has  to  be  resolved 
in  ways  tha t  a re  mul t i la tera l ly  acceptable ,  not  only  to  us ,  but  to  our  
t rading par tners  because  i t  i s  not  only  China  wi th  whom we have major  
currency misa l ignment .  
 The concept  tha t  you would  have tar i f fs  tha t  are  bound and 
currencies  tha t  can  move 20,  30 ,  50  percent  wi th  no consequence  and 
no r ights  amongst  par t ies  who face  those  k inds  of  swings  in  currencies  
leads  to  the  exacerbat ion of  the  problems that  we face .  
 So wi th  tha t ,  I  wi l l  s top  and le t  Mr.  McCormack pick  i t  up .  
 [The s ta tement  fo l lows:]  
 
 
Prepared Statement  of  Mr.  Terence P.  Stewart ,  Esq.  
Stewart  and Stewart ,  Washington,  DC 
 
 Hearing Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission on 
China’s Industrial Policy and its Impact on U.S. Companies, Workers and the 
American Economy 
Testimony of Terence P. Stewart, Esq. 
March 24, 2009 
INTRODUCTION 
Members of the Commission, thank you for the opportunity to appear today.  My name is 
Terence Stewart.  I am managing partner of Stewart and Stewart, an international trade 
law firm that has helped U.S. companies and workers compete in the international 
marketplace for the last 50 years. 
In my testimony today, I will discuss how China has used a variety of tools to grow and 
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transform its economy and to achieve its national security objectives.  In areas where 
China is a net importer and where deficits now prevail, China’s leaders clearly aim to 
reverse the situation and achieve trade dominance in these sectors. 
China’s local, state, and national governments use a variety of direct subsidies to 
domestic industries, subsidies and other incentives to attract foreign investors, as well as 
major state investment of research and development in sectors where it aims to be more  
competitive. 
China has singled out for promotion and development a number of “strategic industries” 
such as those that involve national security, large and important infrastructures, important 
mineral resources, important public utilities and public services, and key enterprises in 
the pillar industries, such as high-technology. 
Clearly, these policies have worked for China, as is evidenced by its extraordinary 
economic growth and its transformation from dependence on imports to the predominant 
exporter to the world.  Data on state-owned enterprises shows strong growth in exports 
over the last two years in areas such as communications equipment, consumer electronic, 
and steel. 
Among the sectors that have benefitted from these governmental interventions in the 
market is information technology, steel, manufacturing equipment, tires, and paper. 
At the same time, China’s policies have contributed to an ever-widening trade gap with 
the United States. The U.S goods deficit with China was $266.3 billion in 2008 and 
China accounts for roughly 12 percent of total U.S. trade and one-third of the total U.S. 
goods trade deficit with the world.  China’s policies have also raised serious questions in 
the United States and other countries about whether these policies have distorted trade 
and led to job losses and economic dislocation. 
PERVASIVE NATURE OF GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES IN CHINA’S ECONOMY 
It is well established that the Chinese government at all levels - central, provincial, and 
local – has long provided a wide range of subsidies to state-owned and state-invested 
enterprises and, as well, to foreign-invested enterprises to attract investment and obtain 
technology transfer.   
Academics, business groups such as the American Chamber of Commerce in China, 
government agencies such the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, the World Trade 
Organization, and the Commission itself have noted the prevalence of these policies in 
China.  The Commission’s 2007 annual report cited low cost loans, asset injections, 
subsidized inputs, tax breaks, energy subsidies, land subsidies, and purchasing SOE 
products as some of the subsidies provided by the Chinese national, state, and local 
governments.  
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To date, China’s disclosure of its subsidies appears to have been limited.  China has 
submitted only one subsidies notification to the WTO (covering subsidies in existence 
from 2001 through 2004), and that was not submitted until April 7, 2006, four years after 
accession.  Moreover, the United States, the European Communities, and other countries 
pointed out that China failed to list numerous subsidies provided at the provincial and 
local level in that notice.  
The United States has brought two WTO actions against Chinese subsidies.  One matter 
was resolved in January 2008, when China agreed to eliminate certain prohibited export 
and import substitution subsidies that benefitted a wide range of industries in China. The 
second case was initiated in December 2008 and concerns certain measures offering 
grants, loans and other incentives to enterprises in China.  
Since October 2006, U.S. industries, including paper, steel, tires, textiles, and chemicals, 
have alleged injury from Chinese subsidies and petitioned for relief in the form of 
countervailing duties. To date, Commerce has completed 10 countervailing duty 
investigations concerning China, with three other investigations currently pending. 
CHINA’S INDUSTRIAL POLICIES FAVOR SELECTED INDUSTRIES AND STATE-OWNED 
ENTERPRISES, WITH THE GOAL OF PROMOTING NATIONAL AND GLOBAL CHAMPIONS 
That the Chinese government grants domestic subsidies in a variety of forms to SOEs and 
to foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) is not in itself surprising or remarkable.  What is 
notable, however, about China’s use of subsidies and other incentives is the scale of its 
subsidy and incentive measures and China’s efforts to direct these measures to targeted 
recipients and industries through the implementation of central government policies.   
One goal of China’s industrial policy is to favor and promote certain state-owned 
enterprises into national and global “champions.”  In the 2008 trade policy review of 
China, the WTO Secretariat described the shift in China’s industrial policy toward 
favored sectors and SOEs as follows. 
“Direct intervention in the economy remains the main approach of 
industrial policy.  Nonetheless, there has been a shift towards the use of 
various other policy tools to channel resources into certain activities that 
the Government believes are important for China’s continued growth and 
development.  In addition to tariffs and other border tax measures, tax 
incentives, and subsidies, these tools include ‘guided’ credit, various 
‘catalogues’ identifying sectors eligible for incentives, as well as restricted 
or prohibited activities, various forms of ‘guidance’ including section-
specific ‘industrial development policies’ (e.g. for steel, automobiles, and 
cement), and price controls.” 
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CHINA’S ELEVENTH FIVE-YEAR PLAN AND RELATED GUIDELINES TARGET CERTAIN 
DESIGNATED STRATEGIC AND PILLAR INDUSTRIES FOR DEVELOPMENT AND 
PROMOTION 
SOE Restructuring 
In 2006, China issued its Eleventh Five-Year Plan for the period 2006-2010.  The Plan 
provided a general outlook for economic growth that aims to “further strengthen China’s 
industrial sectors and foster the growth of a more highly-developed, knowledge-based 
economy.”  China’s Plan “proposed to accelerate the transformation of the economy from 
being ‘resource dependent’ to ‘innovation driven.’”   
China implements its industrial policy through its control of SOEs, particularly through 
direct control of the largest and most dominant SOEs by the State-owned Asset 
Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), which is responsible for 
managing government assets and reform of central-level non-financial SOEs.  As noted 
by the WTO Secretariat, SOEs under SASAC management “accounted for 40% of total 
SOE assets in 2006, and earned 60% of total profits.”  USTR has noted that it is “evident 
that the Chinese government {is} intent on heavily intervening in the commercial 
decisions of state-owned enterprises, including decisions related to their strategies, 
management and investments.” 
Specific guidance regarding SOEs was provided in December 2006 by the National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) when it issued a guiding opinion on 
state-owned assets restructuring.  The opinion states that SASAC’s state-owned assets 
should concentrate on “important industries and key areas” (i.e., strategic industries).  
The opinion then explained that the “important industry and key areas” shall “mainly 
include industries that involve national security, large and important infrastructures, 
important mineral resources, important public utilities and public services, and key 
enterprises in the pillar industries and high-tech industries.”  The opinion calls for the 
administrative agencies to promulgate catalogues and to lay down specifics as to which 
sectors shall be subject to absolute control or relative control by SOEs.  “Absolute” and 
“relative” control are not defined; but it is generally understood that absolute control 
means control by majority ownership; and relative control means another controlling 
position short of majority ownership. 
On December 18, 2006, Li Rongrong, Chairman of the NDRC, delivered a speech in 
which he clarified the guiding opinion.  Chairman Li stated that the Government should 
maintain absolute control over SOEs involved in “important industries and key areas” in 
the interest of China’s security and economic livelihood.  These “important industries 
and key areas” include seven industries: defense, electric power and grid, petroleum and 
petrochemical, telecommunications, coal, civil aviation, and shipping.  Li said that 
NDRC’s policy was to increase the overall state-owned assets in these industries, to 
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optimize their structure, and to develop some of the key enterprises into world top tier 
enterprises. 
For SASAC-controlled SOEs in the sectors of defense, petroleum, natural gas and some 
other important natural resources exploration, electric power and grid, and basic 
telecommunication infrastructure, the Government would maintain sole ownership or 
absolute control.  For their subsidiaries, and for SASAC-controlled SOEs in civil aviation 
and the shipping industry, the Government will maintain majority ownership.  For 
downstream petrochemical products distribution and retail and for telecommunication 
valued-added services, the SASAC will seek private and foreign investment to diversify 
ownership structure. 
Li further stated that, in addition to the seven strategic industries, the Government would 
maintain a strong control position (i.e., 30%-50% equity ownership) for key enterprises 
in the basic and pillar industries, which include equipment manufacturing, auto, 
information technology (IT), construction, iron and steel, non-ferrous metals, chemicals, 
and surveying and design.  For these pillar industries, SASAC will reduce its share of 
state-owned assets, but will increase its economic influence and guiding role.  
Specifically, SASAC-controlled SOEs are directed to become key enterprises and play a 
leading role in the equipment manufacturing, auto, IT, construction, steel, and non-
ferrous metal industries.   It has been estimated that 40-50 of the SOEs controlled by 
SASAC are in the strategic industry category and account for 75 percent of SASAC’s 
total assets and up to 79 percent of SASAC’s total profits.  
USTR has repeatedly expressed concerns about China’s increasing use of industrial 
policies to promote SOE dominance in selected industry sectors and create national 
champions.  For instance, USTR’s 2008 compliance report noted that U.S. companies 
had pointed to an array of Chinese polices “promoting and protecting ‘pillar industries.’” 
  
Investment Guidelines 
China furthers its industrial policy goal of creating national champions by controls on 
investment.  As noted by the WTO Secretariat, China’s Eleventh Five-Year Plan 
“proposed to accelerate the transformation of the economy from being ‘resource 
dependent’ to ‘innovation driven.’”  The scope of China’s reinvestment plans was 
evident in the Secretariat’s description, which covered more than 20 industries, including 
539 encouraged categories, 190 restricted categories, and 300 prohibited categories 
(which are to be eliminated gradually or within a specific time frame).   
With respect to foreign investment, in November 2006, China issued a policy titled 
Guideline for Utilizing Foreign Investment for the 11th Five-year Period (2006-2010) 
which signaled that China intended to continue its policy of attracting foreign investment. 
 The key themes of that guideline include establishing a unitary regulatory system for 
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both foreign and domestic companies and attracting foreign investment that helps with 
upgrading technology-intensive industries.     
The Provisions on Guiding Foreign Investment Direction set out the basic regulations 
concerning foreign direct investment (FDI) in China.  In general, they classify foreign 
investment projects into four categories:  encouraged, permitted, restricted, and 
prohibited.  The current Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign Investment Industries 
entered into force on December 1, 2007.  The Catalogue lists industries that are 
encouraged, restricted, and prohibited; if a project is not within these categories, it is 
permitted.  The FDI Catalogue provides guidance on foreign investment in China’s 
designated “strategic” and “pillar” industries.   
USTR has expressed concerns about China’s investment polices that signal that SOEs 
“should absolutely control, or at least maintain a ‘strong controlling position’ over broad 
swaths of its industry – in sectors such as equipment manufacturing, automobiles, iron 
and steel.”   
Another investment-related concern raised by USTR and U.S. companies is China’s new 
anti-monopoly law which took effect in August 2008.  While the new law is an 
improvement on China’s previous competition law, the U.S. government and companies 
have questioned whether the new law will be applied to favor domestic companies and 
restrict investment by foreign companies.  In a recent instance that may raise concern 
about China’s application of the anti-monopoly law to restrict foreign investment, China 
rejected the $2.4 billion bid of Coca-Cola to acquire China’s largest juice maker, China 
Huiyuan Juice Group.   
SELECTED EXAMPLES OF CHINA’S INDUSTRIAL POLICIES THAT FAVOR DESIGNATED 
INDUSTRIES: STEEL AND AUTOS 
Steel 
The substantial extent of government subsidies to the Chinese steel industry has been 
well documented in a number of research studies.  For example, one study found that a 
wide range of subsidies benefited the Chinese steel industry, including cash grants, land 
grants, transfers of ownership interest on terms inconsistent with commercial 
considerations, conversion of debt to equity in steel companies, debt forgiveness and 
inaction regarding non-performing loans, preferential loans and directed credit, tax 
incentives, targeted infrastructure development, manipulation of raw material prices, and 
manipulation of the value of the Chinese RMB. 
According to the Commission, the result of such substantial government intervention has 
been “a dramatic increase in steel output in China, so far exceeding even China’s 
skyrocketing domestic steel consumption that huge overcapacity has resulted.”  In its 
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2007 annual report, the Commission succinctly summarized the effects of China’s steel 
policy –a huge increase in steel production capacity to become the world’s largest steel 
producer and transformation from a net steel importer to a net steel exporter. 
In addition to subsidies, China’s steel policy protects the Chinese steel industry through 
restrictions on foreign investment.  Article 23 of China’s Steel and Iron Industry 
Development Policy (issued in July 2005) provides that foreign investors may not hold a 
controlling share in a Chinese steel company.  Moreover, China’s steel policy requires 
foreign investors to transfer proprietary technology.  In addition to subsidies, USTR 
summarized a number of other aspects of China’s steel policy that favor domestic 
companies and concluded, “China’s steel policy is also striking because of the extent to 
which it attempts to dictate industry outcomes and involve the government in making 
decisions that should be made by the marketplace.  It prescribes the number and size of 
steel producers in China, where they will be located, the types of products that will and 
will not be produced, and the technology that will be used.” 
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Autos 
China designated the auto industry as a pillar industry targeted for development.  The 
Commission noted in its 2006 annual report that China views the promotion of the auto 
industry as a “fundamental step in achieving the technologically advanced industrial base 
it seeks to develop.”  Under China’s Industrial Policy for the Automobile Industry, there 
is a “50% foreign-ownership restriction in vehicle manufacturing, including completely 
built up units, automobiles for special use, agricultural transport vehicles, and 
motorcycles.”  As noted by the Secretariat, “When establishing a foreign-invested 
automotive manufacturing joint venture, the place of origin of technology must be 
registered with the competent authorities (e.g., the provincial departments of the 
MOFCOM or the NDRC).” 
The effect of China’s auto policies has been a dramatic increase in production capacity 
and expanded exports.  “China’s auto production is on a fast roll. China’s auto output has 
nearly quintupled since 2001, and China is expected to become the world’s largest 
producer in 2009.  Half the world’s auto industry expansion has recently occurred in 
China.  China achieved a surplus in auto parts in 2005.  That surplus grew 83 percent in 
2007 and has been increasing at an even faster rate in 2008,” according to the 
Commission in its 2008 annual report. 
CHINA TRADE DATA DEMONSTRATES THAT CHINA’S INDUSTRIAL POLICIES OF 
SUBSIDIES AND INVESTMENT CONTROLS HAVE RESULTED IN EXPANDED EXPORTS IN 
MANY INDUSTRY SECTORS 
In addition to steel and autos, there are a variety of instances where China’s industrial 
support policies have effectively targeted sectors in which China has experienced a trade 
deficit and either sharply curtailed that deficit or turned the deficit into a surplus over 
time.  Through strategic investments and support to these industries, China has been able 
to stem or even reverse areas of weakness in their trade balance. 
For example, in the steel industry, China consistently ran trade deficits with the rest of 
the world each year from 1995 through 2004.  After years of government support, China 
was able to reverse this deficit, and it ran a surplus in its steel trade for the first time in 
2005.  That surplus has increased each year since, reaching nearly $67 billion in 2008. 
In the auto industry, while China still runs an overall trade deficit, it is remarkable that 
the deficit has not grown sharply in light of China’s surging domestic demand for 
automobiles and the challenges of overcapacity and dampened demand faced by the 
automotive industry in the rest of the world.  Over the past five years, while China’s auto 
imports have doubled in value, their exports have nearly quadrupled. 
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INCENTIVES FOR FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CHINA 
Income Tax 
Since the beginning of China’s reform and opening up, the government has relied heavily 
on preferential income tax treatment to attract foreign investors.  Before the current 
enterprises income tax became effective on January 1, 2008, China had in place a dualist 
system for corporate income tax, applying a special income tax law to foreign invested 
enterprises (FIEs).  The FIE income tax law allowed favourable tax treatment for FIEs.  
Most well known is the so-called “two free, three half” policy, which exempted 
manufacturing FIEs from paying income tax for the first two years starting from the year 
when the company registered a profit, and allowed a 50% tax reduction for the 
subsequent three years.  Other incentive tax policies included allowing FIEs to deduct 
their R&D expenses from their taxable income and allowing an income tax credit for 
purchasing domestic equipment.  Under China’s new Enterprise Income Tax Law 
(effective January 1, 2008), China unified its income tax system, applying the same rate 
of 25% to all enterprises, including FIEs, except for enterprises subject to a five-year 
“grandfathering” period.  However, tax incentives for enterprises engaged in high-tech 
and new technology activities continue to be subject to a preferential tax rate of 15%. 
Value-Added Tax (VAT) 
In general, China applies a 17 percent VAT for selling goods or providing taxable 
services.  VAT preferential treatment is another incentive tool, mostly used to reduce 
costs for technology renovation for FIEs, thus encouraging them to adopt advanced 
technology in their local operation.  For example, China had allowed a VAT exemption 
to FIEs when they purchased equipment either locally or from overseas.  This policy, 
however, was abolished in December 2008 when China introduced its new VAT code. 
In more general terms, the fact that China has a system that relies on indirect taxes, such 
as the VAT, is itself an incentive to foreign investment due to the disparate treatment 
accorded direct and indirect taxes in world trade.  Under GATT/WTO rules, indirect 
taxes, such as VAT and excise taxes, are adjustable at the border, while direct taxes, such 
as income taxes, are not.  These rules allow countries that have indirect tax systems to (1) 
impose indirect taxes, such as the VAT, on incoming imports, and (2) provide a rebate of 
the tax on outgoing exports.  However, the same treatment is not accorded to countries, 
such as the United States, that rely primarily on direct tax systems.  In other words, under 
the GATT/WTO rules, indirect taxes are adjustable at the border, direct taxes are not.  
China is one of the 153 countries that imposes a VAT and allows rebates of VAT on 
exports. Based on 2007 data, the VAT disadvantage to U.S. producers and exporters as a 
result of China’s use and application of VAT is estimated to have been as high as $52 
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billion.  Given the disparate treatment of indirect and direct taxes under current trade 
rules, China’s VAT gap may be viewed as a $52 billon incentive for U.S. producers to 
move to China. 
China also uses VAT export rebates as a tool to adjust and control trade flows.  China 
imposes a standard VAT rate of 17 percent on goods domestically produced or imported 
and grants VAT rebates upon export, but the rate of the rebate is generally less than the 
VAT rates actually paid.  Periodically, China adjusts the rate of the VAT rebate applied 
to particular products in order to, inter alia, “meet industrial development goals, and 
control exports of certain products,” as well as to “rein in out-of-control expansion of 
production capacity in particular sectors.” 
General Policy Shift 
In general, the Chinese government has reduced some of its broadly applicable 
preferential policies in recent years, and has been trying to create a unitary system for 
both domestic and foreign-invested companies.  In addition to adopting a unitary tax 
system, the State Council in 2006 established a national minimum price for land used for 
industrial purposes that applies equally to domestic and foreign companies.  On the other 
hand, in order to expedite procedures, the Central Government has delegated foreign 
investment approval authority to provincial governments for projects below RMB100 
million.  It appears that the Chinese government has determined that, given the fast 
growth of China’s domestic market, access to the domestic market itself will provide a 
sufficient incentive for foreign investors.  In this respect, it is notable that China has often 
required that foreign companies, as a condition for access to the Chinese market, provide 
technology transfer to Chinese producers.   
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Misaligned Currency 
China’s undervalued currency effectively acts as an incentive for foreign companies to 
invest in China because the cost of foreign investment and establishing operations in 
China is cheaper for the foreign company than it would be if the Chinese currency 
operated under market forces.   
Local Preferential Policies 
Although the Central Government has been reducing preferential policies, local 
governments are still providing incentives to foreign investment.  For example, the 
Ningbo Municipality Authority in 2005 awarded government assistance to large foreign-
invested projects.  Projects with foreign investment over US$5 million are entitled to a 
cash award ranging from RMB 30,000 to RMB 120,000, depending on the size of the 
investment. 
CHINA’S 2009 STIMULUS PACKAGE INCLUDES PREFERENCES FOR FAVORED STATE-
OWNED ENTERPRISES AND DESIGNATED INDUSTRIES 
To combat the worldwide economic slowdown, on November 9, 2008, China announced 
a RMB 4 trillion (US$585bn) economic stimulus plan for the next two years (2009-
2010).  The size of the stimulus plan is equivalent to 14 percent of China’s GDP.  The 
Chinese Government hopes that the stimulus plan will enable China to maintain an 
annual growth rate of 8 percent over the 2009-2010 period.  Economic growth for the 
fourth quarter of 2008 was 6.8 percent and the growth estimate for 2009 was 7.2 percent 
without the stimulus package.  It is not clear how much of the stimulus comprises 
spending not previously planned, but it has been estimated that new spending is roughly 
equivalent to 5-7 percent of GDP.  A total of RMB 1.18 trillion will be supplied by the 
Central Government in FY 2009 and 2010, and it is estimated that this will drive up 
China’s fiscal deficit to 3 percent of GDP in 2009. 
The stimulus package appears to have increased investment in China.  The National 
Statistics Bureau released statistics on March 11, 2009 that showed that, for the first two 
months of 2009, total investment increased by 30 percent (after adjustment for inflation). 
 Bank loans for the first two months of 2009 was RMB 2.6 trillion.  In comparison, total 
bank loans for 2008 were RMB 4.9 trillion.  MOFCOM data, however, show that, 
comparing January 2008 and January 2009, foreign direct investment (FDI) declined by 
US$7.5 billion (32.67 percent). 
Policies for Industries Covered by the Stimulus Package 
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Prior to the NPC’s annual plenary session in March 2009, the State Council decided, in 
general, that ten major industries would be covered in the stimulus package and laid out 
the general policies to be followed when funneling funds to these industries.  The ten 
major industries include steel, auto, textile and apparel, equipment manufacturing, ship 
manufacturing, electronics and information technology, light industry, petrochemical, 
non-ferrous metals and logistics.  The broad measures to be used to assist these industries 
include: (1) reducing tax burdens; (2) allowing more access to financial resources; (3) 
providing RMB100 billion and other financial support to promote R&D; and (4) 
facilitating industrial structure adjustments and upgrading, as well as encouraging merger 
and restructuring to create large companies. 
With respect to concerns that the new stimulus plan would add too much new capacity to 
the specified industries, Vice Chairman Zhang explained that the package funds would 
not be used for investment in the processing industry and duplicative projects.  Instead, 
the focus would be on promoting social welfare, or “three-rural” projects.  Investments 
will flow primarily to infrastructure projects, ecosystem and environment protection, 
energy saving and emission reduction projects, and be used to cover costs for structural 
adjustment, technology renovation, and modification of economic development patterns. 
 
Industry Policies 
Auto industry 
Implement the new energy strategy, commercialize electric cars 
and key components, allocate central fiscal funds to support 
energy saving cars and cars using new energy in middle to large 
cities; subsidize consumption; encourage early retirement of old 
cars; reduce consumption tax for cars to 5% 
Steel industry 
Control the total output, retire old technologies, merger and 
restructuring, support technology renovation, optimize 
geographical allocation 
Textile and apparel Increase export VAT rebate from 14% to 15%  
Ship making 
Stabilize demand, control new capacity development, push 
forward structure adjustment, improve the overall 
competitiveness of large ship makers, speed up renovation, 
develop high value added ship manufacturing capacity, develop 
marine engineering equipments manufacturing capacity 
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Industry Policies 
Equipment 
manufacturing 
Promote domestic manufacturing capacity for key technical 
equipments, encourage structural adjustment; support merger 
among the key equipment manufacturing companies to create a 
large enterprise group with the capacity to engage in international 
operation and financing capabilities; accelerate and improve 
products standards setting; and foster the development of a 
modern manufacturing service industry for the sector 
Electronics and 
information 
technology 
Optimize industrial structure, ensure the stable development of 
the key enterprises in the industry, develop self innovation 
capacity, achieve break-through in key technologies, enhance 
software development capacity, foster the creation of economic 
driving engine in the telecommunication equipments, information 
service and technology sector 
Light industry Expand consumption and supply, improve trade facilitation, and 
maintain overseas market shares 
Petrochemical Upgrade the industry and establish a national refined oil strategic 
reserve system 
Non-ferrous metals 
Stabilize and expand domestic and overseas markets; support 
exports of deep processed, high value-added, and high-
technology products; support technology renovation; encourage 
enterprises restructuring; improve raw material supply security; 
develop recycling capacity; develop national reserve systems for 
some of the non-ferrous metals; and adjust VAT rebate structure  
Logistics 
Promote commercialized and specialized logistics services; 
promote merger and restructuring to create large and globally 
competitive logistics companies; promote logistics services in 
energy, mineral, auto, agricultural products, medical device 
industries; and promote international logistics and tariff bond 
logistics capacities 
Source: Chinanews; available at http://www.chinanews.com.cn/cj/gncj/news/2009/02-
25/1578916.shtml. 
 
 
 
 
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  Thank you,  Mr.  Stewar t .  
 Mr.  McCormack.  
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STATEMENT OF MR. RICHARD A.  MCCORMACK 
EDITOR & PUBLISHER, MANUFACTURING & TECHNOLOGY 
NEWS 
ANNANDALE, VIRGINIA 
 
 MR.  McCORMACK:  Thanks .    
 As  a  journal is t ,  your  Commiss ion is  one  of  the  few places  tha t  
these  i ssues  are  a i red ,  d iscussed,  and--  
 COMMISSIONER BLUMENTHAL:  Is  tha t  good or  bad?  
 MR.  McCORMACK:  No,  tha t ' s  rare ,  and so  i t ' s  very  impor tant .   
My job i s  a  journal is t .   And my job i s  to  g ive  voice  to  people ,  and 
somet imes  not  to  have  a  voice  i s  more  impor tant  than anything e lse  I  
do ,  jus t  provide  an  avenue for  o ther  people  to  express  themselves .  
 When Ralph says  the  in teres ts  of  corpora t ions  have d iverged 
f rom the  in teres ts  of  America ,  tha t  i s  profoundly  impor tant ,  and i t  
could  be  jus t  repeated  over  and over ,  and I  th ink people  in tu i t ive ly  
know that ,  but  i t ' s  jus t  so  impor tant  tha t  he  jus t  sa id  tha t  to  you.  
 I 'm going to  da te  mysel f .   I  s ta r ted  as  a  journal is t  in  Washington,  
D.C. ,  on  Fr iday,  February  12,  1983.   There  was  a  huge snowstorm that  
day.   I  was  on the  s taf f  of  the  Energy Dai ly ,  and the  Energy Dai ly  
d idn ' t  produce  tha t  day;  we missed a  day.  
 But  on  tha t  day,  there  was  a  ship ,  coal  col l ie r  tha t  went  down off  
the  coas t  of  Virginia .  Some of  you might  remember  i t .   I t  was  the  
Marine  Elect r ic .   And on Monday,  I  came in to  the  off ice ,  and my 
edi tor  sa id ,  “Hey,  Richard ,  f ind  out  where  tha t  coal  was  going,  who 
owned that  sh ip .”  
 I t  was  pre- In ternet .   So  I  found out  who the  owner  of  the  
company was   and I  got  h im on the  phone,  and I  s tar ted  asking him 
ques t ions  about  the  coal ,  and he  sa id ,  ”You know,  god-damn i t ,  the  
coal  i s  a t  the  bot tom of  the  ocean a long wi th  31 people ,”  and on that  
phone ca l l  he  cr ied .  
 As  a  journal is t - - there  are  o ther  journal is t s  in  th is  room--when 
you hear  a  grown man cry ,  tha t  s tops  you in  your  t racks ,  and i t ' s  an  
impor tant  th ing as  a  journal is t  to  exper ience .  
 Now,  f lash-forward 25 years .   Two years  ago,  I 'm in terviewing 
the  pres ident  of  the  larges t  family-owned furni ture  company in  New 
England.   Jus t  shut  h is  doors ,  la id  off  200 people .   I 'm on the  phone 
wi th  h im.   He sa id  these  are  a l l  people  my parents  have  worked wi th ,  
my fa ther ,  my grandfather  worked wi th  them.   I  went  to  e lementary  
school  wi th  these  people .   I  jus t  la id  them al l  of f  because  the  Chinese  
are  making the  same exact  cane  chair  tha t  I 'm making in  Maine  for  
$15,  and i t  cos ts  me $110 to  make i t  here .   Al l  these  people  are  now 
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gone.   Our  town is  des t royed.   And he  d id  the  same th ing.   He cr ied .  
 I  don ' t  know i f  you 've  ever  been around a  grown man who cr ies ,  
but  le t  me te l l  you,  i t  has  an  ef fec t  on  you.   And our  country  for  the  
las t  e ight  years  has  to ta l ly  ignored these  people .   We heard  Dr .  Haley  
ment ion the  smal l -  and medium-size  enterpr ises .   They have no voice .   
They 've  had very  l i t t le  voice  in  a l l  th is .  
 They 've  been drowned out  by lobbyis ts  and the  b ig  mul t ina t ional  
companies  wi th  the i r  t rade  lawyers  and economis ts  everywhere  ta lk ing 
about  the  benef i t s  of  f ree  t rade  and global iza t ion .   Wel l ,  I  deal  wi th  
the  people  who,  a t  leas t  I  t ry  to ,  who are  having to  confront  th is  every  
day.   And they 've  been marginal ized.   We've  marginal ized them in  our  
country .   That ’s  those  people  who are  going to  lose  the i r  jobs--we ' l l  
g ive  them t rade  adjus tment  ass is tance .  
 That ' s  the  cos t  of  our  having a  g lobal  socie ty ;  tha t ' s  a  cos t  of  
rea l ly  cheap goods  a t  Wal-Mart .    And there  i s  th is  ra t ional iza t ion  
that ' s  gone on.   And as  somebody who has  covered th is ,  I 've  covered 
tha t  ra t ional iza t ion  and I 've  covered the  guys  who are  los ing the i r  
jobs ,  the  women who are  los ing the i r  jobs ,  the  towns tha t  a re  
complete ly  decimated,  the  depress ion tha t  exis ts  in  our  country .   I t  i s  
rea l  as  rea l  can  be .   Al l  you have to  do i s  dr ive  through Michigan;  i t ' s  
a  depress ion.  
 Most  of  us  l ive  in  Washington,  and in  2002,  we had the  sniper  
shoot ing around here .   I  l ive  in  nor thern  Virginia  in  Annandale  r ight  
c lose  to  Fal ls  Church,  and the  sniper  shot  seven or  e ight  people  in  
Bethesda ,  and I 'm th inking,  oh ,  tha t ' s  Bethesda ,  tha t ' s  over  there ,  I  
th ink I 'm okay,  I 'm over  here  in  Virginia .  
 A couple  of  days  go by,  and he  shoots  somebody down in  
Manassas  on Route  28 and 66 a t  the  Sunoco s ta t ion .   That ' s  k ind of  
c lose .   Then he 's  down in  Freder icksburg  and he  shot  somebody.   Then 
he  shot  the  woman who worked for  the  FBI  a t  the  Fal ls  Church Home 
Depot .   That 's  where  I  shop.  
 So we 've  had e ight  years  of  saying who cares  about  Detroi t ,  who 
cares  about  Cleveland,  who cares  about  the  Rust  Bel t ,  who cares?   
Wel l ,  i t ' s  not  over  there  anymore .   I t  was  Cleveland.   I t  was  Detroi t .   
But  now what  happens  in  Detroi t  i s  going to  af fec t  what  happens  in  
Vegas ,  in  Tampa,  and Phoenix ,  and the  contagion has  spread.   I t ' s  not  
over  there  in  Bethesda  anymore .   I t ' s  not  jus t  up  in  the  Rust  Bel t .   I t ' s  
everywhere .  
 We've  seen an  u t ter  economic  ca lamity  caused by th is ,  and you 
guys  have been in  the  absolute  foref ront  of  i t ,  ta lk ing about  i t .   We 've  
been wri t ing  about  i t .  We 've  been press ing i t .   We 've  been saying--
Ernie  Preeg f rom the  Manufacturers  Al l iance  i s  in  the  room--warning 
us  tha t  th is  could  be  ca lamitous .  
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 The Nat ional  Academy of  Sciences  wrote  a  s tudy,  "The 
Gather ing Storm."   Wel l ,  the  s torm has  ar r ived.   Now we need to  do 
something,  and so  we have t ime to  ta lk  about  what  tha t  i s .   But  for  me,  
and I 'm sure  for  a l l  of  you,  i t ' s  been a  f rus t ra t ion  t ry ing to  get  these  
s tor ies  to ld ,  t ry ing to  get  the  word out .  
 One las t  point - - I  subscr ibe  to  a  service  ca l led  Government  Pol icy  
Newswire ,  and everyday there 's  a  journal is t  who provides  th is  da ta  
service  of  a l l  the  press  re leases ,  a l l  the  repor ts ,  everything tha t  comes 
out  regarding Washington government ,  a l l  the  government  agencies ,  a l l  
the  congress ional  of f ices ,  a l l  the  t rade  associa t ions .  
 These  i ssues  are  hardly  d iscussed.   They ' re  jus t  hardly  d iscussed.  
 I  read  through i t  every  day t ry ing to  pul l  th ings  out .   What 's  the  
impact  of  China  on var ious  indust r ies?   How are  we approaching 
economic  pol icy?   What 's  the  debate  over  indust r ia l  pol icy?   How 
about  long- term R&D? 
 So,  a t  some point ,  a l l  these  i ssues  are  going to  be  e levated  
because  we ' re  going to  have  to  deal  wi th  them,  and i t ' s  going to  happen 
soon.   We've  s t i l l  not  deal t  wi th  them,  I  don ' t  th ink.   The s t imulus  
package,  the  whole  bank bai lout ,  tha t ' s  jus t  a  pa l l ia t ive .   I t ' s  not  
address ing the  rea l  s t ruc tura l  i ssues  tha t  Clyde Pres towi tz  and Alan 
Wolff  and Dr .  Haley were  ta lk ing about  in  the  las t  panel .  
 So  I  commend you for  doing tha t .   I t ' s  rare  and i t ' s  very  
impor tant .   Thanks .  
 [The s ta tement  fo l lows:]  
 
Prepared Statement  of  Mr.  Richard A.  McCormack 
Editor  and Publ isher ,  Manufacturing & Technology News 
Annandale ,  Virginia  
 
Thank you very much for inviting me to testify. This commission is one of the most important information 
resources I use as a journalist. 
 
Virtually all of the domestic manufacturing and technology executives and workers I cover understand the 
reason the United States is in its current economic predicament, and why it will take a long time for the 
country to recover. Few of them were “taken by surprise” by the country’s economic travails. 
 
They understand that the United States government has effectively ignored the essential role manufacturing 
plays in the economy. It has done so at its peril. Its senior leadership has been distracted over the past 20 
years and has barely acknowledged that the country is facing an unprecedented competitive challenge 
posed by dozens of countries, but particularly by China. Until it addresses the underlying cause of the 
financial sector’s collapse, which is the massive imbalance in trade, the glum economic mood of the 
country will not change. There are too many millions of Americans who intuitively know -- because they 
shop -- that the country no longer produces what it consumes. America’s wealth is no longer in America. 
The American industrial sector knows very well that until the government puts in place policies that 
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encourage U.S.-based production of a new generation of consumer and industrial products, there can only 
be an anemic economic recovery. 
 
I have been covering science, technology, industry and government in Washington, D.C., for the past 26 
years. I was the founding editor of New Technology Week in 1987 at the height of Japan’s challenge to 
U.S. technology dominance. I covered the deliberate and in many ways successful U.S. response to that 
challenge. Ronald Reagan was an economic nationalist (a reluctant one). He and many of his political 
appointees in the Defense and Commerce Departments -- as well as a number of members of Congress -- 
understood that in order for the United States to win the Cold War with the Soviet Union it could not lose 
the Economic War with Japan. Reagan invested heavily in digital technologies, the fruits of which 
propelled the country through the 1990s. After a great deal of debate, Reagan also adopted trade policies 
that defended American workers and important “strategic” industries including automotive, machine tools 
and semiconductors. It is the reason he remains a hero in America’s heartland among “Reagan Democrats.”  
 
The primary “issue” that I have been covering as a journalist for the past eight years is this: How is the 
United States dealing with the rise of China?  
 
With the meltdown of the U.S. economy, that question has now been answered. 
 
Two weeks ago as I was just preparing my written testimony for this hearing I went to the Google search 
engine and typed in “China’s strategic industries.” 
 
The first listing -- the prized position, the place on Google where companies pay money to appear -- was 
this hearing. 
 
That tells you something very important. 
 
It means that the United States-China Commission is about the only government organization analyzing the 
most important issue facing the United States of America.  
 
So let me tell you my approach in preparing for my testimony here today. I went on a U.S. government 
goose hunt. Searching through Web sites. Calling offices. Talking to more than a dozen people in the 
Washington, D.C., technology and industrial policy community -- some I have known for years and others 
they recommended. Collectively, these people have hundreds of years of experience working in Congress, 
government agencies such as Commerce, DOD, the State Department, and the International Trade 
Commission. They have worked in the White House, the Office of the United States Trade Representative 
and throughout the Washington, D.C., technology, trade and manufacturing communities. 
 
First I wanted to see if I could locate places within the government that identify any or all of China’s 
“strategic” industries. I sought to find some meaningful analysis of what these industries are; the 
companies that constitute them; China’s policies to promote them; and whether or not the U.S. federal 
government has any type of mechanism to alert American companies of overt Chinese challenges to their 
industries or their specific enterprises.  
 
I will describe later some of what I found, but aside from an occasional report, there is very little. 
 
Also, I should say that as a journalist covering these issues from Washington, D.C., I am not an expert on 
what China considers to be its “pillar” industries. However, I have been chronicling in great detail China’s 
impact on American industries, the American economy and American workers. China’s unrelenting drive 
to develop robust manufacturing and research and technology capabilities with the help of foreign 
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companies has had a profoundly detrimental impact on dozens of U.S. industries, ranging from consumer 
electronics, printed circuit boards, semiconductors, telecommunications equipment, batteries, computer 
components, materials, automotive parts, consumer goods, furniture, textiles and apparel. The list is 
comprehensive and entails virtually every industrial sector in the United States. Americans impacted 
adversely by China’s industrial, trade and currency policies have testified many times before your 
commission. You have heard their stories. You have given them voice. 
 
In doing research for this hearing I also wanted to verify what I have long known to be the case: that the 
United States government not only has little knowledge of what is going on in China (save for the USCC), 
but also has little comprehension of the repercussions for American industry, employers and, most 
important, for American workers and taxpayers. There is no mechanism to systematically track China’s 
thrust into “strategic industries.” Nor is there a robust mechanism in place to defend the interests of 
American companies and workers who must compete with entirely unfair Chinese trading. Finally, there is 
still no strategy to be found anywhere in the government to counter China’s and other foreign nations’ 
successful displacement of American industries. 
 
What I found, instead, was a government that held in contempt Americans concerned about massive trade 
imbalances and the loss of American industry and jobs. A speech by the recently departed Under Secretary 
of Commerce for International Trade, Christopher Padilla, given on November 13, 2008, provides an 
indication of the government’s attitude toward those who express concern about preserving the wealth-
creation engine of the United States. Padilla describes people opposed to the U.S. government’s free trade 
policies as being “pessimistic populists,” a pejorative euphemism for “protectionist.” Such “pessimistic 
populists,” says the man who was in charge of the Commerce Department’s trade functions, “fear the 
world, and blame its products, its people and its investors for our economic anxieties. [They] cannot be 
appeased.” 
 
In his speech, Padilla did not mention the trade deficit or the loss of four million manufacturing jobs over 
the course of the previous eight years. Like virtually all adherents to “free trade,” Padilla staked out the 
moral high ground: “I stand on the other side of this debate, with those who embrace the enduring 
optimism of economic openness.” As hundreds of executives in the domestic manufacturing community 
have told me (with remorse) over the past eight years, it is impossible to have a reasoned discussion with 
people holding such “religious” convictions. (Padilla’s speech “Reflections and Projections: A Trade 
Transition Memo for the New Administration,” before the Washington International Trade Association, is 
located at http://trade.gov/press/speeches/padilla_111308.asp.) 
 
Padilla and others like him have mis-labeled many concerned Americans as being “protectionists” or 
“pessimistic populists.” Many of the manufacturing executives who hire Americans to make products are 
fully aware of the benefits of trade. They just want the U.S. government to put in place industrial and trade 
policies that favor American interests over those of foreign governments, foreign companies, U.S. 
multinationals that have moved production offshore, shipping companies, retailers that buy from cheap 
factories overseas, Wall Street wizards who pressure companies to fire American workers and shift 
production offshore so they can make additional pennies per share, and all of the economists, lawyers and 
lobbyists successfully representing these people in Washington, D.C. 
 
All of these well-funded interests have won the economic debate -- they claim that cheap prices and 
offshore outsourcing are good for Americans -- but the United States has lost the underpinnings of its 
economy. 
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In the 1990s, the story that I covered was the rebirth of American industry. A big part of the story was the 
popular business technique of studying the “best practices” of the world’s best companies, and adopting 
them. 
 
What has become abundantly clear in the past decade is that the United States federal government does not 
study the best practices of foreign nations’ increasingly successful economic, technology and industrial 
development programs.  
 
In every case, what was told to me by people I spoke with in preparation for my testimony here confirmed 
what I have know as a journalist in Washington covering competitiveness for 22 years: the United States 
government has largely disassembled the mechanisms by which it was monitoring foreign technology 
development and economic threats to America’s most important industrial sectors. With little knowledge of 
what is happening overseas, particularly in China, the United States does not have the ability to formulate 
any type of effective response. It does an ad-hoc job of defending American companies and their workers 
confronting those threats. It does not even assure that the benefits of the massive investments it is making 
in research are accruing to American taxpayers who fund the research. 
 
The result of such negligence is now readily apparent to tens of millions of Americans. The U.S. economy 
is in ruins. Yet the “free trade” forces are in hyper-mode, pouncing on any type of pro-American policy 
that smacks of “fair trade.” They are ready to blame the “pessimistic populists” for a massive fall-off of 
international trade similar to what (arguably) occurred after the Smoot-Hawley tariff bill of 1930. Yet a 
massive decline in international trade is occurring without there having been implemented any substantive 
protectionist measures in the United States for decades. 
 
The United States government has allowed -- indeed encouraged -- the loss of its most important “strategic 
industries,” one after another. The evidence resides within the story told by the trade figures released every 
month by the Census Bureau. These figures are about the only real indicator the government keeps of the 
health of specific industrial sectors. 
 
There are, however, pockets of people in government and Congress concerned about these issues. I have 
worked with them for years. They are passionate about protecting the interests of America over the 
interests of foreign countries and multinational companies that are benefiting from foreign trade, labor, 
environmental and government practices that would be illegal in the United States. For the most part, this 
small cadre of Patriots work for institutions that are enervated after decades of neglect and budget cuts. 
 
They have expressed to me on countless occasions that the U.S. government is structured for a different era 
driven by an outdated mindset that the country has the most productive workers, the best technology, and a 
system of unfettered free trade that will benefit the majority of Americans. For the hundreds of thousands 
of manufacturing workers who are losing their jobs in “low-tech” industries targeted by cheap foreign 
imports, there is the Trade Adjustment Assistance Program to help them retrain for new opportunities. 
Unfortunately, the entire country is now on a massive “Trade Adjustment Assistance.” 
 
The U.S. governments’ effort aimed at tracking Chinese industry was described to me as being a case of 
“benign neglect.” There is a lack of awareness within government of China’s capabilities and even less 
appreciation of China’s momentum in advanced technology development, commercialization and 
production. “The problem is getting bigger and the capability to track it is being diminished,” said one 
government technology veteran. “Who is studying their capability?” asks an industrial scientist managing a 
government R&D agency. “That is a big blank. We’re competing globally but we don’t know what we’re 
competing against.” Said another: “We’re not even in the game. There is an insidious process going on.” 
 
93
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
Here is some of what I found: 
 
International Trade Administration 
If there is one place in the government that would be monitoring U.S. and foreign strategic industries, it 
would be the ITA. This is home of the “Manufacturing Czar,” who resides in the division’s Manufacturing 
& Services Bureau. There are a few nuggets on the ITA Web site, but there really is not much about China. 
Two reports produced in March 2008 under the “automotive” link (“The Road Ahead for the U.S. Auto 
Market,” and “Automotive Parts Industry Annual Assessment”) paint a grim picture of the U.S. auto 
industry. In the auto parts report, the ITA Manufacturing division notes that the Detroit 3 have been 
“advocating that U.S.-based suppliers move production to lower cost countries or risk losing future 
contracts.” There is no analysis of why they are doing so, nor of how many auto suppliers have moved. 
The report does not describe what other countries are doing to entice them. There is nothing about what the 
U.S might do to counter such an economically destabilizing trend. Both reports provide little insight into 
the activities of Chinese and Indian parts and auto producers. The “Road Ahead” report notes that 
“globalization and foreign competition continue to impact the U.S. economy particularly the automotive 
industry.” Both reports provide little by way of dealing with the pending collapse of the American 
automobile industry.  
 
STAT-USA “State of the Nation” 
STAT-USA is an online subscription service run by the Commerce Department that says it is the “Federal 
Government’s best resource for monitoring the U.S. economy.” Frankly, such a claim is specious and the 
Web site is not worth the $200 annual subscription fee for anyone involved in the industrial technology 
community. There are links to statements made by Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke and daily releases on 
Treasury yield curves, commercial paper and bond rates. It posts the economic releases from most 
government agencies, such as monthly trade statistics, import price indexes, employment, GDP and 
earnings. Most of these are available for free on those agencies’ Web sites. There is nothing on the site 
from the State Department’s commercial or scientific attaches or any of the intelligence agencies 
describing overseas industrial developments, nor anything of substance describing the true condition of 
various U.S. industries.  
 
The DOD’s Office of Industrial Policy 
This office has repeatedly and clearly stated for years that the U.S. defense industrial base is robust and 
that the Pentagon is not vulnerable to supply disruptions caused by a reliance on foreign producers of 
essential defense technologies. “The Department of Defense is not aware of any foreign vulnerabilities 
within its supply chains,” it states in its latest “Foreign Sources of Supply” report published in September 
2008. It notes that the last time it assessed the military supply chain was in 2003. 
The office states that that the Department’s industrial policy is geared toward working with foreign 
suppliers. “The Department incorporates foreign items and components into many important systems, and 
in some cases the Department may be dependent upon foreign supplies for these items,” it says. “However, 
this does not mean the Department suffers from a foreign vulnerability. Foreign dependence usually does 
not equate to foreign vulnerability. The Department is not vulnerable if it is dependent on reliable foreign 
suppliers, just as it is not vulnerable when it is dependent on reliable domestic suppliers. Foreign 
vulnerability would occur only if the Department was dependent upon suppliers from a single or small 
group of countries that had the capability and political will to halt shipments to DOD in time of need, and 
when such delivery denial would cause direct and unacceptable impact to operations. In short, for there to 
be foreign vulnerability, DOD must be dependent upon the foreign source (no alternative sources available 
or that could rapidly become available), and there must be a significant, credible, and unacceptable risk of 
supply disruption due to political intervention by the host country or countries.”  
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The DOD Office of Industrial Policy’s Web site is worth viewing. There are current reports on various 
industries (such as the recent “Assessment of Industry Investment in U.S. Domestic Production of Strategic 
Materials,” January, 2009), http://www.acq.osd.mil/ip/. 
 
DOD’s “Annual Report To Congress on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2008,” is 
located at http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/china.html. 
 
The United States Trade Representative publishes an annual “Report to Congress on China’s WTO 
Compliance.” This is good. 
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2008/asset_upload_file192_15258.pd
f. 
 
The International Trade Commission published an excellent report, “China: Description of Selected 
Government Practices and Policies Affecting Decision Making in the Economy,” in December 2007. This 
is by far the best government study found about China’s industrial policy intentions: 
http://www.usitc.gov/publications/pub3978.pdf. 
 
Director of National Intelligence: 
Over the past month, Dennis Blair, the director of National Intelligence, has briefed both the House and 
Senate on the “Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community.” In his first sentence to both the 
Senate Armed Services Committee on March 10 and the House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence on February 25, Blair said that the “primary near-term security concern of the United States is 
the global economic crisis and its geopolitical implications.” He told the Senate hearing that “time is 
probably our greatest threat. The longer it takes for the recovery to begin, the greater the likelihood of 
serious damage to U.S. strategic interests. Roughly a quarter of the countries in the world have already 
experienced low-level instability such as government changes because of the current slowdown.” 
Most of Blair’s 45-page testimony is devoted to terrorist extremists. At the February 25 hearing before the 
House of Representatives, he did not field a single question on China or on the “economic crisis and its 
geopolitical implications.” Members instead focused on the prison at Guantanamo Bay, cyber terrorism, 
and the situation in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq. 
Blair’s March 10, 2009, testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee is located at 
http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/20090310_testimony.pdf. 
A transcript of Blair’s hearing before the House Permanent Select committee on Intelligence is located at 
http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/20090225_transcript.pdf. 
 
“Global Trends 2025, A Transformed World,” from the National Intelligence Council, states that among its 
“relative certainties” is the emergence of a “global multi-polar system” with the rise of China and India. By 
2025 “a single ‘international community’ composed of nation-states will no longer exist. Power will be 
more dispersed with the newer players bringing new rules of the game while risks will increase that the 
traditional Western alliances will weaken. Rather than emulating Western models of political and economic 
development, more countries may be attracted to China’s alternative development model.” The 99-page 
report is located at  
http://www.dni.gov/nic/PDF_2025/2025_Global_Trends_Final_Report.pdf. 
 
World Technology Evaluation Center (http://www.wtec.org/) 
The World Technology Evaluation Center is a private organization hired by government agencies to 
analyze foreign technology development. In the course of my research for this hearing, I spoke with its 
president, Duane Shelton.  
 “The little bit of scholarship that I do is pointing with alarm to China in science and technology,” he 
explains. “I have been trying to get this in front of some members of Congress who might be aroused to do 
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something about this, but I have had very little luck. They are up to their necks in alligators right now and 
long-range problems like this take a back seat.” 
 
Shelton’s views were typical among those involved in international science and technology issues. He says 
the United States does not monitor the development of strategic and potentially “disruptive” technology 
taking place in China. He recently read that virtually all of the key ingredients used in American antibiotics 
are now produced in China. “I am currently writing about President Truman setting a goal of maintaining 
leadership in science because of his experience in World War II,” Shelton says. It was important for the 
United States to continue inventing new technologies in the absence of war, which had just produced such 
things as the atomic bomb, radar and penicillin. So Truman created the National Science Foundation. “And 
now we found out that all of our penicillin is made in China, which is a potential adversary of ours,” says 
Shelton. “This is shocking.” 
 
Having conducted dozens of foreign technology capability studies over the past 20 years, Shelton says the 
United States is no longer the world leader in many important areas. His organization just finished a study 
on catalysts, a valuable and widely used technology, and found that there is little technical capability left in 
the United States, much of it having shifted to China. “I think this is very alarming,” he says. “But I have to 
tell you that as I try to convince other people, it doesn’t seem to get through to them.” 
 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, there was concern over these issues. The government created the Critical 
Technologies Institute operated out of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy. It was 
busy putting together “critical technology” lists and contemplating policies needed to encourage their 
development in the United States. “But over the years as more and more technologies were lost and the 
manufacturing capacity went abroad and there were multiple sources of supply, our government just gave 
up: ‘there is a free marketplace and we will always buy things in the market so don’t worry about it,’ ” says 
Shelton. 
 
Today, China is investing huge sums in new technology, production capabilities and science and 
engineering education. “Everything has changed overnight,” says Shelton. “A lot of people went to China 
five years ago and they saw peasants pushing wheel barrels. But if you haven’t been there in the last year, 
you are out of date.” 
 
 
Panel  II:   Discuss ion,  Quest ions  and Answers  
 
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  Thank you,  Mr.  McCormack.    
 And we ' l l  have  now the  ques t ioning by the  commiss ioners .   Each 
commiss ioner  wi l l  ge t  f ive  minutes .   Commiss ioner  Reinsch.  
 COMMISSIONER REINSCH:  Thank you,  and I  apprecia te  your  
cour tesy ,  Mr.  Chairman.   Unfor tunate ly ,  I 'm going to  have  to  leave ,  
and I ' l l  be  back la ter ,  but  I  apprecia te  your  le t t ing  me go f i rs t .  
 Dr .  Gomory,  I  have  a  couple  of  ques t ions  for  you.   I  want  to  
pursue  a  couple  of  the  remedies  tha t  you 've  proposed and ask  you to  
f lesh  them out  a  b i t .  
 On the  corpora te  tax  ra te  sugges t ion ,  tha t  i t  essent ia l ly  be  a  
d i f ferent ia l  ra te  based on company value  added,  can  you say a  l i t t le  
b i t ,  f i r s t ,  about  how you would  determine  the  value  added in  tha t  
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context?   And second,  what  do you th ink the  impact  of  tha t  would  be  
on the  to ta l  number  of  jobs  in  par t icular?  
 I t  seems to  me tha t  your  h igh value  added companies  are  crea t ing  
impor tant  jobs  and jobs  we want ;  they ' re  not  necessar i ly  crea t ing  large  
numbers  of  jobs .  
 DR.  GOMORY:  Yes .   Let  me jus t  take  i t  in  p ieces .   How would  
you measure  value  added?   I 'd  jus t  point  out  tha t  va lue  added is  known 
to  be  very  measurable  because  tha t ' s  what  they measure  in  Europe.   
They have a  value  added tax ,  and i t ' s  a  s t ra ight forward th ing.   I t ' s  
revenue minus  a l l  the  inputs  to  your  company that  you buy f rom the  
outs ide  of  i t .  
 So  there 's  no  ques t ion  tha t  va lue  added is  measurable  because  
i t ' s  be ing measured now in  Europe and every  country .   So i t ' s  a  
measurable  th ing.    
 Now your  ques t ion about  jobs .   Very ,  very  s imi lar  to  the  
ques t ion  tha t  a lways  i s  ra ised  when we f ind  a  way to  automate  
something.   When you want  to  make something,  people  do lose  jobs .   
But  they crea te  a lso  h igher  va lue  added jobs .   This  would  be  an  
incent ive  to  do tha t .    
 In  Westches ter  County  where  I  l ive ,  there  are  a  lo t  of  very  low 
paid  people  making s tone  wal ls  by  hand.   With  th is  tax ,  there  would  be  
an  incent ive  for  o ther  companies- - those  jobs  would  s t i l l  ex is t .   I t ' s  jus t  
the  companies  they represent  would  not  be  very  prof i table .   The wages  
would  s t i l l  be  paid ,  but  the  prof i tabi l i ty  would  be  there ,  but  i t  would  
be  taxed highly .   High tax  on the  low product ive  per-person th ing.  
 I t ' s  an  incent ive  for  people  to  invent  another  way to  make s tone  
wal ls ,  and I  can  te l l  you there  are  o ther  ways .   Higher  inves tment ,  
more  robot ics ,  th ings  of  tha t  sor t .   And they would  enter  in to  tha t  
f ie ld ,  and they would  be  low taxed.  
 So tha t  i s  a  way to  dr ive  innovat ion in  our  country  and crea te  
h igher  va lue  to  replace  lower  value  jobs .   We were  a  r ich  country  
compared to  the  wor ld  because  we dug di tches  wi th  machines ,  not  
shovels .   I f  we were  t ry ing to  crea te  jobs ,  we could  d ig  d i tches  wi th  
spoons .   That ' s  not  the  game.   The game is  to  use  backhoes .  That ' s  the  
game that  th is  would  be  pushing.  
 COMMISSIONER REINSCH:  How would  your  proposal  af fec t  
the  automobi le  indust ry?  
 DR.  GOMORY:  Wel l ,  the  automobi le  indust ry  i s  a  very  
product ive  indust ry .  I t  would  get  a  low tax .   I t ' s  very  product ive  per  
person,  yes .  
 COMMISSIONER REINSCH:  Even though they have large  
numbers  of  employees  overseas ,  you 'd--  
 DR.  GOMORY:  No,  you only  look a t  the i r  domest ic  ac t iv i t ies .  
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 COMMISSIONER REINSCH:  Not  the i r  U.S.  employment  
re la t ive  to  the i r  fore ign employment?  
 DR.  GOMORY:  Excuse  me?  
  DR.  GOMORY:  Not  a t  a l l .   The  only  i ssue  i s ,  a re  these  
fo lks  providing a  lo t  of  output  per  capi ta  in  the  U.S.?   That  would  be  
the  only  measure .    
 COMMISSIONER REINSCH:  Okay.   Let  me ask  you about  the  
t rade  balancing proposal .  
 DR.  GOMORY:  Yes .  
 COMMISSIONER REINSCH:  The Warren Buffe t t  proposal .  
 DR.  GOMORY:  Yes .  
 COMMISSIONER REINSCH:  Do you th ink tha t ' s  cons is tent  wi th  
our  mul t i la tera l  obl iga t ions?  
 DR.  GOMORY:  You mean l ike  i s  i t  cons is tent  wi th  WTO and 
th ings  of  tha t  sor t?  
 COMMISSIONER REINSCH:  Yes .   And other  b i la tera l  and 
mul t i la tera l  obl iga t ions .  
 DR.  GOMORY:  I 've  d iscussed tha t  wi th  lawyers ,  and there  i s  
d issent  among them.   So I  th ink i t ' s ,  I  be l ieve  there 's  a  WTO provis ion 
tha t  a l lows a  country  tha t  has  a  consis tent  t rade  def ic i t  to  do  th is  sor t  
of  th ing.   We are  such a  country .   That ' s  probably  where  i t  would  come 
out ,  yes .  
 COMMISSIONER REINSCH:  Terry ,  a re  you one of  the  lawyers  
tha t  th inks  i t ' s  WTO compl iant?  
 MR.  STEWART:  I  th ink the  i ssue  i s  could  you s t ructure  
something that  would  be  WTO compl iant ,  and i f  you went  off  of  tha t  
par t icular  provis ion,  then perhaps  you could .    
 COMMISSIONER REINSCH:  I 'm not  sure  what  tha t  means .  
 MR.  STEWART:  This  i s  the  oppor tuni ty  to  impose  a  duty  across  
the  board  where  you ' re  running a  large  balance  of  t rade  def ic i t .   I t ' s  
what  the  U.S.  d id  back in--  
 COMMISSIONER REINSCH:  No,  I 'm t ry ing to  f igure  out  what  
you would  do that  i s  d i f ferent  f rom what  Mr.  Buffe t t  proposed that  
would  make i t  okay?  
 MR.  STEWART:  I  haven ' t  read h is  proposal  in  a  long t ime.   So 
my recol lec t ion  of  h is  proposal  was  tha t  you would  impose  a  duty  
based upon the  level  of  def ic i t  tha t  you were  running to  t ry  to  get  to  a  
ba lance .   I s  tha t  correc t  or - -  
 DR.  GOMORY:  No.   
 MR.  STEWART:  No.  
 DR.  GOMORY:  That ' s  not  qui te  r ight .   I t  was  rea l ly  a  market -
dr iven th ing,  but  i t  would  have ended up wi th  the  ef fec t  tha t  Mr.  
Stewar t  i s  descr ib ing.   Yes .   But  I 've  spent  t ime ta lk ing to  people  
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about  th is .   They th ink you can do i t .   Yes .  
 COMMISSIONER REINSCH:  I 'm out  of  t ime.  
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  Yes .   I f  I  could  jus t  
supplement  tha t .   The Alf red  P .  Sloan Foundat ion did  make a  grant  to  
EPI ,  the  Levy Ins t i tu te ,  and some others  to  f lesh  out  tha t  proposal ,  
Bi l l ,  inc luding looking a t  how you can make i t  WTO consis tent ,  and 
my unders tanding tha t  s tudy wi l l  be  out  wi th in  a  month  or  so ,  and we ' l l  
make tha t  avai lable  to  a l l  the  commiss ioners .  
 COMMISSIONER REINSCH:  Good.  
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  Mr.  Wessel .  
 COMMISSIONER WESSEL:   Thank you,  gent lemen.   
 I 'd  l ike  to  fo l low up in  par t  on  Bi l l ' s  l ine  of  ques t ioning - - these  
are  grea t  informat ive  char ts .   My hope i s  tha t  they ' l l  be  in  our  hear ing 
record  and we can pos t  them on our  Web s i te  so  tha t  we can have peer  
review and share  them broadly--  
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  I 'm to ld  by  s taff  tha t  we can do 
tha t .  
 COMMISSIONER WESSEL:   That ' s  great .   Let  me,  Dr .  Gomory,  
i f  I  could ,  fo l low up for  a  moment ,  and you and I  have  ta lked in  the  
pas t .   I  th ink we share  many of  the  same goals .   We 've  ta lked about  
corpora te  governance  and some of  the  grea t  work tha t  Sloan has  funded 
in  the  pas t ,  not  only  what  Pat  jus t  refer red  to ,  but  on  corpora te  
governance ,  on  count ing of  in tangibles ,  how one values  the  work 
product  and the  inves tments  we 've  done here  in  the  U.S. ,  in  t ra in ing,  
re t ra in ing,  and the  ski l l s  tha t  our  workers  have ,  e t  ce tera .  
 At  the  same t ime,  I  have  some concerns  about  the  d i f ferent ia l  tax  
approach because ,  and I  be l ieve  i t  was  dur ing the  NAFTA negot ia t ions  
again  where  the  ITC did  an  evaluat ion of  how workers  would  be  
af fec ted ,  which has  been a  proxy for  many other  t rade  debates ,  and 
they sa id  70 plus  percent  of  the  American people  would  be  
d isadvantaged as  they were  lower  ski l led  because  they had less  than a  
col lege  degree .  
 They sa id  tha t  h igh-ski l led ,  h igh col lege-educated  people  would  
be  the  benef ic iar ies ,  and those  who did  not  have  tha t  level  would  not  
be ,  and c lear ly  we have to  do something about  our  educat ion  level ,  e t  
ce tera .  
 But  i f  you use  a  value-added model  as  you ' re  sugges t ing ,  a  
Genera l  Motors  could  increase  i t s  va lue  addi t ion ,  i f  you wi l l ,  assuming 
i t  can  mainta in  pr ices ,  by  impor t ing  more  fore ign auto  par ts  because  
on a  credi t  invoice  method or  on  a  VAT deduct ion method,  you do i t  a t  
the  value  i t ' s  been increased a t  each s tage  of  product ion.  
 As  you pointed  out ,  you subtrac t  out  the  inputs  in to  the  sys tem.   
And I  th ink that  in  some ways  unless  we are  able  to  d isaggregate  th is  
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and go a t  i t  much more  careful ly ,  the  sys tem you 're  sugges t ing  may 
ac tual ly  d isadvantage  lower-ski l led  workers .   Not  a l l  of  them are  going 
to  be  able  to  move up and s top us ing the  shovels  and us ing the  
backhoes .   We'd  love  a l l  of  them to ,  but  tha t ' s  not  the  way that  the  
sys tem works .  
 So I  th ink again  the  goals  tha t  you ' re  sugges t ing  are  very  
laudable .  
 In  addi t ion ,  the  Buffe t t  approach,  I  be l ieve ,  a l lows for  
gamesmanship ,  and,  I 've  been arguing for  my ent i re  adul t  l i fe  pol icy-
wise  tha t  we need to  do something about  our  t rade  def ic i t .   However ,   
the  Buffe t t  approach,  i f  you ' re  ta lking about  the  cer t i f ica te-based 
approach where  expor ters  earn  cer t i f ica tes ,  for  those  wi th  monopoly ,  
monopsony or  o ther  subs tant ia l  power  in  our  markets ,  they would  keep 
these  cer t i f ica tes  of  the  market  and therefore  l imi t  the  abi l i ty  of  the i r  
compet i tors  to  be  able  to  gain  access .  
 So  a l l  I 'm sugges t ing  i s  I  th ink  there  are  no  s impl is t ic  so lu t ions-
-we need to  f ind  a  way of  debat ing a l l  of  th is .    
 The ques t ion  i s  for  so  long we have v iewed China ,  Japan and others  as  
be ing unfa i r  in  te rms of  the i r  t rade  approaches .   Maybe we need to  
become more  l ike  them.   How would  you change U.S.  pol ic ies?   That  
the  Chinese ,  the  Japanese ,  the  Europeans ,  what  are  they doing tha t  we 
should ,  in  fac t ,  adopt  ra ther  than s imply  cont inue  to  ask  them to  
d ismant le  the i r  pol ic ies?  
 DR.  GOMORY:  Wel l ,  you’ve  got  a  lo t  of  ques t ions  there .  
 COMMISSIONER WESSEL:   That ' s  t rue .   And I  got  a l l  my 
ques t ions  in  under  f ive  minutes .  
 DR.  GOMORY:  So le t  me t ry  my bes t  to  answer  them.   Fi rs t  of  
a l l ,  on  the  ques t ion  of  d isadvantaging lower  ski l led  workers- - I  th ink 
there  has  been far  too  much emphasis  p laced on th is  educat ional  
a t ta inment .   When we became the  grea tes t  economic  power  in  the  
wor ld ,  which was  in  the  1920s--  i t  wasn ' t  because  our  workers  were  
bet ter  educated .   I t  was  because  our  companies  provided them a  se t t ing  
in  which they could  contr ibute ,  notably  a  product ion l ine .  
 So we keep point ing to  the  educat ion of  our  individuals .   We 
should  be  point ing  a t  the  abi l i ty  of  our  companies  to  make them 
product ive .  I  th ink we 're  underes t imat ing the  human capabi l i t ies  and 
pushing i t  on  the  educat ional  sys tem.    
 With  respect  to  gaming,  the  Buffe t t  th ing,  we 'd  have  to  ta lk  
about  tha t  in  grea t  de ta i l ,  and we should  f ix  i t .   But  the  mer i t  of  i t  i s ,  
i s  tha t  i t  looks  a t  the  resul t .   Al l  the  proposals  are  about  we ' l l  do  th is  
and we ' l l  do  tha t ,  and maybe that  wi l l  ba lance  the  t rade  bet ter .   This  
looks  d i rec t ly  a t  the  balance .    
 And so  wi th  these  cer t i f ica tes ,  we ' re  going to  have  balance .   
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Then,  people  can s tar t  to  p lay  games  wi th  the  cer t i f ica tes ,  but  I  th ink 
i t ' s  a  good di rec t ion  and deserves  ser ious  considera t ion .   Al l  these  
o ther  th ings  get  ta lked about ,  but  th is  th ing,  which depends  on the  end 
resul t ,  doesn ' t ,  and i t  needs  i t .  
 COMMISSIONER WESSEL:   Comments  by the  o thers  on  what  
you th ink we should  do di f ferent ly?  
 DR.  GOMORY:  I  th ink we should  do di f ferent  two th ings .   We 
should  adopt  some vers ion of  the  tax  I  descr ibed,  and we should  adopt  
some vers ion of  the  Buffe t t  proposal ,  but ,  in  addi t ion ,  in  the  f i rs t  
panel  and in  many discuss ions  in  which I  have  par t ic ipated ,  we ' re  
a lways  te l l ing  the  o ther  country  to  do th is  and do that .   In  my opinion,  
they aren ' t  going to .   They ' re  going to  pursue  the i r  na t ional  in teres t .  
 I  th ink we should  pursue  our  nat ional  in teres t  and put  f i rs t  th ings  
we can control ,  not  th ings  we can t ry  and persuade others  to  do.  
 MR.  STEWART:  I  gave  two areas where  i t  seems to  me you have 
impor tant  oppor tuni t ies  f rom the  U.S.  government  point  of  v iew.   I  
a lso  th ink when you take  a  look,  there  i s  a  s t ra tegic  shi f t  in  the  way 
mul t ina t ionals  are  behaving.  
 His tor ica l ly ,  U.S.  mul t ina t ionals  in  par t icular ,  but  a lso  European 
mul t ina t ionals ,  had a  model  of  supplying f rom a  regional  base ,  and 
China  i s ,  a t  leas t  in  some cases ,  threa tening tha t  bas ic  model ,  and one  
needs  to  take  a  look,  I  th ink,  a t  what  i s  dr iv ing companies  to  change 
the i r  model .  
 I  be l ieve  tha t  the  answer  tha t  wi l l  come back,  i t  i s  the  d is tor t ions  
tha t  a re  crea ted  by the  wide  range of  i ssues  tha t  have  been looked a t  
tha t  make China  appear  to  be  the  only  p lace  tha t  one  can have  a  g lobal  
sh ipping s t ra tegy f rom,  even though take  China  out  of  the  mold  and 
they wouldn ' t  do  tha t  anywhere  e lse  in  the  wor ld .  
 MR.  McCORMACK:  There  has  been a  theme today:    how do we 
become more  l ike  them?  Or  adopt  the i r  s t ra tegies?   And I  th ink,  f i r s t ,  
we don ' t  rea l ly  have  a  governmenta l  appara tus  tha t  rea l ly  s tudies ,  does  
the  analys is  of  what  those  are ,  and Clyde was  ta lk ing about  i t  th is  
morning.   We heard  h im say tha t  i t  would  be  grea t  to  ge t  In te l  and IBM 
and others  to  d iscuss  why thei r  inves tment  i s  going where  i t  i s .   And 
unt i l  you know that ,  i t ' s  very  hard ,  I  th ink,  to  counter  i t .    
 Second,  Commiss ioner  Reinsch asked th is  morning what  i s  our  
s t ra tegy?   Should  we a t tack  them wi th  t rade  ru les  and the  l ike--or  
should  we play  the i r  game even though we th ink i t ' s  i l legal?  
 Having covered sc ience  and technology,  indust ry  and government  
s ince  I  s tar ted  New Technology Week in  1987,  I  th ink there 's  an  
American way to  do th is ,  too ,  and i t ' s  been successful .   We crea ted  the  
Nat ional  Science  Foundat ion af ter  World  War  I I .   We created  DARPA. 
 We put  a  lo t  of  money in to  sc ience  and technology.   The In ternet  was  
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not  indust r ia l  pol icy  per  se ,  but  i t  was  genera l ly  the  resul t  of  a  
t remendous  inves tment  in  research and technology.  
 I  s tar ted  New Technology Week in  1978at  the  height  of  the  
Japanese  compet i t ive  threa t ,  and I  got  to  know people  l ike  Bob Galvin  
a t  Motorola  and John Young a t  Hewlet t -Packard  and Bob Noyce a t  
In te l .   We had rea l  champions  come,  and they thought  the  way you deal  
wi th  th is  Japanese  threa t ,  a t  leas t  one  of  them,  and a  very  impor tant  
one  a t  tha t ,  was  by inves t ing  heavi ly  in  sc ience  and technology.  
 We saw the  creat ion of  SEMATECH.  The Nat ional  Center  for  
Manufactur ing Sciences  was  crea ted .  You ' l l  hear  f rom OIDA, the  
Nat ional  Elec t ronics  Manufactur ing In i t ia t ive  was  crea ted .  
 There  was  a  t remendous  sense  tha t  for  the  Uni ted  Sta tes ,  the  
only  way i t  could  win  the  Cold  War  was  we couldn ' t  out -produce  the  
Sovie t  Union,  but  we could  make sure  tha t  we were  dominant  
technological ly .   And for  some reason in  the  las t  e ight  years ,  tha t ' s  
jus t  been off  the  table .  
 Dur ing tha t  era  when we had these  incredible  champions ,  and 
maybe i t ' s  for  the  reasons  tha t  Ralph ta lks  about ,  the  d ivergence  of  
corpora te  in teres ts  and nat ional  in teres ts  but  we don’ t  have  them 
anymore .   But  in  terms of  cover ing the  Reagan era  there  was  pol icy  
debate  about  indust r ia l  pol icy  and how to  deal  wi th  Japan,  but  the  
country  had Alan and Clyde.   I  don ' t  know i f  those  people  exis t  now.   I  
jus t  don ' t  know.  
 Maybe they do.   Maybe they ' re  somewhere  a t  USTR,  and we ' l l  
know about  them in  20 years ,  but  they were  pre t ty  wel l -known back 
then.   And so  I  don ' t  see  tha t  now.   And I  th ink af ter  Ronald  Reagan 
did  what  he  d id ,  he  became a  hero among Reagan Democrats  because  
he  was  an  economic  nat ional is t .   He was  a  re luctant  one ,  but  by  1987,  I  
was  cover ing him c lose ly ,  and he  was  as  o ld  as  my grandmother ,  and 
everything had kind of  run amok in  many respects ,  but  in  sc ience  and 
technology,  i t ' s  good to  have th ings  run amok.  
 I t ' s  good to  have  t r ia l  and er ror .   I t ' s  good to  p ick  winners  and 
losers  because  when you pick  a  loser ,  you ' re  going to  learn  a  lo t  f rom 
i t .  That ' s  the  whole  idea  behind the  t r ia l  and er ror  method.   So we have  
our  way.   I t ' s  proven to  work.   We know i t  works .   And in  a l l  th is ,  the  
ru les  deal ing  wi th  China ,  t ry ing to  force  them to  f loa t  the i r  currency,  
man,  tha t ' s  tough,  tha t ' s  tough.  
 But  there  are  some th ings  tha t  a ren ' t .   I  th ink one  of  them is  jus t  
an  absolute  commitment  to  sc ience ,  technology,  innovat ion,  
commercia l iza t ion .  We have the  models  here .   Everybody e lse  has  
s tudied  them.   We have the  Advanced Technology Program.   We have 
DARPA.  We have these  mechanisms a l ready in  p lace  to  u t i l ize ,  and 
tha t ' s  a t  leas t  one  tha t ' s  wi th in  our  contro l .  
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 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  Commiss ioner  Wortzel .  
 VICE CHAIRMAN WORTZEL:  I  have  a  longer  ques t ion  for  Dr .  
Gomory that ,  i f  we get  around to  a  second round,  I ' l l  g ive  h im a  few 
minutes  to  ta lk  about .  Mr.  Stewar t ,  two of  your  tables  rea l ly  
a t t rac ted  my a t tent ion ,  and I  want  to  focus  on them.   China 's  impor ts  
by  s ta te-owned enterpr ises  and China 's  expor ts  by  s ta te-owned 
enterpr ises .   And I  want  to  turn  our  a t tent ion  to  nat ional  secur i ty  for  a  
minute .  
 I f  you look a t  the  number  f ive  impor t  by  China 's  s ta te-owned 
enterpr ises ,  in  your  table ,  today 74 percent  of  the  impor ts  by  s ta te-
owned enterpr ises  are  a i rcraf t ,  powered a i rcraf t ,  spacecraf t  and launch 
vehic les- -powered a i rcraf t ,  spacecraf t ,  and launch vehic les .  
 And then number  47 i s  turboje ts ,  turbo-propel lers  and other  gas  
turbines .   China  has  been his tor ica l ly  horr ib le  a t  those  th ings ,  and--  
a l though they 've  improved-- they impor ted  68 percent  today-- in  2006;  
only  50 percent  today.    
 I f  you look a t  China 's  expor ts  in  tha t  a rea ,  those  th ings  aren ' t  
l i s ted  in  the  top  50 expor ts .   They ' re  not  there .   So you have a  country  
tha t  i s  manufactur ing  maneuverable  sa te l l i tes  to  potent ia l ly  impact  
American spacecraf t .   You have a  country  tha t ' s  doing a  grea t  job  on 
ant i -sa te l l i te  weapons .   I t ' s  got  new ranges  of  miss i les ,  and i t ' s  doing 
a l l  tha t  wi th  fore ign help .  
 I t  can ' t  make an  ef fec t ive  je t  turbine  engine  for  a  tank or  for  an  
a i rcraf t  or  for  a  submarine ,  or  a  turbo engine  for  a  submarine ,  and i t ' s  
impor t ing  a l l  tha t .  
 I t  seems to  me tha t  one  of  the  pol icy  levers  we need to  th ink 
about  i s  how to  make sure  tha t  they don ' t  do  a  lo t  be t ter  and tha t  they 
don ' t  begin  expor t ing  that  s tuf f  tha t  they get  to  be  a  wor ld-c lass  
producer?   
 And so  I  would  invi te  a l l  of  you to  ta lk  about  mechanisms to  
make sure  tha t  in  those  two areas ,  the  Uni ted  Sta tes  i s  able  to  mainta in  
i t s  compet i t ive  edge and protec t  i t s  na t ional  secur i ty  when you have 
the  Second Art i l le ry  of  China  threa tening to  use  these  miss i les  to  s ink  
American ships .  
 MR.  STEWART:  Par t  of  the  chal lenge,  i t  seems to  me,  
commiss ioner ,  tha t  we have  in  an  area  l ike  c iv i l  a i rcraf t ,  what  the  
s ta t i s t ics  show is  what  the i r  indust r ia l  pol icy  i s ,  namely ,  tha t  c iv i l  
a i rcraf t  i s  a  s ta te-dominated  area .  
 The chal lenge i s  wi th  so  few major  c iv i l  a i rcraf t  producers ,  you 
a l ready have commitments  to  produce  in  China  cer ta in  p ieces  of  the  
b ig  commercia l  a i rcraf t  as  the  pr ice  for  a  s ta te-owned enterpr ise  being 
wi l l ing  to  cont inue  to  buy f rom American sources  I  suppose .  
 So the  chal lenges ,  having t ransfer red  a  cer ta in  amount  of  the  
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technology and a  cer ta in  amount  of  the  manufactur ing,  we ' re  not  ye t  
see ing i t  in  f in ished a i rcraf t ,  but  obviously  one  of  the i r  ambi t ions  i s  to  
be  an  in ternat ional ly  compet i t ive  a i rcraf t  producer ,  and wi th  a  good 
par t  of  g lobal  demand for  a i rcraf t  projec ted  to  be  in  China  over  the  
next  ten ,  15  years ,  there  cer ta in ly  i s  an  incent ive  for  them to  get  there .  
 Hard  to  see  how you back away f rom them having that  
oppor tuni ty  o ther  than put t ing  a  res t r ic t ion  on companies  l ike  Boeing 
f rom being able  to  t ransfer  tha t  technology which is  a l ready being 
t ransferred .   So I  don ' t  have  a  good answer  for  you as  to  what  you can 
do.  
 VICE CHAIRMAN WORTZEL:   Any other  comments?  
 DR.  GOMORY:  No.  
 MR.  McCORMACK:  Good luck.   I  went  to  Japan in  1987,  and I  
toured around Japan wi th  the  Akio  Mori ta ,  and we met  wi th  the  
Keidanren,  and a lso  we a lso  went  to  Mitsubishi  Heavy Indust r ies ,  and 
they were  pursuing a l l  these  technologies ,  and they sa id  we targeted  
your  indust ry .   We targeted  your  American aerospace  indust ry .   Look 
out .  
 I 've  learned a  lo t  f rom Toyota .  I  wrote  a  book about  Toyota .   
Toyota  doesn ' t  mind giving away i t s ,  quote ,  "secre ts"  because  i t ' s  
t ry ing to  s tay  in  f ront  of  everybody e lse ,  and I  th ink for  us  to  survive ,  
to  prosper ,  I  th ink tha t ' s  pre t ty  much what  our  s t ra tegy should  be--we 
can ' t  s top  technology f rom leaking or  s top  people  f rom get t ing  i t .  
 When the  Sovie t  Union put  up  the i r  space  shut t le ,  i t  looked 
exact ly  l ike  our  space  shut t le .  I 've  jus t  seen p ic tures  on  the  In ternet  
recent ly  of  China 's  B-1 bomber .   I t  looks  exact ly  l ike  ours ,  so  you jus t  
have  to  s tay  ahead.   You have to  s tay  ahead.   Otherwise  you ' re  h is tory;  
you ' re  toas t .  
 There  jus t  has  to  be  such a  profoundly  impor tant  and robust  
commitment  to  sc ience  and technology in  our  country ,  and there  hasn ' t  
been.  
 The Nat ional  Science  Foundat ion 's  budget  i s  $5  b i l l ion  or  $6  
b i l l ion  for  research .   That ' s  our  t rade  def ic i t  in  three  days .   The DoD 
budget  i s  $600 bi l l ion ,  $700 bi l l ion .   NSF's  i s  $6  b i l l ion .   I t ' s  noise .   
When I  was  deal ing wi th  the  DARPA guys  who are  in  charge  of  
technology,  Steve  Squires  back developing advanced computa t ional  
techniques  to  crea te  the  petaf lop  computer- -he  a lways  sa id  tha t ' s  
"noise ."  
 So we have to  do something other  than noise  to  make sure  tha t  
we s tay  in  f ront ,  ahead,  v ibrant ,  and to  keep our  companies  heal thy.  
 DR.  GOMORY:  Could  I  add something to  your  ques t ion?   I f  you 
pick  a  par t icular  indust ry ,  say  par t  of  th is  a i rcraf t  indust ry ,  I  th ink i t ’ s  
a  mis take  to  say  how can we keep i t?   I f  you have balanced t rade ,  i f  
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you 're  los ing th is ,  you ' re  going to  make up for  i t  somewhere  e lse .  
 I t ' s  the  threa t  tha t  we ' re  going to  lose  everything tha t  i s  
d is turbing.   And that ' s  why you may lose  i t  because  they subsid ize  
the i r  a i rcraf t  par t  indust ry  or  something e lse .   That ' s  why balancing 
t rade  i s  absolute ly  essent ia l  because  o therwise  they can take  one  damn 
th ing af ter  another .  
 So i f  you don ' t  address  balanced t rade ,  you ' re  jus t  going to  f ight  
one  los ing bat t le  af ter  another .  
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  Commiss ioner  Blumenthal .   
 Thank you.    
 COMMISSIONER BLUMENTHAL:  Thank you a l l  very  much.  
 Pres ident  Reagan as  an  economic  nat ional is t - - I  guess  we ' re  a l l  
economic  nat ional is ts  now in  terms of  f lashing marginal  tax  ra tes  and 
deregula t ing  major  par ts  of  the  economy.   Cer ta in ly  he  was  in teres ted  
in  cer ta in  technologies  to  compete  wi th  the  Sovie ts ,  SDI ,  but  economic  
nat ional is t  I  th ink may be  pushing i t .  
 I 've  read "The Gather ing Storm" very  careful ly ,  and I  agree  wi th  
Mr.  McCormack on the  need for  sc ience  and technology,  which has  
been downward s ince  the  end of  the  Cold  War .  
 But  le t  me ask  you a l l  three  th is  ques t ion ,  which i s  what  made 
Japanese  and Korean and German auto  companies  decide  to  inves t  
heavi ly  in  the  southern  s ta tes  of  the  Uni ted  Sta tes?  
 DR.  GOMORY:  In  what?  
 COMMISSIONER BLUMENTHAL:  In  the  southern  s ta tes  in  the  
Uni ted  Sta tes?   What  pol ic ies  d id  those  s ta tes  take  to  make themselves  
a t t rac t ive?  
 MR.  McCORMACK:  Wel l ,  Clyde ment ioned i t ,  jus t  asking the  
bas ic  ques t ion ,  which i s  what  wi l l  i t  take  for  you to  inves t  here?    
 COMMISSIONER BLUMENTHAL:  And what  d id  i t  take?  
 MR.  McCORMACK:  I  th ink Alabama put  $350 mil l ion  down on 
the  table ,  and tha t ' s  been debated  as  to  whether  or  not  tha t  was  paid  
off ,  i f  i t  was  a  wor thy inves tment?   I  th ink North  Carol ina  has  
probably  done-- I 'm not  sure  exact ly  how much--but  they came to  the  
table  wi th  BMW.  I  th ink IBM inves ted  in  New York.  
 COMMISSIONER BLUMENTHAL:  Wasn ' t  i t  labor  pol ic ies  and 
tax  incent ives  and--  
 MR.  McCORMACK:  Par t ly ,  yes .   I t ' s  a l l  tha t .  
 COMMISSIONER BLUMENTHAL:  Okay.  
 MR.  McCORMACK:  Uh-huh.   I  th ink tha t ' s  one  of  the  keys  tha t  
we have to- -we don ' t  know in  th is  country  why companies  are  
inves t ing .   One of  the  b ig  s tor ies  tha t  I  covered in  manufactur ing in  
the  1990s  was  bes t  prac t ices .  
 Companies  s tudied  bes t  prac t ices  and adopted them.   We haven ' t  
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rea l ly  done tha t  in  our  country .  
 COMMISSIONER BLUMENTHAL:  Are  those  inves tments  by 
Mercedes  and DaimlerChrys ler  and Hyundai  and Toyota  and Honda,  are  
they good for  American workers  and are  they good for  the  American 
economy as  inves tments  in  those  par t icular  s ta tes?  
 MR.  McCORMACK:  I t ' s  a  rhetor ica l  ques t ion;  r ight?  
 COMMISSIONER BLUMENTHAL:  Wel l - -  
 MR.  McCORMACK:  Yes ,  absolute ly .  
 COMMISSIONER BLUMENTHAL:  So we actual ly  know how to  
do th is?   We actual ly  know how to  incent iv ize  fore ign companies  to  
inves t  in  our  country?  
 MR.  McCORMACK:  Our  s ta tes  do.   Yes ,  I  would  say  our  s ta tes  
do.  
 COMMISSIONER BLUMENTHAL:  Anyone e lse  on th is  i ssue?   
We actual ly  know the  answer  to  Mr.  Pres towi tz '  ques t ion  before?  
 MR.  STEWART:  There 's  no  company tha t  has  a  fac i l i ty  in  
America  tha t  doesn ' t  know how to  go af ter  the  s ta tes  to  he lp  lower  
the i r  cos ts  by  providing incent ives  for  locat ing  or  re locat ing  where  
they ' re  located .   So tha t ' s  t rue  for  domest ica l ly-based companies  and 
for  subs id iar ies  of  fore ign companies .  
 COMMISSIONER BLUMENTHAL:  But ,  in  genera l ,  th is  has  
been good for  the  American economy,  in  your  opinion?  
 MR.  STEWART:  There  wi l l  be  debates  as  to  whether  or  not  i t ' s  
been good for  the  American economy to  have tha t  compet i t ion  between 
the  s ta tes .   But  cer ta in ly  the  s ta tes  know how to  go out  when somebody 
is  looking to  inves t  in  the  Uni ted  Sta tes  to  ge t  i t  inves ted  in  Alabama 
or  Michigan or  Cal i fornia ,  where  have you.  
 COMMISSIONER BLUMENTHAL:  Do you th ink that  those  
inves tments  have  been good for  the  American economy?  Those  
inves tments  by  fore ign automobi le  makers ,  in  par t icular?  
 DR.  GOMORY:  Do I  th ink so?  
 COMMISSIONER BLUMENTHAL:  Yes .  
 DR.  GOMORY:  I  th ink i t ' s  hard to  know,  but  i f  I  may ment ion 
some re la ted  topics .   There 's  been a  s t ress  on  unders tanding tha t  sor t  
of  ques t ion,  and one of  the  th ings  tha t  the  Sloan Foundat ion did  was  to  
found in  26 indust r ies  academic  centers  to  do tha t  k ind of  s tudy.   I  
would  suggest  tha t  you ta lk  to  our  Automobi le  Center .  
 I 've  done tha t .   And I 've  asked them th is  sor t  of  ques t ion .   For  
example ,  what  i s  the  fore ign content  in  a  Toyota  made in  Nor th  
Carol ina  as  compared to  the  fore ign content  of  a  Chrys ler  or  a  GM car?  
 And the  answer  i s  i t ' s  about  the  same.   So what  you rea l ly  have  done 
i s  s imul taneously  Detroi t  has  s tar ted  to  impor t  a  good por t ion  of  i t s  
va lue  and Toyota  has  crea ted  in  Nor th  Carol ina ,  for  example ,  a  p lace  
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which a lso  impor ts  but  adds  American labor  and so  for th ,  and today 
they ' re  hard  to  d is t inguish  between.  
 The net  impact  on  the  Uni ted  Sta tes  i s  par t ly  to  keep down the  
wage level .   Okay.   So that  the  d iv is ion  of  va lue  add is  a  l i t t le  
d i f ferent  f rom what  i t  used to  be .   In  o ther  words ,  one  of  the  
a t t rac t ions  of  those  s ta tes ,  of  course ,  was  tha t  the i r  non-union labor  
was  lower  paid  than union labor  in  Detroi t ,  but  i f  you look a t  the  
ac tual  performance,  they ' re  a l l  us ing about  the  same technology.   One 
is  not  more  ef f ic ient  than the  o ther .   They have a  somewhat  d i f ferent  
labor  sca le ,  and tha t ' s  about  the  only  d i f ference  today.  
 COMMISSIONER BLUMENTHAL:  Do you th ink the  Japanese  
and the  Koreans  are  debat ing whether  the i r  companies  by  inves t ing  in  
the  Uni ted  Sta tes  are  somehow being unpat r io t ic ,  and i f  they are ,  
would  tha t  be  a  des t ruct ive  debate  to  have  in  the  American economy? 
 DR.  GOMORY:  That ' s  very  hard for  me to  know what  they ' re  
debat ing ,  but  I  can  te l l  you th is ,  I  remember  qui te  a  few years  back 
see ing a  presenta t ion  by a  Japanese  computer  manufacturer  because  
tha t ' s  what  I  deal t  wi th ,  when I  was  in  IBM, and they put  up  a  l i s t  of  
what  the  company is  there  for .   Number  one  on the  l i s t ,  and I  never  
forgot  i t ,  was  crea te  good jobs  in  Japan.   
That  was  number  one .   Around number  seven was  prof i t .  
 COMMISSIONER BLUMENTHAL:  But  they ' re  creat ing good 
jobs  in  the  Uni ted  Sta tes ,  and i f  they o therwise  d idn ' t  inves t  in  the  
Uni ted  Sta tes ,  then they wouldn ' t  be  crea t ing  those  good jobs  in  the  
Uni ted  Sta tes .  
 DR.  GOMORY:  I  th ink i f  I  were  in  Japan,  I  would  be  very  
concerned tha t  i f  I  a t tempted to  cont inue  to  compete  in  the  Uni ted  
Sta tes  by  shipping over  completed  vehic les ,  tha t  I  might  have  a  
problem.  
 COMMISSIONER BLUMENTHAL:  Is  my t ime up?  
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  Yes .  
 COMMISSIONER BLUMENTHAL:  Okay.   Thank you.  
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  Thank you.  
 Commiss ioner  Slane .  
 HEARING COCHAIR SLANE:  One of  the  impediments  of  
so lv ing our  def ic i t  problem is  the  res is tance  tha t  the  government  
receives  f rom U.S.  mul t ina t ional  companies .   How do we change the  
f iduciary  duty  of  U.S.  mul t ina t ionals  f rom a  s tockholder  to  inc lude  
o ther  cons t i tuents?  
 DR.  GOMORY:  Wel l ,  I  do  th ink tha t  one  of  the  ways  i s  to  
reward companies  tha t  do  what  we consider  the  r ight  th ing.   The f i rs t  
th ing,  however ,  i s  the  government  has  to  say  what  i t  th inks  i s  the  r ight  
th ing.  
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 I  s i t  on  the  board  of  a  nameless  g lobal  corpora t ion  and a l l  we do 
is  we move jobs  out  of  the  U.S.   Now we 're  moving them out  of  
Mexico.   Now we 're  moving them out  of  Scot land.   Al l  we do is  
moving them to  what  we refer  to  as  low-something companies .   We do 
tha t .  
 Nobody makes  a  peep on the  board inc luding yours  t ru ly .   What  
am I  supposed to  do?   Say th is  i s  bad for  the  country?   I 've  t r ied  doing 
tha t .   And the  answer  i s  the  country  i s  not  saying tha t  to  us .   The 
Uni ted  Sta tes  government  i s  not  asking th is  company or  any other  
company to  keep jobs  in  the  U.S.  or  to  keep them in  Mexico or  to  keep 
them in  Scot land.   They don ' t  have  anything to  do wi th  tha t .  
 Number  one ,  there  i s  no  reference  point  for  a  board  of  d i rec tors  
to  have  o ther  than prof i t  maximizat ion  as  i t s  goal .   Okay.   
 Second,  i f  we were  to  enact  a  tax  which made corpora te  
prof i tabi l i ty  in  the  U.S.  h igh value  add,  then there  would  be  a  mot ive  
to  consider  th ings  of  tha t  sor t ,  l ike  jobs  in  the  U.S.   But  r ight  now i t ' s  
a  vacuum.   Even jawboning is  not  be ing done.  
 MR.  McCORMACK:  I t ' s  amazing.  
 MR.  STEWART:  I t ' s  an  in teres t ing  ques t ion .   I  guess  I  would  
s tar t  f rom a  premise  s imi lar  to  Dr .  Gomory,  in  tha t  as  present ly  
const i tu ted ,  boards  obviously  have  as  the i r  pr imary objec t ive  to  look 
out  for  the  shareholders .   In  many companies  shareholders  inc lude  the  
workers  through re t i rement  funds  or  pens ion programs where  company 
s tock is  par t  of  what  i s  be ing held .  
 From a  corpora te  law perspect ive ,  one  could  look a t  the  r ight  of  
what  you might  ca l l  minor i ty  shareholders ,  which would  typica l ly  be  
the  ro le  of  employees .   However ,  I  th ink in  te rms of  the  overa l l  i ssue ,  
v is -a-vis  China  and other  t rading par tners- - i t  comes  down to  the  bas ic  
government  pol ic ies  tha t  have  been put  in  p lace .  
 When you take  a  look jus t  a t  something l ike  the  d iscr iminat ion  
we face  on indi rec t  tax  versus  d i rec t  tax ,  our  inabi l i ty  as  a  na t ion  to  
come up wi th  a  sys tem that  re l ies  more  heavi ly  on indi rec t  tax ,  we 
subjec t  our  domest ic  producers  to  as  much as  a  25  percent  
d isadvantage  on impor ts  tha t  come in  and compete  agains t  them,  and 
our  expor ters  to  a  25  percent  tax  over  and above what  they pay in  the  
Uni ted  Sta tes .  
 Those  are  major  d isadvantages  tha t  a re  pol icy  se lec t ions  by the  
government  tha t  ought  to  be  addressed tha t  a re  wi th in  our  contro l  tha t  
don ' t  have  anything to  do wi th  what  China  does  or  doesn ' t  do .  
 There  are  many pol icy  opt ions  tha t  China  pursues  tha t  e i ther  are  
subjec t  to  negot ia t ion .   We don ' t  have  inves tment  obl igat ions ,  and so  
the  b i la tera l  inves tment  t rea ty  approach would  be  an  approach tha t  
could  help  address  some of  the  problems our  companies  face  in  get t ing  
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a  fa i r  shake when they move to  China  or  when they consider  inves t ing  
in  China  or  when they consider  not  inves t ing  in  China ,  but  nonetheless  
face  barr iers  tha t  would  be  WTO inconsis tent  or  tha t  could  be  
addressed through some other  negot ia t ion .  
 So I  see  my t ime is  up .   So I ' l l  s top  there .  
 MR.  McCORMACK:  I  would  say th is ,  tha t  Dan is  r ight .   S ince  
the  Reagan years ,  we 've  been in  an era  of  th inking the  corpora te  prof i t  
mot ive  i s  going to  save  us ,  and our  bes t  long- term in teres ts  are  going 
to  be  carr ied  by the  in teres t  of  corpora t ions .  
 But  I  th ink tha t  model  has  proven to  be  wrong.   I  have  covered 
government  being here  for  26  years ,  and I  th ink one  of  the  f rus t ra t ions  
tha t  I  found wi th in  our  government  and people  who are  deal ing wi th  
these  i ssues  tha t  you are  ta lk ing about  here  i s  tha t  there 's  only  one  
p lace  rea l ly  in  our  country  tha t  has  the  long- term in teres ts  of  our  
country  wi th in  the i r  purview of  what  they do,  and tha t ' s  wi th in  our  
government .  
 Because  the  pr ivate  companies  are  looking to  maximize  prof i t .   
They are  looking to  move jobs  overseas .   And I  th ink our  government  
inf ras t ructure  has  been enervated  by th is  inabi l i ty  to ,  unwil l ingness  to ,  
a l low/empower  people  to  take  r i sks ,  to  look out  for  the  long- term 
in teres ts  of  the  country ,  to  adopt ,  quote ,  " indust r ia l  pol ic ies ,"  or  
p icking winners  or  losers ,  or  corpora te  welfare ,  what  have  you.  
 There 's  tha t  o ld  saying in  Japan tha t  the  nai l  tha t  s t icks  up gets  
hammered back down.   Wel l ,  i t ' s  k ind of  happened in  our  country .   And 
we 're  paying the  pr ice  for  tha t .   We are ,  everybody knows tha t  wi th  the  
Wal l  S t ree t  mel tdown.  
 We need to  have  a  much longer- term view.   We need to  empower  
people  wi th in  our  government  to  take  r i sks ,  and when I  ment ioned 
dur ing the  Reagan years ,  there  were  people  l ike  Bruce  Merr i f ie ld  and 
Bob Coste l lo  and Clyde and others .   They were  empowered to  take  
r i sks ,  and I  th ink tha t  the  one  th ing tha t  I  would  love  to  see  occur  in  
our  country  i s  tha t  happening once  again .     
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  Thank you.  
 Commiss ioner  Videnieks .  
 COMMISSIONER VIDENIEKS:   Gent lemen,  good af ternoon.   I t ' s  
my unders tanding that  U.S.  R&D expendi ture  a  par t  of  GDP,  i s  pushing 
three  percent ,  two-and-a-hal f ,  three  percent  to ta l ,  government  and 
pr ivate ,  corpora te .  
 But  I  unders tand the  t rend has  been s l id ing a  b i t .   Going down 
f rom the  h ighs  of  a  few years  ago,  a  couple  decades  ago,  down to  what  
i t  i s  now.   Our  re la t ive  product iv i ty  apparent ly ,  employee  product iv i ty  
and compet i t iveness  re la t ive  to  PRC are  apparent ly  s l id ing a lso .   And 
yet  we s t i l l  lead  the  wor ld  or  are  one of  the  leaders  of  the  wor ld  in  
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R&D expendi tures .   Where  i s  th is  money going?   That 's  a  ques t ion  for  
a l l  of  you.    
 MR.  McCORMACK:  Nuclear  bombs.  
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  You want  to  s tar t ,  Ralph,  or  we 
can go across  the  panel .  
 DR.  GOMORY:  Wel l ,  I  d idn ' t  qui te  fo l low whether  you were  
ta lk ing about- -  
 COMMISSIONER VIDENIEKS:   Has  there  been a  shi f t  in  
des t ina t ion of  th is  R&D money?   The money is  there ,  a  lo t  of  i t .  
 DR.  GOMORY:  I  d idn ' t  qui te  unders tand whether  you were  
ta lk ing about  government  R&D or  a l l  pr ivate  indust ry  R&D or  what?  
 COMMISSIONER VIDENIEKS:   You can take  them separa te ly  i f  
you wish ,  corpora te  versus  government ,  but  I 'm bas ica l ly  in teres ted  in  
aggregate  amounts .   The money is  s t i l l  b ig ,  i t ' s  out  there ,  one  of ,  we ' re  
top ,  top  of  the  wor ld .  
 DR.  GOMORY:  Yes .  
 COMMISSIONER VIDENIEKS:   Compet i t iveness  i s  going down.  
 Where  i s  th is  R&D money going?   That ' s ,  my ques t ion  and we ' l l  have  
to  answer  i t  someday.  
 DR.  GOMORY:  I  th ink the  spending on R&D does  not  
necessar i ly  resul t  in  compet i t iveness .   F i rs t  of  a l l ,  government  
expendi ture  in  R&D is  very  d i f ferent  f rom corpora te  expendi ture  in  
R&D.  So government  expendi ture--so  le t  me jus t  take  the  par t  I  know-
-  
 COMMISSIONER VIDENIEKS:   Basic  versus  appl ied  maybe?  
 DR.  GOMORY:  Basic  research--  we do a  lo t  I  th ink compared to  
many countr ies .   But  bas ic  research,  which used to  then resul t  in  new 
indust r ies  in  the  U.S. ,  because  we were  the  only  people  who could  read 
the  damn papers- - i t ' s  a  d i f ferent  wor ld  now.  
 You 've  got  people  in  China  and you 've  got  people  in  Japan and 
you 've  got  people  a l l  over  Europe who are  jus t  as  capable  of  reading 
the  papers  and t rans la t ing  them in to  ac t ion .   Right .   So  i t ' s  very  hard  
to  win  by doing bas ic  research.  
 So your  compet i t iveness ,  which i t  i sn ' t  c lear  exact ly  how that  
ge ts  measured again ,  but  le t ' s  say  market  share  of  something.   F ine .   
Compet i t iveness  depends  on (a)  be ing able  to  know the  la tes t ;  and (b)  
t rans la te  i t  in to  product .  
  COMMISSIONER VIDENIEKS:   Capi ta l  inves tment  does  
make the  h ighly-paid  U.S.  worker  more  compet i t ive  than a  lower-paid  
worker  wi th  less  capi ta l  back-up.  
 DR.  GOMORY:  Cer ta in ly .  
 COMMISSIONER VIDENIEKS:   So my ques t ion  i s  a re  we s t i l l  
inves t ing  in  capi ta l  tha t  would  increase  the  product iv i ty  of  the  worker  
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or  are  we inves t ing  someplace  e lse?  
 DR.  GOMORY:  Oh,  I  see .   I  misunders tood your  ques t ion.  
  Yes .   That  would  be  a  very  in teres t ing  ques t ion  to  know,  whether  the  
capi ta l  per  worker- - tha t ' s  a  d i f ferent  number  than an  R&D number  
to ta l ly ,  and i t  would  be  in teres t ing  to  know,  and I  don ' t  have  tha t  in  
my arsenal .  
 COMMISSIONER VIDENIEKS:   Si r?  
 MR.  STEWART:  I 'd  be  happy to  supply  informat ion on the  
pr ivate  sec tor  f rom the  government  s ta ts  af ter  th is .   I  don ' t  know off  
the  top  of  my head where  the  changes  occurred .   When I 've  looked a t  
the  i ssue  in  the  pas t ,  you can typica l ly  corre la te  R&D expendi tures  and 
to  some extent  capi ta l  expendi tures  wi th  indust ry  prof i tabi l i ty .  
 And so  the  sec tors  tha t  have  had high prof i tabi l i ty ,  one  would  
expect  there  to  be  h igh R&D, high capi ta l  expendi tures .   But  I 'm happy 
to  do that  for  each of  the  two af terwards .  
 COMMISSIONER VIDENIEKS:   Thank you.   We' l l  ge t  i t .   S i r?  
 MR.  McCORMACK:  In  my coverage  of  sc ience  and technology 
over  the  years ,  I  th ink I 've  heard  a  lo t  about  the  "val ley  of  death"  and 
th is  k ind of  the  mezzanine  area  tha t  i s  be tween bas ic  and appl ied  
product  research,  and there 's  been a  b ig  debate  in  the  las t  few years  
about  our  inves tments  in  sc ience  and technology.   I f  you inves t  in  
nanotechnology,  i t  ge ts  appl ied  in  a l l  products  across  the  board .  
 I f  you ' re  not  making those  products  in  the  Uni ted  Sta tes ,  then 
why are  you inves t ing  in  tha t  i f  i t ' s  benef i t ing  everybody e lse?   I  know 
people  who have looked a t  our  inves tments  in  solar  power ,  for  
ins tance ,  in  photovol ta ics ,  and i t ' s  l ike  we don ' t  make any of  them 
here .   So tha t ' s  a  lo t  of  grea t  inves tment  tha t ' s  jus t  benef i t ing  o thers .  
 Nuclear  power  i s  the  same.   We don ' t  have  a  nuclear  vendor  in  
the  Uni ted  Sta tes ,  ye t  we’re  s t i l l  making t remendous  levels  of  
inves tment .  
 When I  came up to  the  press  conference  here  for  "The Gather ing 
Storm,"  the  ques t ion  I  asked Senator  Domenic i  and others  was ,  okay,  
you ' re  going to  put  a l l  th is  money in  sc ience  and technology and in  
R&D, but  tha t ' s  not  the  problem.   The problem is  you’ve  got  to  
commercia l ize  i t .   You have got  to  crea te  jobs .   You have got  to  crea te  
a  s t ructure  so  tha t  you 've  got  economic  development .   Jobs  are  a  b ig  
deal ,  and that ' s  not  been a  focus .  
 COMMISSIONER VIDENIEKS:   The reason I 'm ta lk ing about  the  
ra t io ,  maybe R&D was the  wrong approach,  but  the  ra t io  of  capi ta l  to  
labor .   There  must  have  been a  shi f t .  
 MR.  McCORMACK:  I  th ink there 's  been a  mass ive  shi f t ,  and 
now pendulum has  swung.   We 're  not  producing in  the  Uni ted  Sta tes .   
A lo t  of  our  R&D is  being conducted offshore  because  you can hi re  a  
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sc ient is t  in  India  for  $5  an  hour ;  in  the  Uni ted  Sta tes ,  i t ' s  $86 an  hour .  
 So we have to  f igure  out  a  way to  get  th is  pendulum back so  i t ' s  
benef i t ing  the  Uni ted  Sta tes ,  and r ight  now i t ' s  not .   Al l  tha t  
inves tment ,  i t ' s  ques t ionable  as  to  whether  or  not  tha t  inves tment  i s  
benef i t ing  the  Uni ted  Sta tes .   That ' s  a  ser ious  ques t ion  tha t  needs  to  be  
addressed and I  th ink i s  going to  be  s tar t ing  to  be  addressed.   Al l  these  
i ssues  are  s tar t ing  to  be  addressed now because  we 're  forced in to  i t .  
 DR.  GOMORY:  Yes .  
 MR.  McCORMACK:  So that ' s  the  good news I  th ink.  
 COMMISSIONER VIDENIEKS:   Thank you.  
 DR.  GOMORY:  I  th ink i t ' s  a  very  good ques t ion,  and I  th ink 
you 've  i l luminated ,  and I  hope maybe our  answers  have ,  i s  tha t  there  
are  d i f ferent  par ts .   There 's  doing the  research.   There 's  doing the  
R&D.  Then there 's  put t ing  the  inves tment  in to  i t  so  something rea l ly  
comes out .   And you can ' t  jus t  ta lk  about  one  par t  as  dr iv ing i t .   You 
have to  have  a l l  the  p ieces  or  you get  nothing out .  
 MR.  McCORMACK:  DARPA was  a  good model  because  of  the  
whole  idea  of  noise ;  they didn ' t  want  to  inves t  a  l i t t le  b i t .  They needed 
to  get  through that  va l ley  of  death .  
 COMMISSIONER VIDENIEKS:   But  they lead the  wor ld .   So i t  
may be  noise  to  DoD,  but  i t  may not  be  noise  to  another  depar tment .   
The bucks  may be  smal l  depending on how you look a t  them.  
 MR.  McCORMACK:  Wel l ,  in  prepar ing for  th is  event ,  I  s ta r ted  
ca l l ing  around to  see  i f  anybody moni tors  fore ign technology,  and I  
came across  the  World  Technology Evaluat ion  Center .   They jus t  
completed  a  repor t  on  ca ta lys is  research  and how impor tant  ca ta lys ts  
are  in  the  ent i re  indust r ia l  process .   And I  th ink in  here  i t  says  tha t  
ca ta lys is  resul ts  in  l ike  $1.3  t r i l l ion  wor th  of  GDP.  
 And then they looked a t  the  Uni ted  Sta tes  inves tment ,  in  
ca ta lys is  research ,  and i t ' s  minuscule .   I t ' s  l ike  $7 mi l l ion ,  but  the  net  
benef i t s  a re  an  indust ry  tha t ' s  $1 .3  t r i l l ion .   So for  a  l i t t le  amount  of  
money,  you can get  a  b ig  impact .  
 COMMISSIONER VIDENIEKS:   That ' s  wi th  the  mul t ip l ier  
ef fec t ,  I  guess ,  of  h igh- tech S&T inves tment .   Yes .   Mr.  Chairman,  I 'm 
done.    
 Thank you.  
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  Thank you.    
 That  was  a  very  in teres t ing  d iscuss ion.   Mr.  Stewar t ,  you were  
going to  be  able  to  get  some informat ion tha t  we could  put  in  the  
record?  
 MR.  STEWART:  Yes ,  I ' l l  do  tha t  af ter  the  hear ing.  
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  That  would  be  very  helpful .   
We 're  going to  s tar t  a  second round af ter  I  have  my t ime,  and then 
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we' l l  go  through.   People  have some second-round ques t ions .  
 Here 's  my unders tanding.   Alexander  Hamil ton when he  was  
Treasury  Secre tary  af ter  we got  our  independence ,  I  th ink the  Br i t i sh  
wanted us  to  take  manufacturers  and we were  to  provide  the  raw 
mater ia ls ,  and Alexander  Hamil ton  sa id  no,  we ' re  going to  become a  
manufactur ing country .  
 And so  there  was  essent ia l ly  an  indust r ia l  pol icy  put  in  p lace  to  
help  us  do tha t .   So  th is  i sn ' t  a  new game.   And my unders tanding is  
China  looked out  there  and sa id ,  wel l ,  you know,  i f  we provide  the  
low-cost  s tuff  and the  Americans  do the  h igh-cos t  s tuf f ,  they ' re  going 
to  be  b igger  and more  powerful  and r icher ,  and so  le t ' s  f igure  out  a  
way for  us  to  move up.   They ' re  l ike  Alexander  Hamil ton,  you know.   
We're  l ike  Br i ta in .   And they sa id  no,  we don ' t  l ike  i t  tha t  way,  and 
they developed a  d i f ferent  way of  looking a t  i t .  
 Now,  the  AFL-CIO at  the i r  March meet ing  in  Miami  i ssued a  
s ta tement  on  "America  Needs  a  Program to  Mainta in  and Grow Good 
Jobs ."   In  th is  s ta tement ,  they say:  
 " I t ' s  t ime to  rea l ign  corpora te  and f inancia l  in teres ts  wi th  
nat ional  in teres ts .   Al l  s takeholder  concerns ,  not  jus t  the  narrow 
in teres ts  of  the  pr iv i leged few,  must  be  addressed i f  we are  to  succeed 
as  a  na t ion ."  
 My unders tanding is  the  corpora t ions  now are  focused sole ly  on 
shareholder  va lue .   My fur ther  unders tanding is  tha t ' s  a  new 
phenomenon essent ia l ly  f rom what  was  going on in  th is  country  35 
years  ago.   There  were  more  s takeholder  in teres ts  involved.  
 I  a lso  unders tand tha t  the  CEOs have t ied  the i r  own sa lar ies  to  
the  shareholder  va lue .   So i f  they increase  shareholder  va lue ,  they 
increase  the i r  own wel l -being.   And the  companies  have  found they can 
increase  shareholder  value  by moving product ion and R&D out  of  the  
country  and shipping back to  the  country ,  which is  d i f ferent  than the  
Japanese  companies  do.   Honda may make a  car  here ,  but  they ' re  not  
sh ipping the  cars  f rom here  back to  Japan.  
 So I  see  tha t  as  a  d i f ferent  way,  and our  corpora t ions  are  doing 
the  o ther ,  making i t  there  and then shipping i t  back.   I s  tha t  f rom your  
perspect ive  the  r ight  analys is  of  what  i s  going?   I  ask  th is  because  
we 're  going to  be  wres t l ing  how to  wri te  a  repor t  to  the  Congress  on 
these  i ssues .    
 Dr .  Gomory,  Mr.  Stewar t ,  and Mr.  McCormack.  
 DR.  GOMORY:  I  do  th ink i t  i s  the  r ight  perspect ive .   I  would  
only  make one  smal l  inundat ion  to  your  remarks ,  i s  tha t  i t  i sn ' t  the  
corpora te  sa lary .   I t ' s  the  CEO's  compensat ion,  the  h igh management  
compensat ion,  which consis ts  only  in  a  very  smal l  way of  sa lary  
a l though people  a lways  ta lk  about  l imi t ing  tha t .   There  are  bonuses  
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and then there  are  s tock opt ions .  
 The bonuses  depend on a t ta in ing a  cer ta in  goal .   S tock opt ions  
depend on the  share  going up.   But  the  purpose  of  tha t  change which 
occurred  in  the  las t  25  years  was  prec ise ly  to  t ie  the  CEO's  in teres t  
and the  upper  management  in teres t  to  tha t  of  the  shareholder ,  and i t  
has  been exceedingly  successful  in  doing jus t  tha t .  
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  Mr.  Stewar t .  
 MR.  STEWART:  Commiss ioner ,  I  would  refer  back to  my 
comment  tha t  the  phenomena you ident i f ied ,  namely ,  companies  
moving offshore  and shipping back,  i s  one  of  the  fundamenta l  sh i f t s  in  
behavior  tha t  one  sees ,  and whether  tha t  f lows f rom corpora te  
governance  i ssues  i s  less  l ike ly  in  my view.   I  th ink i t  f lows f rom an 
imbalance  between overa l l  cos t  s t ructures ,  incent ives  and pol ic ies  of  
t rading par tners  tha t  make i t  an  easy  decis ion for  someone looking to  
maximize  prof i tabi l i ty  to  p ick .  
 And that  in  my view is  an  ar t i f ic ia l  f ramework tha t  has  been 
crea ted  tha t  we don ' t  recognize  because  our  sys tem puts  a  pr imacy on,  
quote-unquote ,  " f ree  markets"  even i f  the  market  tha t  we ' re  deal ing  
wi th  i s  not  a  f ree  market  such as  i s  a  la rge--par t ly  the  case  in  China .  
 The o ther  aspect  tha t  I  th ink of ten  not  unders tood is  tha t  over  
the  las t  50  years  a  lo t  of  corpora te  America  has  moved f rom family  
bus inesses .   I f  you look a t  most  major  c i t ies  and you look a t  what  has  
h is tor ica l ly  been the  corpora te  anchor ,  tha t ' s  a  family  tha t  has  deep 
t ies  to  the  communi ty ,  and so  you of ten  f ind  those  famil ies  on the  
names of  hospi ta ls  and high schools  and other  th ings  in  the  
communi ty .  
 As  those  companies  have been sold  off  f rom the  famil ies ,  you 
lose  tha t  connect ion ,  and then i t  becomes an  eas ier  mat ter  to  s imply  
look a t  i t  as  a  chessboard  and where  do I  move my pieces ,  and tha t  
becomes a  constant ly  evolving game.  
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  Thank you.  
 MR.  McCORMACK:  In  terms of  my coverage  on these  i ssues ,  
your  ques t ion  i s  about  the  most  in t r iguing i ssue  I 've  covered in  the  las t  
e ight  years  because  I  d idn ' t  ever  hear  of  i t  unt i l  e ight  years  ago,  unt i l  
you had the  domest ic  manufactur ing group wi th in  the  NAM saying our  
in teres ts  are  d i f ferent  f rom the  mul t ina t ional  in teres ts .  
 And to  cover  tha t  s tory ,  i t ' s  hard .   I t ' s  a  hard  s tory  to  cover ,  and 
i t ' s  not  been covered wel l ,  but  i t ' s  absolute ly  the  essent ia l  s tory  of  our  
era .   This  idea  of  corpora te  in teres ts  d iverging f rom nat ional  in teres ts  
i s  a  very  hard  th ing to  put  your  hands  around,  but  you have to  ask  the  
ques t ion .  
 I f  you ask  that  ques t ion  of  Caterpi l la r  or  of  the  companies  tha t  
are  outsourc ing or  are  g lobal ,  you don ' t  ge t  rea l ly  much of  a  reply  
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other  than the  fac t  tha t  they are  doing what 's  in  the i r  bes t  in teres ts  and 
they have to  do i t  in  order  to  survive .  
 And you ask  the  smal l  guy,  and he 's  absolute ly  i ra te  and he 's  
going out  of  bus iness ,  and he 's  los ing his  abi l i ty  to  pay workers  and 
have  communi t ies  tha t  thr ive .   As  a  journal is t  cover ing th is ,  i t ' s  
incredible  to  hear  the  pass ion of  people  who are  in  the  smal l  and 
medium-sized bus inesses  ta lk  about  how th is  i s  a  major  socie ta l  
change.  
 I f  the  mul t ina t ionals  are  no longer  suppor t ing  Americans ,  then 
what?   I f  you have th is  whole  sys tem,  th is  inf ras t ructure  fa l lout ,  and 
then do Americans  do?   Do we a l l  kni t  and grow gardens  and become 
somehow sel f  suff ic ient .   Do we a l l  go  back to  the  pre-mul t ina t ional  
days?  
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  I f  I  could ,  before  we s tar t  the  
second round,  I ' l l  jus t  f in ish ,  and I  won ' t  take  a  second round.  
 MR.  McCORMACK:  Yes .  
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  The other  ques t ion ,  you sa id  
tha t  th is  i s  the  way our  sys tem works ,  the  companies  are  out  pursuing 
the  prof i t ,  and I  th ink you sa id  ear l ie r  tha t  the  government  should  have  
a  voice  te l l ing  what  do  you rea l ly  want  of  your  companies ,  and our  
government  doesn ' t  say  anything.  
 MR.  McCORMACK:  I  th ink i t  might  change.   I  th ink we might  
see  a  change.   
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  Why isn ' t  our  government  
saying anything?   I 'd  l ike  for  you to  go across  the  board  and te l l  me 
tha t .  
 MR.  McCORMACK:  I  ta lked to  Representa t ive  Michaud and I  
asked him the  same ques t ion ,  and he  sa id  we have monied in teres ts .   
Bas ica l ly  he  jus t  came s t ra ight  out  and sa id  i t :   Those   who contro l  the  
debate  are  the  people  who have the  money to  inf luence  and shape the  
debate ,  and those  are  the  organiza t ions  tha t  represent  these  very  large  
companies .   He says  i t  s t ra ight  out .  
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  Does  anybody e lse  have a  
comment  on tha t  one?  
 DR.  GOMORY:  I  would  agree ,  but  I  th ink we keep coming back 
to  the  fac t  tha t  the  corpora t ions  are  making a  prof i t  and tha t ' s  the i r  
whole  goal ,  and the  country  needs  GDP--r ight - -and these  two are  not  
the  same.   And the  government  i s  doing nothing to  a l ign  them,  and 
that ' s  why I  propose  the  par t icular  form of  tax  tha t  I  d id ,  and in  the  
debate ,  they don ' t  have  a  c lear  v is ion of  th is  problem.  
 They are  constant ly  get t ing  input  f rom my old  company,  good 
old  IBM, e t  ce tera ,  e t  ce tera ,  and tha t  input  i s  leave  us  a lone ,  we ' re  
doing jus t  f ine .  
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 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  Do you have anything to  add?   
Okay.   Commiss ioner  Wessel .  
 Thank you.  
 COMMISSIONER WESSEL:   Thank you.  
 I 'm sure  we could  not  only  have a  hear ing on th is  topic  for  the  
res t  of  the  day but  probably  for  many,  many weeks .   Al though we are  a  
U.S. -China  Commiss ion,  the  i ssue  of  corpora te  governance  I  th ink does  
impact  a  lo t  of  these  i ssues .  
 I  should  point  out  tha t  a  corpora t ion  i s  a  legal  ent i ty .   I t ' s  
c rea ted  by government  or  ac tual ly  the  laws tha t  a l low i t s  c rea t ion  are  
crea ted  by government ,  and Commiss ioner  Slane  f rom Ohio  has  the  
benef i t  of  a  dramat ica l ly  d i f ferent  corpora te  s t ruc ture  there  or  
corpora te  law as  i t  re la tes  to  the  bus iness  judgment  ru le ,  where  in  
Ohio ,  a  d i rec tor  of  a  publ ic  corpora t ion  i s  a l lowed to  take  the  in teres ts  
of  a l l  s takeholders  in to  account ;  a  Delaware  corpora t ion  has  to  address  
the  pr imary of  the  in teres ts  of  the  shareholders .  
 So there  are  some ways  of  looking a t  th is ,  but  i t  demands  a  much 
deeper ,  longer- term discuss ion tha t  rea l ly  goes  to  the  core  of  some of  
our  laws that  have  been on the  books  s ince  the  founding of  th is  na t ion,  
some s ince  the  '34  Secur i t ies  and Exchange Act  and subsequent  to  tha t .  
 Potent ia l ly  the  Research Working Group may want  to  d iscuss  the  
ques t ion  of  whether  we can see  any di f ferences  in  how companies  
opera te  based on the i r  s ta te  of  incorpora t ion  and whether  there  i s  some 
impact  on  tha t  v is -a-vis  a lso  family-owned ins t i tu t ions ,  e t  ce tera?  
 That  may be  a  projec t  tha t  i s  too  b ig  for  us  to  under take  but  
something worth  d iscuss ing.  
 Mr.  Stewar t ,  I 'd  l ike  to  go back to  your  data  for  a  moment ,  and 
looking a t  the  fore ign- inves ted  enterpr ise  i ssue ,  when PNTR was  
passed,  the  proponents  hera lded the  abi l i ty  to  serve  the  Chinese  market  
as  one  of  the  most  impor tant  benef i t s  of  PNTR.  
 As  I  look a t  these  numbers  and the  research we 've  done over  the  
years ,  I  look a t  these ,  many of  the  fore ign- inves ted  enterpr ises ,  
potent ia l ly  as  indust r ia l  tour ism,  tha t  they are  impor t ing  par ts  tha t  a re  
la rgely  being assembled and then re-expor ted  ra ther  than serving the  
Chinese  market .  
 Have you looked a t  the  under ly ing data  here ,  and would  you 
agree  tha t  what  many of  the  mul t ina t ionals  tha t  have  gone over  to  
inves t  in  China  are ,  in  fac t  doing is  rea l ly  us ing China  as  an  expor t  
p la t form? 
 MR.  STEWART:  I  don ' t  have  good data  on domest ic  
consumpt ion in  China .   Cer ta in ly  what  you say  i s  t rue ,  tha t  there  are  
lo ts  of  impor ts  by  fore ign- inves ted  companies  tha t  a re  components  tha t  
go  in to  products  tha t  a re  e i ther  so ld  domest ica l ly  or  expor ted  to  
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someplace  in  the  wor ld .  
 How big  tha t  d i f ference  i s  I  can ' t  te l l  you.   You see  large  
increases  on both  the  expor ts  and the  impor ts  f rom fore ign inves ted ,  
and i t  var ies  qui te  a  b i t .   When you look a t  the  IT sec tor ,  for  example ,  
you see  tha t  there 's  mass ive  semiconductors  tha t  a re  expor ted  to  China  
and obviously  a l l  of  the  products  in  which semiconductors  are  used,  
there 's  even larger  increases  in  expor ts  f rom China  of  those  products .  
 The miss ing e lement  i s  how big  i s  the  domest ic  market  and how 
much of  the  fore ign- inves ted  product  i s ,  in  fac t ,  be ing sold  in  the  
domest ic  market?   Cer ta in ly ,  f rom anecdota l  informat ion tha t  I  would  
have  f rom companies  tha t  I 've  ta lked to  over  the  years ,  tha t  wi l l  vary  
qui te  a  b i t .   
 You have companies  who view thei r  inves tments  as ,  f i r s t  and 
foremost ,  to  serve  the  Chinese  market  and to  supply  cer ta in  products  
for  expor t ,  but  I 'm sure  tha t  you have some,  some companies  who have 
inves ted  to  make that  be  the  g lobal  source  for  Product  A or  Product  B.  
 COMMISSIONER WESSEL:   Do you have  as  a  pr iva te  sec tor  
prac t i t ioner  access  to  tha t  informat ion?   I s  corpora te  repor t ing  robust  
enough?  Is  i t  done through BPI  data  to  Commerce?   How would  we,  i f  
we wanted to  get  fur ther  in to  th is  informat ion and unders tand sourc ing 
pat terns  and consumpt ion pat terns  get  a t  i t?  
 MR.  STEWART:  I 'm not  aware  of  any source ,  and as  a  genera l  
mat ter  publ ic  companies  don ' t  break China  out  separa te ly .   Some do,  
but  most  don ' t .   And so  I  don ' t  th ink you could  get  i t  f rom a  publ ic  
da tabase .  
 You would  need a  survey done e i ther  by one of  the  bus iness  
associa t ions ,  something of  tha t  sor t .   Now,  the  U.S.  Chamber  in  China  
may col lec t  tha t  type  of  informat ion.   I  haven ' t  looked a t  the i r  most  
recent  repor t  so  I  don ' t  reca l l  of f  the  top  of  my head.  
 COMMISSIONER WESSEL:   I f  the  ITC were  asked to  do a  s tudy 
such as  tha t ,  would  they through one of  the  ques t ionnai res  have  
access?  
 MR.  STEWART:  Sure .   They could  do that  through 
ques t ionnai res .   You could  do i t  through For tune  100 and get  a  good 
idea  for  a t  leas t  some of  the  very  larges t  companies  what  the i r  
exper ience  has  been.  
 COMMISSIONER WESSEL:   Okay.  
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:   
Commiss ioner  Wortze l .  
 VICE CHAIRMAN WORTZEL:  Dr .  Gomory,  I 've  never  read 
Warren Buffe t t ' s  2003 For tune  ar t ic le .   So I  jus t  missed tha t .  
 DR.  GOMORY:  I t ' s  rea l ly  a  beauty .  
 VICE CHAIRMAN WORTZEL:  Can you br ief ly  expla in  how th is  
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market  in  impor t  cer t i f ica tes  might  work?  
 DR.  GOMORY:  Yes .  
 VICE CHAIRMAN WORTZEL:  And then what ,  i f  you crea ted  
such a  market  
- -what  regula tory  mechanism would  you need to  prevent  manipula t ion  
as  people  t rade  in  cer t i f ica tes?  
 DR.  GOMORY:  Yes .   Let  me descr ibe  the  second par t .   You 're  
sure  you want  to  hear  th is?  
 VICE CHAIRMAN WORTZEL:   Wel l ,  keep i t  s imple .    DR.  
GOMORY:  I t ' s  pre t ty  s t ra ight forward because  Warren Buffe t t  i s  a  
very  s t ra ight  th inker .   And i t ' s  jus t  th is ,  tha t  every  expor ter ,  suppose  
he  expor ts  a  mi l l ion  dol lars '  wor th  to  any country  outs ide  the  U.S gets  
a  cer t i f ica te  tha t  says  a  mi l l ion  bucks  expor t .    
 Any impor ter ,  and these  th ings  are  sold  on the  market  now,  who 
wants  them,  impor ters  are  not  a l lowed to  impor t—for  example  in  a  
mi l l ion  dol lars '  wor th  of  goods  unless  they 've  bought  the  cer t i f ica te .  
 VICE CHAIRMAN WORTZEL:  Okay.  
 DR.  GOMORY:  So now you have a  f ree  market  of  se l l ing  these  
cer t i f ica tes .   Now the  way th is  would  work,  a t  the  beginning,  s ince  
there 's  a  def ic iency of  impor ts  versus  expor ts ,  these  th ings  would  go 
for  a  h igh pr ice ,  but  as  the  th ing equal ized,  i t  would  get  down to  zero ,  
and you 'd  have balanced t rade .  
 Now,  as  far  as  schemes for  manipula t ing  i t ,  i t  would  be  l ike  
manipula t ing  any other  market .  You might  t ry  and corner  th is  or  corner  
tha t ,  and so  I  would  say  whatever  regula tory  mechanism one has  for  
ordinary  markets ,  and perhaps  there 's  some def ic iencies  in  them,  would  
be  appl ied  here  a lso .  
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  Thank you.  
 Commiss ioner  Slane .  
 HEARING COCHAIR SLANE:  One of  our  responsibi l i t ies  i s  to  
repor t  to  Congress  recommendat ions  on how to  deal  wi th  th is  i ssue .   I  
jus t  have  a  very  s imple  ques t ion .   Would  we be  bet ter  of f  ta lk ing to  the  
chai rman of  boards  ra ther  than the  CEOs of  these  large  mul t ina t ional  
corpora t ions  or  should  we go di rec t ly  and sol ic i t  the i r  input  f rom the  
CEOs?  
 DR.  GOMORY:  From the?  
 HEARING COCHAIR SLANE:  CEOs or  the  chai rmen of  boards?  
 DR.  GOMORY:  In  most  companies  today,  tha t ' s  the  same 
person,  yes .   I  don ' t  th ink you ' l l  ge t  a  d ivergence  of  v iews.   I  th ink 
tha t  most  boards  of  d i rec tors ,  and I 've  been on boards  of  d i rec tors  for  
25  years ,  and i t  has  changed.   Bel ieve  me the  or ienta t ion  of  boards  has  
changed,  and today i t ' s  a l l  about  share  value ,  and i t  wasn ' t  when I  f i r s t  
was  around.  
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 You 're  going to  jus t  ge t ,  I  th ink,  f rom both  of  them a  focus  on 
shareholder  va lue ,  and I  th ink they ' l l  say ,  as  a  mat ter  of  fac t ,  I  have  
some quotes  a t  the  end of  my wri t ten  tes t imony that  the  government  
does  something to  change that ,  we ' re  going to  go s t ra ight  ahead.    
 And they ' re  rea l ly  even sugges t ing  the  government  should  g ive  
them an incent ive  for  doing something e lse ,  but  the  government  wasn ' t .  
 The Chief  Economic  Advisor  of  the  previous  adminis t ra t ion  sa id  in  
h is  annual  repor t  tha t  of f -shor ing i s  good for  the  Uni ted  Sta tes ,  and so  
i t  makes  i t  pre t ty  hard  for  anyone e lse  to  go in  a  d i f ferent  d i rec t ion .  
 MR.  McCORMACK:  I  th ink r ight  now we 're  a t  an  inf lec t ion  
point .   People  have  rea l ized,  okay,  we 've  done a l l  th is  outsourc ing;  
we 've  forgot ten  tha t  the  engine  for  the  whole  wor ld  economy is  the  
Uni ted  Sta tes .   Uh-oh.  
 So I  th ink we 're  a t  th is  point  where  the  CEOs are  reevaluat ing  
now.   Where  do we make our  inves tment?   How do we make sure  tha t  
the  U.S.  market  remains  robust  and s t rong enough?   Because  everybody 
thought  they were  decoupled.   GE's  chai rman Jer rey  Immel  was  on the  
Char l ie  Rose  show,  and sa id  tha t  i f  the  U.S.  economy goes  sof t ,  i t ' s  not  
going to  mat ter .  
 But  i t  does  mat ter ,  and I  th ink a l l  these  o ther  economis ts  now are  
beginning to  re-evaluate  the i r  previous  assumpt ions .   We heard  in  the  
f i rs t  panel  th is  morning about  how al l  th is  inves tment  in  China  might  
backf i re .   I  th ink there 's  def in i te ly  an  oppor tuni ty  here .   I t ' s  very  
impor tant  r ight  now.   We're  a t  th is  moment  where  there 's  a  sense  we 
have to  gain  contro l  of  the  s i tua t ion  again .  
 I  a lso  th ink there 's  an  in tu i t ive  unders tanding in  the  Uni ted  
Sta tes  tha t  we have  to  s tar t  making products  again .   The products  tha t  
we ' re  consuming have to  s tar t  to  be  made in  the  Uni ted  Sta tes  so  tha t  
we ' re  crea t ing  weal th  in  the  country .   And I  th ink tha t  goes  a l l  the  way 
up to  the  top to  the  CEO now.  
 HEARING COCHAIR SLANE:  I  keep reading th is  quote  f rom 
th is  professor  of  economics  a t  Pr inceton,  Alan Bl inder  
,who was  the  former  v ice  chai rman.   And he  says  tha t  we ' re  going to  
lose  30 to  40 mi l l ion  jobs  to  off-shor ing in  the  next  ten  years .  
 DR.  GOMORY:  Yes .  
 HEARING COCHAIR SLANE:  That ' s  very ,  very  d is turbing,  and 
i t  f l ies  in  the  face ,  Ralph,  of  what  these  people  are  saying.  
 DR.  GOMORY:  Of  what?  
 HEARING COCHAIR SLANE:  What  th is  former  government  
off ic ia l  i s  saying,  tha t  of f -shor ing is  good.  
 DR.  GOMORY:  I f  I  may be  a l lowed to  reply ,  and I  wi l l  t ry  and 
be  measured and not  ge t  too--what  tha t  chap was  saying is  wrong.   
Okay.  Jus t  p la in  wrong.   I  rea l ly  know that  sor t  of  economics  up,  
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down,  and s ideways .   Okay.   I 've  wri t ten  a  book on in ternat ional  t rade  
wi th  a  very ,  very  wel l -known economis t .   And i t  s imply  i sn ' t  t rue .    
 MR.  McCORMACK:  But  there  are  so  many people  who bel ieve  
tha t  i t ' s  t rue  s t i l l .  
 DR.  GOMORY:  I  know,  but  they don ' t  read-- they haven ' t  read 
the  economic  l i te ra ture .  
 COMMISSIONER BLUMENTHAL:  What  i s  i t?  
 DR.  GOMORY:  And I  c i te  tha t - -  
 MR.  McCORMACK:  The Mankiw l ine  about  how outsourc ing 
benef i t s  the  Uni ted  Sta tes .   We're  bet ter  of f .  
 DR.  GOMORY:  I t ' s  jus t  wrong.   Even i f  you take  the  s imples t  
economic  example  tha t  everybody gets  taught .   England specia l izes- -
England makes  text i les  wel l ,  but  doesn ' t ,  the i r  wine  i s  c rummy.   
Por tugal ' s  rea l ly  good a t  wine .   Okay.   I t ' s  t rue  tha t  f ree  t rade  
improves  th ings .    
 The  Br i t i sh  make a l l  the  text i les .   Por tugal  makes  a l l  the  wine .   
They ' re  both  bet ter  of f ,  but  they never  take  the  next  s tep .   What  
happens  i f  Por tugal  learns  to  make text i les?   Have you worked that  
out?   I 've  worked i t  out .   Paul  Samuelson has  worked i t  out .   The 
answer  i s  the  Br i t i sh  s tandard  of  l iv ing goes  down.  
 And most  economis ts  never  make tha t  s tep  even in  the  s imples t  
example .   So the  guy is  wrong.  He 's  wrong theore t ica l ly ;  he 's  wrong in  
prac t ice .   And i t ' s  a  horr ib le  th ing.  
 HEARING COCHAIR SLANE:  The government  off ic ia l  i s  
wrong?   
 DR.  GOMORY:  Yes .  
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  Thank you.  
 Commiss ioner  Blumenthal .  
 COMMISSIONER BLUMENTHAL:  Yes .   I  jus t  wanted to  correc t  
Mr.  McCormack.   We're  in  v io lent  agreement  on  the  need for  sc ience  
and technology spending.   But- -  
 MR.  McCORMACK:  I  d id  say  that - -  
 COMMISSIONER BLUMENTHAL:  Dur ing the  Reagan era  was  
when corpora t ions  a l l  of  a  sudden misa l igned wi th  U.S.  in teres ts .   I t  
has  a lways  been thus .   I 'm t ry ing to  th ink of  the  great  ha lcyon days  
when corpora te  in teres ts  were  perfec t ly  a l igned wi th  nat ional  in teres ts .  
 I 'm going through my American business  h is tory  here .  
 MR.  McCORMACK:  What 's  good for  GM is  good for  America .  
 COMMISSIONER WESSEL:   Let ' s  not  have  so  much corpora te  
bashing.  
 COMMISSIONER BLUMENTHAL:  There 's  a lways  a  crea t ive  
tens ion between government  and bus iness- -we had t rus t  bus ters  dur ing 
the  Reagan years  and we had companies  tha t  wanted to  inves t  in  the  
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Sovie t  Union in  the  o i l  sec tor ,  and that  was  put  down.   So th is  i s  some 
imaginary  t ime when corpora t ions  were  a l igned wi th  nat ional  in teres ts .  
 They do the i r  b i t  and government  does  i t s  b i t  to  crea te  fa i r  
markets ,  f ree  markets .   So le t ' s  jus t  put  tha t  premise  as ide  for  now.  
 I  th ink there  wi l l  be  a  ques t ion  here ,  but  I  th ink the  o ther  th ing I  
wanted to  correc t  you on is  about   sc ience  and the  sc ience  pol icy  in  the  
Uni ted  Sta tes ;  one  of  the  reasons  we had a  major  boom is  because  we 
were  able  to  have  immigra t ion  of  Indian  and Chinese  and Taiwanese  
sc ient is t s ,  to  absorb  the  ta lent  be t ter  than anybody e lse ,  to  keep them 
in  Si l icon Val ley .  
 I f  you look a t  what 's  been going on in  Si l icon Val ley  over  the  
American boom real ly  in  h igh tech i s  tha t  Taiwanese  and Chinese  form 
great  connect ions  wi th  the i r  S i l icon Val ley  counterpar ts ,  got  capi ta l ,  
got  technologica l  development ,  and brought  some of  i t  to  Taipei ,  
brought  some of  i t  to  Shanghai ,  but  we ' re  s t i l l  keeping most  of  the  
value .  
 I  don ' t  th ink i t ' s  th is  ra t io  tha t  i s  the  s t raw man tha t ' s  se t  up  tha t  
because  an  Indian  sc ient is t  i s  cheaper  tha t  he 's  taking somebody 's  job ,  
I  th ink i s  jus t  p la in  wrong.   I  th ink so  another  e lement  of  the  pol icy  i s  
to  jus t  keep the  immigra t ion  and a t t rac t iveness  of  the  American 
economy open to  the  bes t  ta lent  which is  something we 've  been good a t  
for  so  very  long.  
 The ques t ion  i s ,  and i t ' s  k ind of  a  leading ques t ion ,  but  in  China  
you have a  s i tua t ion  where  we 're  a l l  sor t  of  saying that  China  i s  doing 
so  much r ight  and therefore  we should  fear  a  "economic  threa t ."  
 I  don ' t  know what  an  economic  threa t  i s  ac tual ly .   I  know what  a  
mi l i ta ry  threa t  i s .   That  does  concern  me wi th  respect  to  China .   
 But ,  in  China ,  you do have an  a l ignment ,  and i t ' s  a  par t icular  
par ty  and company.   So i t s  par ty-company in teres ts  more  so  tha t  
na t ional  and company in teres ts .   There 's  a  lo t  of  corrupt ion because  of  
tha t .   There  are  a  lo t  of  bad loans  tha t  go  out .   China  i s ,  in  th is  
recess ion,  i s  fac ing 20,  30  mi l l ion  job  losses  a t  a  minimum. 
 This  i s  a lso  a  leading ques t ion,  but  which economy would  you 
ra ther  have?   The American economy or  the  Chinese  economy,  which,  
i s  throwing a  lo t  of  money in to  indust r ia l  pol icy ,  and hoping tha t  they 
get  some brand for  na t ional  pres t ige  reasons .   but  the  Chinese   
economy is  a l igned wi th  a  par ty ,  and there  are  examples  of  tha t  in  Nazi  
Germany and in  I ta ly ,  but  i t  d idn ' t  work so  wel l  for  them.  
 So the  idea  tha t  th is  i s  somehow posing a  long- term economic  
threa t ,  again ,  I  ask  you which economy would  you ra ther  have ,  even in  
th is  g lobal  recess ion?   The Chinese  economy or  the  American 
economy,  which par t  of  the  wor ld  would  you ra ther  be  par t  of?  
 MR.  McCORMACK:  I 'd  be  amazed i f  anybody in  the  Uni ted  
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States  would  say  the  Chinese  economy.  
 COMMISSIONER BLUMENTHAL:  Okay.   Thank you.  
 MR.  McCORMACK:  Real ly .   But  you might  want  to  ask  that  
ques t ion  in  f ive  years .   That  might  be  a  d i f ferent  answer  in  f ive  years .  
 We have 31 mi l l ion  people  who receive  food s tamps r ight  now and 45 
mi l l ion  or  50  who don ' t  ge t  heal th  care .  
 COMMISSIONER BLUMENTHAL:  What  i s  the  Chinese  
economy going to  do in  f ive  years  to  make i t  more  a t t rac t ive?   What  
are  you seeing now in  the  Chinese  economy that  they ' re  doing r ight  
now? 
 As  I  sa id  in  the  ear l ie r  panel ,  we ' re  a l l  repeat ing  the  same exact  
impulses  we had before .   We 're  spending a  lo t  and going in to  def ic i t ,  
and they ' re  buying our  debt ,  and they ' re  t ry ing to  get  back to  an  
expor t - led  model .  
 What  do you see  in  the  Chinese  economy r ight  now in  terms of  
major  s t ructura l  reforms that  would  make you say tha t  in  f ive  years  
they might  have  a  more  a t t rac t ive  economy.  
 MR.  McCORMACK:  Wel l ,  I 'm th inking about  our  economy.   I  
looked back a t  my repor t ing  three  years  ago,  and we did  not  pressure  
China .   We did  not  want  to  pressure  China  on the i r  currency because  
there  was  a  concern  tha t  Chinese  f inancia l  sys tem would  col lapse .  
 That ' s  what  the  concern  was .   That ' s  why we didn ' t  approach 
China  and t ry  to  force  them to  f loa t  the i r  currency,  but  i t  was  our  
f inancia l  sys tem that  has  now col lapsed.   We' l l  f ind  out  the  
repercuss ions  of  tha t  in  f ive ,  ten  years ,  I  th ink.  
 COMMISSIONER BLUMENTHAL:  Is  China  doing anything 
today to  f ix  i t s  bas ic  s t ructura l  imbalances?   I t s  demographic  
problems?   I t s  pens ion problems?   I t s  over-savings?   I t s  overre l iance  
on the  expor t  economy?  Is  there  any evidence  to  back up the  c la im 
that  in  f ive  years  China  wi l l  have  a  more  a t t rac t ive?  
 I 'd  l ike  some evidence  tha t  the  Chinese  are  doing something 
today tha t  wi l l  make them more  a t t rac t ive  in  f ive  years .  
 DR.  GOMORY:  Today we ' re  in  a  cr i s i s .   But  le t ' s  jus t  back up a  
year  and ask  what  happened the  f ive  previous  years?   That ' s  rea l i ty .   
That  economy grew at  about  e ight  percent .   That ' s  a  very  good ra te .   
That ' s  what  they were  doing r ight .  
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  Good.   I  want  to  thank th is  
panel .   I  want  to  thank Dr .  Gomory for  coming a l l  the  way f rom Sun 
Val ley ,  Idaho to  be  here  today.  
  
 And,  Mr.  Stewar t ,  thank you for  your  wonderful  tes t imony that  
we ' l l  put  up  on the  Web s i te  and those  grea t  s ta t i s t ics .   Thank you,  Mr.  
McCormack for  providing us  wi th  your  monthly  repor t  and for  your  
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tes t imony here  today.   You have a l l  made a  grea t  contr ibut ion and we 
apprecia te  i t  very  much.  
 DR.  GOMORY:  Could  I  say  one  th ing?   I 'm sure  I 'm 
represent ing the  v iews of  the  three  of  us .  We 're  gra teful  to  you 
because  you are  address ing a  te r r ib ly  impor tant  problem that  most  
people  neglect .   So we would  l ike  to  thank you.  
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  Thank you.  
 COMMISSIONER BLUMENTHAL:  Thank you very  much.  
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  We wi l l  reconvene a t  2 :00 
o 'c lock for  the  next  panel .  
 [Whereupon,  a t  1 :00 p .m. ,  the  hear ing recessed,  to  reconvene a t  
2 :05 p .m. ,  th is  same day. ]  
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A F T E R N O O N   S  E S S I  O N 
 
PANEL III:   CHINA’S TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (IT)  INDUSTRIES 
                                         
 HEARING COCHAIR SLANE:  This  i s  our  th i rd  panel  which i s  
going to  address  the  development  and growth in  the  
te lecommunicat ions  and informat ion technology indust r ies  of  China .  
 We 're  par t icular ly  in teres ted  in  hear ing about  the  ro le  of  the  
Chinese  government  in  the  market  s t ructure .    
 Richard  Sut tmeier  i s  Professor  Emeri tus  a t  the  Univers i ty  of  
Oregon and a  former  Direc tor  of  the  Center  for  Asian  and Paci f ic  
Studies .   Dr .  Sut tmeier  specia l izes  in  Chinese  and Japanese  pol i t ics ,  
sc ience ,  technology and in ternat ional  re la t ions .  
 His  current  research inc ludes  s tudy of  China 's  sc ient i f ic  
communi ty ,  the  ro le  of  sc ience  and technology in  U.S. -China  re la t ions ,  
and a  longer- term s tudy of  Chinese  approaches  to  the  management  of  
technology and environmenta l  r i sks .  
 Andrew Szamosszegi  i s  a  Managing Consul tant  wi th  Capi ta l  
Trade  Incorpora ted ,  who specia l izes  in  in ternat ional  economics  and 
t rade  pol icy .   He has  consul ted  for  U.S.  and in ternat ional  c l ients  on  a  
wide  range of  topics  ranging f rom the  impact  of  t rade  l ibera l iza t ion  
and currency valuat ion  i ssues  to  technical  aspects  of  ant idumping and 
countervai l ing  duty  margins .  
 Denis  Simon is  a  Professor  a t  the  Penn Sta te  School  of  
In ternat ional  Affa i rs  and he  focuses  on in ternat ional  and comparat ive  
bus iness  s t ra tegy,  technology innovat ion and global  management  of  
technology wi th  a  specia l  reference  to  China  and the  Paci f ic  Rim.  
 Dr .  S imon has  es tabl ished deep government ,  bus iness  and 
academic  re la t ionships  in  China  and is  wel l -known for  both  h is  
scholar ly  and ent repreneur ia l  accompl ishments .  
 Dr .  Sut tmeier ,  would  you s tar t ,  p lease?  
 
STATEMENT OF DR. RICHARD P.  SUTTMEIER 
PROFESSOR EMERITUS,  UNIVERSITY OF OREGON 
EUGENE, OREGON 
 
 DR.  SUTTMEIER:   Yes .   Thank you,  Mr.  Chairman,  a  p leasure  to  
be  here .  
 I  come a t  th is ,  as  you suggested ,  as  somebody who sor t  of  works  
on sc ience  and technology pol icy ,  but  has  had a  long-s tanding in teres t  
in  indust r ia l  pol icy ,  in  par t  f rom teaching on Japan,  and having done 
research  in  Japan a t  an  ear l ie r  s tage  as  wel l .  
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 That  exper ience  wi th  Japan a ler ted  me to  the  fac t  tha t  th is  i ssue  
of  technical  s tandards ,  which Alan Wolff  ment ioned th is  morning,  i s ,  
in  fac t ,  a  very  cent ra l  ques t ion  for  indust r ia l  pol icy .   When the  
Chinese  government  began to  ta lk  qui te  a  lo t  about  s tandards  shor t ly  
af ter  the i r  access ion to  the  WTO, I  began to  look in to  tha t  ques t ion  a  
l i t t le  b i t ,  and have now produced severa l  repor ts  deal ing  wi th  Chinese  
approaches  to  technica l  s tandards .  
 So par t  of  my remarks  here  wi l l  be  drawn from these  repor ts .   A 
copy of  the  la tes t  i s  submit ted  here  for  the  record .   And then I ' l l  make 
a  few addi t ional  comments  on  indust r ia l  pol icy .   
 I  do  th ink,  as  sugges ted  th is  morning,  tha t  th is  i s  an  
in ternat ional  problem that  we ' re  ta lking about  today;  i t ' s  not  s imply  a  
b i la tera l  problem.   When we look around the  wor ld ,  we f ind  
governments  a l l  t ry ing to  reach some kind of  new in tegra t ion  of  the  
protec t ion  of  na t ional  economies  and accommodat ing the  dynamic  
f lows of  technology  and inves tment  tha t  happen in ternat ional ly .   I  
th ink i t ' s  impor tant  to  keep tha t  in  mind to  s tar t  wi th .  
 Secondly ,  i t ' s  a lso  a  l i t t le  b i t  t r icky to  t ry  to  na i l  down exact ly  
what  Chinese  indust r ia l  pol icy  i s .   In  par t ,  tha t ' s  because  China  i s  
changing so  very  rapidly ,  wi th  the  resul t  tha t  indust r ia l  pol icy  of  the  
ear ly  1990s  and mid-1990s  i s  no  longer  the  indust r ia l  pol icy  of  today.  
 Ownership  i s  changing in  China .   Levels  of  technology are  
changing in  China .   Rela t ions  wi th  the  in ternat ional  economy are  
changing.   And as  a  resul t ,  we see  very  s igni f icant  movements  f rom a  
country  pr imar i ly  concerned wi th  absorbing fore ign technology to  one  
very  much commit ted  now to  developing i t s  own,  and wi th  tha t  
objec t ive ,  a  very  aggress ive  sc ience ,  technology and indust ry  program 
for  the  current  Five  Year  Plan  and for  the  next  15  years .  
 So  wi th  tha t ,  le t  me jus t  t ry  to  address  very  br ief ly  the  points  
tha t  you put  to  me in  your  le t ter  of  invi ta t ion .   One ques t ion  had to  do 
wi th  the  ways  in  which China 's  R&D programs tend to  suppor t  the  ICT 
indust r ies .   There  i s ,  no  ques t ion ,  as  my wri t ten  submiss ion points  out ,  
tha t  ICT is  a  very  h igh pr ior i ty  area  for  China ,  as  i t  i s  for  most  o ther  
countr ies ,  and indeed we f ind  i t  emphasized in  China 's  na t ional  R&D 
programs.   I t  has  been in  the  863 Program,  unt i l  now focusing on so-
cal led  th i rd  genera t ion  te lecommunicat ions ,  and there  i s  now in  the  
new long- term plan ,  2005 to  2020,  a  major  commitment  to  four th  
genera t ion  technology.  
 And I  th ink i t  i s  the  la t te r  tha t  we rea l ly  should  be  focusing on 
a t  th is  point ,  ra ther  than revis i t ing  some of  the  problems wi th  3G.   
However ,  as  I  point  out  in  the  wri t ten  s ta tement ,  the  3G problems 
i l lus t ra te  the  p i t fa l l s  of  indust r ia l  pol icy .   Indeed,  looking a t  3G,  I  
th ink one  could  argue tha t  China  on balance  has  not  been a l l  of  tha t  
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successful  wi th  i t s  indust r ia l  pol icy  wi th  regard  to  s tandards .  
 The 4G is  wor th  not ing for  a  couple  of  reasons .   F i rs t ,  the  
amount  of  money tha t  wi l l  be  spent  on  i t  wi l l  be  much,  much more  than 
anything done on 3G.   More  impor tant ly ,  the  base  of  par t ic ipants ,  the  
s takeholders  who are  being crea ted  for  th is  4G program,  i s  much 
broader .   Our  work suggests  tha t  when you have a  broader  coal i t ion  of  
in teres ts ,  tha t  tends  to  be  good for  the  acceptance  of  the  s tandard .  
 Most  impor tant ly ,  th is  new work,  I  th ink,  wi l l  be  done much 
more  by Chinese  companies  as  opposed to  research ins t i tu tes  and 
univers i t ies .  So the  o ld  problems of  ge t t ing  research  out  of  ins t i tu tes  
in to  the  marketplace  wi l l  be ,  I  th ink,  less  of  a  problem.  
 What  about  Chinese  overseas  expansion of  i t s  te lecom indust ry?  
 Yes ,  indeed,  one  can see  tha t  especia l ly  I  th ink wi th  regard  to  the  
equipment  manufacturers .   Huawei  and ZTE,  for  ins tance ,  have  been 
very  successful ,  I  th ink,  in  expanding especia l ly  to  second and th i rd-
t ie r  markets .   As  I  point  out  in  the  paper ,  we see  some evidence  of  
successful  penet ra t ion  of  f i rs t - t ie r  markets  as  wel l .  
 The  service  providers  are  somewhat  less  in ternat ional ized ,  
a l though some of  you may know that  China  Mobi le ,  the  b igges t  mobi le  
carr ier  in  the  wor ld  d id ,  in  fac t ,  acquire  a  wire less  te lecom company in  
Pakis tan .  
 Third ,  wi th  regard  to  the  reorganiza t ion  of  the  te lecom indust ry  
you asked about ,  I  th ink China  i s  now in  a  shakeout  phase ,  and th is  
could  las t  for  some t ime.   As  some of  you know,  the  reorganizat ion has  
led  to  the  es tabl ishment  of  three  major  service  providers .   Wil l  th is  
enhance  the  abi l i ty  of  those  providers  to  expand in ternat ional ly?   I  
th ink not .   I  th ink tha t  probably  the  b ig  focus  in  the  near  te rm is  going 
to  be  jus t  making tha t  reorganiza t ion  work domest ica l ly .  
 There  are  obvious  problems of  corpora te  cul tures  which have  to  
be  in t regra ted ,  and there  i s  a lso  the  i ssue  of  the  implementa t ion  of  TD-
SCDMA, the  indigenous  Chinese  3G s tandard ,  which has  been ass igned 
to  China  Mobi le .  
 So  where  does  a l l  th is  leave  us  in  te rms of  impl ica t ions  for  the  
U.S.?   I  jus t  got  back f rom China  las t  week,  and I  was  th inking a  l i t t le  
b i t  about  how one re turns  f rom China  today in  compar ison wi th  the  
way one re turned f rom China  in  1978,  the  t ime of  my f i rs t  v is i t .  
 In  1978,  we were  s t i l l  th inking about  the  legacy of  Maoism and 
how i t  was  in tended to  make China  a  revolut ionary  socie ty .   Yet ,  a t  
tha t  t ime,  China  was  the  deades t ,  most  “unrevolut ionary”  p lace  in  the  
wor ld .   Not  too  much evidence  of  change.     You ar r ived back in  the  
Uni ted  Sta tes  and you sa id ,  wow,  th is  i s  rea l ly  a  revolut ionary  socie ty ,  
one  tha t ' s  rea l ly  dynamic  and on t rack.   
 Today,  the  fee l ing  i s  qui te  d i f ferent .   Today,  you get  the  sense  of  
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a  China  tha t  i s  rea l ly  very  dynamic ,  very  much on the  move,  f i l led  
wi th  problems which I  a l lude  to  in  the  paper .   The U.S.  on  the  o ther  
hand,  seems to  be  as leep.   We don ' t  qui te  know what  we 're  doing wi th  
regard  to  g lobal iza t ion ,  the  nature  of  our  economy and,  wi th  a l l  of  i t s  
resources ,  and we seem to  be  le t t ing  our  sc ient i f ic  and technologica l  
leadership  on which pas t  dynamism res ted ,  s l ip  away.   As  a  resul t ,  the  
impress ion today,  I  th ink,  i s  qui te  d i f ferent  f rom what  i t  was  30 years  
ago.  
 What  I  sugges t  in  the  paper  i s  tha t  we need the  network qual i t ies  
of  g lobal iza t ion ,  and wi th  tha t  I  th ink the  key ques t ion  i s  how do you--
how does  any country--capture  the  pos i t ive  network external i t ies  of  
g lobal iza t ion?   I  th ink the  Chinese  have  been ext raordinar i ly  c lever  a t  
th is  whereas  we have been somewhat  overwhelmed by a  combinat ion of  
the  negat ive  external i t ies  and our  own domest ic  problems.  
 How do we get  the  network to  serve  us?   A cr i t ica l  par t  of  tha t - - I  
suspect  my col league,  Denis  Simon,  wi l l  say  something more  about  
th is - -has  to  do  wi th  h igh- level  human ta lent .   The  compet i t ion  for  
ta lent  i s  a  very ,  very  major  par t  of  th is  new world ,  and I  th ink the  U.S.  
has  t radi t ional ly  done except ional ly  wel l  as  be ing a  magnet  for  tha t  
ta lent .  
 For  a  lo t  of  reasons--new oppor tuni t ies  e lsewhere ,  our  i l l -
conceived and implemented immigra t ion  problems—this  i s  changing.   
We can go in to  th is  in  Q&A if  you want .    
 Expor t  cont ro l  ques t ions ,  I  th ink need some a t tent ion .   We have 
th is  new repor t  f rom the  Nat ional  Academy of  Sciences  tha t  warrants  
a t tent ion ,  whether  you agree  wi th  a l l  the  conclus ions  or  not ,  but  i t  
does  ra ise  some impor tant  ques t ions .  
 Fore ign inves tment  i ssues ,  I  th ink,  are  going to  come up.   Again ,  
i t  has  to  do wi th  th is  whole  quest ion  of  the  Uni ted  Sta tes  being a  
magnet  for  fore ign inves tment .   China ,  g iven i t s  s ize ,  g iven i t s  
technologica l  level ,  i s  going to  be  an increas ingly  in teres ted  par ty  in  
inves t ing  in  th is  country ,  but  we haven ' t  rea l ly  shaken out  what  the  
nat ional  secur i ty  ques t ions  rea l ly  are .  
 The exper iences  thus  far ,  as  I  sugges t  in  the  paper ,  a re  not  so  
i l luminat ing.   But  fundamenta l ly ,  I  th ink I 'd  subscr ibe  to  the  points  
tha t  were  made th is  morning,  about  the  impor tance  of  the  U.S.  
mainta in ing an  ecosys tem for  innovat ion.   We jus t  have  to  run fas ter .   
Our  problems wi th  our  economy—and where  we are  going as  a  socie ty-
-are  not  pr inc ipal ly  problems der ived f rom China 's  indust r ia l  pol icy .   
In  th is  whole  ques t ion of  the  1978 to  2009 compar ison,  you don ' t  
expla in  tha t  change as  a  resul t  of  pol icy  a lone .   Something 
fundamenta l  i s  happening wi th  the  cul tures  of  the  two countr ies ,  the i r  
mot ivat ions ,  what 's  dr iv ing them,  the i r  v is ions ,  and so  for th .   We need 
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to  become far  more  sens i t ive  to  these  changes .   In  th is ,  the  ques t ion  of  
the  revi ta l iza t ion  of  U.S.  sc ience  i s  impor tant .   And ul t imate ly  I  th ink 
that  comes back to  ques t ions  of  pr imary and secondary  educat ion.   So 
the  human resource  d imension of  our  chal lenges ,  I  th ink,  i s  one  tha t  
has  to  be  g iven a  lo t  of  a t tent ion ,  and i t  doesn ' t  ge t  as  much.  
 Thank you.  
 [The s ta tement  fo l lows:]  
 
Prepared Statement  of  Dr.  Richard P.  Suttmeier  
Professor  Emeritus ,  Univers i ty  of  Oregon 
Eugene,  Oregon 
 
Written Statement to the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission 
Hearing on China’s Industrial Policy And Its Impact on US Companies, Workers 
and the American Economy, March 24, 2009 
 
Richard P. Suttmeier 
University of Oregon 
 
The subject of today’s hearing is an important one for a variety of reasons.  It is 
important for the US as it seeks to define appropriate policies for relations with a rapidly 
changing China.  It is important for China, as well, as it seeks to refine the policy 
environment for its developmental trajectory in the face of new domestic and 
international contingencies.  It is also important for the larger international community 
which must both accommodate China’s emergence as a major economy, and force in 
science and technology, while also struggling with the reconciliation of national self-
interests, international processes of technological innovation, and the building of 
international regimes for the governance of a global knowledge economy. The issues 
before us are not simply those of a complex bilateral US-China relationship.  They are 
rather symptomatic of the challenges facing many countries as they attempt to prepare 
domestic industries for interactions with global production and innovation networks. 
 
Our topic is also one that is not easily understood. China’s industrial policy, and it’s 
approaches to the building of pillar or strategic industries, continue to evolve as the 
economy becomes more complex in terms of ownership, levels of technology, and 
relations with players in the international economy. And, increasingly, industrial policy 
engenders dissensus within China, thus making the domestic politics of industrial policy 
also more complex. A central question for any national industrial policy, and one which 
China struggles with now, is the proper role of the state in guiding industrial 
development.  Once taken for granted, the answer to this question in China today is 
increasingly contested as China attempts to conform with its WTO obligations, as 
Chinese companies discover that their interests are no longer automatically aligned with 
those of the state, and as increasingly cosmopolitan government officials come to 
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understand that national industrial policies which do not recognize and accommodate 
global trends in research and innovation invite costly failures.  Let me illustrate some of 
these points with reference to our recent work on ICT standards as a tool of industrial 
policy.1 
 
There is no doubt that the Chinese state regards the telecommunications and information 
technology industries (hereafter, ICT) as central to national security and economic well-
being.  In this, China is no different from the national governments of a number of other 
countries, including our own, which have used industrial and technology policies to 
promote these industries. In China, the recent government reorganization to create the 
Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), which has as part of its 
Chinese name (Gongye Xinxihu Bu) the concept of “infomatization” (xinxihua), implies 
that advanced information technologies are intended to be diffused throughout society, 
including to the industrial economy and the national defense system.  Not surprisingly, 
therefore, ICT research has been included in major state-supported national R&D 
projects, such as the 863 program, and in the new 15 year Medium to Long-Term Science 
and Technology Plan.  Included in the latter, for instance, is a large project on “Next-
Generation Broadband Wireless Mobile Communications Network,” focused on the 
development of fourth generation (4G) telecommunications technology, which is 
expected to receive more than 70 billion yuan over the course of the project.2 The 
national R&D system has taken technical standards development as a key task, special 
R&D programs for standards have been initiated, and tax and procurement policies are 
being used to incentivize Chinese enterprises to become centers of intellectual property 
development and standards initiatives. In addition, direct R&D support is being offered to 
enterprises. In the ICT sector, for instance, Huawei and Datang reportedly have been 
awarded new “national laboratories,” an institutional designation that leads to preferential 
funding that had previously been reserved for research institutes and universities.3 
 
Large R&D projects of this sort, however, have not always enjoyed the success which 
might be expected from the heavy investment of resources they have received.  This is 
well illustrated by past work on 3G technology and, in particular, the development of the 
Chinese TD-SCDMA 3G standard. Although TD-SCDMA was recognized by ISO as 
international standard in 1999, China’s ability to incorporate the standard into 
                     
1 Scott Kennedy, Richard P. Suttmeier, and Jun Su. Standards, Stakeholders, and Innovation: China’s 
Evolving Role in the Global Knowledge Economy.  Seattle.  National Bureau of Asian Research.  NBR 
Special Report Number 15.  September, 2008. 
2 http://english.caijing.com.cn/2008-02-25/100049443.html. Accessed March 20, 2009. 
3 See Caijing Annual English Edition, December 2007, http://www.caijing.com.cn/English/Cover/2008-02-
20/48880.shtml and http://www. 
caijing.com.cn/English/Editorial/2008-02-20/48880.shtml. 
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commercially viable innovative telecommunication systems has been a long and drawn 
out affair, with Chinese telecommunications companies only reluctantly accepting it. 
 
Chinese efforts to support a distinctive Chinese 3G standard illustrates a number of 
problems with the development and implementation of Chinese industrial policy more 
generally.  First, in spite of the technical contributions made by Chinese researchers, the 
standard also relied heavily on foreign technology.4 Thus, in spite of suggestions that 
China seeks greater technological self-reliance in its industrial policy, maintaining an 
openness to international technology flows will continue to be an important part of 
technological development going forward. As with other standards, such as the WAPI 
(WLAN Authentication and Privacy Infrastructure) security standard for local wireless 
networks, TD-SCDMA was aggressively pushed by its developers and bureaucratic allies 
to the point of securing government support without necessarily considering the interests 
of other Chinese stakeholders; in this case, important telecommunications companies 
who had a vested interests in commercially viable 2G legacy technologies more 
compatible with the other two international 3G standards (WCDMA and CDMA 2000).  
Thus, in keeping with classical critiques of industrial policy, predictable rent seeking 
behavior by special interests seeking bureaucratic sanction emerged and came into 
conflict with the market-based technological judgments of the Chinese service providers. 
 The development of operational TD-SCDMA systems has been further complicated by 
efforts to reorganize the telecommunications industry. The now reorganized industry 
involves competition among three service providers each having a license for a different 
3G technology.  Thus, the TD-SCDMA standard is licensed to China Mobile, the world’s 
largest mobile operator (which absorbed China Tietong), while China Telecom has a 
license for a CDMA 2000 system, and China Unicom (which merged with China 
Netcom) is licensed to develop W-CDMA technology. 
 
The reorganization itself raises some interesting questions about industrial policy.  By 
licensing three separate and competing technologies, the Chinese government appears to 
be adopting a position of technology neutrality vis-à-vis Chinese and international 
standards, seemingly in support of the principle of market competition.  On the other 
hand, the delays in licensing which have occurred over the past several years have been 
interpreted as a form of state intervention to allow time for further development of the 
less mature TD-SCDMA technology.  In addition, the assignment of the TD-SCDMA 
license to China Mobile, which has a much larger mobile subscriber base (over 400 
million, in contrast to Telecom’s 43 million and Unicom’s 125 million) could be 
interpreted as tilting the competition towards the stronger player as the chosen champion 
of the Chinese standard.  On the other hand, Chinese industrial policy has often sought to 
                     
4 Chinese share of the patents in the standard, reportedly, was only about 7%. Yan Hui, “The 3G Standard 
Setting Strategy and Indigenous Innovation Policy in China: Is TD-SCDMA a Flagship,” Danish Research 
Institute for Industrial Dynamics, DRUID Working Papers, no. 07-01, 2007. 
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promote competition.  Thus, the less mature technology was licensed to the stronger 
company in order that competition be maintained.  Should Telecom, and especially 
Unicom (which has the second-largest subscriber base), provide better quality service, 
based on more mature technologies, Mobile’s advantage could erode.  Further 
complicating the picture are the problems of making mergers work, as companies that 
have developed under competitive market conditions face the challenges of dealing with 
the corporate cultures of new partners whose traditions are in a planned economy. 
 
The 3G story in China illustrates both possibilities for effective industrial policy, but also 
its pitfalls.  Through government policy efforts China has been able to establish an 
international standard for next-generation mobile telephony and seems ready, finally, to 
establish the standard in a large commercial system.  Many observers both inside and 
outside of China, however, would be loath to regard the 3-G story as a success, however, 
given the costs it has imposed on service providers, and the cost to consumers in terms of 
delayed rollouts of 3G service and the likelihood that the service may not employ the best 
available technology.  A far stronger case for the TD-SCDMA program can be made if it 
is regarded as an expensive learning technology which will put China in a much stronger 
position to compete in 4G technology. For instance, for 4G, there will be more companies 
involved as stakeholders in the development of the technology, and more of the R&D 
will be performed in corporate labs, rather than in government research institutes and 
universities. 
 
Chinese industrial policy will be measured, in part, by the success of its key companies 
abroad, and Chinese telecommunications companies are certainly beginning to make their 
presence known internationally.  Among service providers, for instance, China Mobile in 
2007 acquired Pakistan’s Paktel and established CMPak, now a wholly owned subsidiary 
of the parent company. China’s telecom equipment manufacturers, especially Huawei 
and ZTE, have been considerably more active in terms of international expansion. Both 
have become important international suppliers of telecom equipment in second and third 
tier markets, and are beginning to make their presence felt in first tier markets as well.  
For instance, Huawei reportedly has secured a contract from TeliaSonera to deploy the 
world’s first 4G commercial network in Oslo, which should begin operations in 2010.5 
 
An interesting question about this expansion is the extent to which it leads to the 
diffusion of Chinese technical standards abroad.  The evidence is not clear.  Successful 
companies, like Huawei and ZTE, are now investing heavily in their own R&D at home 
and abroad and are incorporating innovative Chinese technology in the products they sell 
internationally.  However,  market-based companies are driven primarily by solutions 
that work and thus are drawn to the use of established international standards where these 
                     
5 http://www.chinatechnews.com/2009/01/20/8544-huawei-deploys-first-4g-commercial-network-in-
norway/. Accessed March 18, 2009. 
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offer the greatest functionality.  Thus in the Oslo project, Huawei appears to be offering 
innovative fourth-generation telecommunications base stations that can handle 4G 
standards derived from WCDMA (WCDMA/LTE) and CDMA (CDMA/LTE), and not 
from TD-SCDMA. It is interesting to note, though, that in May, 2008, China sponsored a 
20 day seminar on Chinese approaches to standardization for officials from African 
standardization bodies.  In this, China seems to be proselytizing Africa in ways which are 
reminiscent of recent US and the EU sponsored standards workshops and seminars 
intended to proselytize China! 
 
As we observe the evolution of Chinese industrial policy, especially as it relates to 
technical standards, we can see that it is responding to the complexities of global 
innovation networks and the new technologies they generate, in a way which points to 
active policy learning.  The crude attempt in 2004 to mandate the WAPI standard for 
wireless devices has now given way to a far more sophisticated appreciation of the need 
for industrial policy to conform to market forces and the norms and processes of 
international institutions, including standard-setting institutions.  Efforts to impose strict 
uniform national limitations on the participation of foreign companies in Chinese 
technical committees for standard-setting reportedly have given way to a somewhat more 
relaxed approach in which technical committees can set their own rules for foreign 
participants that are wholly-owned or joint venture firms that are legally registered in 
China.6  These rules, no doubt, will still be under the influence of state bureaucratic 
parents, but the overall policy is one that subjects techno-nationalist objectives to some 
of the realities of techno-globalism. 
 
Chinese industrial policy shares with the industrial policy experiences of other East 
Asian countries in having both successes and failures.  The successes, often achieved at 
great - and in some cases, arguably, unnecessary - costs have come as a part of the 
national “catch up” strategies that have transformed poor agricultural countries in the 
region into the ranks of technologically capable, middle-or wealthy country status.  The 
ability to mobilize resources and direct them towards state selected priority sectors has 
been key to this catch-up strategy.  But, as with its East Asian neighbors, there comes a 
time when the challenges of moving beyond catch-up make old policy modalities a 
liability. Parts of China still have a very long way to go before the catch-up phase is over, 
but clearly some sectors are approaching - or are at - the stage when catch-up industrial 
policies must give way to new approaches.  China’s leaders appear to recognize this fact 
and have called for the creation of a China by 2020 which is an “innovative society,” and 
an industrial leader in new science-based industries, including ICT.  Opinion is divided, 
both in China and abroad, as to whether these goals are achievable and as to the 
instruments being used to pursue them.  In many ways, the trajectory of Chinese high 
technology development is very impressive, but we should also recognize the many 
                     
6 Personal communication.  Beijing, March, 2009. 
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problems China faces to maintain that trajectory.7  Nevertheless, as frequent visitors to 
China can attest to, there is an increasingly sophisticated and cosmopolitan vibrancy to 
the place which would lead one to place one’s bets on significant industrial and 
technological achievements over the coming decade. 
 
Given this likelihood, the US must prepare itself for a far more competitive China in 
areas of high technology and science-based industry where we once enjoyed comfortable 
leads.  While it will want to continue to monitor Chinese industrial policy to assess 
China’s compliance with its WTO commitments, and engage China on a variety of 
bilateral trade and investment issues, the US must confront the need for its own 
revitalization and realize that revitalization is inseparable from our growing 
interdependence with China. This requires some serious rethinking of our interests vis-à-
vis China, and a far more proactive approach to securing long-term benefits for the US 
from the successes of China’s industrial and technological development. Chinese 
industrial policy need not lead us into a zero sum game, especially if we recognize that 
the challenges from China has less to do with Chinese industrial policy than with our 
failures to solve chronic problems keeping our nation from reaching its potential.  A 
number of interrelated issues have to be faced by the US political system, the resolution 
of which requires far more effective bipartisan congressional leadership, and executive-
legislative cooperation, than we have recently seen. These include: 
1. Global Competition for Talent.  Due to the relative underdevelopment of research and 
education conditions in China, and the superiority of those conditions in the United 
States, the US has long been a magnet for science and engineering talent from China. 
But, as a result of pro-research and education policies being pursued by the Chinese 
government, the advantage once possessed by the US is fading. As Chinese students seek 
advanced degrees in their own country, as generous research support from the Chinese 
government makes the salaries, equipment and facilities in China competitive with those 
in the US, and as economic conditions lure Chinese technical entrepreneurs to invest their 
energies in home markets with remarkable growth opportunities, the trans-Pacific 
competition for talent will intensify. One should note that this competition is not solely 
limited to Chinese scientists and engineers.  China seeks to attract talent from around the 
world much as the US has long done. 
 
2. Immigration. This competition for talent moves immigration policy to the center of the 
economic revitalization agenda, as illustrated, for instance, by the concerns of US high-
technology companies in their efforts to recruit highly skilled Asian immigrants. 
Although some progress has been made in reconciling US traditions of free movement of 
people with the security concerns expressed in tightened post-9/11 visa policies, 
                     
7 See, Richard P. Suttmeier. “The Discourse on China as Science and Technology Superpower: Assessing 
the Arguments.” Presented at the “International Symposium on China As a Science and Technology 
Superpower” Organized by the China Research Center Japan Science and Technology Agency Tokyo, 
December 9-10, 2008.  Submitted for the record of this hearing. 
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problems remain. Chinese scientists often have been unable to get visas in time for 
important professional meetings (including meetings of technical committees for 
international standards development), for instance, and this has not only produced 
considerable antipathy towards the US in the Chinese technical community, but has also 
led US companies and professional societies to convene their activities outside of the 
United States. Less than welcoming immigration policy has not helped in the competition 
for talent. Since the success of Chinese industrial policy, especially in next-generation 
science-based industries, ultimately depends on the quantity and quality of technical 
personnel available, US visa policy should be seen as a factor affecting the success of 
Chinese industrial policy. 
 
3.  Export controls. There is a need to reassess whether controls over high technology 
exports hit the right balance between the promotion of trade in industries where the US 
enjoys comparative advantage and the protection of strategic technologies in the face of 
Chinese security challenges. Special attention should be given to “deemed exports,” or 
the movement of technology acquired by foreign researchers who participate in the work 
of American companies, universities, or government laboratories. The analysis and 
recommendations of “Beyond Fortress America,” the recently released  report on export 
controls and visa policies by the National Academy of Sciences, warrant priority 
attention. Chinese colleagues take great pleasure in pointing out that US export controls, 
while limiting technological capabilities in the short run, have often forced China into 
either seeking technology from other suppliers (at US expense) or, forcing a 
recommitment through Chinese industrial policy to develop the technology itself. 
 
4. Foreign Investment.  The growing wealth and technological sophistication of Chinese 
companies are likely to lead to an increased interest in acquiring stakes in American 
high-technology firms.  Interest in such investment is again symptomatic of the 
interrelated nature of competitiveness and China policy.  The hostility toward prospective 
Chinese investments in American firms during the past eight years was often of 
questionable economic rationality and security value, and created negative feelings 
towards a US which has long preached to others of the virtues of free and open foreign 
investment policies. A China that is emerging as one of the world’s largest economies 
and an important player in global research and innovation is certain to seek further 
foreign investment opportunities in the United States, and the US needs to have a policy 
environment that will increase the likelihood that these investment initiatives lead to win-
win outcomes, rather than lose-lose. 
 
5. Standards and Intellectual Property.  US leadership in setting technical standards and 
creating intellectual property continues, but there is little doubt that China seeks to 
challenge that leadership for economic, national security, and prestige reasons.  With 
enhanced national science and technology capabilities, distinctive market conditions, and 
government policies in support of standard-setting and intellectual property development, 
competition over standards and IP is sure to increase. The US cannot allow its leadership 
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in standard-setting for cutting-edge technologies to dissipate. 
 
A “new geography of knowledge”8 represented by China’s emergence as an important 
player in science and technology, a “new geography of finance,”9 represented by China’s 
national wealth and foreign currency reserves, along with a “new geography of pollution 
and resource consumption” have created a very different international reality from that 
which most Americans are familiar with.  This new international reality requires a major 
recalibration of US security, economic, and environmental interests vis-à-vis China. 
Successful engagement with the consequences of Chinese industrial policy, including its 
growing technological capabilities, requires that the health of the eco-system for research 
and innovation in the US be ensured. It is necessary that the nation’s science and 
engineering be given high level attention and priority access to resources. Science in the 
White House can no longer be relegated to an ancillary position.  The President’s Science 
Advisor needs to be given real stature and the Office of Science and Technology Policy 
should be strengthened, including the addition of personnel who are familiar with 
Chinese science and technology trends.  Since the stakeholders in US science and 
technology relations with China extend well beyond those in the government, there is 
also a need for a high-level government-private sector council on US-China science and 
technology relations that would include representatives from industry, universities, 
NGOs, as well as government, to share information and coordinate activities. At present, 
US participation in science and technology relations with China are woefully 
uncoordinated, and government offices responsible for this relationship are woefully 
understaffed. 
 
The US must recommit itself to the ideas of maintaining scientific and technological 
excellence throughout its public and private institutions and ensure that it remains a 
magnet for technical talent from throughout the world.  This cannot be done without the 
revival of science as a US cultural value and the rebuilding of an effective system of 
science and engineering education. There is no greater long-term threat to the US ability 
to engage Chinese industrial policy than having a scientifically illiterate American 
population interact with a scientifically and mathematically sophisticated Chinese 
population on matters of science and technology. 
 
 
 
 HEARING COCHAIR SLANE:  Thank you.  
 Dr .  Simon.  
 
                     
8 Dieter Ernst. “A New Geography of Knowledge? Asia’s Role in Global Innovation Networks.” East-
West Center Policy Studies. 2009. 
9 I’m indebted to Dieter Ernst for suggesting this term. 
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STATEMENT OF DR. DENIS FRED SIMON 
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 
PENN STATE UNIVERSITY, UNIVERSITY PARK, PA 
 
 DR.  SIMON:  Thank you.  
 I  a lso  have  recent ly  re turned f rom China ,  ac tual ly  having made 
about  three  t r ips  over  the  las t  several  months ,  and one  s imple  fac t  i s  
c lear  to  me.   We might  say  i t  th is  way:  the  dragon is  not  as leep.  
 I  th ink one  i s  impressed qui te  c lear ly  by looking a t ,  whether  the  
nat ional  level  or  the  local  level ,  tha t  the  PRC is  less  engaged r ight  
now in  debates  about  ba i louts  and bonuses  and Cabinet  appointments ,  
and much more  preoccupied wi th  f igur ing out  how China  i s  going to  
move beyond the  current  economic  and f inancia l  c r i s i s  fac ing the  
country .  
 What 's  rea l ly  in teres t ing ,  I  th ink,  about  the  current  per iod  i s  tha t  
the  chaos  and the  tumul t  tha t  have  come on l ine  because  of  the  g lobal  
f inancia l  c r i s i s  for  China  represents  a  k ind of  ideologica l  and 
phi losophical  watershed moment ,  not  only  in  wor ld  h is tory ,  but  a lso  in  
the  60 year  h is tory  of  the  People 's  Republ ic .  
 I  th ink for  Chinese  leaders  in  Zhongnanhai ,  the  fa i lure  of  the  
market  economies ,  led  by the  Uni ted  Sta tes ,  to  re ign in  the  excesses  
and the  ext remes  of  Wal l  S t ree t  and the  banking indust ry  are  v iewed as  
a  reaff i rmat ion of  the  Chinese  procl iv i ty  for  favor ing more  expl ic i t  
s ta te  contro l  and more  over t  regula t ion .  
 I  a lso  th ink tha t  f rom the  perspect ive  of  the  current  leadership ,  
there  has  not  been a  v is ion  about  China 's  fu ture  tha t  has  not  inc luded a  
cent ra l  ro le  for  the  s ta te  as  the  u l t imate  source  of  guidance  and 
control ,  even a l lowing for  a l l  of  the  reforms and the  in t roduct ion of  
market  mechanisms throughout  the  las t  30  years .  
 I  th ink for  both  h is tor ica l  and cul tura l  reasons ,  as  wel l  as  some 
combinat ion  of  pol i t ica l  expediency,  the  Chinese  see  th is  as  a  ra ther  
unique and advantageous  moment  in  t ime,  i t  i s  a  s t ra tegic  oppor tuni ty  
where  China  holds  the  phi losophical  h igh ground to  re inforce  i t s  long-
held  pos i t ion  a t  home and abroad tha t  unbr id led  capi ta l i sm and a  weak 
s ta te  are  a  sure  rec ipe  for  ser ious  sociopol i t ica l  and economic  
problems.  
 I t ' s  agains t  th is  backdrop tha t  one  must  evaluate  and assess  the  
ro le  and impact  of  indust r ia l  pol icy  in  China ,  especia l ly  wi th  respect  
to  the  development  of  h igh technology capabi l i t ies .   I  th ink i t ' s  
impor tant  to  recognize  tha t  whi le  we don ' t  want  to  underes t imate  the  
sa l ience  of  the  g lobal  f inancia l  c r i s i s  as  a  prec ip i tant  to  fos ter ing  some 
badly  needed economic  changes  in  China ,  i t  a l so  i s  the  case  today tha t  
many of  the  chal lenges  fac ing the  Chinese  leadership  are  rooted  in  a  
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range of  cr i t ica l  s t ruc tura l  problems that  predate  the  onset  of  the  
cr is i s .  
 In  ef fec t ,  the  g lobal  f inancia l  c r i s i s  exacerbated  many of  these  
s t ructura l  problems and highl ighted  the  necess i ty  of  moving beyond 
the  so-cal led  "fac tory  to  the  wor ld"  economic  model  tha t  has  helped 
spur  Chinese  growth over  the  las t  three  decades  inc luding dr iv ing i t s  
open pol icy .  
 As  Long Yongtu--China 's  former  negot ia tor  for  WTO—recent ly  
sa id  speaking to  a  conference  in  Wenzhou in  December  tha t  I  a t tended-
-  and I 'm paraphras ing here :  
 “Whi le  we China  can eas i ly  be  deter red  by the  d i f f icul t ies  
brought  on  by the  g lobal  f inancia l  c r i s i s ,  the  fac t  i s  tha t  the  current  
cr i s i s  i s  a  c loud wi th  a  s i lver  l in ing,  an  oppor tuni ty  to  take  on the  
under ly ing defects  and shor tcomings  present  in  our  prevai l ing  
economic  model  and to  move the  country  to  the  next  phase  in  i t s  
economic  and technologica l  development .”  
 So,  I  th ink i t ' s  impor tant  to  unders tand tha t  China  sees  th is  as  a  
s t ra tegic  oppor tuni ty  and tha t  they have ,  in  a  rea l  sense ,  th is  k ind of  
moral  and technologica l  h igh ground.  
 I  was  asked to  ta lk  about  a  number  of  facets  about  the  Chinese  
technology ef for t .   I  th ink one  th ing is  c lear ,  and Professor  Sut tmeier  
a l luded to  i t ,  tha t  wi th  the  onset  of  the  Medium to  Long-Term S&T 
Plan,  which I ' l l  ca l l  the  MLP,  Chinese  leaders  have  recognized tha t  
even though they have been the  benef ic iary  of  the  open global  
economy,  the  rea l i ty  i s  tha t  i t  i s  no  longer  safe ,  i t  i s  no  longer  wise  for  
China  to  depend so  extens ively  on external  sources  of  technology.  
 And for  the  t ime being,  we can see  in  China  tha t  those  who favor  
the  “make s ide”  of  the  so-cal led  "make versus  buy decis ion"  are  in  the  
ascendancy.   This  i s  the  group of  technologis ts  seem to  be  in  the  lead  
versus  the  group of  economis ts  who have debated  the  o ther  s ide  of  the  
argument .  
 I  th ink there  a lso  i s  a  growing apprehension in  Bei j ing  tha t  the  
technology re la ted  benef i t s  tha t  China  has  been able  to  secure  as  a  
resul t  of  i t s  openness  to  g lobal iza t ion  may,  in  fac t ,  be  s tar t ing  to  
erode.   And,  Chinese  leaders  are  fearful  tha t  they wi l l  now have even 
more  l imi ted  access  to  some of  the  core  technologies  tha t  they seek to  
dr ive  the i r  innovat ion program and to  ca tapul t  the  Chinese  economy to  
the  next  level .  
 We know that  China  has  put  in  p lace  over  the  years  a  number  of  
s t ra tegic  technology programs-- the  863 Program,  e tc .  the  Torch 
Program,  the  973 Program.   Al l  of  these  in i t ia t ives  are  ref lec t ive  of  a  
s ta te-di rec ted  ef for t  to  ca tapul t  China  ahead in  i t s  technologica l  
development .  
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 And,  a l l  of  these  programs,  whi le  they 've  y ie lded some 
substant ia l  resul ts ,  a lso  have  genera l ly  le f t  Chinese  leaders  somewhat  
d isappointed  by the  pace  of  progress .  
 The Chinese  R&D system cont inues  to  be  beset  by  a  range of  
problems and chal lenges ,  inc luding the  absence ,  in  la rge  par t ,  of  a  
cul ture  tha t  rewards  r i sk  taking,  ent repreneur ia l  behavior ,  individual  
in i t ia t ive ,  and even a t  t imes  crea t iv i ty .  
 There  a lso  have  been a  number  of  cr i t ic isms launched both  
in ternal ly  and external ly  about  the  management  of  these  key programs 
and the  use  of  government  funds .   
 On the  success  s ide  are  companies  l ike  the  SIASUN Automat ion 
and Robot ics  Company up in  Shenyang,  which is  led  by a  re turnee  who 
s tudied  robot ics  in  Germany in  the  ear ly  '90s .   He came back and he  
jump-s tar ted  th is  company working wi th  the  Chinese  Academy of  
Sciences  and receiving money f rom the  863 Program.  
 He is  an  example  of  the  ent repreneur ia l  sp i r i t  tha t  has  succeeded 
in  China  despi te  countervai l ing  t rends  and pushback in  a  number  of  
areas .  
 At  the  same t ime,  there  a lso  are  a  number  of  o ther  problems that  
have  af fec ted  programs l ike  the  863 Program.   In  2006,  for  example ,  
there  were  two ser ious  scandals  tha t  were  uncovered tha t  ref lec t  the  
huge pressures  tha t  exis t  for  progress  among those  receiv ing high level  
and of ten  subs tant ia l  government  suppor t  in  programs l ike  the  863 
Program.  
 The f i rs t  case ,  known as  the  Hanxin  chip  case ,  involved a  
re turning sc ient is t  a t  the  pres t ig ious  Shanghai  J iaotong Univers i ty .   A 
second example  involved a  Chinese  company named ARCA 
Technologies  which diver ted  funds  away f rom research and used those  
monies  for  rea l  es ta te  inves tments  and for  h igh sa lar ies  to  pay top  
execut ives .  
 These  two scandals  because  they were  so  publ ic  and so  
pronounced rocked the  Chinese  S&T sys tem and ra ised  many ques t ions  
about  the  s ta tus  of  China’s  ac tual  capabi l i t ies  in  f ie lds  such as  
microelec t ronics .  
 I  a lso  was  asked to  ta lk ,  in  fac t ,  about  the  PRC microelec t ronics  
ef for t ,  so  le t  me say a  few th ings  about  i t  because  I  th ink tha t  despi te  
the  fac t  tha t  China  has  p laced a  h igh pr ior i ty  on development  of  th is  
area ,  i t  cont inues  to  suffer  some ser ious  problems.  
 The ef for t  to  promote  the  development  and deepening of  the  
semiconductor  indust ry  today s tands  out  as  an  example  of  the  mixed 
resul ts  of  indust r ia l  pol icy .   Today,  China  absorbs  about  a  th i rd  of  the  
wor ldwide  market  for  semiconductors ,  reaching about  $88 bi l l ion  in  
2007.   At  the  same t ime,  however ,  the  Chinese  share  of  g lobal  
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semiconductor  product ion accounts  for  only  n ine  percent  of  wor ldwide  
output .  
 China 's  IC market  grew to  a lmost  74  b i l l ion  in  2007,  account ing 
for  33-34 percent  of  g lobal  IC t rade .  
 According to  a  recent  s tudy by PWC, however ,  there  were  no 
Chinese  companies  in  the  top  55 suppl iers  to  the  Chinese  
semiconductor  market  in  2007.   The PWC study goes  on to  indica te  
tha t ,  quote :  "Even i f  the  larges t  Chinese  semiconductor  companies  sold  
a l l  of  the i r  output  wi th in  China ,  no  Chinese  semiconductor  company 
would  be  among the  top  50 suppl iers  to  the  Chinese  semiconductor  
market  in  2007."   The s i tua t ion  regarding ICs  i s  even worse  wi th  the  
consumpt ion/product ion gap reaching a lmost  $55 bi l l ion  in  2007.   This  
i s  a  s t rong indic tment  of  Chinese  ef for ts  here tofore  to  enhance  the i r  
capaci ty  to  meet  the  growing demand for  semiconductors  and IC 
products  which,  in  fac t ,  cont inues  to  exceed the  in ternat ional  growth 
ra te  by  a  s igni f icant  margin .  
 So where  does  tha t  leave  us  wi th  China?   Wel l ,  le t  me c i te  two 
examples  where  there  does  seem to  be  progress .   F i rs t ,  the  case  of  the  
Godson or  what 's  a lso  ca l led  the  Loongson computer  chip;  and second,  
the  development  of  China 's  h igh performance supercomputer  sec tor .  
 Through the  863 Program and the  Knowledge Innovat ion Program 
under  the  CAS,  the  Chinese  have  been able  to  launch the i r  f i r s t  
somewhat  In te l - l ike  Pent ium IV repl ica ted  chip .   The Loongson chip  
bas ica l ly  i s  an  effor t  by  China  to  wean i t se l f  of f  of  not  only  In te l  
products  but  a lso  the  Winte l  p la t form for  personal  computers .  
 The chips  have  been des igned by the  Ins t i tu te  of  Computer  
Technology and by the  BLX IC Design Corporat ion,  a  company 
founded by that  Ins t i tu te .  
 The Loongson is  a  bas ic  chip  for  computer  technology,  but  the  
unique  th ing about  i t  i s  tha t  i t ' s  not  based on the  x86 ins t ruct ion  se t ,  
but  ins tead uses  a  modif ied  vers ion of  the  MIPS ins t ruct ion  se t .   That  
means  tha t  bas ica l ly  i t  can  use  Linux but  not  use  Windows products .  
 The  o ther  example  I  want  to  c i te  i s  the  supercomputer  ef for t  by  
China ,  the  Dawning 5000A,  which is  a  h igh performance computer  tha t  
ra tes  number  seven in  terms of  the  wor ld 's  fas tes t  comput ing 
computers  out  there  in  the  marketplace .  
 The Dawning 5000A is  no match for  IBM's  Roadrunner  which 
bas ica l ly  runs  a t  about  one  quadr i l l ion  opera t ions  per  second which is  
four  t imes  fas ter  than the  Dawning 5000A.  
 But  very  in teres t ingly ,  the  Dawning,  which uses  AMD 
microprocessors ,  cos ts  about  $29 mi l l ion  in  contras t  to  the  IBM 
Roadrunner- -which cos t  the  U.S.  Depar tment  of  Energy about  $100 
mi l l ion .   The Chinese  a l ready are  seeking to  br ing  the i r  computer  in to  
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the  g lobal  marketplace .  
 So where  does  tha t  leave  us  wi th  China  and where  i s  the  PRC 
headed?   I t ' s  c lear  tha t  China  remains  s t rongly  commit ted  to  fur ther  
enhancing i t s  own indust r ia l  base  and indigenous  technologica l  
capabi l i t ies .   But ,  i t ' s  a lso  c lear  tha t  China  i s  not  an  uns toppable  
technologica l  juggernaut .    
 There  are  two large  unknowns regarding China 's  technologica l  
potent ia l ,  whether  i t ' s  in  ICT or  in  o ther  areas .   F i rs t  i s  the  sof tware  
s ide  of  what  I  ca l l  the  technology equat ion,  and second,  China 's  
s t ra tegic  in tent .    
 With  regard  to  the  sof tware  s ide ,  ques t ions  exis t  about  the  
abi l i ty  of  China  to  adapt ,  sh i f t  and opera te  wi th  the  h igh degree  of  
f lexibi l i ty ,  agi l i ty  and responsiveness  required  for  compet i t ive  success  
in  the  g lobal ized wor ld  of  the  21s t  century .  
 With  respect  to  s t ra tegic  in tent ,  the  unknowns may be  even 
grea ter .   I t  i s  c lear  tha t  China  remains  f rus t ra ted  wi th  the  Uni ted  
Sta tes  in  a  number  of  key areas ,  par t icular ly  as  Professor  Sut tmeier  
indica ted ,  the  cont inued imposi t ion  of  U.S.  expor t  contro ls .  
 On the  o ther  hand,  American and Chinese  bus inesses ,  as  we 
heard  th is  morning,  are  inext r icably  l inked together ,  and i f  t rends  
pers is t ,  they wi l l  become even more  in t imate ly  coupled.  
 S imply  s ta ted ,  a t  present ,  China 's  r i se ,  perhaps  ra ther  than being 
a  s t ra tegic  threa t  or  a  zero  sum game,  may present ,  in  fac t ,  a  s t ra tegic  
oppor tuni ty  for  the  Uni ted  Sta tes .   In  fac t ,  i t  may represent  the  
beginning of  a  new innovat ion paradigm.   The rea l  chal lenge for  the  
Uni ted  Sta tes  in  th is  regard  i s  to  be t ter  apprecia te  China 's  sens i t iv i t ies  
and vulnerabi l i t ies ,  to  ident i fy  and capi ta l ize  on the  emerging pockets  
of  excel lence  in  the  Chinese  technology sys tem,  and to  engage China  
as  a  fu l l  par tner .  
 Deeper  engagement  and c loser  ar t icula t ion  wi th  one  another  in  
sc ience  and technology af fa i rs  provides ,  I  be l ieve ,  one  key mechanism 
for  bui ld ing br idges  and unders tanding as  wel l  as  bui ld ing t rus t .   In  
emerging f ie lds  such as  new energy development  and environmenta l  
management ,  such br idge  bui ld ing could  become the  impetus  for  a  new 
paradigm of  innovat ion and technologica l  advance  tha t  wi l l  not  only  
benef i t  the  people  of  both  countr ies ,  but  a lso  o ther  par ts  of  the  wor ld  
as  wel l .  
 Thank you very  much.  
 [The s ta tement  fo l lows:]  
 
Prepared Statement  of  Dr.  Denis  Fred Simon 
School  of  Internat ional  Affairs  
Penn State  Univers i ty ,  Univers i ty  Park,  PA 
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Introduction 
Thank you for the invitation to address this commission on the issue of China’s industrial policy.  Having 
made three trips to China over the last 6 months, let me state at the outset a simple but important fact:  “the 
dragon is not sleeping.”  Chinese leaders at both the national and local level are less engaged in on-going 
debates about bailouts, bonuses, and cabinet appointments, and are more preoccupied with managing 
China’s way out of the current economic and financial crisis facing their nation.  They are making a 
concerted effort, using all the policy instruments and tools at their disposal, to re-fashion and re-shape 
China’s development trajectory.  Key cities such as Dalian are fully engaged in re-defining their economic 
and technology base as part of China’s transition to the next stage in the country’s modernization.  While 
still somewhat “shocked” by the rapidity and comprehensiveness with which in the international financial 
crisis has engulfed the Chinese economy, the PRC leadership appears to be moving ahead with a high 
degree of self-confidence and conviction that is helping to moderate the “sense of gloom and doom” that 
seems to be steadily overtaking the economies of the US and the other industrialized nations.  Even taking 
into account the fact that 2008 was a tumultuous year for China, especially in terms of the Wenchuan 
earthquake and the onset of a number of serious food and product safety issues, the Chinese leadership has 
been able to leverage the success of the 2008 Olympics to mobilize domestic resources and talent to attack 
the numerous economic and financial challenges facing the country.   
 
In many respects, for China, the chaos and tumult brought on by the global financial crisis represents an 
important ideological and philosophical watershed moment in both world history and the 60 year history of 
the People’s Republic of China.  The “failure” of the market economies, led by the United States, to reign 
in the excesses and extremes of Wall Street and the banking industry, is viewed in Zhongnanhai as a 
reaffirmation of the Chinese proclivity for favoring more explicit state control and more overt regulation.  
From the perspective of the current leadership, in spite of all the adjustments and concessions made over 
the last 30 years of reform to allow more room for market forces and the market mechanism in the 
operation of the PRC economy, there always has remained an underlying commitment to the efficacy of the 
state as the ultimate source of control and guidance.  For both important historical and cultural reasons, as 
well as political expediency, the role of the Chinese state has remained a necessary and ever-present feature 
in evolving visions of China’s future.  In this regard, it is quite clear that China’s leaders see the current 
crisis as a unique, advantageous moment in time—as a strategic opportunity where China holds the 
philosophical high ground to reinforce its long-held position at home and abroad that unbridled capitalism 
and a “weak” state are a sure recipe for serious socio-political and economic problems. 
 
It is against this backdrop that one must evaluate and assess the role and impact of industrial policy in 
China, especially with respect to the development of high technology capabilities in the PRC.  Even though 
it is clear that one should not underestimate the salience of the global financial crisis as a precipitant to 
fostering badly needed economic change and restructuring in China, it also is the case that many of the 
challenges currently facing the PRC leadership with regard to the Chinese economy are rooted in a range 
of critical structural problems that predate the onset of the crisis.  In effect, the global financial crisis 
exacerbated many of these structural problems and highlighted for President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen 
Jiabao the necessity of moving beyond the “factory to the world” economic model that helped support 
Chinese growth over the initial three decades of reform and the open policy--as quickly and definitively as 
possible.    While it might be more natural as well as politically easier for the PRC leadership to play to the 
crowd of those Chinese workers whose jobs have been lost and whose lives have been dislocated by the 
progression of the financial crisis—and adopt a sort of “henny-penny, the sky is falling” motif, the fact is 
that Chinese officials seem to be moving in just the opposite direction; as Long Yongtu, China’s former 
chief negotiator for WTO accession, remarked (paraphrase) to a group of business leaders in Wenzhou in 
December 2008, “while we [China] can be easily deterred by the difficulties brought on by global financial 
crisis, the fact is that the current crisis is a cloud with a silver lining—an opportunity to take on the 
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underlying defects and shortcomings present in [our] prevailing economic model and to move the country 
to the next phase in its economic and technological development.” 
 
The External Environment 
Just as policymakers and corporate executives in the US and EU read such reputable magazines and 
newspapers as Business Week,  Fortune, Forbes, the Wall Street Journal, etc., so do their Chinese 
counterparts.  Over the last 2-3 years, China’s leaders have become familiar with stories about the fluidity 
and turbulence present in the global economy, about the intensification of international competition, about 
the impacts—positive and negative—of globalization, about the growing concerns surrounding energy and 
the environment issues, and about the heightened focus on intellectual property matters.  They also have 
become familiar with the on-going provocative characterizations of international competition as reflected 
in phrases such as technology wars, patent wars, talent wars, and standards wars.  And, they too have come 
to recognize what many corporate CEOs and some government officials have come to understand about the 
growing centrality and strategic importance of innovation.   For the PRC, innovation, and by implication, 
strengthened capabilities in science and technology, hold the key to addressing China’s three most pressing 
overall priorities:  increased international competitiveness, enhanced national security, and long-term 
sustainability.   
 
In January 2006, Chinese leaders put into place their new 15-Year Medium-to-Long Term S&T Plan, 
which laid out an innovation driven roadmap for pressing ahead with the goal of re-orienting the economy 
away from excessive dependence on an economic model dominated by its strong emphasis on cheap-labor 
driven low-end manufacturing, over reliance on fossil fuels and extensive consumption of natural 
resources, and an apparent insensitivity to the environmental implications of that model.  The focus of the 
MLP is explicitly on enhancing China’s capacity for independent innovation (zizhu chuangxin); the goal is 
to ensure that more and more of the intellectual capital and know-how utilized across the Chinese 
economy—derives from indigenous sources rather than simply importing know-how and equipment from 
abroad.  The Chinese emphasis on independent innovation does not mean, by any measure, a return to the 
self-reliance policies (zili gengsheng) that came into prominence during the Cultural Revolution; Chinese 
leaders have gone to great lengths to assure foreign observers of the Chinese S&T that China intends to 
remain fully engaged with the world.  After all, globalization has proven to be a major windfall for China 
in terms of the increased access it has provided in terms of knowledge acquisition, investment, and trade 
opportunities.  With globalization has come a massive explosion in foreign investment around the world, 
with China being among the top five recipients of FDI annually over the last decade.  While it is not 
always the case, the growth in foreign investment to China has proven to be an important vehicle for 
technology transfer, including managerial know-how, that has helped China steadily move up the learning 
curve in terms of taking on more sophisticated, higher value-added production tasks and becoming more 
deeply integrated in the global supply chains of the world’s most technologically advanced companies. 
 
 Nonetheless, with innovation having moved to center stage in the world of international competition, 
Chinese leaders have determined that continued dependence on external sources of technology is simply 
not a smart thing to do.  For the time being, the “make versus buy” debate in China between technologists 
and economists seems to have been won by the former.1 There is growing apprehension in Beijing that the 
technology-related benefits that China has been able to secure as a result of its openness to globalization 
may be starting to erode as access to “key” or “core” know-how remains restricted or limited and may 
                     
1 This does not mean that reverse-engineering, for example, has been rendered a lower priority, but rather 
that Chinese leaders increasingly have come to appreciate the need to generate more of their own know-
how and IPR and that the best way to ensure China’s on-going ability to “plug into” evolving technological 
streams around the world is to ensure that the PRC has the ability to generate key pieces of the overall 
know-how puzzle from indigenous sources.    
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become even more so as controls on IPR and related technology become even tighter.  In other words, the 
hospitable world of last two decades of the 20th century may be giving way to an international environment 
that is less user-friendly than before.  Added to this, we must also factor in Chinese national security 
imperatives, which continue to be a key driver behind China’s desire for strengthening its internal 
innovation capabilities.  While China’s overall perception of world trends may be true in some key 
respects, it is ironic insofar as three countervailing trends that seem to be underway:  first, the continued 
growth of foreign R&D centers in China—there are over 1200+ such centers in operation and indications 
are that more will be setup in the future—even taking into account the porous nature of China’s IPR 
regime; second, the apparent increased willingness of many foreign firms to share technology with China 
in return for access to Chinese industrial and consumer markets—these decisions seem more the result of 
strategic business considerations rather than arm-twisting from the Chinese side; and third, the enhanced 
importance of China’s high-end talent pool—which now has become an attractive magnet for both 
domestic and foreign firms wishing to tap into “Chinese brainpower” to drive advanced manufacturing and 
innovation activities in China.  In fact, of all China’s alleged comparative advantages, it may be “talent” --
effectively deployed and efficiently utilized--that ultimately stands out as the key source of the Chinese 
long-term competitive edge.2   
 
It must be recognized, however, that there really is nothing novel or new about China’s stated effort and 
pro-active attempts to build up its domestic S&T capacity.   Starting from the early 1980s, one can easily 
chart statements by Chinese leaders across the board that identify “catching up with the West” and “closing 
the prevailing technological gap” as national priorities and goals.  The drive to strengthen independent 
innovation as articulated in the MLP must be viewed within the context of a series of state-directed, S&T 
plans and initiatives that China has put in place since the mid-1950s.  I mention this not so much as a 
lesson from history, but largely to indicate that China’s drive to catch up with the West is not the product 
of secret internal Chinese deliberations and “neibu” “hongtou wenjian” (red-headed documents); rather, the 
drive to close the technology gap has been a largely transparent effort situated at the nucleus of the 
modernization drive launched under Deng Xiaoping.  The problem is that many in the US and abroad paid 
scant attention to Chinese ambitions, let alone China’s actions and progress until recent years.  Perhaps this 
was a product of our extensive concerns with the former Soviet Union or our preoccupation with the 
competitive threat from Japan in the 1980s; nonetheless, it is important to acknowledge the steadfastness 
with which China has carried forward its programs, policies, and initiatives to ensure that it has the 
requisite credentials and capabilities to sit at the table of global competition.   China has built an extensive 
network of global S&T connections and international relationships, most clearly manifested in the plethora 
of bilateral government-to-government S&T agreements and student-scholar exchange programs that it has 
put in place, that have become a strategically important component of its industrial policy and technology 
strategy since the early 1980s. 
 
The Domestic Perspective 
From a domestic perspective, at the heart of China’s state-driven technology initiatives have been a series 
of programs that have been in operation since the mid 1980s, foremost among them in the 863 Program 
and the Torch Plan, subsequently followed by the 973 Program almost a decade later.  The 863 Program is 
a program under the Ministry of Science and Technology, first brought forth to Deng in March 1986 by 
four of China’s top scientists who wanted to ensure that China could generate its own high-technology 
know-how.  The program covers a broad range of civilian and military related technology fields; each year, 
applications are made for project grants and reviews are carried out to award these funds—some of which 
go to enterprises and others of which go to faculty members at various Chinese universities.  Overseas 
Chinese scholars also are allowed to participate in 863 projects, and most recently, under an agreement 
with the EU, foreign scholars from Europe can work with their Chinese counterparts on projects funded 
                     
2 See Denis Fred Simon and Cong Cao, China’s Emerging Technological Edge (Cambridge U Press, 2009). 
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under the 863 program.  Projects in the IT field, microelectronics, semiconductors and integrated circuits 
have been a critical focal point for 863 support over the years—along with projects covering a broad range 
of other fields under the umbrella of high technology, e.g. lasers and biotechnology. 
 
The Torch Program is a complementary project to the 863 Program; the Torch Program is focused on 
commercialization of R&D and ensure that research results get translated into usable, commercially viable 
new products and services.  Torch operates many of China’s technology incubators, where new, emerging 
technologies can be harvested and brought to market by young start-up companies who need assistance 
securing ample capital and/or talent.  It also has responsibility for managing the 50+ national science and 
technology industrial parks under the aegis of the State Council. 
 
It is clear that monies allocated to projects sponsored by these and related programs have yielded some 
impressive results (see below); it also is clear that Chinese officials remain generally disappointed by the 
pace of progress.  China’s R&D system continues to be beset by a range of problems and challenges, 
including the absence, in large part, of a culture that rewards risk taking, entrepreneurial behavior, 
individual initiative, and even creativity.  There also have been a number of criticisms launched both 
internally and externally about the management of these programs and the use (or abuse) of government 
funds.  On the success side stands the example of the SIASUN Robot and Automation Company in 
Shenyang, which was founded by Dr. Qu Daokui, a 48 year-old senior scientist who also serves as Deputy 
Director of China’s National Engineering Research Center on Robotics.   The company, which is affiliated 
with the Chinese Academy of Sciences, has a 90% share of the domestic robot market, with sales of 880 
million yuan in 2008.  It also controls 30% of the industrial robot market in China.  SIASUN’s CEO Qu 
studied with Jiang Xinsong, who is considered to be the father of robotics in China.  He spent the early 
1990s studying robotics and automation overseas in Germany and returned to China in 1993.  After his 
return, he began the process of building his reputation and creating a commercial enterprise; he became 
CEO in 2000.  His company has received funds and support from the 863 Program as part of MoST’s 
support for establishing an “intelligent robot industrialization base” in China.  The firm also is certified as a 
“national robot engineering center” by MoST as well.  Along with the equipment developed by SIASUN 
that is used in the automobile industry, its robots and automation equipment also are deployed in rail 
transit, the energy sector, logistics and storage, and clean room automation.  The company seems 
positioned to continue its steady, albeit gradual, march to becoming a global player in robotics. 
 
Unfortunately, such cases do not always appear to be the norm.  Problems within 863 and similar plans, as 
suggested earlier, have emerged due to oversight and monitoring issues.  In 2006, two serious scandals 
were uncovered that reflect the huge pressures that exist for progress among those receiving high-level and 
often substantial government support.  The first case, known as the Hanxin chip scandal, involved a 
returnee scientist (Professor CHEN Jin) at the prestigious Shanghai Jiaotong University.  Dr. Chen was 
found guilty of scientific fraud after he claimed to have developed an indigenous microchip (digital signal 
processing chip), but was later discovered to have faked his research.  It is said that Chen received in 
excess of 114 million RMB; his work was allegedly reviewed by a team of experts during each new 
funding phase of his research.  Initially, his research achievements and results had been applauded as a 
prime example of the utility of close university-industry ties, but he was later totally discredited after the 
fraud was uncovered.   A second example involves a Chinese company named ARCA Technologies, which 
was viewed as a rising star within the Zhongguancun Science Park in Beijing.   After receiving 
approximately 100 million RMB from the Chinese government for developing Arca-1 and Arca-2 CPU 
chips for lower end computers, ARCA was awarded another 15.38 million RMB under the 863 program to 
develop an Arca-3 version.  Unfortunately, the monies allocated to the firm did not seem to end up in the 
research lab, but rather in real estate investment and high salaries to the firm’s top executives.  These two 
scandals rocked the Chinese S&T system and raised many questions about the status of China’s actual 
domestic capabilities in the microelectronics field.  It also generated a broader discussion about the line 
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between business and academia—a line that seems to have become blurred on many occasions as efforts 
were made to ensure closer links between university-based research and enterprises to foster the 
commercialization of technology.  Prompted by the possibility that further examples of research fraud 
might exist in other areas, to its credit, China’s MoST immediately stepped up its due diligence efforts to 
ensure improved compliance. 
 
The ICT Sector 
One of the constants of China’s industrial policy and technology development efforts over the last ten years 
has been the high priority attached to the development of microelectronics, telecommunications, and 
information technologies.3  In the space of a few minutes, it is not possible to do justice to the full range of 
issues that need to be discussed when assessing China’s progress in this strategic field.  Few persons 
realize that China’s efforts to develop its own indigenous computer industry date back to the 1950s, when 
with Soviet assistance and training, China  began its march to establish a viable computer design and 
production capability; were it not for the damaging effects of the Cultural Revolution, China might have 
been one of the world’s major players in the global computer industry today.    At the center of China’s 
efforts has been the desire to develop a domestic capability in semiconductors and integrated circuits as 
these are the building blocks for advancement in computers, telecommunications, and programmable 
machine tools.  The effort to develop a competitive capability in advanced microelectronics reflects both 
the strengths and weaknesses of Chinese industrial policy and technology strategy.  In the midst of some 
ample progress, especially since 2000, there have been many false starts and stops that have slowed down 
the overall momentum in this sector and have done little to diminish China’s overall reliance on imports to 
service the country’s growing demand for semiconductor products and components. 
 
In 2006, in conjunction with the S&T MLP and program such as 863, China’s State Council set forth the 
country’s new national informatization strategy, 2006-2020.  The initial phase of that strategy was reflected 
in the priorities and policies set forth in the 11th FYP (2006-2010).  The goals for the informatization 
strategy include building a vibrant nationwide IT infrastructure, strengthening the country’s innovation 
capabilities in IT, improving information security, enhancing the application of IT across the economy and 
public, and optimizing the structure of the IT industry.  There are nine key aspects to the strategy, the bulk 
of which are focused on ways to promote overall informatization of the national economy and government 
sector.  In 2008, IT spending in China grew by 9.1%, commensurate with the overall rate of economic 
growth; while IT spending will probably slow down somewhat in 2009, the fact is that within the country’s 
national stimulus package of US$586 billion, investments in railways, telecom, and education will provide 
opportunities for continued growth of IT. 
 
Driving the country’s IT agenda is the newly formed Ministry of Industry and Information Technology.  
The new ministry absorbed many of the responsibilities of the former MII (Ministry of Information 
Industry) in terms of the IT sphere.  In addition, however, the new MIIT, will play a larger role in 
establishing industry standards, driving technology innovation, shaping the development of the IT 
infrastructure, and promoting information security.  Of special importance will be three areas:  1) overall 
development of the software industry; 2) growth and expansion of IT services; and 3) continued 
development of the local semiconductor industry.  In 2007, China’s annual software output topped 
US$84.5 billion, making it the fourth largest producer of software in the world, with an 8.7% share of the 
global software industry.  Software exports, however, were only US$930 million.  With respect to IT 
services, the market value reached US$10.9 billion in 2007—leaving China far still behind India both in 
terms of capacity and capability. 
 
The effort to promote further development and deepening of the semiconductor sector stands out as an 
                     
3 Michael Pecht, China’s Electronics Industry (Norwich: William Andrew Publishing, 2007) 
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example of the mixed results from Chinese industrial policy.  Today, China absorbs about 1/3 of the 
worldwide market for semiconductors, reaching about US$88 billion in 2007.  At the same time, however, 
the Chinese share of global semiconductor production accounted for only about 9% of worldwide output.  
China’s IC market grew to almost USD$74 billion in 2007, accounting for 33.8% of the global IC market.  
 Trade data from MIIT and from China’s Ministry of Commerce indicate that the primary market for 
semiconductors in China continues to be the export market.  Foreign companies are the main suppliers for 
meeting Chinese needs.  According to a recent study by PWC, there were no Chinese companies in the top 
55 suppliers to the Chinese semiconductor market in 2007.4 The PWC study goes on to indicate that “even 
if the largest Chinese semiconductor companies sold all their output within China, no Chinese 
semiconductor company would be among the top 50 suppliers to the Chinese semiconductor market in 
2007.”  The situation regarding ICs is even worse—with the consumption/production gap reaching 
US$54.9 billion in 2007.  This is a strong indictment of Chinese efforts heretofore to enhance their 
capacity to meet the growing PRC demand for semiconductor and IC products—which continues to exceed 
the international growth rate by a significant margin.5 
 
In 2000, the Chinese government issued State Council Document #18 which lays out a new strategy for 
developing the country’s semiconductor and integrated circuit industry.  Under this new plan, the PRC 
government has invested a total of US$ 6.6 billion over the last five years and is expected to invest over 
US$20 billion in the next five years (2009-2013) in projects in Suzhou, Wuxi, Shandong, Shanghai, 
Shenzhen and Dalian.  Overall, it is estimated that between 2008-2020, the Chinese government will invest 
a total of US$30 billion in the semiconductor and software sector.  Whether these huge investments will 
materialize and whether they will yield desired results are major questions; nonetheless, moving ahead is 
considered to be a critical priority for the government.  Key to this new strategy is the recognition that 
foreign investment can play a critical role in helping to stimulate the overall growth and expansion of the 
industry.  Much of this foreign investment has located in and around Shanghai and the Yangtze River Delta 
area.  One key exception, however, is the recent US$2.5 billion investment by Intel in Dalian—which 
reflects Intel’s intent to remain not just a major supplier to China (it was #1 in 2007), but also to help shape 
the evolution of the industry and to use its “insider” position to influence the direction of Chinese policies 
and technical standards.  The plant known as Fab 68, which when approved in 2007 intended to deploy 90 
nanometer technology to produce 300 mm integrated wafers, is intending to move into the 65 nanometer 
range once operational in 2010.  It is clear that as demand for semiconductors in China has risen and as 
electronics and IT-related manufacturing has moved into the higher valued added segments in computing, 
communications and consumer products, many of the world’s major semiconductor firms have decided to 
set up shop in China, bringing with them advanced equipment and know-how needed to support their 
increasingly advanced operations.  China is continuing to absorb more and more of the world’s 
semiconductor production activities, especially as demand seems likely to continue to rise across the 
board—but with foreign firms occupying the largest portion of the market.   
 
Of course, China’s semiconductor sector has not gone unscathed by the recent financial downturn.  Experts 
project that the market will decline in 2009.  Reverberations and bankruptcies occurring around the world 
are clearly making themselves felt in China.  To remedy the situation, Wen Jiabao chaired a special 
meeting of the State Council in mid-February 2009 to address the challenges facing the electronics and 
information industry.  Domestic producers in China are seeking more favored treatment by the government 
with respect to import duties on equipment, financing, and chip procurement.  The premier outlined four 
core tasks to assist the industry get through the tough times ahead:  a)improve the industrial structure of the 
industry; b)increase investment in technological upgrading, including the integrated circuit industry, LCD 
                     
4 See, PWC, “China’s Impact on the Semiconductor Industry: 2008 Update,” 2008. 
5 According to PWC, since 2001, China’s semiconductor market has grown at a 31.5% compounded 
annual growth rate, while the world market has grown at 10.6%. 
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technologies, and new generation mobile telephony; c) strengthen the capacity for independent innovation; 
and d) increased support for service outsourcing as well as the globalization of Chinese firms in R&D, 
manufacturing and marketing.  To their credit, Chinese leaders seemed less inclined to adopt a “circle the 
wagons” strategy and appear to be more interested in preparing the industry for its future challenges. 
 
Perhaps the two best examples of the early success of Chinese industrial policy in the ICT sector involve a) 
the development of the Godson (also called Loongson) computer chip and b) the development of the high 
performance super-computer.  In an effort to dislodge itself from total dependence on foreign imported 
CPUs for computers, China has been engaged in a research initiative designed to create an indigenous 
computer chip.  Supported by both the 863 Program and the Knowledge Innovation Program (KIP) under 
the Chinese Academy of Sciences, the Institute of Computing Technology (ICT) seems to have achieved 
its mission with the design and production of the Loongson IIE chip.  The chip emulates early series Intel 
Pentium IV processors in performance, but cost less to produce.  Also, most important, Loongson PCs use 
a Linux operating system, which also plays to China’s desire to wean itself off excessive dependence on 
the Wintel platform.  The chips are manufactured in China by a French-Italian firm named ST 
Microelectronics in conjunction with BLX IC Design Corporation, which was founded by ICT and the 
Jiangsu Zhongyi Group.  The chip is a much improved and enhanced version of Loongson-1 (a pure 32-bit 
CPU which was used for running cash registers and similar equipment).  A Loongson-3 version is now in 
development; the new version will have four cores and an eight core version is being planned.6  The unique 
aspect of the Loongson design is that it is not based on the x86 instruction set, and instead uses a modified 
version of the MIPS instruction set.7  In July 2008, two foreign manufacturers—one in Holland and one in 
France—announced that they would adopt Loongson products for sale outside of China.   
 
China’s success in building its own supercomputer reflects another example of Chinese efforts to target 
needed technologies and create an indigenously designed and manufactured product.  The global market 
for high performance computing systems reached US$11.6 billion in 2007 and is expected to reach US$15 
billion by 2011.  Currently, among the world’s 500 fastest supercomputers, 15 are in China.  In mid-2008, 
Chinese officials at the Dawning Information Industry Company announced the production of the Dawning 
5000A, a Chinese-made high performance server that rivals the 7th fastest in the world for computing 
speed.  The machine has a capability of 160 trillion computing operations per second.  The Dawning 
5000A remains no match for the fastest computer in the world, the Roadrunner—designed by IBM for the 
US Department of Energy’s Los Alamos National Laboratory—which at one quadrillion operations per 
second is 5.4 times faster than the Dawning 5000A.  The computer is installed at the Shanghai 
Supercomputer Center, which specializes in computing outsourcing services for genome mapping, 
earthquake appraisal, weather forecasting, mining surveys, and stock exchange data analysis.  Originally, 
the Dawning 5000A was to utilize the Loongson computer chip produced domestically, but instead a 
decision was made to rely on the AMD Barcelona quad-core processor.  The choice of AMD was largely 
based on the fact that Dawning relies on a Windows-based operating system instead of Linux.  The cost of 
the Dawning 5000A, even with imported AMD microprocessors, was about US$29 million in contrast with 
the IBM Roadrunner, which cost the US Department of Energy US$100 million.  Chinese officials clearly 
hope domestically designed and manufactured machines will make their way into the international market; 
the Chinese Electronics Standards Association already has a process underway to help PRC manufacturers 
become suppliers of their machines to the developing world.8   
 
                     
6 Tom Halfhill, “Fast Forward: China’s Newest CPU,” Maxiumumpc, February 26, 2009, #5418. 
7 According to Li Guojie, Director of ICT, these devices cannot compete head on with Intel on mainstream 
desktops and laptops, but rather will focus primarily on embedded applications, including set-top boxes, 
auto electronics, and industrial control.  Use in low-end computers also is a possibility. 
8 South China Morning Post, June 24, 2008, p.7. 
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These two examples attest to the extensive commitment made by the Chinese government to enhance its 
indigenous technological capabilities.  While neither product is state of the art in terms of carving out a 
new technological frontier or leading the pack in terms of a new technology roadmap, they represent part 
of an important learning curve that is occurring in Chinese technology circles across many industrial 
sectors and technology fields.  With compressed product and technology life cycles and new opportunities 
for cross border collaboration emerging, China is now part of a series of global knowledge networks that 
are helping to define the new technological frontiers of the 21st century.  Unlike the hierarchical forms of 
one-way technology transfer that characterized international technology markets from the 1960s through 
the early 1990s, the process of engagement in global technology collaboration networks has become the 
new modality for technological learning and advance.  A nation does not necessarily need to have 
ownership or control of state-of-the-art knowledge to enjoy the benefits of collaboration in these new 
knowledge networks; rather, the nature of specialization and cross-border collaboration are increasingly 
focused on the merging of technological complementarities that provide new channels for less advanced 
players to enter into these collaborative activities.  As Chinese talent progresses ahead in the coming years, 
there is little doubt that China will become further embedded in these networks, moving from being a 
“taker” and lower end contributor to a high value added contributor.  Developing and maintaining 
incentives and opportunities for China to remain engaged in these networks fully and collaboratively 
represents not only a technological challenge but also a political challenge in the years ahead. 
 
Whither Industrial Policy in China? 
There is little doubt that China remains strongly committed to further enhancing its own industrial base and 
indigenous technological capabilities.  During the course of the next 5-10 years, China will continue to 
strengthen its domestic institutions, especially at the enterprise level, to promote an enhanced commitment 
to technological innovation.  At the same time, global competition, transplanted to the Chinese market, will 
mean foreign firms will continue, willingly and actively, to bring advanced technology and equipment to 
China as part of their global strategic positioning.  While the Chinese system may lag the US in most areas 
of innovative capability, the fact that it currently has become a preferred site for R&D suggests it is now 
strongly embedded in the global knowledge system.  And, as China becomes more integrated into the 
fabric of global R&D activities, it will no doubt steadily seek a greater voice in negotiations about 
standards, markets, etc. 
 
At the same time, however, it also is clear that China is not an unstoppable technological juggernaut that 
will soon dominate international product and technology markets, especially in terms of high technology.  
There are two large unknowns regarding China’s technological potential and the role that it will play in the 
global economy:  1) the “software” side of the technology equation; and 2) the issue of strategic intent.  
With respect to the software side of the equation, many questions remain about China’s ability to adapt, 
shift and operate with the high degree of flexibility, agility and responsiveness required for competitive 
success in the globalized world of the 21st century.  For example, do Chinese policymakers and enterprise 
executives have the skills and comfort levels to manage in a highly fluid, fast changing environment?  Do 
they have the ability to manage technologies across borders and cultures, especially outside of Chinese 
ethnic and guanxi networks?  Does China have the ability to fully absorb the new cohort of Chinese 
returnees who are seeking to come back to the PRC to launch new research projects and businesses?  And, 
does the leadership have the global outlook and understanding needed to compete effectively in a world 
where collaboration and cooperation are the new hallmarks of innovation and new knowledge creation? 
 
In terms of the uncertainties regarding strategic intent, the unknowns may be even greater.  Chinese 
perceptions regarding global trends and developments, especially in view of the global financial crisis, 
need to be better understood.  It is clear that China remains frustrated with the US in a number of areas, 
especially with respect to bilateral S&T cooperation and the continued imposition of export controls.  On 
the other hand, there are few global problems, if any, that can be addressed adequately without full 
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cooperation and participation from the Chinese side.  American and Chinese business are inextricably 
linked together, and if trends persist, they will become even more intimately coupled.  The fact is that the 
US and China have reached a level of interdependence that few could have predicted when Deng Xiaoping 
made his historic visit to the US in the late 1970s.   Simply stated, at present, China’s rise represents a 
strategic opportunity for the US, not a zero sum game or threat.9  The real challenge for the US, in this 
regard, is to better appreciate Chinese sensitivities as well as vulnerabilities, to identify and capitalize on 
the emerging pockets of excellence in the Chinese technology system, and to engage China as a full 
partner.  While we may be a long way from the G-2 model being put forth by some in Beijing and other 
places around the world, the reality is that both countries can benefit a great deal from easing the continued 
political distrust that exists.  Deeper engagement and closer articulation with one another in science and 
technology affairs provides one mechanism for building bridges and understanding as well as trust.  In 
emerging fields such as new energy development and environmental management, such bridge building 
could become the impetus for a new era of more mutually beneficial “collaborative innovation” and 
technological advance that will not only benefit the people of both countries, but also other parts of the 
world as well.  
  
 
 
 HEARING COCHAIR SLANE:  Thank you,  Dr .  Simon.  
 Mr.  Szamosszegi .  
 
STATEMENT OF MR. ANDREW Z.  SZAMOSSZEGI 
MANAGING CONSULTANT, CAPITAL TRADE INC.,  
WASHINGTON, DC 
  
 MR.  SZAMOSSZEGI:   Thank you.  
 I  jus t  wanted to  s tar t  of f  by  saying tha t  I 'm honored to  tes t i fy  
before  the  Commiss ion on China 's  indust r ia l  pol icy  and the  impact  on  
U.S.  companies ,  workers ,  and the  American economy.  
 As  you know,  I  have  co-authored an  analys is  of  subsidies  
provided by the  government  of  China  to  domest ic  and fore ign f i rms in  
the  so-cal led  absolute  contro l  and heavyweight  indust r ies .  And my 
discuss ion today is  going to  draw heavi ly  f rom that  repor t .  
 The  subs id ies  repor t  reviewed the  f inancia l  s ta tements  of  three  
f i rms tha t  a re  re levant  to  today 's  inquiry :  China  Telecom Corpora t ion;  
China  Elect ronics  Corpora t ion  Holding Company;  and the  IRICO 
Group Elect ronics  Company Limited .   Informat ion about  te lecom 
equipment  providers  Huawei  and ZTE was  a lso  reviewed,  and I  wi l l  
reference  tha t  informat ion as  wel l .  
 Today,  I  hope to  make s ix  points  tha t  I  address  fur ther  in  my 
wri t ten  tes t imony:  
                     
9 In many respects, the strategic opportunity derives from the fact that the US-China S&T relationship has 
become less one-sided than before and is much less hierarchical due to the fact that the PRC has more to 
contribute of value and interest to the US science and engineering communities in key fields such as 
nanotechnology, life sciences, and new materials. 
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 Point  one:  the  Chinese  government  i s  a  major  p layer  in  the  
te lecom and IT sec tors .   For  example ,  as  of  December  31,  2007,  s ta te-
owned enterpr ises  and other  government  ent i t ies  owned approximate ly  
83 percent  of  China  Telecom,  75 percent  of  China  Elect ronics ,  and 75 
percent  of  IRICO,  and a lso  18 percent  of  ZTE.  
 So tha t ' s  another  way in  which the  Chinese  government ,  ra ther  
than through funding,  can inf luence  research and development  and 
technology wi th in  these  f i rms.  
 Government  ownership  in  China  rea l ly  means  something.   
Typical ly ,  s ta te-owned f i rms have bet ter  access  to  loans  f rom the  
Chinese  s ta te-owned banks ,  be t ter  access  to  below-market  f inancing,  
government  grants  and other  benef i t s .  
 Under  these  c i rcumstances ,  we should  not  be  surpr ised  i f  f i rms 
s t ress  goals  o ther  than prof i t  maximizat ion  in  these  sec tors .    
 Point  number  two:  The government  provides  these  sec tors  wi th  
meaningful  f inancia l  suppor t .   Based on our  analys is  of  2007 f inancia l  
s ta tements ,  we found the  fo l lowing:  in  2007,  China  Telecom benef i t ted  
f rom large  tax  breaks  for  inves t ing  in  Western  China  and for  i t s  
purchase  of  domest ic  equipment .  
 The f i rm a lso  purchased subsidiar ies  in  Hong Kong and in  the  
Americas  f rom i t s  government-owned parent  a t  be low-market  pr ices .   
Together  these  subsid ies  to ta led  $700 mi l l ion ,  which i s  more  than hal f  
of  va lue  of  money ra ised  by the  f i rm in  i t s  2002 in i t ia l  publ ic  of fer ings  
in  New York and Hong Kong.  
 ZTE benef i t ted  f rom a  number  of  specia l  tax  preferences  re la ted  
to  i t s  h igh- tech s ta tus ,  as  wel l  as  a  grant .   These  preferences  amounted 
to  $162 mi l l ion ,  which is  36  percent  of  the  funds  i t  ra ised  in  i t s  2004 
publ ic  offer ing in  Hong Kong.   So the  bot tom l ine  i s  tha t  th is  suppor t  
i s  pre t ty  s igni f icant  in  the  overa l l  scheme of  these  f i rms tha t  we 
looked a t .  
 Point  number  three :  China 's  indust r ia l  pol icy  toward te lecom 
services  i s  mul t i face ted  and extends  beyond in ternat ional  
compet i t iveness  in  the  services  indust ry .  
 Bei j ing  wants  to  improve te lecom service  in  the  domest ic  
market ,  encourage  ac t iv i ty  in  the  western  par t  of  the  country ,  
encourage  consol idat ion ,  and suppor t  the  development  and adopt ion of  
home-grown technology and equipment .  
 Whi le  i t  i s  t rue  tha t  the  government  wants  service  providers  to  
compete  in ternat ional ly ,  i t  i s  poss ib le  tha t  pursui t  of  these  o ther  
pol icy  goals  may get  in  the  way of  tha t  goal .  
 Point  number  four :  the  impact  of  China 's  suppor t  for  the  te lecom 
and IT sec tors  has  both  shor t  and long-run dimensions  in  terms of  the  
U.S.  economy.   The Capi ta l  Trade  Study inc ludes  pol icy  s imula t ions  
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tha t  assess  the  potent ia l  e ffec t  of  reducing Chinese  subs id ies  to  
absolute  control  and heavyweight  indust r ies  on  the  Chinese  and U.S.  
economies .  
 Were  Chinese  subsidies  removed,  U.S.  employment ,  expor ts ,  
domest ic  sa les ,  and economic  welfare  would  r i se  in  the  targeted  
sec tors  whi le  China  would  exper ience  lower  expor ts  and higher  
impor ts  in  those  same sectors .  
 I f  we take  in to  account  los t  U.S.  inves tments  resul t ing  f rom 
Chinese  subs id ies ,  especia l ly  those  tha t  sh i f ted  inves tment  f rom the  
Uni ted  Sta tes  to  China ,  the  losses  caused by the  subsid ies  are  even 
higher  over  the  long run to  the  U.S.  economy.  
 Point  f ive :  any remedies  to  Chinese  subs id ies  in  th is  par t icular  
space  may have to  go through the  WTO.  Domest ic  t rade  laws can be  
used to  a t tack  Chinese  subsid ies  but  are  l imi ted .   I f  you are  a  U.S.  f i rm 
opera t ing  in  a  specia l  economic  zone and benef i t ing  f rom Bei j ing 's  
generos i ty ,  i t  might  be  very  d i f f icul t  for  you to  f i le  a  pe t i t ion  tha t  puts  
the  government  of  China  on t r ia l  for  programs s imi lar  to  the  ones  tha t  
are  put t ing  money in  your  pocket .  
 I f  you are  a  p layer  in  China 's  market ,  and many IT and te lecom 
equipment  vendors  are  because  China  t radi t ional ly  had few domest ic  
sources  for  these  products ,  then you do not  want  to  get  on  the  
government 's  bad s ide .  
 Given these  c i rcumstances ,  the  WTO may be  the  bes t  venue for  
address ing Chinese  IT and te lecom subsidies  because  the  U.S.  indust ry  
i s  not  a  d i rec t  par t ic ipant  in  the  WTO inves t igat ions ,  and the  U.S.  
government  has  the  v is ib le  suppor t  of  o ther  countr ies .  
 Because  of  th is ,  a  WTO f i l ing  i s  less  l ike ly  to  cause  b lowback 
than a  CVD pet i t ion  f i led  by U.S.  producers .  
 Point  number  s ix :  on  the  te lecom equipment  s ide ,  the  chal lenge 
may have less  to  do wi th  s tandards  and more  to  do wi th  manufactur ing 
prowess .   Huawei  and ZTE have a  growing in ternat ional  presence  and 
appear  to  have  leadership  pos i t ions  in  cer ta in  appl ica t ions ,  though not  
in  4G.  
 They both  t ry  to  spend about  ten  percent  of  revenues  on R&D 
and have f i led  thousands  of  patent  appl ica t ions  over  the  years .   The 
two f i rms '  combined revenue has  gone f rom $3.4  b i l l ion  in  2002 to  
$17.1  b i l l ion  in  2007,  an  annual  growth ra te  of  31  percent .  
 According to  the  U.S.  Census  Bureau 's  MA334P,  the  U.S.  t rend 
is  heading in  the  opposi te  d i rec t ion ,  negat ive  s ix  percent  growth in  
revenue f rom 2001 to  2007.  
 So s tandards  are  ext remely  impor tant  and the  impl ica t ions  to  
U.S.  economic  secur i ty  of  China 's  rapid  ascent  up  the  ladder  of  
technologica l  innovat ion are  worrying though,  as  my col leagues  here  
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have noted ,  there  are  cer ta in  oppor tuni t ies  tha t  come wi th  China 's  
development .   
 But  i t  i s  somewhat  d isconcer t ing  tha t  the  government  of  a  
country  tha t  a l ready has  a  mass ive  t rade  surplus  wi th  the  Uni ted  Sta tes  
i s  spending bi l l ions  of  dol lars  so  i t  can  replace  h igh- tech impor ts  wi th  
domest ic  products ,  and i t ' s  l ike ly  to  t i l t  the  p laying f ie ld  in  China  
agains t  U.S.  producers  going forward.  
 But  what  worr ies  me more  than the  s tandards  are  the  negat ive  
t rends  on the  product ion s ide  of  th ings ,  tha t  we are  le t t ing  a  very  
focused country  approach and potent ia l ly  surpass  us  in  manufactur ing 
th is  impor tant  se t  of  products  so  tha t  s tandards  u l t imate ly  may not  
mat ter .  
 Thank you.  
 [The s ta tement  fo l lows:]  
 
Prepared Statement  of  Mr.  Andrew Z.  Szamosszegi  
Managing Consultant ,  Capital  Trade Inc. ,  Washington,  DC 
 
Good afternoon.  My name is Andrew Szamosszegi.  I am a managing consultant with Capital Trade 
Incorporated.  I am honored to testify before the Commission on China’s industrial policy and its impact on 
U.S. companies, workers, and the American economy. 
I have recently co-authored an analysis of subsidies provided by the government of China to domestic and 
foreign firms in the so-called absolute control and heavyweight industries.  Telecommunications is one of 
China’s absolute control industries and is therefore considered of vital importance to the proper function of 
China’s safety and economic well being.  Information technology is considered one of China’s 
heavyweight industries, and is also considered to be of special importance.  My report therefore contains 
information relevant to today’s hearing, and my testimony will rely heavily on information collected while 
preparing that study.  
The Capital Trade subsidies report reviewed the financial statements of three firms relevant to today’s 
inquiry: China Telecom Corporation Limited, China Electronics Corporation Holdings Company Limited, 
and IRICO Group Electronics Company Limited.  Information about equipment providers Huawei and 
ZTE was also reviewed, and I will reference that as well.  With the exception of Huawei, these quasi-
public companies have SOEs with similar names.  To avoid confusion, the firms I refer to as China 
Telecom, China Electronics, and IRICO are subsidiaries, not the 100 percent state-owned parents. 
Point 1: The government is a major player in the telecom and IT sectors. 
Our study suggests that the government plays a significant role in the telecom and IT industries.  I just 
want to highlight the government’s role in three areas: ownership, subsidies, and policy guidance. 
In terms of ownership, the government remains a major player in this space.  As of December 31, 2007, 
state-owned enterprises and other government entities owned approximately 83 percent of China Telecom, 
75 percent of China Electronics, 75 percent of IRICO, and 18 percent of ZTE.   
Government ownership in China means something.  Typically, state-ownership confers access to loans 
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from Chinese state-owned banks, below-market financing from those banks and related companies, and 
access to government grants.  In the case of telecom, the government has already announced that state and 
state-owned financial institutions will support the development, deployment, and export of domestically 
developed telecom technologies.  The extensive ownership by the Chinese government suggests that the 
government will have many levers at its disposal to make firms in this space toe the line with the 
government’s industrial policy.  Under these circumstances, we should not be surprised if firms stress goals 
other than profit maximization. 
Point 2: The government provides these sectors with meaningful financial support. 
The firms we examined all received significant government aid.  China Telecom is a case in point.  By the 
end of 2007, it had 220 million fixed line subscribers and 35 million broadband subscribers, and described 
itself as China and the world’s largest wire line telecommunications and broadband services provider.  
Despite this firm’s preeminence in the Chinese market, it was still a major recipient of state support.  In 
2007, it benefitted from large tax breaks for investing in western China and for its purchases of domestic 
equipment.  The firm also purchased subsidiaries in Hong Kong and the Americas from its government-
owned parent at below market prices.  In all, the government subsidy to China Telecom indicated in its 
annual report was nearly $700 million in 2007.   
ZTE’s annual report shows it too receives subsidies.  It benefits from a number of special tax preferences, 
such as the two full, three half program, special VAT rebates related to software procurement and high tech 
production, and an R&D grant.  These preferences amounted to $162 million in 2007. 
China Electronics and IRICO are much smaller firms and they received subsidies of $4 million and $46 
million respectively.  What is interesting about these firms is the extent to which the government has 
played a role in their recent restructurings in the face of unfavorable trends.  In the case of China 
Electronics, its state-owned parent performed a nifty reverse listing in Hong Kong by purchasing newly 
issued shares from an existing company on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and effectively becoming the 
firms’ majority owner.  The firm’s existing business lines were sold, leaving only the handset operations of 
China Electronics, a major producer of Philips branded phones.  Philips has since exited the mobile handset 
business, leaving the brand and sales channel to China Electronics. IRICO experienced a similar 
misfortune as the world has moved to flat screen TVs, thereby reducing demand for IRICO’s primary 
product, color picture tubes.  The government’s response was telling.  IRICO’s state-owned parent 
company built China’s first LCD-TFT glass substrate production facility and then sold it to IRICO at a 
discount.  IRICO is also the beneficiary of preferential tax rates, government grants, and preferential loans. 
The subsidies received by these firms are not trivial.  The value of the subsidies calculated from the China 
Telecom’s 2007 annual report is more than half of the value of money raised by the firm in 2002 from its 
initial public offerings in Honk Kong and New York.  For ZTE, the estimated subsidy calculated from the 
2007 annual report amounts to 36 percent of the funds it raised in its 2004 public offering in Hong Kong.  
For IRICO, the 2007 subsidy is equivalent to 46 percent of its 2004 public offering in Hong Kong.   
Point 3: China’s industrial policy toward telecom services is multifaceted and extends beyond 
competitiveness.   
The Chinese government seems to be pursuing a number of different goals.  One, it wants to improve 
telecom service in the domestic market.  Two, it wants to encourage activity in the western part of the 
country.  Three, the government is also looking to consolidate the telecom services sector.  I am not only 
speaking of the current tie ups pushed by the government.  It is reasonable to conclude that the cash haul 
from the China Telecom’s 2002 IPO funded the firms’ domestic buying spree thereafter.  Four, the 
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government is pushing the adoption of homegrown technology and the use of domestic equipment, and is 
deploying the resources of state-owned financial institutions to achieve these ends.  This goal seems to be 
above all others. For all intents and purposes, the government is forcing the TD-SCDMA technology onto 
China Mobile and telling the main domestic service providers that they will be judged by their ability to 
develop and propagate homegrown technologies.  While it is true that the government also has dreams of 
competition in international services, it is possible that pursuit of these other policy goals has the potential 
to get in the way. 
Point 4: The impact of China’s support for the telecom and IT sectors has both short and long-run 
dimensions.   
The Capital Trade study includes policy simulations that assess the potential effects of reducing Chinese 
subsidies to absolute control and heavyweight industries on the Chinese and U.S. economies.  Without 
getting into specific numbers, I will say the subsidies are harmful to U.S. interests in the short run.  Were 
these subsidies removed, U.S. employment, exports, domestic sales, and economic welfare would rise in 
the targeted sectors, while China would experience lower exports and higher imports in these sectors.   
The long run dimensions of this subsidy problem are even more troubling.  U.S. data indicate that the stock 
of equipment in the U.S. manufacturing sector has been stagnant since the year 2000.  This is no surprise in 
light of the massive increases in manufactured imports from China.  Data also indicate that capital 
expenditures by the majority-owned manufacturing affiliates of U.S. multinational corporations in China 
have been increasing during this period, and that manufactured imports from China have been increasing as 
well.  Combined, these two trends suggest that foreign investment in China may be replacing capital 
investment in the United States.  To assess the potential effects of such a trend on U.S. economic 
performance, we ran a long-run policy simulation in which capital stock was shifted to the U.S. from China 
in conjunction with a removal of subsidies in China.  The result was an even more significant improvement 
in the performance of U.S. industries at home and abroad, and a larger increase in U.S. economic welfare.  
Point 5: Any remedies to subsidies in this space may have to go through the WTO. 
Given the widespread use of subsidies by China, and their adverse impacts on U.S. producers, it is curious 
that more U.S. industries are not utilizing U.S. trade laws.  Part of the answer to this puzzle may lie in the 
high levels of U.S. foreign direct investment in China.  Because the government in China has a much larger 
economic footprint in China, U.S. firms with operations there may be reluctant to file CVD petitions 
against Beijing.  Unlike antidumping cases, subsidies cases require participation from the government of 
China.  If you are a U.S. firm operating in a special economic zone and benefitting from Beijing’s 
generosity, it might be very difficult for you to file a petition that, in essence, puts the government of China 
on trial for programs that are similar to the ones putting money in your pocket.  If we look at the firms 
filing petitions, they tend to belong to U.S. industries such as steel and paper, with limited participation in 
China, or from smaller, largely domestic, industries.  Beijing has no leverage over them, so it is easier to 
file a petition if the subsidies are hurting your U.S. operations.  Another factor limiting the use of domestic 
trade remedies is that the Chinese market is booming and a potential source of huge profits in the future.  If 
you are a player in that market, and many IT and telecom equipment vendors are because China 
traditionally had few domestic sources for these products, then you do not want to get on “Red Star’s” bad 
side. 
Given these circumstances, the WTO may be the best venue for addressing Chinese subsidies.  The United 
States usually has to take the first step, as was the case in the prior subsidies cases and in the current case 
against China’s “famous brands” program. But once a case has been filed, other countries have participated 
in the process.  Because the U.S. industry is not a direct participant in WTO investigations and the U.S. 
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government has the visible support of other countries, a WTO filing is less likely to cause “blowback” than 
a CVD petition filed by U.S. producers. 
It is doubtful that the WTO can solve all of our problems regarding any adverse U.S. impacts of China’s 
state support. However, the United States has had some success with the WTO.  For example, China 
agreed to delay implementation of its plan to increase tariffs on imported parts that were contingent on the 
localization level of Chinese produced vehicles.  Unfortunately, China appears to have made this 
concession only after extracting promises from several foreign carmakers to increase local content.  The 
last dispute settlement action against certain subsidies programs also resulted in China promising to end a 
variety of programs, including certain tax provisions that favored foreign investors.  Many firms that are 
now paying corporate tax rates of 15 percent or less will see rates rise to 25 percent in stages over the next 
several years. 
Point 6: On the telecom equipment side, the challenge has less to do with standards and more to do with 
manufacturing prowess. 
Huawei is a major force internationally.  Its revenues have increased at a compound growth rate of 33 
percent from 2001 to 2007. According to an Economist Intelligence Unit report, the firm is ranked number 
1 in the world in terms of commercial WiMax contracts and its shipments of 3G and 2G mobile phone 
networking equipment doubled during the first half of 2008.   Growth has been strong internationally.  In 
2007, 72 percent of its growth came from increased penetration of international markets, with a growth rate 
of 150 percent in developed markets.  Huawei has also been very successful in Latin America.   
In terms of its technological prowess, Huawei’s R&D labor force is 35,000 strong and it spends 10 percent 
of revenues on R&D.  It is one of the top applicants for UMTS 3G essential patents and among the worlds’ 
top 3 holders of LTE essential patents.  It had filed 35,773 patent applications by December 2008.   
ZTE is smaller than Huawei overall, but is no slouch.  ZTE’s revenues increased 24 percent annually from 
2001 to 2007, and its exports are expected to expand 30 percent in 2009 despite the weak global economy. 
 The company actually has a higher market share in China than Huawei.  ZTE also strives to spend 10 
percent of its revenues on R&D.  It has applied for 17,000 patents, including 1,000 3G terminal patents. 
The two firms’ combined growth is impressive.  They have gone from a $3.4 billion in revenues in 2001 to 
$17.1 billion in 2007.  Their annual revenue growth during the period has been 31 percent.  According to 
the Census Bureau’s MA334P, the U.S. trend is heading in the opposite direction.  The U.S. growth rate 
from 2001 to 2007 was negative six percent, compared to positive 31 percent for Huawei and ZTE.  The 
value of telecom equipment shipments by U.S. producers was $61.9 billion in 2007, less than four times 
the revenues of Huawei and ZTE combined.   
When I consider the rapid progress made by these two firms relative to U.S. firms, the U.S. consumer 
electronics industry comes to mind.  Back when countries were racing to develop HDTV, someone, it may 
have been Peter Drucker, said that it did not matter who invented it, because Japan had raced so far ahead 
of the United States in manufacturing that whatever standard was adopted, Japanese companies would be 
able to make it.  This was prophetic.  Japan’s NHK developed and, in 1987, began broadcasting over 
analog HDTV.  Digital HDTV, what we are all watching now, was invented in California in 1990 by a 
Korean-born engineer working for a firm called General Instruments.  But today, when I look around the 
competitive landscape, I see many Americans buying digital HDTVs, but no U.S. firms producing them in 
large quantities.  The one I know of, a niche player called Olevia, entered chapter 11 last year. 
I do think standards are important, and I do worry about the implications to U.S. economic security of 
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China’s rapid ascent up the ladder of technological innovation.  I am also perturbed that the government of 
a country that already has a massive trade surplus with the United States is spending billions of dollars so 
that it can replace high tech imports with domestic products, and likely to tilt the playing field in China 
against U.S. producers.  But what worries me more than standards are the negative trends on the 
production side of things -- that we are repeating the mistake of letting a country get so far ahead of us in 
manufacturing this important set of products that standards ultimately will not matter.   
 
PANEL III:   Discuss ion,  Quest ions  and Answers  
 
 HEARING COCHAIR SLANE:  Commiss ioner  Wortze l ,  we ' l l  
s tar t  wi th  you.  
 VICE CHAIRMAN WORTZEL:   Gent lemen,  thank you a l l  for  
be ing here  today and for  shar ing your  research and knowledge wi th  us .   
 I  have  to  say  as  a  comment ,  Dr .  S imon,  tha t  I  th ink the  "make 
versus  buy"  argument  tha t  you c i te  among Chinese  economis ts  i s  rea l ly  
a  fa lse  argument ,  tha t  most  of  what  I 've  seen over  the  couple  of  
decades  I 've  been watching i t  has  been a  lo t  of  buying,  a  lo t  of  reverse  
engineer ing,  and then a  lo t  of  making.  
 In  o ther  words ,  we deal  wi th  i t  a l l  t ime here  wi th  IPR thef t ,  
which leads  me in to  another  area  tha t  Dr .  Sut tmeier  refer red  to  and 
tha t  wi l l  a f fec t  the  indust r ies  tha t  Mr.  Szamosszegi  inves t iga ted .   I 'd  
l ike  to  draw you out  on  the  balance  between nat ional  secur i ty  contro ls  
on  expor ts  and br inging in  researchers  or  doing research  in  China ,  both  
as  appl ies  to  bas ic  research  and appl ied  research a t  U.S.  univers i t ies ,  
and how these  deemed expor t  ru les  are  rea l ly  af fec t ing  i t?  
 I  read  the  For t ress  America  repor t .   I  l ike  i t  very  much.   I  th ink 
Commiss ioner  Reinsch may have some other  v iews,  but  I  th ink they did  
a  very ,  very  good job.   
 The problem is  where  does  th is  ba lance  come in  when you s t i l l  
have  a  country  tha t ' s  t ry ing to  use  a  space-based sa te l l i te  a rchi tec ture  
to  guide  a  miss i le  warhead through space  us ing sensors  tha t  wi l l  a t tack  
an  American carr ier?   Not  much room there  for  coopera t ion .  
 DR.  SUTTMEIER:   I  th ink that  your  ques t ion about  the  deemed 
expor ts   rea l ly  goes  to  one  of  the  changed c i rcumstances  tha t  we face--
the  dual -use  revolut ion  phenomenon and the  fac t  tha t  so  much bas ic  
research  does  have  a  re la t ive ly  shor t  t ime f rame before  i t  ac tual ly  can 
f ind  i t s  way in to  appl ica t ions .  
 Jus t  as  an  as ide ,  I 've  been working on th is  projec t  on  U.S. -China  
sc ience  and technology coopera t ion  looking over  the  pas t  30  years ,  and 
one  of  the  th ings  tha t  I  th ink i s  rea l ly  manifes t ly  c lear  i s  jus t  how 
much tha t  gap has  c losed or  how much the  accelera t ion  has  occurred .   I  
th ink to  impl ica t ions  fo l low.   F i rs t ,  again ,  we have to  run fas ter .   But ,  
second,  we need to  improve  our  in te l l igence  about  the  Chinese  sys tem 
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so  tha t  we don ' t  have  b lanket  deemed expor t  cont ro l  pol ic ies  tha t  
rea l ly  put  unnecessary  burdens  on companies  and on univers i t ies .   As  a  
professor ,  I  am par t icular ly  sens i t ive  to  the  ways  in  which univers i t ies  
become  ins t ruments  of  na t ional  secur i ty  pol icy;  univers i t ies  do  have  
nat ional  secur i ty  responsibi l i t ies ,  but  we should  a lso  recognize  tha t  
univers i t ies  serve  nat ional  needs  bes t  in  providing forums for  the  open 
exchange of  ideas  and in  serving as  magnets  for  the  bes t  and br ightes t  
technica l  ta lent  f rom around the  wor ld .   So,  in  consider ing r i sks  and 
oppor tuni t ies ,  I  th ink we need a  much bet ter  focus  on what  th is  Sino-
U.S.  sc ience  and technology re la t ionship  i s  a l l  about .  
 I f  you look a t  the  way the  U.S.  government ,  i s  s taf fed  to  in terac t  
wi th  China  on these  mat ters ,  i t  i s  ra ther  s tovepiped.   I t  i s  rea l ly  very  
f ragmented and where  you 're  supposed to  have  coordinat ion  the  
s taf f ing  is  p i t i fu l—one or  two junior  of f icers  taking on th is  major  
responsibi l i ty  for  the  fu ture  of  the  two countr ies ;  i t ' s  c razy.  
 So I  th ink a  combinat ion of  be t ter  coordinat ion ,  be t ter  
in te l l igence ,  not  in  te rms of  spying necessar i ly ,  but  analyt ica l  work on 
what  i s  and is  not  poss ib le .   Because  I  th ink u l t imate ly  you can ' t  shut  
th is  a l l  down;  you can ' t  shut  i t  of f .   
 As  Denis  points  out ,  I  th ink the  poss ib i l i t ies  for  very  s igni f icant  
benef i t s  to  both  countr ies  as  wel l  as  to  the  wor ld  in  many,  many areas  
become impor tant .  
 That  sa id ,  I  th ink separa te ly  then you have to  begin  to  engage 
China  on secur i ty  d iscuss ions  a t  new levels ,  saying,  you know,  we 're  
very  worr ied  about  what  you ' re  doing in  space ,  what  we see  on 
indust r ia l  espionage,  e tc .  (which I ’m sure  they know by th is  t ime) .   I  
don ' t  know i f  tha t  fu l ly  answers  the  ques t ion.  
 VICE CHAIRMAN WORTZEL:   That ' s  very  helpful .   Thank you.  
 DR.  SIMON:  I  would  go back to  the  point  I  made about  s t ra tegic  
in tent .   I  th ink tha t  under ly ing the  U.S. -China  re la t ionship  s t i l l  ex is ts  
a  grea t  deal  of  mis t rus t  and not  a  grea t  deal  of  mutual  unders tanding,  
and we opera te  a t  very  superf ic ia l  levels  in  many cases ,  and a  lo t  of  
the  d iscuss ion about  what  goes  on in  each o ther 's  countr ies  rea l ly  i s  
not  necessar i ly  very  wel l  informed.  
 For  example ,  in  the  Japan case ,  we used to  use  the  ro le  of  the  
Nat ional  Science  Foundat ion and i t s  overseas  off ices ,  par t icular ly  in  
Japan,  as  a  k ind of  a  l i s tening pos t ,  not  for  in te l l igence  col lec t ion ,  but  
bas ica l ly  as  a  way of  ge t t ing  more  to  the  hear t  of  what  i s  going on 
ins ide  of  Japanese  sc ience  and technology c i rc les .   There  was  a  
repor t ing  funct ion tha t  was  very  impor tant .  
 The same th ing wi th  the  Science  and Technology Counci lor’s  
ro le .   I t  used to  be  in  the  ear ly  '80s ,  a t  leas t  f rom my ear ly  
exper iences ,  there  used to  be  a  very  proact ive  repor t ing  ro le .  
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 When you speak to  these  people  today,  they don ' t  ta lk  about  the i r  
repor t ing  ro le  as  much anymore .   In  fac t ,  they spend most  of  the i r  t ime 
hand-holding delegat ions  and prepar ing for  h igh- level  v is i t s ,  but  not  
doing very  much in  terms of  ge t t ing  in to  the  bowels  of  Chinese  sc ience  
and technology ins t i tu t ions  and rea l ly  get t ing  a  good unders tanding of  
what ' s  going on.   
 There  needs  to  be ,  I  th ink,  a  revis i t ing  of  the  ro le  of  those  
off ices  and those  funct ions  so  tha t  when we encounter  th is  k ind of  
problem about  who 's  coming to  s tudy or  what  they may be  coming to  
s tudy for ,  we have a  more  wel l - informed decis ion.  
 The U.S.  government  goes  around t ry ing to  f igure  out  what  to  do 
about  v is i tors .   You remember  years  ago,  we used to  have  an  
organizat ion ca l led  COMEX, which was  the  Commit tee  on Exchanges ,  
tha t  used to  look a t  v is i tors ,  but  i t  became too burdensome to  review 
everyone.  
 But  now,  wi th  the  onset  of  computer  technology and our  
Depar tment  of  Homeland Secur i ty ,  we probably  are  in  a  much,  much 
bet ter  pos i t ion  now to  make judgments  in  a  wel l - informed way,  
suppor ted  by bet ter  da ta  and informat ion.   I  th ink tha t ' s  rea l ly  what 's  
necessary  here .  
 MR.  SZAMOSSZEGI:   This  i sn ' t  rea l ly  my area  of  comparat ive  
advantage  so  I 'm going to  s t ick  to  my l i t t le  s tudy.   One of  the  th ings  
tha t  I  in tended to  do s ince  armaments  i s  one  of  the  main  indust r ies  on  
the  Chinese  l i s t  of  absolute  contro l  indust r ies ,  I  wanted to  rea l ly  go in  
there  and f ind  informat ion about  a  mi l i ta ry  weapons  f i rm.  
 I  quickly  found that  no  such informat ion exis ts  because  these  are  
the  s ta te-owned enterpr ises  tha t  c lose ly  guard  a l l  the  informat ion.   
They ' re  not  required  to  f i le  forms wi th  the  s tock exchange.  
 But  what  we did  f ind  were  a  couple  of  secur i ty- re la ted  f i rms 
owned by the  s ta te-owned enterpr ises  tha t  a re  the  main  weapons '  
manufacturers .   And what  we found was  in  the  case  of  one  of  them,  
AVI-China ,  tha t  th is  par t icular  f i rm which produces  regional  je ts  and 
hel icopters  was  owned by the  Chinese  producer  SOE AVIC-II .   The 
subsid iary ,  which i s  ac tual ly  l i s ted  in  Hong Kong,  has  a  ser ies  of  jo in t  
ventures  wi th  Airbus  and Embraer .   I t  manufactures  for  Boeing and 
Airbus .  
 This  i sn ' t  the  same th ing as  expor t  cont ro ls  necessar i ly ,  but  i t ' s  a  
way,  I  th ink,  to  get  technology to  go f rom Western  f i rms which maybe 
have had a  h igher  level  of  technology to  a  Chinese  f i rm that  i s  owned 
by a  s ta te-owned enterpr ise  tha t  produces  weapons .   
 So ,  in  a  case  l ike  th is ,  we ' re  bas ica l ly  a t  the  mercy of  the  jo in t  
venture  par tners  as  to  what  k ind of  technology is  t ransfer red  to  China .  
 Another  f i rm that  we found is  CASIL.   Those  are  in i t ia ls  tha t  i t  
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uses  in  i t s  annual  repor t .   This  par t icular  f i rm is  engaged in  
const ruct ion  of  sc ience  and technology and aerospace  parks .   I  know 
that  we ' re  focusing on the  three  programs,  the  Torch Program and the  
863 Program,  but  I  th ink tha t  the  Chinese  government  a lso  i s  
inf luencing technology in  o ther  ways  by having s ta te-owned f i rms 
suppor t  pr iva te ly-owned f i rms tha t  ra ise  money in  in ternat ional  capi ta l  
markets  to  bui ld  these  n ice  sc ience  and technology parks  and aerospace  
parks .  
 So tha t ' s  another  area  in  which the  Chinese  government  i s  
moving th is  whole  technologica l  development  forward,  and I  th ink i t ' s  
going to  be  impact ing us  increas ingly  because  as  they popula te  those  
areas ,  I  be l ieve  the i r  technologica l  capaci ty  i s  going to  increase .  
 VICE CHAIRMAN WORTZEL:   May I  be  permit ted  a  shor t  
comment?  
 HEARING COCHAIR SLANE:  Sure .    
 VICE CHAIRMAN WORTZEL:  I t  does  b lend.   We vis i ted  a  
grea t  enterpr ise  las t  year  tha t  was  bui ld ing contro l  mechanisms for  
environmenta l  cont ro l  sys tems in  power  p lants  and s tee l  p lants ,  and i t  
looked great .  
 I  opened a  cabinet  and looked a t  a l l  the  routers ,  and a l l  the  
routers  and a l l  the  e lec t ronic  and computer  cont ro l  equipment  came 
f rom a  s ingle  Chinese  f i rm.   50  mi les  away we passed that  f i rm and in  
i t s  parking lo t  was  an  e lec t ronic  warfare  and jamming regiment  of  the  
People 's  Libera t ion  Army being out f i t ted  wi th  the  same router .   So  I  
don ' t  know how you make that  separa t ion.  
 HEARING COCHAIR SLANE:  Thank you.  
 Chairman Bar tholomew.  
 CHAIRMAN BARTHOLOMEW:  Thank you very  much.   Thank 
you,  gent lemen,  for  your  in teres t ing  tes t imony,  ge t t ing  r ight  to  the  
hear t  of  some of  the  chal lenges  tha t  we face ,  I  th ink.  
 Dr .  Sut tmeier- -ac tual ly  for  a l l  of  you-- I 'm in teres ted  in  th is  idea  
of  be ing able  to  crea te  the  condi t ions  in  which innovat ion thr ives .   
You ment ioned speci f ica l ly  pr imary and secondary  educat ion,  which I  
th ink we a l l  recognize  we 've  got  to  do a  much bet ter  job  of  here  in  the  
Uni ted  Sta tes .   These  chi ldren ,  they ' re  our  seed capi ta l .  
 We 're  ta lk ing about  tha t ' s  an  inves tment  tha t  won ' t  rea l ly  provide  
re turns  to  us  for  a t  leas t  a  decade and more  l ike ly  severa l  decades  
before  these  k ids  who are  get t ing  new oppor tuni t ies  are  going to  move 
in to  the  workforce .  
 How are  th ings  s tanding,  though,  in  terms of  pr imary and 
secondary  educat ion in  China?   How is  the  Chinese  government  doing 
in  educat ing i t s  own young people?  
 DR.  SUTTMEIER:   I  th ink i f  you look a t  s ta t i s t ics ,  they ' re  not  so  
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impress ive .   Many people  would  argue  tha t  the  Chinese  sys tem has  
been weak on educat ion,  but  again  one  of  the  th ings  tha t  th is  points  to ,  
I  th ink,  i s  perhaps  the  l imi ts  to  pol icy .   the  dr ive  for  educat ion  in  
China  I  th ink i s  not  to ta l ly  a  mat ter  of  pol icy;  i t ' s  much more  a  mat ter  
of  cul ture ,  of  family  inf luences ,  and th ings  l ike  tha t .  
 I  th ink one  reason why even the  univers i ty  sec tor ,  which 
arguably  i s  s t i l l  p lagued wi th  enormous problems in  China ,  does  as  
wel l  as  i t  does  in  terms of  producing good people- - i s  because  they ' re  
dr iven by other  th ings  in  some sense .  
 But  there  i s ,  I  th ink,  a  concer ted  ef for t  now to  t ry  to  keep 
bui ld ing sc ience  educat ion ,  popular iza t ion  of  sc ience  throughout  the  
pr imary and secondary  sys tem as  wel l  as  the  genera l  publ ic .  
 But  I  th ink there  i s  a lso  the  fee l ing  tha t  there 's  A ter r ib le  
under inves tment ,  lack  of  profess ional iza t ion  of  teachers  in  la rge  par ts  
of  the  country .   Remember ,  th is  i s  a  country  where  a t  leas t  ha l f  of  i t  i s  
s t i l l  a  pre t ty  underdeveloped place ,  and you don ' t  have  enough highly  
profess ional ized people  to  supply  qual i ty  educat ion  for  the  ent i re  
country .   So,  th is  i s  one  reason why I  th ink i t ' s  a lways  so  d i f f icul t  to  
draw conclus ions  about  China .   Which China  are  you ta lk ing about?   
For  ins tance ,  in  terms of  the  te lecom expansion,  when we consider  
subs id ies  for  the  expansion of  te lecom to  west  China ,  i s  tha t  an  
indust r ia l  pol icy  i ssue  or  i s  i t  a  na t ional  development  i ssue?   We spent  
a  lo t  of  t ime and money in  th is  country  t ry ing to  br ing  e lec t r ic i ty  and 
te lephones  to  rura l  a reas  as  wel l .   
 DR.  SIMON:  I  th ink the  Chinese  are  t ry ing to  take  a  rea l ly  c lose  
look a t  the i r  pr imary and secondary  educat ion r ight  now.   Par t  of  th is  
i s  because  they rea l ize  tha t  the  roots  of  crea t iv i ty ,  in  fac t ,  a re  
es tabl ished ear ly  on.  
 I  am very  famil iar  wi th  severa l  exper iments  going on.   In  the  
c i ty  of  Dal ian ,  for  example ,  where  an  individual  crea ted  a  pr iva te  
school ,  brought  back a  Chinese  Canadian teacher ,  who had been in  
Canada for  about  hal f  a  dozen years ,  and crea ted  a  K through 3  
program for  young kids .   Bas ica l ly ,  there  are  a  lo t  of  the  th ings  tha t  
we have in  our  own kindergar tens--playgrounds  and sandboxes--a l l  of  
those  k ind of  th ings  for  crea t ive  express ion,  f ree  express ion,  e t  ce tera .  
 The  problem is  tha t  a f ter  the  th i rd  grade ,  they must  go  back in to  
the  Chinese  school  sys tem so  you have a  lo t  of  perplexed kids  who 
bas ica l ly  now have got ten  a  dose  of  the  open c lassroom in  some ways  
and then back to  the  t radi t ional  very  r ig id  c lassroom.  
 I  was  jus t  going through admiss ions  appl ica t ions  for  Penn Sta te  
for  my graduate  school ,  and i t ' s  amazing;  for  every  Chinese  s tudent ,  i t  
seems to  be  the  same--750 or  800 on thei r  GRE math  and,  500 or  lower  
on the  verbal  par t  of  the i r  GREs and even lower  on thei r  essays .  
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 In  fac t ,  i t ' s  a lmost  a  done deal  tha t  the  Chinese  s tudents  when 
they come to  the  Uni ted  Sta tes  f ind  even our  graduate  programs in  area  
such as  s ta t i s t ics  jus t  fa i r ly  s t ra ight forward,  very  easy  to  do,  because  
of  the  bas ic  foundat ions  they s t i l l  ge t  in  the i r  ear ly  educat ion  back in  
China .  
 So I  don ' t  th ink the  Chinese  government  and the  Chinese  
educat ion  author i t ies  are  wi l l ing  to  g ive  a l l  of  tha t  up  and to  re lease  
the  whole  educat ion sys tem to  be  a  k ind of  open c lassroom for  a l l .  
 In  fac t ,  there  probably  i s  some value  in  looking for  some blend 
of  what  we do here  in  the  West ,  which i s  probably  a  l i t t le  b i t  too  open-
ended,  and what  they do in  China ,  which i s  probably  a  l i t t le  too  r ig id ,  
and t ry ing to  f igure  out  a  good balance .  
 The Asia  Socie ty  in  New York has  done a  couple  projec ts  tha t  I  
would  commend to  you that  take  a  look a t  the  comparat ive  nature  of  
ear ly  educat ion  tha t  I  th ink would  lend some examples  to  th is  
commit tee  and help  you unders tand more  about  tha t  s i tua t ion .  
 I  th ink  we need to  learn  a  lo t  more  about  what  makes  the  Chinese  
educat ion sys tem good and they want  to  learn  a  lo t  more  about  us ,  and 
exchanges  of  teachers  and academic adminis t ra tors  would  go a  long 
way to  t ransfer r ing  some of  tha t  unders tanding in  both  d i rec t ions .  
 CHAIRMAN BARTHOLOMEW:  Jus t  one  comment  and I ' l l  have  
a  second round i f  we have a  second round of  ques t ions .   
 Dr .  S imon,  I  th ink the  chal lenge a lways  i s  when you ta lk  about  a  
new paradigm of  coopera t ion,  making sure  tha t  we have an  idea  what  
we want  to  get  out  of  tha t  coopera t ion  because  the  Chinese  government  
a lways  seems to  have  a  much bet ter  idea  of  what  they want  to  get  out  
of  the  coopera t ion .   I ' l l  ra ise  tha t  i f  we have an  oppor tuni ty  on the  
second round.  
 HEARING COCHAIR SLANE:  Commiss ioner  Blumenthal .  
 COMMISSIONER BLUMENTHAL:  Yes .   Thank you a l l  very  
much.    
 I 'm par t icular ly  happy to  see  Dr .  S imon and Dr .  Sut tmeier  here .   
I 'm a  b ig  fan  of  your  work in  general .   No offense-- I  haven ' t  seen your  
work yet .  
 MR.  SZAMOSSZEGI:   None taken.  
 COMMISSIONER BLUMENTHAL:  I 'm looking forward to  being 
famil iar  wi th  your  work.  
 But  I  have  a  couple  of  quest ions .   One is  th is  innovat ion 
paradigm.   I  guess  my ques t ion  would  be ,  f i rs t ,  to  f lesh  out  what  you 
mean by that .   I  don ' t  remember  which one  of  you sa id  i t .  
 And the  second would  be  about  what  you descr ibed in  terms of  
lack  of  crea t iv i ty  in  sc ience  and r i sk  avers ion;  I  th ink i t  ge ls  very  
much wi th  the  research I 've  done on th is  topic  mysel f .   But  are  you 
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seeing cer ta in  areas  where ,  not  copycat t ing  ce l l  phones ,  there  are  
ac tual  breakthroughs  tha t   a re  sc ient i f ica l ly  appl icable ,  ac tual  
breakthroughs  tha t  ac tual ly  s tar t  to  compete  wi th  U.S.  breakthroughs?   
 Which par t icular  areas  would  those  be ,  and how would  that  
potent ia l ly  harm us  or  hur t  us?   When we ta lk  about  compet i t ion ,  
usual ly  as  Americans ,  we th ink compet i t ion  i s  a  good th ing,  but  how 
could  tha t  ac tual ly  harm or  hur t  us?  
 So a  two-par t  ques t ion .   One is  what  do  you mean by a  
coopera t ive  innovat ion paradigm?  And the  o ther  i s  cer ta in  areas  of  
sc ience  and technology where  breakthroughs ,  commercia l  
breakthroughs ,  may ac tual ly  s tar t  to  compete  wi th  the  Uni ted  Sta tes  in  
harmful  or  he lpful  ways?  
 And i t ' s  rea l ly  to  both  of  you.  
 DR.  SIMON:  I  gave  you the  example  of  what 's  been going on 
wi th  respect  to  supercomput ing.   I  th ink high performance comput ing 
i s  an  area  tha t  not  only  has  China  targeted  but  they 've  ac tual ly  made 
some substant ia l  progress .  
 Clear ly ,  in  the  vers ion tha t  I  ta lked about ,  I  pointed  out  tha t  the  
archi tec ture  i s  the i r  own,  but  they ' re  s t i l l  us ing AMD microprocessor  
technology.   I t  would  be  a  b ig  leap forward,  for  example ,  for  them to  
use  th is  Loongson chip ,  the  processor  they developed to  be  the  main  
core  processors  for  something l ike  th is .   That ' s  the i r  in tent .   I t ’ s  the i r  
s ta ted  in tent ,  c lear ly ,  to  do  th is ,  and they c lear ly  want  to  br ing h igh 
performance comput ing in to  the  marketplace ,  probably  f i rs t  to  what  I  
would  ca l l  in to  in termedia te  markets .  
 That  i s ,  they want  to  in t roduce  these  f i rs t  in to  developing 
country  markets ,  grab  some market  share ,  use  tha t  to  enhance  and 
improve performance,  and br ing those  products  then to  the  h igher-end 
markets  in  the  West .  
 And,  I  th ink what  we 're  see ing in  the  Chinese  case  i s  a  very  
d i f ferent  technology s t ra tegy than one  where  they immedia te ly  have  to  
leapfrog r ight  to  the  very  top .   There 's  a  lo t  of  d iscuss ion about  
leapfrogging in  China .  
 But  I  th ink tha t  i f  we ac tual ly  look a t  the  way China  i s  moving 
through the  s tages  of  technologica l  development ,  i t  i s  a  learning curve  
process ,  and we see  them s teadfas t ly  engaged in  f i rs t  be ing a  taker ,  
then being a  marginal  contr ibutor ,  and then embedding themselves  
through the i r  marginal  cont r ibut ions  in  these  technology networks  tha t  
are  being formed,  and us ing those  as  a  replacement  for  the  t radi t ional  
modal i t ies  of  technology acquis i t ion .  
 So,  th is  expanded par t ic ipat ion  i s  ge t t ing  them access  in to  
networks  where  new knowledge is  be ing crea ted  a t  the  f ront ier .   I f  you 
look a t  the  papers  tha t  a re  be ing wri t ten  and the  conferences  tha t  a re  
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being held ,  you see  s igni f icant  Chinese  par t ic ipat ion ,  Chinese  
contr ibut ions ,  and Chinese  co-authorship .   These  are  some of  the  
dr ivers  tha t  are  pushing forward progress  in  areas  in  such as  b io  chips ,  
for  example ,  in  the  l i fe  sc iences  f ie ld ,  in  key areas  of  IT,  and in  some 
aspects  of  nanotech—which you ' l l  hear  about  f rom Rich Appelbaum 
this  af ternoon.   And whi le  not  r ight  a t  the  forefront ,  China’s  progress  
c lear ly  i s  subs tant ia l  enough to  make them a  p layer  in  the  game,  which 
then a l lows them to  rub shoulders  wi th  the  s ta te-of- the-ar t  p layers  and 
a l lows them to  do a  lo t  of  immedia te  and rapid  learning.  
 COMMISSIONER BLUMENTHAL:  Does  that  hur t  us  
economical ly?   And i f  so ,  how? 
 DR.  SUTTMEIER:   Does  i t  hur t?   I t  probably  hur ts  individual  
companies  tha t  lose  market  share  to  the  Huaweis ,  for  ins tance ,  or  the  
ZTEs.  
 Does  i t  necessar i ly  hur t  a l l  of  us?   I  don ' t  know,  because  gains  in  
one  par t  of  an  indust ry  may lead to  losses  in  o ther  par ts  of  the  
indust ry .   Remember ,  an  awful  lo t  of  th is  technology pol icy  tha t  you ' re  
see ing in  China  comes as  a  resul t  of  th is  percept ion  tha t  they are ,  
a l though in  absolute  te rms,  ga iners ,  but  in  re la t ive  terms they are  not  
doing so  wel l  because  i t  i s  the  people  who contro l  the  technologica l  
a rchi tec ture ,  and tha t  i s  the  IP  and the  s tandards ,  who are  get t ing  the  
l ion 's  share  of  the  benef i t s .  
 So  what  I  th ink i s  dr iv ing an  awful  lo t  of  the  work then in  
technologica l  innovat ion in  China  i s  an  a t tempt  to  sor t  of  change tha t  
ba lance  somehow.   
 As  for  the  innovat ion in  th is  repor t ,  we ta lk  a  l i t t le  b i t  about  
types  of  innovat ion because  I  th ink when you get  in to  th is  ques t ion  of  
innovat ion,  you do have to  be  a  l i t t le  b i t  sens i t ive  to  whether  you ' re  
ta lk ing about  some kind of  incrementa l  innovat ion,  major  d is rupt ive  
innovat ions .  
 I  th ink the  people  who have been looking a t  a  lo t  of  the  
innovat ion in  ICT would  say  tha t  you ' re  see ing more  of  the  incrementa l  
s tuf f - -but  th is  can pay off  because  i t  can  g ive  new funct ional i ty  to  
products  in  the  domest ic  market  where  the  Chinese  companies  may be  
especia l ly  sens i t ive  to  demand and new funct ional i ty  in  in ternat ional  
markets  as  wel l .   So  Chinese  companies  can be  expected  to  be  
in ternat ional ly  compet i t ive  not  only  on pr ice ,  but  a lso  on innovat ive  
fea tures  of  the i r  products  even thought  those  innovat ions  tend to  be  
incrementa l .  
 The one  o ther  th ing I  would  add in  terms of  new innovat ion 
paradigm,  goes  back to  Commiss ioner  Wortze l ' s  point ,  and deemed 
expor t  i ssue .   We are  rea l ly  in  an  increas ingly  in terdependent  
re la t ionship  wi th  China  on research and development .  
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 This  i s  t rue  in  terms of  univers i t ies .   Look a t  who 's  s taf f ing up 
our  facul t ies ,  and where  the  s tudents  are  coming from.   I t  i s  t rue  in  the  
corpora te  wor ld ,  as  wel l .   I 'm increas ingly  tempted to  use  the  term 
"Chimer ica ,"  or  “Chimer ican sc ience”  ( to  borrow Nial l  Ferguson’s  
te rm used to  descr ibe  f inancia l  re la t ions  between the  two countr ies)  to  
descr ibe  re la t ions  in  research  and innovat ion.   In  l ight  of  th is  growing 
in terdependence ,  we have to  f igure  out  new ways  to  bui ld  a  t rus t ing  
re la t ionship ,  and,  you cannot  do  tha t  i f  you ' re  turning people  away a t  
the  U.S.  consula tes  in  China—we s t i l l  do  tha t  a  lo t  much more  than we 
should .  
 COMMISSIONER BLUMENTHAL:  I f  we have t ime,  I ' l l  fo l low 
up.  
 HEARING COCHAIR SLANE:  Great .   Okay.  
 COMMISSIONER BLUMENTHAL:  Thank you very  much.  
 HEARING COCHAIR SLANE:  I  have  a  quick  ques t ion for  Dr .  
Sut tmeier  and Dr .  Simon.   Your  Chinese  graduate  s tudents ,  do  you f ind  
tha t  they come wi th  the  in tent  of  re turning or  do  you f ind  tha t  they 
come and hope to  s tay?  
 DR.  SIMON:  I  th ink i t ' s  about  50-50.   I  th ink hal f  of  them come 
wi th  the  expecta t ion  and maybe the  obl igat ion ,  depending on who 's  
paying the  b i l l  when they come to  go home.   I f  they ' re  gongfei ,  or  
government-sponsored,  s tudents ,  they have an  obl igat ion  to  re turn .   
And s ince  there  i s  no  longer  a  June  4 th  or  o ther  k ind of  prec ip i tant  to  
a l low them to  s tay  f ree ly ,  then they wi l l  probably  wi l l  re turn .  
 On the  o ther  hand,  the  o ther  50  percent ,  those  who are   z i fe i  or  
se l f - f inanced,  increas ingly ,  I  th ink  they are  coming wi th  the  not ion 
tha t  they wi l l  t ry  to  ge t  employment  once  they-- le t ' s  say  get  a  Ph.D.  in  
the  Uni ted  Sta tes ,  they wi l l  ge t  employment  and the i r  hope,  a t  leas t  
in i t ia l ly ,  may be  to  s tay .   
 The ideal  paradigm for  many of  them is  to  come for  the i r  
graduate  degree ,  s tay  in  the  U.S.  for  "x"  numbers  of  years ,  and use  tha t  
as  a  jumping off  point  to  go back and get  a  very  h igh-paying job,  
e i ther  wi th  a  mul t ina t ional  company back in  China  or  wi th  a  Chinese  
pr ivate  sec tor  company or ,  in  some cases ,  and I  th ink th is  i s  very  
impor tant ,  become the  new wave of  technologica l  ent repreneur  in  
China  tha t  I  th ink i s  going to  become an impor tant  ca ta lys t  for  change 
in  China 's  technology sector .  
 I  th ink more  and more  of  those  young ent repreneurs  who have 
had exper ience  on both  s ides  of  the  ocean,  they wi l l  become cr i t ica l  
p layers  in  the  game of  helping China  change i t s  innovat ion cul ture  and 
they wi l l  be  an  impor tant  ca ta lys t .  
 So  the  fac t  tha t  they re turn ,  there  are  some good aspects  to  tha t  
and there  are  some not  so  good aspects  to  tha t .   We can ' t  have  our  cake  
164
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
and ea t  i t  too .   We can ' t  a lways  have  the  benef i t s  of  both ,  such as  hal f  
here  and hal f  there .   There  are  many Chinese  who are  so-cal led  
amphibians ;  th is  i s  what  they ca l l  them now,  tha t  i s ,  they have one  foot  
in  the  U.S.  and they have one foot  in  China .   Under  the  863 Program,  
for  example ,  they may have a  labora tory  and a  projec t  tha t ' s  par t ia l ly  
funded by the  Chinese  government :   in  the  U.S.  they have a  projec t  
tha t ' s  funded by the  Nat ional  Science  Foundat ion.   They have a  lab  
there  wi th  graduate  s tudents  and they have a  lab  here  wi th  graduate  
s tudents .   They ' re  running bas ica l ly  mul t ip le  se ts  of  exper iments  and 
mul t ip le  se ts  of  projec ts .   Al l  of  these  are  very  powerful  fac tors  tha t  
he lp  dr ive  not  only  American sc ience  but  a lso  Chinese  sc ience .  
 DR.  SUTTMEIER:   I  would  agree  wi th  most  of  what  I  th ink 
Denis  i s  saying.   I  would  jus t  add that  in  some ways  we don ' t  know as  
much about  tha t  ques t ion  as  we might .   NSF has  done surveys  of  
in tent ions  to  s tay  or  not  s tay .   But  I  th ink i t  touches  on some very  
in teres t ing  ques t ions  about  cul tura l  a t tachments ,  ident i ty  i ssues ,  as  
wel l  as  market  forces .  
 I  th ink tha t  i f  you ' re  ta lk ing in  market  te rms,  you’ l l  f ind  these  
fo lks  can f inesse  many of  the  immigrat ion  i ssues  they might  face--
they ' re  par t  of  th is  g lobal  workforce ,  and they migra te  around.   
 So you can go to  the  labora tor ies  of  U.S.  companies  in  Shanghai  
and meet  some guys  who are  working there ,  e thnic  Chinese  who 
f in ished the i r  work in  the  Uni ted  Sta tes  in  the  la te  '80s .   They then 
went  to  work in  the  corpora te  labora tor ies  in  the  U.S.  for  ten  years ,  
and they expect  to  go back to  the  U.S.  af ter  China ,  and then perhaps  
move on to  India  af ter  tha t .  
 That ' s  why th is  i ssue  of  compet ing for  ta lent  and making th is  
economy one where  people  rea l ly  want  to  come becomes so  impor tant ,  
I  th ink.  
 HEARING COCHAIR SLANE:  Thank you.  
 COMMISSIONER REINSCH:  May I  fo l low up on that?  
 HEARING COCHAIR SLANE:  Please ,  yes .  
 COMMISSIONER REINSCH:  Those  are  very  in teres t ing  
examples ,  and you make some impor tant  points .   Dr .  S imon,  you 
reminded me that  a  few years  ago,  I  d id  a  conference  on th is  where  I  
spoke a long wi th  the  then Jordanian Ambassador  to  the  Uni ted  Sta tes ,  
and he  added the  commercia l  e lement  to  th is .   
 I t  may not  be  qui te  as  t rue  for  China  as  i t  was  for  Jordan,  but  I  
thought  i t  was  an  in teres t ing  comment .   He sa id  there  are  thousands  of  
Jordanians  who come to  the  Uni ted  Sta tes  to  go to  medical  school ,  and 
they a l l  graduate ,  and he  sa id  they a l l  go  back,  and they a l l  buy GE 
medical  equipment .  
 The point  tha t  he  was  making was  tha t  the  re la t ionships  and 
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bonds  tha t  they form here ,  as  wel l  as  the  language tha t  they learn ,  not  
necessar i ly  here  but  the  language they speak and the  language they ' re  
educated  in ,  c rea tes  a  re la t ionship  which t ranscends  where  they ' re  
located .  
 And the  mentors  they have,  the  people  they look a t ,  a re  here ,  and 
tha t  forms a  se t  of  re la t ionships  tha t  cause  me to  conclude  tha t  in  a  lo t  
of  cases  having fore ign s tudents  here  i s  win-win.   I t  doesn ' t  mat ter  
whether  they s tay  here  or  whether  they go back;  we win e i ther  way.  
 Now,  in  some of  your  areas ,  i t ' s  not  qui te  tha t  c lear  because  
there  are  secur i ty  impl ica t ions ,  which br ings  me to  a  ques t ion ,  which I  
want  to  ask  Dr .  Sut tmeier ,  because  you brought  up  the  Nat ional  
Academy s tudy.   Larry  and I  probably  don ' t  ent i re ly  agree  on i t  
a l though I  do  th ink i t ' s  probably  the  most  compel l ing  indic tment  of  the  
s ta tus  quo tha t  I 've  ever  read,  and the  s ta tus  quo deserves  to  be  
indic ted .  
 But  I 'd  l ike  you to  comment  br ief ly ,  not  only  the  expor t  contro l  
par t  of  i t ,  but  on  the  v isa  par t  of  i t ,  the  t ravel  par t  of  i t ,  because  
f rankly  in  the  publ ic  debate  over  the  document ,  tha t  p iece  has  got ten  
very  shor t  shr i f t .   Most  of  the  focus  and much of  the  controversy  has  
surrounded the  res t  of  i t .   Do you endorse  the  recommendat ions?   Do 
you th ink that  what  they propose  as  far  as  both  s tudent  t ravel  and a lso ,  
as  I  reca l l ,  sor t  of  v isa  appl ica t ion  process  i s  the  r ight  way to  go?  
 DR.  SUTTMEIER:   I  th ink a  good par t  of  i t  was  to  have 
recognized sc ient is t s  vouch for  the  reputa t ion--  
 COMMISSIONER REINSCH:  Yes .  
 DR.  SUTTMEIER:   - -and in tent ions  of  the  people .  
 COMMISSIONER REINSCH:  That  was  one piece  of  i t .  
 DR.  SUTTMEIER:   Yes ,  I  th ink in  genera l  I  do .   And you say,  in  
reference  to  the  Jordanian  case ,  i t ' s  a lways  a  win-win th ing.   I 'm not  
sure  i t  a lways  i s  a  win-win th ing.  
 In  fac t ,  I  would  argue tha t  i f  we ' re  not  careful ,  we ' re  rea l ly  
turning i t  in to  a  win- lose  s i tua t ion  where  we 're  the  losers .   I  have   
many discuss ions  wi th  people  f rom the  Chinese  technical  communi ty  
who have the i r  educat ions  here  who are  l ike ly  to  buy GE equipment  
and HP equipment  and want  to  mainta in  an  ac t ive  profess ional  
engagement  wi th  U.S.  sc ience ,  who then get  turned away when 
applying for  a  v isa  a t  the  U.S.  consula te .   I  mean,  there  i s  something--  
 COMMISSIONER REINSCH:  So there 's  a  loss  through our  
pol icy  though;  r ight?   I t ' s  not  f rom thei r  exposure  to  the  Uni ted  Sta tes?  
 DR.  SUTTMEIER:   Exact ly .  
 COMMISSIONER REINSCH:  That ' s  f rom our  fa i lure  to  a l low 
the  re la t ionship  to  grow.  
 DR.  SUTTMEIER:   Yes .    
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 COMMISSIONER REINSCH:  That ' s  wel l - taken.  
 DR.  SUTTMEIER:   How do you win in  tha t  c i rcumstance?   Here  
you 've  inves ted  in  bui ld ing goodwil l :   we have a  whole  long his tory  of  
Chinese  sc ient is t s  who s tudied  here ,  they 've  become a  grea t  resource  
for  our  in teres ts ,  and so  for th ,  and we have now th is  pol icy  
d iscr iminates  agains t  them and makes  them fee l  l ike  they are  being 
t rea ted  as  infer iors ,  i f  not  as  enemies .   Eventual ly ,  some cease  to  even 
th ink about  get t ing  a  U.S.  v isa .   Go bui ld  the i r  overseas  profess ional  
re la t ionships  wi th  o thers .   They’ l l  go  to  Aust ra l ia  for  a  meet ing  or  
they ' l l  go  someplace  e lse .  
 COMMISSIONER REINSCH:  There 's  a lso  a  s t ra tegic  component  
to  i t .   In  my day job ,  I  represent  b ig  companies ,  and they 've  had to  
deal  wi th  th is  problem from the  s tandpoint  of  the  engineers  and 
sc ient is t s  they want  to  h i re  or  who a l ready are  working for  them 
overseas .   I  got  more  complain ts  about  exact ly  what  you ' re  ta lk ing 
about  in  2002,  '3 ,  '4 ,  than any other  i ssue  I  deal t  wi th .  
 I  ge t  a  lo t  fewer  complain ts  now except  unt i l  recent ly ,  which i s  a  
footnote  tha t  we don ' t  have  t ime to  get  in to ,  but  the  reason the  volume 
of  complaints  d iminished was  not  because  the  problem was  solved,  but  
because  i f  you ' re  GE,  you have th ings  you can do about  i t .  
 And what  you do about  i t  i s  you move your  conference  to  
Singapore  or  Vancouver ,  and ul t imate ly  what  you do about  i t  i s  you 
move your  research lab  to  Tianj in ,  which i t  seems to  me is  not  in  our  
na t ional  secur i ty  in teres t  or  our  job  crea t ion  or  employment  in teres ts .   
But  tha t ' s  what 's  happening as  a  d i rec t  consequence  of  the  pol ic ies  tha t  
you ' re  ta lk ing about .  
 I 've  taken too  much t ime.   I 'm sorry .  
 DR.  SUTTMEIER:   I f  you then turn  i t  back to  the  ques t ion of  
indust r ia l  pol icy ,  you can make a  case ,  I  th ink,  tha t  U.S.  immigra t ion  
pol icy  ac tual ly  does  grea t  th ings  for  Chinese  indust r ia l  pol icy .  
 COMMISSIONER REINSCH:  I  need to  say  for  the  record  tha t  
the  reference  to  GE was  a  hypothet ica l  one .   I  was  p icking on a  
company and not  c i t ing  a  speci f ic  example .    
 HEARING COCHAIR SLANE:  Commiss ioner  Wessel .  
 COMMISSIONER WESSEL:   Thank you for  being here  today.  
 I  want  to  ask  some ques t ions  about  a  rea l - l i fe  i ssue  we 're  going 
through r ight  now here ,  and whether  you suppor t  or  oppose  the  recent  
s t imulus  b i l l  and the  "Buy America"  provis ions  tha t  were  inc luded 
wi th in  i t ,  which is  now the  law of  the  land.  
 NTIA,  the  Nat ional  Telecommunicat ions  Informat ion 
Adminis t ra t ion ,  has  been looking a t  how to  implement  the  law as  i t  
re la tes  to  the  te lecom IT sec tor ,  and they apparent ly  under  pressure  
f rom the  Chinese  and others  are  looking a t  c rea t ing  a  b lanket  
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exempt ion f rom the  Buy America  provis ions  as  i t  re la tes  to  the  te lecom 
IT sector  for  the  sourc ing tha t ' s  funded by the  b i l l .  
 As  we look a t  the  comments  you 've  made about  the  s tandard  
se t t ing  in  China ,  as  we look a t  what  has  happened to  the  migra t ion  of  
product ion,  not  necessar i ly  development  but  product ion of  much of  the  
e lec t ronics  and commodi t ies  tha t  go  into  the  IT sector ,  how should  we 
be  v iewing that  r ight  now? 
 We ta lked about  win- lose ,  lose- lose ,  e t  ce tera ,  and we jus t  ta lked 
about  th is  GE s i tua t ion ,  about  the  ques t ion--  
 COMMISSIONER REINSCH:  Hypothet ica l .  
 COMMISSIONER WESSEL:   - -hypothet ica l  GE s i tua t ion as  i t  
re la tes  to  R&D, e t  ce tera .   Most  engineers ,  as  I  unders tand i t ,  l ike  to  
have  product ion c lose  to  R&D so tha t  they can t inker  on the  shop f loor  
and go back and for th .   What 's  happening to  our  indust ry?   
 I s  i t  migra t ing  to  China  as  they develop the  s tandards ,  as  we 
look a t  the  serving a  one  p lus  b i l l ion  dol lar  market ,  as  we look a t  the  
migra t ion of  what 's  happened here?   Has  i t  now got ten  to  the  point  
where  we couldn ' t  even enforce  Buy America  pol icy  because  we don ' t  
make i t  here?  
 DR.  SIMON:  In  many ways ,  tha t ' s  exact ly  what  i s  happening.   
As  we 've  seen in  the  semiconductor  area ,  put t ing  as ide  the  shor t - term 
dis locat ions  tha t  wi l l  occur  over  the  next  year  or  two,  i t ' s  very  c lear  
tha t  fore ign inves tment  not  only  has  fo l lowed the  oppor tuni t ies  in  the  
Chinese  market ,  fore ign inves tors  now see  China  as  the  s t ra tegic  
p la t form for  not  only  the  domest ic  market  but  a lso  for  the  g lobal  
market .  
 So,  the  bulk  of  those  semiconductors  tha t  do  get  impor ted ,  for  
example ,  they tend to  go r ight  out  in  terms of  expor ted  products  where  
the  Chinese  are  s t i l l  doing bas ica l ly  a  lo t  of  the  assembly and a  lo t  of  
the  screwdriver  opera t ions .  
 One of  the  th ings  tha t  we missed discuss ing th is  morning was  
th is  ques t ion  about  local  content  and what  the  rea l  va lue  added is  f rom 
American companies  in  China .   Those  expor ts  tha t  a re  being sent  f rom 
China  back to  the  Uni ted  Sta tes ,  what  i s  the  rea l  U.S.  content  in  te rms 
of  to ta l  va lue  added?  
 Somebody sa id  25 or  30  percent  of  the  content  i s  rea l ly  s t i l l  
American content .   The o ther  i s  sourced f rom other  par ts  of  Eas t  Asia  
or  o ther  par ts  of  the  wor ld ,  but  a t  leas t  30  percent  of  the  value  of  those  
par ts  and components  in  ICT products  coming back to  the  Uni ted  
Sta tes  be long to  the  Uni ted  Sta tes  or ig inal ly .   The PWC study,  which I  
would  commend to  you,  points  th is  out  as  wel l ,  tha t  ra ther  than 
sourc ing local ly ,  many of  the  fore ign companies  ins ide  of  China  and 
even local  companies  buy the i r  chips  external ly  and br ing them in to  
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the  country  because  the  dut ies  have  been now re laxed down to  zero .  
 So i t ' s  a  very  d i f f icul t  a rgument  to  make about  what  i s  rea l ly  
U.S.  content - -and I  keep see ing in  my mind the  p ic ture  of  tha t  IBM 
laptop computer  tha t  was  brought  to  Congress  dur ing the  Lenovo 
discuss ions  and how i t  was  d ismant led ,  and tha t  par t  was  made in  
Singapore ,  and th is  par t  was  made in  Taiwan,  and what  was  the  rea l  
va lue  added in  China?  
 I 've  seen another  analys is  jus t  done of  the  30 gigabi t  iPod,  a  
s imi lar  k ind of  analys is  about  how i t  a l l  i s  put  together ,  and what  i s  
rea l ly  Chinese  value  and what  be longs  to  the  U.S.  and Japan,  e t  ce tera .  
 This  i s  g lobal iza t ion ,  and whether  we l ike  i t  or  not ,  I  th ink i t  wi l l  be  
very  tough whether  i t ' s  an  automobi le  or  an  a i rp lane  or  an  iPod to  
begin  to  d iscern  exact ly  what  i s  the  American por t ion  of  i t  and what  i s ,  
le t ' s  say ,  the  Chinese  por t ion  and what  be longs  to  some other  par t  of  
the  wor ld .   I  th ink i t ' s  jus t  too  d i f f icul t  and probably  not  wor th  the  
ef for t .  
 COMMISSIONER WESSEL:   Wel l ,  I  don ' t  know that  i t ' s  not  
wor th  the  ef for t ,  because  of  the  ques t ion of  the  migra t ion of  R&D and 
product ion--but  i f  China  i s  ac t ive ly  us ing s tandards  to  dr ive  the  
product ion there ,  the  development  and the  product ion,  f rom an 
employment  base  approach--  
 DR.  SIMON:  Right .  
 COMMISSIONER WESSEL:   - -not  a  weal th  crea t ion ,  because  
you may s t i l l  have  the  prof i t s  re turning to  the  U.S. ;  f rom an 
employment  impact ,  there  are  repercuss ions  over  t ime.  
 I f  I  could  ask  another  ques t ion:    a re  there  in ternat ional  s tandard  
se t t ing  bodies  in  the  te lecom IT indust ry  tha t  could  help  media te  th is  
and look a t  a  g lobal  so lu t ion  ra ther  than a  nat ional is t ic  so lu t ion?  
 DR.  SUTTMEIER:   Yes .   I  th ink one of  the  th ings  tha t  we found 
is  tha t  there  ac tual ly  has  been a  k ind of  in ternat ional iza t ion  of  the  
Chinese  approach to  s tandards .   I  d id  my f i rs t  paper  on  i t  a t  the  height  
of  the  WAPI business ,  and I  th ink tha t  the  learning curve  s ince  then 
has  changed and wi th  i t  a t t i tudinal  changes .  
 China  a t  tha t  t ime was  not  so  famil iar  wi th  most  s tandard  se t t ing  
organiza t ions  but  s ince  tha t  t ime,  they 've  recognized tha t  they rea l ly  
need to  get  involved wi th  formal  s tandards  bodies  as  wel l  as  many of  
the  consor t ia  tha t  do  s tandard  se t t ing  in  h igh- tech f ie lds .  
 So there  i s  a  degree  of  learning tha t  i s  going on a l ready wi th  
both  formal  organiza t ions  l ike  ISO and ITU,  IEC,  as  wel l  as  consor t ia ,  
and th is  i s  having the  ef fec t  of  media t ing  some of  the  potent ia l  
tens ions .   At  the  same t ime,  China’s  increas ingly  ac t ive  par t ic ipa t ion  
in  in ternat ional  s tandards  bodies  a lso  provides  oppor tuni t ies  for  them 
to  chal lenge es tabl ished pr incip les  and norms in  those  bodies .  
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 And what  we ' re  see ing domest ica l ly  in  China ,  i s  a  compl ica ted  
s tory .   Not  a l l  Chinese  producers  are  keen on embracing the  Chinese  
developed s tandards .   They ' re  t ied  in  wi th  g lobal  ne tworks  and the  
funct ional i ty  tha t  they want  in  markets  abroad is  rea l ly  t ied  up wi th  
in ternat ional  s tandards ,  and the  Chinese  producers  don ' t  want  to  
necessar i ly  g ive  tha t  up .   So  i t ' s  a  much more  compl ica ted  i ssue  I  th ink  
of  how that  ac tual ly  a l l  works .  
 But  the  shor t  answer  I  th ink i s  yes .   I  would  only  add that  there  
remains-- th is  i s  not  necessar i ly  your  purview in  th is  Commiss ion--a  
b ig  phi losophical  ques t ion  tha t  China  i s  par t  of ,  but  so  i s  India ,  so  i s  
Brazi l ,  so  are  o ther  p laces ,  the  nature  of  the  in ternat ional  s tandard  
sys tem and especia l ly  how in te l lec tual  proper ty  f i t s  in to  i t .  
 So  tha t ' s  a  separa te  debate .   China  i s  a  par ty  of  tha t  debate ,  but  
i t  has  less  to  do  wi th  indust r ia l  pol icy ,  and more  to  do wi th   a  la rger  
ques t ion  about  what  should  be  the  ru les  for  th is  g lobal  knowledge-
based economy when you have new players  l ike  India ,  l ike  China ,  who 
have been s tandard  takers  in  the  pas t  and now want  to  be  s tandard  
makers ,   They somet imes  have very  d i f ferent  v iews about  the  ro le  of  IP  
in  these  s tandards  regimes .  
 COMMISSIONER WESSEL:   Unders tand.   Thank you.  
 DR.  SIMON:  Can I  add jus t  a  quick  point  to  th is?   One of  the  
th ings  behind In te l ' s  decis ion to  bui ld  th is  $2 .5  b i l l ion  chip  fac tory  in  
Dal ian  was  an  apparent  des i re  by In te l  which had been af fec ted  
in i t ia l ly  by  the i r  WAPI exper ience ,  e t  ce tera ,  to  become an ins ide  
p layer  in  the  Chinese  economy.  
 And,  one  of  the  th ings  tha t  In te l  has  sought  to  do  i s  to  have  more  
and more  inf luence  by being an  ins ider  over  the  evolut ion  of  s tandards  
and the  choice  of  s tandards ,  and to  focus  these  s tandards  d iscuss ions  
by us ing i t s  leverage  in  th is  $2 .5  b i l l ion  fac i l i ty .   Bas ica l ly ,  i t  wants  
to  say ,  hey look,  I  made th is  b ig  commitment ,  you can ' t  k ind of  jus t  go  
run in  th is  or  tha t  d i rec t ion  and leave  me out  in  lef t  f ie ld .  
 Now,  whether  or  not  they wi l l  be  able  to  achieve  the i r  goals  i s  
another  ques t ion ,  but  c lear ly  one  th ing on the i r  mind is  tha t  th is  i s  a t  
leas t  one  source  of  leverage  tha t  they can now have tha t  they d idn ' t  
have  before .  
 COMMISSIONER WESSEL:   I t  was  a lso ,  I  would  say ,  the  
hundreds  of  mi l l ions  of  dol lars  in  subs id ies  tha t  they got  f rom the  
Chinese  tha t  drove the  IRR on the  projec t - -  
 DR.  SIMON:  Made i t  look very  n ice ;  r ight .  
 COMMISSIONER WESSEL:   - -over  the  25 percent  margin .   So 
tha t  may have had something to  do wi th  i t .  
 HEARING COCHAIR SLANE:  Commiss ioner  Mul loy.  
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  Thank you,  Mr.  Chairman.  
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 I 'm going to  ask  a  couple  of  quick  ques t ions  jus t  to  get  some 
benchmarks  es tabl ished and then wi l l  ask  a  la rger  ques t ion  where  you 
could  offer  opinion.  
 So Dr .  Lebby,  who is  on  the  next  panel ,  he  s ta tes  in  h is  
tes t imony i f  you s top manufactur ing,  you wi l l  s top  innovat ing.   Do you 
agree  wi th  tha t  s ta tement ,  yes  or  no?   Doctor ,  i f  you could  jus t  go  
across .  
 DR.  SUTTMEIER:   Not  ent i re ly .  
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  What  about  you,  Dr .  Simon?  
 DR.  SIMON:  Also  not  ent i re ly .  
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  You th ink there 's  a  lo t  of  t ru th  
to  i t ,  but - -  
 DR.  SIMON:  I  th ink there 's  a  lo t  of  t ru th  but  not  to ta l .  
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  What  about  you?  
 MR.  SZAMOSSZEGI:   Most ly .  
   
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  Okay.   Secondly ,  he  says  R&D 
usual ly  fo l lows manufactur ing.   So  when you manufacture ,  then R&D 
wil l  fo l low.   I f  you lose  your  manufactur ing base ,  you ' re  probably  
going to  lose  your  R&D base  as  wel l .  
 Do you agree  wi th  tha t?  
 DR.  SUTTMEIER:   Yes ,  I  th ink that  there’s—yes.  
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  What  about  you,  Dr .  Simon?  
 DR.  SIMON:  Yes .  
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  What  about  you?  
 MR.  SZAMOSSZEGI:   Yes .  
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  Okay.   Then the  th i rd  point .   
Dr .  S imon,  in  your  tes t imony you s ta te  th is :  you say tha t  growth of  
fore ign inves tment  in  China  has  proven to  be  an  impor tant  vehic le  for  
technology t ransfer  inc luding manager ia l  know-how that  has  helped 
China  s teadi ly  move up the  learning curve  in  terms of  taking on more  
sophis t ica ted ,  h igher  va lue-added product ion tasks .  
 So tha t ' s  I  th ink innovat ion;  i sn ' t  i t?  
 DR.  SIMON:  Not  necessar i ly  innovat ion.   I t ' s  learning.   I t ' s  the  
abi l i ty  to  repl ica te ,  the  abi l i ty  to  repeat ,  the  abi l i ty  to  produce  
re l iably ,  on  schedule ,  e t  ce tera ,  e t  ce tera .    
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  Does  i t  move you up fur ther  to  
be  able  to  innovate  than i f  you were  s t i l l  doing other  th ings  tha t  you 
could  do 30 years  ago?  
 DR.  SIMON:  Sure .   I t  puts  you c loser  to  the  edge.  
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  And they ' re  now closer  to  
being an  innovat ive  socie ty .  
 DR.  SIMON:  Yes .  
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 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  You fur ther  s ta te  about  China 's  
leaders  have  wanted China  to  reduce  i t s  dependence  on external  
sources  of  technology,  and they want  to  move China  in to  an  innovat ion 
socie ty .  
 And then you say th is :  China ,  added to  th is  fac t ,  we should  a lso  
add China  nat ional  secur i ty  impera t ives ,  which cont inue  to  be  a  key 
dr iver  behind China 's  des i re  for  s t rengthening i t s  innovat ion 
capabi l i t ies .  
 So  am I  correc t  tha t  they see  innovat ion  as  a  na t ional  secur i ty  
i ssue?  
 DR.  SIMON:  No doubt .  
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  How is  tha t?   Do you a l l  agree  
wi th  tha t?  
 DR.  SUTTMEIER:   Oh,  yes .  
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  So,  in  o ther  words ,  when 
they ' re  moving up,  would  you say i f  we ' re  he lp ing them innovate ,  tha t  
we ' re  being fool ish?  
 DR.  SUTTMEIER:   Is  tha t  the  b ig  ques t ion?  
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  They see  i t  as  a  na t ional  
secur i ty  i ssue ,  and they have pol ic ies  to  get  them there .  
 DR.  SIMON:  They see  i t  as  par t  of  a  threefold;  they see  i t  as  
par t  of  compet i t iveness ,  na t ional  secur i ty ,  and sus ta inabi l i ty .   Those  
are  the  three  legs  of  the  s tool  tha t  dr ive  innovat ion for  China  today.  
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  Yes .   And what  are  we doing?   
I  won ' t  ask  tha t .  
 DR.  SIMON:  Okay.  
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  So we’ve  got  tha t  es tabl ished--
innovat ion can be  a  na t ional  secur i ty  i ssue  and your  abi l i ty  to  move up 
the  food chain;  correc t?   There 's  another  wi tness  tha t  wi l l  come in  
la ter  on ,  Dr .  Ar thurs ,  and he  s ta tes  on page three  of  h is  tes t imony,  
we ' re  ta lk ing about  a l l  these  Chinese  s tudents  coming to  America .   And 
he  says :  China  now has  adopted a  pol icy  of  lur ing back top sc ient is ts .   
This  i sn ' t  jus t  happenstance .   I t ' s  a  pol icy .  
 He s ta tes  fur ther :  tha t  the  Chinese  Academy of  Sciences  
announced the i r  p lan  to  ent ice  s tudents  to  come back only  days  af ter  
the  Congress  Par ty  of  the  Centra l  Commit tee  es tabl ished tha t  pol icy .   
And he  says  tha t  they ' re  ca l l ing  on s ta te  enterpr ises  and academic  
ins t i tu t ions  to  a t t rac t  more  leading overseas  sc ient is t s ,  especia l ly  
those  on the  cut t ing  edge of  sc ience  and technology,  to  come back.  
 I f  tha t ' s  going on,  does  i t  make as  much sense  for  us  to  be  
br inging as  many Chinese  sc ient is t s  and engineers  over  and get t ing  
them the  top  educat ion we could  g ive  them,  put  them in  the  top  
labora tor ies  in  th is  country ,  and then send them back to  China?   Or  
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would i t  make more  sense  for  us  to  be  t ry ing to  f ind  ways  to  nur ture  
American s tudents  to  get  in to  those  pos i t ions  and advance  our  
innovat ive  capaci ty?  
 I  ask  a l l  of  you.  
 DR.  SUTTMEIER:   Wel l ,  the  la t ter ,  as  Commiss ioner  
Bar tholomew pointed  out ,  i s  going to  be  a  longer- term objec t ive ,  I  
th ink,  to  make that  happen because  those  of  us  who teach the  young,  
we see  the  in teres t  in  pursuing careers  in  sc ience  and engineer ing has  
not  been so  great .   Maybe now that  you can ' t  make a  mi l l ion  dol lars  on  
Wal l  S t ree t ,  the  bes t  and the  br ightes t  wi l l  go  back in to  sc ience .  
 But  I  th ink one  should  be  a  l i t t le  b i t  careful  about  how you 
unders tand those  points  tha t  you quote .   Because ,  f i r s t  of  a l l ,  the  bes t  
and the  br ightes t  have  not  gone back to  China .   Our  col league tha t  we 
have worked wi th  has  looked a t  th is  ques t ion ,  and by and large ,  the  
bes t  and the  br ightes t  Chinese  s tay  here  because  i t ' s  so  much bet ter  to  
work profess ional ly .  
 Now,  you do have th is  accelera ted  ef for t  to  lure  people  back 
made poss ib le  by  the  f inancia l  c r i s i s ,  in  par t .   The Chinese  are  wi l l ing  
to  get  ta lent  wherever  they can ge t  i t .   But  in teres t ingly ,  i t ' s  not  only  
Chinese  tha t  they ' re  t ry ing to  recrui t ,  they ' re  t ry ing to  recrui t  anybody.  
 That ' s  the  compet i t ion  for  ta lent .  
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  Since  my t ime is  l imi ted ,  Dr .  
Simon,  do you have anything you want  to  add?  
 DR.  SIMON:  In  December ,  the  Organizat ion  Depar tment  of  the  
Communis t  Par ty  announced the  Thousand Person Returnee  Program,  
and th is  program is  des igned to  take  advantage  of  the  f inancia l  c r i s i s  
to  br ing people  back.  
 But  i t ' s  very  c lear ,  as  Dr .  Sut tmeier  sa id ,  some of  the  bes t  s t i l l  
want  to  be  in  the  Uni ted  Sta tes ,  and there  i s  an  anchor .   The  anchor  are  
the i r  fami l ies  and the i r  chi ldren  who they want  to  see  get  educat ion  
here  in  the  Uni ted  Sta tes ,  and tha t ' s  one  of  the  most  impor tant  reasons  
why many of  them don ' t  go  back.  
 MR.  SZAMOSSZEGI:   To answer  your  ques t ion ,  I  th ink tha t  i t ' s  
be t ter  to  nour ish  American s tudents ,  but  I  a lso  agree  tha t  tha t ' s  a  long-
term under taking.  
 Dr .  Sut tmeier  ment ioned tha t  the  f inancia l  c r i s i s  has  probably  
changed some incent ives  in  the  Uni ted  Sta tes .   That  comment  was  
maybe in  jes t ,  I  don ' t  know.   But  I  th ink tha t  tha t ' s  been a  b ig  problem,  
tha t  we 've  had incent ives  tha t  have drawn a  lo t  of  the  bes t  and the  
br ightes t  in to  f inancia l  engineer ing,  and tha t ' s  been to  our  de t r iment .  
 But ,  f ina l ly ,  I  th ink tha t  by  exper iencing what  we 've  exper ienced 
wi th  manufactur ing,  about  i t  i s  increas ingly  c lear  tha t  manufactur ing 
and R&D are  in ter l inked;  where  one  goes ,  the  o ther  tends  to  migra te .   
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The poor  re turns  in  manufactur ing and higher  re turns  to  f inancia l  
engineer ing,  are  two s ides  of  the  same coin .  
 People  don ' t  want  to  go in to  f inancia l  engineer ing because  i t ' s - -
you can make a  lo t  of  money,  but  manufactur ing,  on  the  o ther  hand,  
you ' re  ge t t ing  beaten  down by impor ts  a l l  the  t ime.   I t ' s  not  as  
prof i table .   And I  th ink tha t ' s  par t  of  the  same problem.  
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  Thank you.  
 That  was  very  helpful .   I  apprecia te  a l l  of  you giving me that  
oppor tuni ty  to  get  those  ques t ions  out .  
 HEARING COCHAIR SLANE:  Commiss ioner  Videnieks .  
 COMMISSIONER VIDENIEKS:   Mine  wi l l  be  very  br ief  because  
we 're  ge t t ing  there .   Jus t  to  k ind of  sum i t  up ,  a  lo t  of  impor tant  
i ssues- -okay--but  re la t ive ly  how large  percentage-wise  i s  the  IT sec tor  
of  the i r  na t ional  income,  the  GDP?  What  are  we rea l ly  ta lk ing about?  
 But  then,  again ,  how capi ta l  in tens ive  i s  i t?   How many sa te l l i tes  do  
they have up there ,  communicat ion ,  c iv i l ian ,  and what  are  we rea l ly  
ta lk ing about  in  te rms of  s ize?  
 DR.  SIMON:  Wel l ,  about  1 .6  percent  th is  pas t  year  was  spent  
for  R&D as  a  percentage  of  GDP.  
 COMMISSIONER VIDENIEKS:   R&D.  Al l  of  R&D? 
 DR.  SIMON:  R&D.  Al l  in .   And the  in teres t ing  th ing,  however ,  
i s  tha t  i f  you look a t  the  Bat te l le  Ins t i tu te 's  recent  s tudy,  they say  tha t  
looking a t  R&D among a l l  of  the  countr ies  in  the  wor ld ,  China  i s  
among the  fas tes t  growing—in terms of  growth of  R&D expendi tures .  
 COMMISSIONER VIDENIEKS:   Growing.   Not  there  yet .   We 're  
way ahead.  
 DR.  SIMON:  Right .   According to  some OECD data ,  China  s t i l l  
accounts  for  only  about  n ine- ten  percent  of  g lobal  R&D spending.   We 
account  for  some 30 plus  percent .  
 So  the  d i f ferent ia l  i s  subs tant ia l ,  and I  th ink when Rich 
Appelbaum ta lks ,  he  wi l l  ta lk  about  nanotech,  the  d i f ference  in  the  
inves tment  in  nanotech in  China  versus  what  our  inves tment  i s  i s  
subs tant ia l ,  though.   Again ,  these  are  d i f ferent  dol lars .  
 COMMISSIONER VIDENIEKS:   How many c iv i l ian  
communicat ion  sa te l l i tes  wi l l  they have up there  and who owns them,  
who put  them up there ,  who mainta ins  them? 
 MR.  SZAMOSSZEGI:   Don ' t  know.  
 DR.  SIMON:  Don ' t  know.  
 COMMISSIONER WESSEL:   You s tumped them.  
  DR.  SUTTMEIER:   Severa l .   I  don ' t  th ink there  i s  too  
many.   And I  th ink most  of  them probably  are  s ta te  owned.  
 COMMISSIONER VIDENIEKS:   I f  they were  to  execute  tha t  
WTO government  procurement  agreement ,  would  the  communicat ions  
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sector  be  open to  compet i t ion  by us  and others?  
 DR.  SIMON:  According to  the  WTO requirements ,  gradual  
opening of  the  te lecom sector  on  both  the  equipment  and services  s ide  
i s  supposed to  be  par t  of  the  agreement .   I t ' s  lagged a  l i t t le  b i t .   I t  
hasn ' t  gone the  way or  as  fas t  as  we had hoped,  but  i t ' s  moving.   I t ' s  
been moving in  the  r ight  d i rec t ion ,  jus t  s lowly,  very  s lowly.  
 COMMISSIONER VIDENIEKS:   Are  we ta lk ing about  a  minor  
par t  of  the i r  GDP that ' s  f lashing the  news or  i t ' s  something tha t ' s  got  a  
t rend to  i t  or  what?  
 MR.  SZAMOSSZEGI:   I  could  probably  get  you and I ' l l  endeavor  
to  ge t  the  Commiss ion the  exact  da ta .   But  I  th ink i t ' s  growing given 
the  large  amount  of  inves tments  tha t  have  occurred  in  th is  sec tor  over  
the  pas t  seven or  e ight  years .  
 COMMISSIONER VIDENIEKS:   I t  would  be  n ice  to  know what  
we ' re  ta lk ing about  re la t ive ly ,  the  re la t ive  ra tes  of  growth of  U.S.  IT 
sec tor ,  the i r  IT sec tor ,  how i t  s tands  g lobal ly ,  how many bi rds  do we 
have up there ,  and so  for th ,  you know?   
 Wel l ,  thank you.  
 HEARING COCHAIR SLANE:  Thank you,  gent lemen.  
 I t ' s  been very ,  very  helpful .   We rea l ly  apprecia te  your  t ime 
coming here  and we wish  good speedy t r ip  back to  Oregon and 
Pennsylvania ,  and we ' l l  s tand adjourned for  ten  minutes .  
 [Whereupon,  a  shor t  recess  was  taken. ]  
 
 
PANEL IV:  CHINA’S NANOTECHNOLOGY AND 
OPTOELECTRONICS INDUSTRIES 
 
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  This  i s  panel  four ,  and we 're  
looking a t  "China 's  Nanotechnology and Optoelec t ronics  Indust r ies ."   
And we 're  t ry ing to  look a t  these  in  terms of  innovat ive  indust r ies ,  
where  China  i s  t ry ing to  develop and has  a  s t ra tegy to  t ry  and develop 
these .  
 We're  very  for tunate  to  have  three  d is t inguished wi tnesses .   Dr .  
Michael  Lebby is  the  Pres ident  and CEO of  the  Optoelec t ronics  
Indust ry  Development  Associa t ion .    
 Dr .  Lebby has  more  than 175 U.S.  pa tents  i ssued in  the  f ie ld  of  
optoelec t ronics  and his  career  has  spanned a l l  aspects  of  the  bus iness  
f rom research and development  to  manufactur ing to  f inance  to  sa les  
and market ing.  
 Dr .  Eugene Arthurs  i s  the  CEO of  the  In ternat ional  Socie ty  for  
Opt ics  and Photonics .   He has  a  Ph.D.  in  appl ied  physics  and is  an  
ac t ive  member  of  numerous  sc ient i f ic  socie t ies .  
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 Dr .  Richard  Appelbaum is  the  Professor  of  Sociology and Global  
and In ternat ional  Studies  a t  the  Univers i ty  of  Cal i fornia  in  Santa  
Barbara .  
 He is  current ly  engaged in  a  s tudy of  h igh technology 
development  in  China  focusing on nanotechnology.  
 So we 're  very  for tunate  to  have you gent lemen wi th  us  today and 
why don ' t  we s tar t  wi th  you,  Dr .  Lebby.   And we ' l l  t ry  and go seven 
minute  s ta tements ,  more  or  less ,  and then we ' l l  open up to  
commiss ioners  f ive  minute  rounds .  
 
STATEMENT OF DR. MICHAEL LEBBY 
PRESIDENT AND CEO, OPTOELECTRONICS INDUSTRY 
DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION, WASHINGTON, DC 
  
 DR.  LEBBY:  Good af ternoon.  
 OIDA has  over  18 members  who research,  manufacture  and se l l  
optoelec t ronic  components  and sys tems in  appl ica t ions  such as  
communicat ions ,  defense ,  d isplays ,  so l id-s ta te  l ight ing ,  sens ing,  and 
solar  energy.  
 OIDA is  in  a  unique posi t ion  to  address  the  i ssues  posed by the  
Commiss ion.   OIDA members  inc lude  large  companies  such as  Genera l  
Dynamics ,  Cisco,  Corning,  Telcordia ,  JDSU,  and a lso  fas t -growing 
ent repreneur ia l  companies .  
 In  the  pas t  f ive  years ,  the  Chinese  government  has  made a  
concer ted  ef for t  to  t rans i t ion  f rom a  "copy and assemble"  economy that  
re l ies  on  low labor  and manufactur ing cos ts  in to  a  innovat ion-dr iven 
one.   I t  i s  focus ing on higher-value  products  and is  encouraging i t s  
companies  to  move up the  value  chain .   China  i s  seeding a  compet i t ive  
optoelec t ronics  indust ry  by suppor t ing  a  wide  range of  R&D act iv i t ies  
f rom mater ia ls  to  devices  to  manufactur ing technology.  
 As  par t  of  i t s  indust r ia l  pol icy ,  the  Chinese  government  
encourages  fore ign companies  to  es tabl ish  fac i l i t ies  in  China .   The 
subsid ies  tha t  the  Chinese  government  of fers  are  a  major  incent ive  for  
U.S.  companies  to  shi f t  R&D and product ion to  China .  
 They inc lude  tax  incent ives ,  bui ld ing subsid ies ,  f ree  t rade  zones ,  
and low-cost  labor .   Many U.S.  companies  see  these  incent ives  as  a  
means  to  survive  in  an  increas ingly  compet i t ive  g lobal  bus iness  
environment .  
 Corpora te  s t ra tegies  tha t  keep product  des ign in  the  U.S.  whi le  
moving manufactur ing overseas  over  t ime wi l l  d i lu te  our  abi l i ty  to  
innovate .   Most  innovat ion i s  incrementa l ,  not  revolut ionary .   I t  
cons is ts  of  constant  smal l  improvements  to  the  product  and the  
manufactur ing process  tha t  resul t  in  be t ter  performance and lower  cos t .  
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 In  optoelec t ronics ,  even the  s l ightes t  change in  the  y ie lds  of  
manufactur ing processes  can af fec t  the  economic  v iabi l i ty  of  a  
company.   Mainta in ing the  c lose  proximi ty  of  R&D to  manufactur ing i s  
essent ia l  for  dr iv ing process  improvement  and innovat ion.  
 In i t ia l ly ,  jobs  tha t  move overseas  to  China  are  not  jobs  tha t  
require  a  h ighly  ski l led  workforce .   China  has  a  la rge  number  of  h ighly  
educated  people ,  and wi th  th is  resul t ,  Chinese  companies  can readi ly  
move up the  value  chain .   Consequent ly ,  h ighly  ski l led  U.S.  jobs  of ten  
are  the  next  ones  to  fo l low.  
 Many OIDA member  companies  have a l ready moved assembly 
and packaging to  China ,  but  have  kept  the  optoelec t ronics  chip  
fabr ica t ion  fac i l i t ies  in  the  U.S.   Chip  des ign is  complex and the  
embedded in te l lec tual  proper ty  provides  the  compet i t ive  edge for  the  
f ina l  product .  
 U.S.  optoelec t ronics  companies  are  concerned tha t  i f  the  chip  
fabr ica t ion  p lants  move overseas  as  wel l ,  th is  market  sec tor  wi l l  a lso  
be  los t .  
 Manufactur ing your  core  technology overseas  can be  per i lous .   
One OIDA member  tha t  t ransferred  chip  fabr ica t ion to  China  found 
tha t  the  fac i l i ty  making the  chips  was  a lso  se l l ing  them to  the  
member 's  compet i tors  in  China .  
 The in te l lec tual  proper ty  in  optoelec t ronics  of ten  res ides  in  the  
ski l l s  of  people  as  much as  in  the  corpora te  t rade  secre ts  and issued 
patents .   Chinese  nat ionals ,  who t ra in  in  U.S.  univers i t ies ,  work a t  
U.S.  companies ,  and then re turn  to  China ,  lead  to  a  cont inuous  f low of  
core  ski l l s  leaving the  U.S.  
 A leading U.S.  producer  of  optoelec t ronic  components  recent ly  
opened an  optoelec t ronics  R&D center  in  China .   When OIDA asked i f  
China  had the  requis i te  ta lent  to  run and manage the  R&D team,  the  
company responded that  i t  had sent  U.S.  exper ts  to  China  to  br ing the  
Chinese  engineer ing leaders  up to  speed.  
 The U.S.  government  needs  to  fund optoelec t ronics  R&D 
aggress ively .   I t  needs  to  p lace  an  increased emphasis ,  however ,  on  
development  in  addi t ion  to  suppor t ing  pure  research.   Exis t ing  
government  agencies ,  which fund research  a l ready,  have  cer ta in ly  the  
resources  to  implement  such a  shi f t  in  focus .  
 OIDA members  bel ieve  tha t  d i rec t  government  suppor t  and 
programs are  considerably  more  ef fec t ive  than indi rec t  suppor t .   The  
impact  of  d i rec t  government  suppor t  i s  readi ly  measurable .  Focused 
optoelec t ronics  R&D programs wi l l  lead  to  concre te  markets  and 
tangible  resul ts .  
 Indi rec t  government  suppor t ,  such as  tax  credi ts ,  a re  of  l i t t le  
va lue  to  ent repreneur ia l  s tar t -ups  tha t  a re  far  f rom genera t ing  prof i t s  
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tha t  tax  credi ts  offse t .   Even larger  corpora t ions  wi l l  not  benef i t  f rom 
tax  credi ts  i f  they are  not  earning prof i t s .  
 In  b iophotonics ,  for  example ,  the  Nat ional  Science  Foundat ion 
and NIH are  the  pr imary sources  of  government  funding.   Today,  the  
NSF and NIH pr imar i ly  fund research a t  academia  and not - for-prof i t  
research organiza t ions .   OIDA members  suppor t  an  expanded ro le  
where  these  agencies  fund innovat ions  a t  bus inesses  as  wel l .  
 Areas  where  government  optoelec t ronics  inves tments  can  y ie ld  
resul ts  inc lude:  
 Communicat ions .   The implementa t ion  of  a  t rue  h igh-speed 
In ternet  inf ras t ructure- -one  terabi t  per  second in  the  core  backbone of  
the  network and one  g igabi t  per  second to  the  home.    This  wi l l  require  
government-sponsored programs that  he lp  develop the  optoelec t ronics  
inf ras t ructure  of  components ,  modules ,  subsystems and f iber .  
 Displays .   Al though glass-based f la t  panel  manufactur ing takes  
p lace  a lmost  exclus ively  in  Asia ,  the  U.S.  can  es tabl ish  a  dominant  
pos i t ion  in  ro l l - to- ro l l  manufactur ing of  f lexible  d isplays  based on 
organic  l ight  emi t t ing  d iode  technology.   Large  companies ,  for  
example ,  l ike  Kodak and 3M,  have the  requis i te  exper t i se  to  innovate  
and manufacture  in  ro l l - to- ro l l  process ing,  but  the  technica l  r i sks  are  
s t i l l  h igh.   Numerous  U.S.  s tar t -ups  are  leaders  in  th is  area .  
 Computa t ion .   Inves t  in  next -genera t ion  communicat ion  for  
computer  processors .   Future  processors  and mul t i -core  s i l icon 
in tegra ted  c i rcui t  engines  wi l l  need optoelec t ronics  to  suppor t  chip- to-
chip  and in t ra-chip  in terconnect  technology.  
 Sol id  s ta te  l ight ing .   Accelera te  inves tment  in  indust ry-dr iven 
R&D in  h igh br ightness  l ight  emi t t ing  d iodes .   This  inc ludes  advanced 
mater ia ls  sys tems,  manufactur ing equipment  inf ras t ructure ,  and device  
ef f ic iency.   For  example ,  se t  a  goal  to  advance  the  s ta te-of-ar t  by  
increas ing the  wafer  s ize  f rom two inches  in  an  LED plant  to  e ight  
inches .  
 Optoelec t ronic  devices .   Inves t  in  photonic  in tegra ted  c i rcui ts .   
This  technology is  based both  on s i l icon and indium phosphide .   PIC 
devices  wi l l  t ransform optoelec t ronics  jus t  as  the  in tegra ted  c i rcui t  
t ransformed semiconductor  technology 50 years  ago.   For  PICs,  
Moore 's  law,  made famous by the  semiconductor  indust ry ,  i s  jus t  
beginning.  
 Image sensors .   Inves t  in  in tegra t ing  s i l icon image sensors  wi th  
IC technologies ,  leading to  advanced imaging capabi l i ty  for  defense  
and medic ine .  
 Biophotonics .   Suppor t  mul t id isc ip l inary  projec ts  tha t  promote  
bet ter  communicat ion  and innovat ion among the  optoelec t ronics ,  
b io logica l  and medical  communi t ies .   Fos ter  commercia l  innovat ion by 
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suppor t ing  optoelec t ronics  R&D for  medical  and heal thcare  
appl ica t ions .  
 Defense .   Optoelec t ronics  technology increas ingly  provides  the  
performance edge in  defense  and avionics  appl ica t ions .   DoD needs  a  
t rus ted ,  U.S. -based source  of  photonic  devices .   A photonics  foundry 
tha t  develops  model ing tools  and val ida ted  common processes  wi l l  
ensure  v iable  U.S.  sources .  
 Solar  photovol ta ics .   Like  d isplays ,  photovol ta ic  technology wi l l  
benef i t  f rom innovat ions  in  ro l l - to- ro l l  process ing.   The U.S.  can  
capture  leadership  in  th is  impor tant  and growing market ,  and through 
i t ,  the  a l ternat ive  energy markets .  
 Green photonics  technology.   Optoelec t ronic  components  wi l l  
dr ive  energy ef f ic iency improvements  in  a  wide  range of  appl ica t ions  
such as  moni tor ing--sensors  in  o i l  wel ls ;  automobi le  engines ;  wind 
turbine  b lades ,  for  example;  in  the  f ie ld  of  genera t ion ,  so lar  ce l l s ;  and 
in  the  f ie ld  of  conservat ion ,  so l id-s ta te  l ight ing .  
 OIDA's  market  research forecas ts  tha t  by  2020,  green photonics  
appl ica t ions  wi l l  account  for  54  percent  of  the  optoelec t ronics  
components  market .   This  in terdisc ip l inary  area  i s  h ighly  appropr ia te  
for  government- led  inves tment .  
 In  addi t ion  to  our  tes t imony,  I  respect fu l ly  refer  the  Commiss ion 
to  the  wri t ten  s ta tement  of  one  of  our  member  companies ,  Inf inera ,  a  
company that  has  rea l ly  grown very  quickly  on PICs and recent ly  went  
publ ic .  
 In  prepar ing th is  tes t imony,  many people  I  contac ted  s t ressed the  
impor tance  of  th is  decis ive  ac t ion  by the  U.S.  government  and indust ry  
now.   Optoelec t ronics  s i t s  a t  the  in tersec t ion  of  mul t ip le  technica l  
d isc ip l ines .   U.S.  univers i t ies  and indust ry  are  par t icular ly  adept  a t  
br inging diverse  people  together  to  work on complex problems.  
 We have,  by  the  nature  of  our  inherent  d ivers i ty ,  an  advantage .   
What  for  many presents  a  chal lenge for  us  comes natura l ly .  
 Thank you for  th is  oppor tuni ty  to  present  our  indust ry 's  
perspect ive .  
 [The s ta tement  fo l lows:]  
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President and CEO, Optoelectronics Industry Development Association 
Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 
Hearing on China’s Industrial Policy and Its Impact 
on U.S. Companies, Workers and the American Economy 
 
I am the President and CEO of the Optoelectronics Industry Development Association 
(OIDA), an industry association based in Washington, DC. OIDA has over 80 members 
who research, manufacture, and sell optoelectronics components and systems in 
applications such as communications, defense, displays, solid-state lighting, sensing, and 
solar energy.  
OIDA is in a unique position to address the issues posed by this Commission. OIDA 
members include large companies such as General Dynamics, Cisco, Corning, Telcordia, 
and JDSU, and fast-growing entrepreneurial companies. 
In the past five years, the Chinese government has made a concerted effort to transition 
from a “copy and assemble” economy that relies on low labor and manufacturing costs 
into an innovation-driven one. It is focusing on higher-value products and is encouraging 
its companies to move up the value chain. China is seeding a competitive optoelectronics 
industry by supporting a wide range of R&D activities from materials to devices to 
manufacturing technology.  
 
“If an optoelectronics effort looks promising, China will support a commercial 
start-up 
until it’s profitable” 
 
The Chinese government supports optoelectronics through the research, development, 
and production phases (R&D&P). An example is their new multi-million dollar Wuhan 
National Laboratory for Optoelectronics (WNLO). It is one of the five national 
laboratories formed and sponsored by the Chinese Ministry of Science and Technology. 
The mission of WNLO is to become the innovation base for optoelectronics in China, to 
promote and lead the complete commercialization system for “Wuhan Optics Valley of 
China,” and to contribute to the growth of optoelectronics industries through technology 
transfer.  
The government also uses consortia such as the Northern Microelectronics R&D Center, 
which has the Institute of Microelectronics of the Tsinghua University in Beijing as a 
principle member, to foster academic-industry collaborations.  
 
“U.S. companies are competing with countries not companies” 
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As part of its industrial policy, the Chinese government encourages foreign companies to 
establish facilities in China. The subsidies that the Chinese government offers are a major 
incentive for U.S. companies to shift R&D and production to China. They include tax 
incentives, building subsidies, free trade zones, and low-cost labor. Many U.S. 
companies see these incentives as a means to survive in an increasingly competitive 
global business environment. 
Corporate strategies that keep product design in the U.S. while moving manufacturing 
overseas over time will dilute our ability to innovate. Most innovation is incremental, not 
revolutionary. It consists of constant small improvements to the product and 
manufacturing process that result in better performance and lower cost. In 
optoelectronics, even the slightest change in the yields of manufacturing processes can 
affect the economic viability of a company. Maintaining the close proximity of R&D to 
manufacturing is essential for driving process improvement and innovation.  
 
“If you stop manufacturing, you will eventually stop innovating” 
 
Initially, jobs that move overseas to China are not jobs that require a highly skilled 
workforce. China has a large number of highly educated people and with this resource, 
Chinese companies can readily move up the value chain. Consequently, highly skilled 
U.S. jobs often are the next ones to follow.  
 
“R&D usually follows manufacturing; optoelectronics is no different” 
 
Many OIDA member companies have already moved assembly and packaging to China, 
but have kept the optoelectronics chip fabrication facilities in the U.S. Chip design is 
complex and the embedded intellectual property provides the competitive edge for the 
final product. U.S. optoelectronics companies are concerned that if the chip fabrication 
plants move overseas as well, this market sector will also be lost.  
Manufacturing your core technology overseas can be perilous. One OIDA member that 
transferred chip fabrication to China found that the facility making the chips was also 
selling them to the member’s competitors in China! 
The intellectual property in optoelectronics often resides in the skills of people as much 
as in corporate trade secrets and issued patents. Chinese nationals who train at U.S. 
universities, work at U.S. companies, and then return to China, lead to a continuous flow 
of core skills leaving the U.S.  
A leading U.S. producer of optoelectronics components recently opened an 
optoelectronics R&D center in China. When OIDA asked if China had the requisite talent 
to run and manage the R&D team, the company responded that it had sent U.S. experts to 
China to bring the Chinese engineering leaders up to speed.  
181
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
A number of optoelectronics companies have 90% of their employees in Asia and retain 
only 10% in the United States. Their U.S.-based jobs are increasingly in sales and 
marketing – not in engineering or manufacturing. We can expect more optoelectronics 
companies to move R&D and production to China unless the U.S. government takes 
effective steps to support the domestic industry.  
 
“U.S. optoelectronics companies are increasingly becoming simply marketing 
outlets for Chinese-manufactured goods” 
 
The United States government needs to fund optoelectronics R&D aggressively. It needs 
to place an increased emphasis, however, on Development in addition to supporting pure 
Research. Existing government agencies, which fund research already, have the resources 
to implement such a shift in focus. 
OIDA members believe that direct government support and programs are considerably 
more effective than indirect support.1 The impact of direct government support is readily 
measurable. Focused optoelectronics R&D programs will lead to concrete markets and 
tangible results. Indirect government support, such as tax credits, are of little value to 
entrepreneurial start-ups that are far from generating profits that tax credits offset. Even 
larger corporations will not benefit from tax credits if they are not earning profits.  
The U.S. government should increase its time horizon for measuring program success – 
perhaps two or three times longer than venture capital expects for its investments. A 
model could be the New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organization 
(NEDO), in Japan.2 NEDO’s programs last five to ten years. This gives companies the 
opportunity to nurture innovative technologies and retain skilled labor.   
The government can improve and expand worthwhile existing programs like the Small 
Business Innovative Research (SBIR). The published SBIR topics are often so narrow, 
however, that innovative new optoelectronics technologies do not fall within their scope. 
Broad topics, on the other hand, would allow companies to put forth their concepts and 
increase the likelihood that these funds will lead to commercial products. OIDA members 
support recent legislation relaxing Small Business Administration rules that limited 
                     
1 An example of such an indirect subsidy was the tax incentive for repatriating income of foreign 
subsidiaries contained the 2004 America Jobs Creation Act, and considered by Congress in the most recent 
stimulus package. Economists have both supported, (Allen Sinai, “A $545 Billion Private Stimulus Plan; 
Let's Bring Home Foreign Earnings Without Tax Penalty” Wall Street Journal, January 28, 2009,) and 
criticized (Chye-Ching Huang, “Proposed Tax Break for Multinationals Would be Poor Stimulus; 
‘Dividend Repatriation Tax Holiday’ Failed in 2004, Unlikely to Work Now” Center on Budget & Policy 
Priorities, January 30, 2008) this method for stimulating corporate investment. For additional discussion, 
please see, David L. Brumbaugh, “Tax Exemption for Repatriated Foreign Earnings: Proposals and 
Analysis” Congressional Research Service, April 27, 2006. 
2 NEDO is a semi governmental organization under the Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
(MITI) http://www.wtec.org/loyola/scpa/09_11.htm. 
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participation by venture-backed companies. 
In biophotonics, the National Science Foundation (NSF) and National Institutes of Health 
(NIH) are the primary sources of government funding. Today, the NSF and NIH 
primarily fund research at academia and not-for-profit research organizations3. OIDA 
members support an expanded role where these agencies fund innovations at businesses 
as well. 
The U.S. has already ceded major sectors of the optoelectronics industry to overseas 
competitors. Notable examples include displays (South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, China), 
solar photovoltaic modules (Germany, Japan), image sensors (Japan, Taiwan), and high 
power lasers (Germany). Notwithstanding this reality, opportunities in optoelectronics 
still abound. The U.S. government must act aggressively and decisively to help U.S. 
industry establish dominance in emerging applications domains.  
 
 
“U.S. needs to act aggressively and decisively now, with focused optoelectronics 
programs” 
 
Areas where government optoelectronics investment can yield results include: 
a) Communications:  The implementation of a true high-speed internet infrastructure 
(1 terabit per second in the core backbone of the network, and 1 gigabit per 
second to the home) will require government-sponsored programs that help 
develop the optoelectronics infrastructure of components, modules, subsystems, 
and fiber. 
b) Displays:  Although glass-based flat panel manufacturing takes place almost 
exclusively in Asia, the U.S. can establish a dominant position in roll-to-roll 
manufacturing of flexible displays based on organic light emitting diode 
technology. Large companies like Kodak and 3M have the requisite expertise to 
innovate and manufacture in roll-to-roll processing, but the technical risks are still 
high. Numerous U.S. start-ups are leaders in this area. 
c) Computation:  Invest in next-generation communication for computer processors. 
Future processors and multi-core silicon integrated circuit engines will need 
optoelectronics to support chip-to-chip and intra chip interconnect technology. 
d) Solid State Lighting:  Accelerate investment in industry-driven R&D in high 
brightness light emitting diodes. This includes advanced materials systems, 
manufacturing equipment infrastructure, and device efficiency. For example, set a 
                     
3 At hearings on the 2008 SBIR Reauthorization legislation, Mark Heeson of the National Venture Capital 
Association stated, “that only 0.4% of extramural grants from NIH went to businesses.” 
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goal to advance the state-of-the-art by increasing the wafer size from 2 inches to 8 
inches.  
e) Optoelectronics Devices:  Invest in photonic integrated circuit (PIC) technology 
based on both silicon and indium phosphide. PIC devices will transform 
optoelectronics just as the integrated circuit (IC) transformed semiconductor 
technology 50 years ago. For PICs, Moore’s law4, made famous by the 
semiconductor industry, is just beginning.  
f) Image Sensors:  Invest in integrating silicon image sensors with IC technologies, 
leading to advanced imaging capability for defense and medicine.  
g) Biophotonics:  Support multi-disciplinary projects that promote better 
communication and innovation among the optoelectronics, biological, and 
medical communities. Foster commercial innovation by supporting 
optoelectronics R&D for medical and healthcare applications. 
h) Defense:  Optoelectronics technology increasingly provides the performance edge 
in defense and avionics applications. DoD needs a trusted, U.S.-based source of 
photonic devices. A photonics foundry that develops modeling tools and validated 
common processes will ensure viable U.S. sources. 
i) Solar Photovoltaics:  Like displays, photovoltaic technology will benefit from 
innovations in roll-to-roll processing. The U.S. can capture leadership in this 
important and growing market and through it, the alternative energy market. 
                     
4 Moore’s law is the empirical observation that the transistor density of integrated circuits doubles every 18 
months. 
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j) “Green” Photonics Technology:  Optoelectronics components will drive energy 
efficiency improvements in a wide range of applications, such as monitoring – 
sensors in oil wells, automobile engines, wind turbine blades, generation – solar 
cells and conservation – solid-state lighting. OIDA’s market research forecasts 
that by 2020, green photonics applications will account for 54% of the 
optoelectronics components market. This inter-disciplinary area is highly 
appropriate for government-led investment. 
In addition to our testimony, I respectfully refer the Commission to the written statement 
of our member company, Infinera. 
In preparing this testimony, many people I contacted stressed the importance of decisive 
action by the U.S. government and industry now. Optoelectronics sits at the intersection 
of multiple technical disciplines. U.S. universities and industry are particularly adept at 
bringing diverse people together to work on complex problems. We have, by the nature 
of our inherent diversity, an advantage. What for many presents a challenge, for us comes 
naturally.  
Thank you for this opportunity to present our industry’s perspective.1
 
 
 
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  Thank you,  Dr .  Lebby.  
 Dr .  Ar thurs .  
 
STATEMENT OF DR. EUGENE ARTHURS 
CEO, SPIE,  THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR OPTICS AND 
PHOTONICS,  BELLINGHAM, WASHINGTON 
 
 DR.  ARTHURS:  Good af ternoon.   Thank you to  the  Commiss ion 
for  the  oppor tuni ty  to  voice  my concerns  and those  of  many of  our  U.S.  
members .  
 We are  a  not - for-prof i t  socie ty  based in  Bel l ingham,  
Washington.   We have about  10,000 members  in  optoelec t ronics  
technologies  in  the  U.S.  and about  400 corpora te  members .   We 're  a  
l i t t le  outs ide  the  pale  in  te rms of  sc ient i f ic  associa t ions  in  tha t  we 
value  convers ion of  sc ience  in to  product .   We rea l ly  are  more  market -
dr iven than technology or  sc ience-push dr iven than the  average  
sc ient i f ic  socie ty .  
 We run the  larges t  conferences  in  optoelec t ronics  in  the  wor ld .   
In  the  U.S. ,  par t icular ly ,  we run Photonics  West  which has  about  a  
thousand exhibi t ing  companies  f rom al l  over  the  wor ld ,  not  so  much 
re la ted  to  the  consumer  market  but  technology companies .   We a lso  are  
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going to  be  running shor t ly  "Defense ,  Secur i ty  and Sensing"  in  
Orlando,  Flor ida ,  wi th  over  500 exhibi t ing  companies  in  the  f ie ld  of  
optoelec t ronics  in  defense .  
 When we look a t  our  s is ter  socie t ies  in  China ,  they rea l ly  are  
very  weak,  as  I  say  in  my tes t imony,  though,  tha t  i s  another  ta rget  tha t  
the  government  has ,  to  improve them and make them essent ia l ly  as  
ef fec t ive  as  the  socie t ies  have  been in  enhancing U.S.  sc ience .  
 One th ing tha t  s t r ikes  me about  the  Chinese  Academy of  
Sciences  i s  tha t  unl ike  most  academies  of  sc iences  throughout  the  
wor ld ,  i t  ac tual ly  ta lks  about  advanced manufactur ing technology and 
automat ion technology.   This  i s  anathema to  most  academies  of  
sc iences  throughout  the  wor ld .  
 This  i s  rea l ly  the  cent ra l  point  tha t  I  would  have:  we are  about  to  
inves t  a  lo t  more  in  R&D.  I  be l ieve  th is  to  be  based on models  of  
t ransforming R&D into  economic  success  tha t  no  longer  exis ts .   I  th ink 
tha t  wi thout  paying a t tent ion  to  the  manufactur ing s ide ,  as  we have not  
been doing--we did  ta lk  about  the  ATP program,  which is  gone,  I  
be l ieve--we now have the  TIP program at  $100 mi l l ion  a  year ,  which i s  
" in  the  noise ,"  to  use  the  express ion used ear l ier .  
 We are  not  as  a  na t ion  paying a t tent ion  to  the  manufactur ing,  as  
I  see  a l l  the  nat ions  in  Asia  are  doing,  and China ,  in  par t icular .  
 Mike  has  covered optoelec t ronics .   The f ie ld  i s  ext raordinar i ly  
broad,  enables  a  lo t  of  technology:  enables  a  lo t  of  the  economy.   One 
of  the  th ings  he  a l ready ment ioned was  solar  energy.   One of  the  
par t icular  ways  of  doing that ,  of  course ,  i s  photovol ta ics- -probably  the  
most  popular  way a t  the  moment .   And i t  was  las t  year  tha t  China  
became the  wor ld 's  la rges t  photovol ta ic  producer .  
 I t  expor ted ,  some say,  98  percent  of  what  i t  produced,  but  i t  
cer ta in ly  was  more  than 95 percent .   I  was  a t  an  exhibi t ion  in  Shanghai  
las t  Fr iday,  and i t  was  about  photovol ta ics ,  and I  not iced  there  the  
prominence  g iven to  the  NREL road map,  something that  my tax  
dol lars  pa id  for .  
 Light ing i s  another  huge economic  f ie ld  covered by 
optoelec t ronics .   I t  has  obviously  changed the  wor ld  a l ready,  and I  see  
here  we have the  soon- to-be-out lawed- in-Aust ra l ia ,  an  incandescent  
l ight .    
 The  th i rd-genera t ion  type  l ights ,  LED-type l ights ,  China  has  
taken a  very  s t rong pos i t ion  there ,  too .   These  are  ac tual ly  
manufactured in  China .   What  i s  k ind of  in teres t ing  i s  tha t  there 's  
absolute ly  no t race  of  who manufactured them on the  box,  which is  
la rgely  because  they ' re  in  v io la t ion  of  s igni f icant  IP  of  o ther  
companies .  
 Optoelec t ronics  i s  a lso  v i ta l  to  na t ional  secur i ty .   I t  wi l l  be  
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increas ingly  impor tant  to  the  war  f ighter .   Think of  the  s logan "We 
Own the  Night ."   Wel l ,  we no longer  own the  n ight ,  but  we share  i t .   
We s t i l l  hope to  own the  day and night  in  the  fu ture  wi th  UAVs loaded 
wi th  optoelec t ronic  sensors  and,  of  course ,  a l l  the  t ime we have 
sa te l l i tes  looking down and checking i f  miss i les  are  being launched 
anywhere  in  the  wor ld .   Again ,  based ent i re ly  on optoelec t ronic  
sensors .  
 The  recent  demonst ra t ion  las t  week of  the  e lec t r ic  laser  as  
opposed to  the  long-going-on chemical  laser  program again  fa l l s  
wi th in  our  technology,  and i t  moves  us  much c loser  to  ef fec t ive  bat t le  
space  ant i -miss i le  sys tems a t  the  speed of  l ight .  
 I f  you look a t  my f igures ,  I  have shown one of  the  t rends  in  
e lec t r ica l  engineer ing Ph.D.s  in  the  U.S.   The problem here  i s  not  tha t  
there  are  so  many fore ign-born .   I t ' s  tha t  the  U.S.  has  so  few.   Bear  in  
mind tha t  companies  l ike  Lockheed Mart in  essent ia l ly  only  employ 
U.S. -born  e lec t r ica l  engineers .  
 They ac tual ly  employ about  four  percent  per  year  of  the  output  
of  U.S.  univers i t ies .   I t ' s  going up to  s ix  percent  because  of  a  
demographic  bulge ,  but  they ' re  f inding i t  increas ingly  d i f f icul t  to  
ac tual ly  ge t  them.  
 I  a lso  show a  graph of  the  overseas  Chinese  s tudents  re turning,  
something we touched on in  the  las t  presenta t ion .   I  th ink tha t  there  
wi l l  s t i l l  be  a  f lood of  Chinese  s tudents  coming here  because  they ' re  
ac tual ly  graduat ing now 6.1  mi l l ion  graduates  in  2009 as  opposed to  
1 .4  in  2002.   
 I  was  in  Shanghai  las t  Saturday when there  were  about  a  
thousand of  them taking Engl ish  as  a  second language,  the i r  passpor t  
essent ia l ly  to  a  univers i ty  in  the  Engl ish-speaking wor ld .  
 I  th ink we wi l l  be  see ing increas ing numbers  of  Chinese  s tudents  
s t i l l  coming here  in  spi te  of  the  v isa  d i f f icul t ies .   We wi l l  not  be  
see ing the  br ightes t  and bes t  for  very  much longer  because  they are  the  
ones  who are  get t ing  the  jobs  in  the  newly expanding Chinese  
univers i t ies .  
 I  a lso  show in  one  of  my graphs  the  expendi ture  on R&D.  I t  had 
come up th is  morning:  where  i s  the  R&D going?   As  you can see  in  
th is ,  we ac tual ly  spend qui te  a  considerable  amount  of  money on R&D 
in  the  U.S.   I t ' s  been increas ing s lowly.  
 China ' s  f igures  are  here  both  in  PPP,  which is  purchas ing power  
par i ty  under  market  exchange ra tes ,  and in  purchas ing power  par i ty ,  
China  i s  ac tual ly  number  two in  the  wor ld  now and increas ing qui te  
rapidly .    
 In  purchas ing power  par i ty ,  i f  you do a  projec t ion of  GDP 
expansion and thei r  move towards  more  percentage  of  the  GDP being 
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spent  on  R&D, they wi l l  pass  the  U.S.  around about  2015 in  PPP 
expendi ture  on R&D. 
 But  my mark for  R&D expendi ture  i s  not  so  much the  number  of  
sc ient i f ic  papers  tha t  a re  produced,  but  the  balance  of  t rade ,  and in  
here ,  there 's  ac tual ly  the  balance  of  t rade  graph for  advanced 
technology products  f rom our  own Census  Bureau.  
 You can see  tha t  in  2008,  i t  ac tual ly  was  a  def ic i t  of  a lmost  $80 
bi l l ion .  
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  How much?  
 DR.  ARTHURS:   $80 bi l l ion  in  th is  graph.   I t  ac tual ly  would  be  
more  except  for  the  economic  col lapse  in  September .   So tha t ' s  one  
good th ing you can thank that  economic  col lapse  for .  
 There 's  another  graph ac tual ly  showing the  def ic i t  in  
optoelec t ronic  products ,  and the  def ic i t  f rom China  in  optoelec t ronic  
products ,  which i s  over  $7  b i l l ion  a t  the  moment .  
 My f ina l  graphs ,  and I  have  no more  t ime,  are  ac tual ly  about  
technica l  papers  tha t  show the  r i se  of  China  as  a  sc ient i f ic  power .   One 
of  the  metr ics ,  and I  th ink a  mis leading metr ic  in  many ways ,  for  
sc ient i f ic  output ,  and one  tha t  we would  prefer  to  see  changed,  has  
been the  number  of  technical  publ ica t ions  or  the  number  of  c i ta t ions .  
And China  has  been taking off  exponent ia l ly  there .  
 I  th ink we need as  a  na t ion ,  as  indeed China  does ,  more  of  a  look 
a t  sc ient i f ic  metr ics  f rom the  sc ience  parks ,  for  example ,  of  how many 
jobs ,  how much ac tual ly  income from the  sc ient i f ic  parks .   I t  was  
ment ioned th is  morning tha t  the  Z-Park  outs ide  Bei j ing  had a  $14 
bi l l ion  revenue.   In  fac t ,  f rom the  Chinese  paper  las t  week,  i t ' s  
ac tual ly  $166 bi l l ion  revenue.   Things  change ra ther  quickly  in  China  
as  they announce new innovat ion measures  in  th is  park  in  Bei j ing .  
 They a lso  have parks  in  Shanghai  and many other  Chinese  c i t ies .  
 I  was  in  the  one  in  Chengdu las t  week where  they have the  larges t  
manufacturer  of  opt ica l  g lass  in  the  wor ld .    
 China  i s  se t t ing  about  th is  wi th  determinat ion ,  and th is  i s  not  for  
me about  what  they are  doing wrong,  though there  i s  a  lo t  of  IP  i ssues ;  
i t ' s  why aren ' t  we doing something r ight?  
 Thank you.  
 [The s ta tement  fo l lows:]  
 
Prepared Statement  of  Dr.  Eugene Arthurs  
CEO, SPIE,  The Internat ional  Society  for  Optics  and Photonics ,  
Bel l ingham, Washington 
 
Dr. Eugene G. Arthurs 
CEO, SPIE, The International Society for Optics and Photonics 
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24 March 2009 
Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 
China’s Industrial Policy and its Impact on U.S. Companies, Workers and the 
American Economy 
 
I would like to thank the Commission for this opportunity to share my grave concerns 
over our future competitiveness in key technologies that are vital to our future prosperity. 
My career has mostly been in the technology industry, leading companies that supplied 
innovative products and tools to researchers in industry, academia and medicine, and to 
product integrators for high technology applications. Since 1999 I have been CEO of 
SPIE, a not-for-profit membership society. SPIE has approximately 17,000 members, 
most of whom have advanced degrees in science or engineering. More than 50% of our 
10,000 U.S. members work in industry.  Most of the remainder work in academia and the 
various government science and technology entities, such as the national laboratories, 
NASA, NIST, and the many excellent Department of Defense facilities.   
Professional associations have played an important and undervalued role in the U.S. and 
global science and technology (S&T) enterprise.  This role is similar to the important role 
of the legal system in underpinning civilization; they underpin science. Our imprimatur 
and archiving are fundamental to scientific progress, and we continue the important 
struggle to keep the internet version of snake oil salesmen from drowning us in pseudo-
science. Many engineering associations set technical standards without which we would 
not have a practical technical infrastructure, and unproductive chaos rather than the 
quality of life that technology has brought. In a reductio ad absurdum example, imagine a 
world with multiple versions for the colors of traffic lights.  
The fact that the strongest scientific associations are based in the U.S.  has been good for 
U.S. science. The networking at meetings and the historic pattern of the top international 
scientists coming to and presenting at meetings staged by associations in the U.S. has 
given our community an edge. The exchange and testing of ideas at such events is at the 
heart of scientific advance. At SPIE’s meetings, postgraduate students network with 
Nobel laureates and industry experts. We just wish there were more U.S. students 
exposed to these life-influencing opportunities.   
 
Scientific associations in China 
China has about 170 scientific societies or associations which are supervised by the 
Chinese Association of Science and Technology (CAST). CAST has a permanent staff of 
1,000 throughout China and a conference/exhibit facility in Beijing.  The effective head 
of CAST operations is Executive Vice President Deng Nan, daughter of former premier 
Deng Xiao-Ping. The scientific societies in China are highly academic and have large 
numbers of nominal members, but are not yet staffed or resourced to provide effective 
networking or services to members. For example, the Chinese Optical Society, the largest 
and most directly focused of several in the optoelectronics field, has at this stage very 
poor connections with industry. The reality is that in China, academic science is 
disconnected from industry research, and many Chinese scientists look to the U.S. as one 
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of the few nations that have the strong connections they seek.   
However, China has the powerful Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) that links 
together and controls many Chinese scientists. The CAS operates many of the larger 
research laboratories through the country and has an extensive campus in Beijing. Unlike 
most academies of science worldwide the CAS has an emphasis on manufacturing and 
technology with “Advanced Manufacturing Technology and Automation Technology” 
listed alongside the “Physical Science and Related Technology, Life Sciences and 
Technology etc.”  The mention of “technology” is in itself unusual for an academy of 
science. 
 
SPIE: Science and Industry 
There is another very important component of our membership that distinguishes SPIE 
somewhat from the typical scientific association. We embrace and acknowledge the 
entrepreneurs, the marketers and the manufacturers who turn research into innovation, 
whose living depends on knowledge of the science, and whose practicality turns it back 
into jobs. We run many large technical meetings that are designed to catalyze photonic 
science and its applications. At our Photonics West meeting in California in January we 
had more than 1,000 exhibiting companies from all over the world.  We will have more 
than 500 companies at our upcoming meeting in Florida: Defense, Security and Sensing 
(another annual event). These are not trade shows; at these meetings there are more than 
6,000 technical presentations. We have an earned reputation for connecting the disparate 
multidisciplinary research community with the commercial and user communities. To us 
the commercialization of science and the success of technology industries are vital to a 
healthy scientific infrastructure. They provide careers for S&T professionals and the bulk 
of funding for innovation.  
 
Optoelectronics 
Optoelectronics, the subject of the present hearing, is loosely defined and also known as 
photonics, optics, electro-optics, and optical engineering. Each name for the field has 
various nuances but I see too much passion for each name to expect agreement.  
Whatever the name, the field is vast and the technology key to the many sectors of a high 
technology economy. It covers the fabrication and inspection of computer chips to 
surveillance equipment, imagers and displays for the health field, cameras and displays 
for the consumer market, and much more. The internet is optically powered; your DVD 
player houses a laser and light detectors, the fundamentals of optoelectronics. Most 
medical diagnostic equipment has significant optoelectronics buried inside, and presents 
the grisly details on an optoelectronic display. Many researchers use optoelectronic tools 
unaware that they are using optics or light. ”Reading” DNA relies on high performance 
optoelectronics, but the typical geneticist gives it no more thought than she does to the 
optical lithography that made her computer’s powerful processor and memory chips.   
The field SPIE (and optoelectronics) covers is light. Experts in optoelectronics look at 
how to best convert sunlight into electrical power or some other form of usable energy, 
such as liberated hydrogen. Photovoltaics are already well known, but not optimized, and 
190
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
perhaps even not the ultimate solution.  Lighting, conversion of initially gas and then 
electricity into light, has changed the world. A century after Edison, there is a huge 
worldwide effort to make lighting more efficient, and China is among numerous 
countries that have identified the economic potential of solid state lighting (LEDs).   
Edison’s story is instructive on the commercialization and exploitation of science.  He 
was not a scientific leader in light or lighting. Rather, he was someone with the drive, the 
single-mindedness, and the persistence to create and dominate a market. Today I only 
find that type of focus in Asia, and indeed see very successful exploitation of science 
there that was funded by taxpayers in the U.S. and Europe. 
 
Workforce: The talent wars  
I recently watched SPIE’s video interview with Kristina Johnson, a former SPIE Board 
member and current nominee for undersecretary at the Department of Energy.  
http://mfile.akamai.com/65904/mov/spiestorage.download.akamai.com/65904/KristinaJo
hnson.mov   
She mentions that she went into the field largely because her father was an electrical 
engineer.  Informal surveys of our U.S. based members suggest that many do not 
recommend the profession to their children. Figure 1 shows the trend in electrical 
engineering PhDs awarded in the U.S.  PhDs are a necessary (but not sufficient) part of 
our innovation infrastructure. We have been fortunate that over the years many of those 
who came here for an education stayed and helped sustain our economy. However, 
relying on historical trends in this regard would be foolhardy. We were the most 
attractive home for China’s best and brightest when we boasted the leading high tech 
economy, and when the alternative was to return to a nation with an impoverished and 
dysfunctional S&T enterprise damaged during the anti-intellectualism of the Cultural 
Revolution.  The days when we could rely on imported brain power are gone. The 
economic picture makes us less attractive in general for those who have a choice of 
options. More Chinese students now go to the EU than to the U.S.   
In the S&T talent stakes, the emphasis by the Chinese leadership on S&T and the obvious 
commitment to build a world class presence in S&T has changed the pattern. Chinese 
students still go abroad in large numbers, but China seems willing to invest heavily in 
luring back top scientists. In January the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) gave a 
boost to their longstanding efforts to recruit expatriate talent and with them the 
knowledge and expertise of many of the world’s top laboratories.   
“The CAS announced the plan only days after a guideline was issued by the General 
Office of the Communist Party of the China Central Committee, calling on state 
enterprises and academic institutions to attract more leading overseas scientists, 
especially those on the cutting edge of science and technology.” 
http://english.cas.ac.cn/eng2003/news/detailnewsb.asp?InfoNo=27559  
The “hai gui” (“sea turtles”) were already returning in increased numbers before this 
latest inducement (Fig. 2). 
I suspect the timing of the CAS announcement is deliberate, as the recession has stirred 
concern for the future in many.  Business Week of March 16th has an article titled 
191
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
“America’s Immigrant Brain Drain” written by Vivek Wadhwa who holds appointments 
at Harvard and Duke, and who is well published on the talent wars. 
“Immigrants are critical to our long-term economic health. Although they represent just 
12% of the U.S. population, they have started 52% of Silicon Valley's tech companies 
and contributed to more than 25% of U.S. global patents. They make up 24% of science 
and engineering workers with bachelor's degrees and 47% of those with PhDs.  
Now, say human resources directors in India and China, what was a trickle of returnees a 
decade ago has become a flood. (There are no official numbers on the reverse migration.) 
Job applications from immigrants in the U.S., they say, have risen tenfold over the past 
few years.” 
Wadhwa quotes the results of a 2008 survey of 1,203 returnees to India and China. His 
team at Duke conducted this survey with AnnaLee Saxenian of the University of 
California at Berkeley and Richard B. Freeman of Harvard University.  
“The vast majority of returnees, we found, are relatively young—30 on average for 
Indians, 33 for Chinese. Their degrees are in management, technology, and science. 
Among the Chinese, 51% have MAs, 41% PhDs. Among Indians, 66% hold MAs and 
21% are PhDs. These figures put the returnees in the U.S. population's educational top 
tier—precisely the kind of people who can make the greatest contribution to innovation 
and growth.” 
Of course there are many who do not return to China. There are other ways of absorbing 
foreign expertise. For example, Chinese institutions welcome western-based Chinese 
scientists with faculty appointments in China. I know of several in my own limited circle, 
one of whom has a full time job leading research in a U.S. lab, and who supervises PhD 
candidates through his faculty appointments at two different Chinese universities, one in 
Beijing and one in Shanghai. 
The Shanghai Jiao Tong rankings of world universities lists only one (mainland) Chinese 
university in the top 50 in the engineering category, and none in science. Tsinghua 
University in Beijing, sometimes called China’s MIT, is ranked #50 in the latest 
engineering ranking. What is striking though is the rate at which Chinese universities are 
moving up in the annual science and engineering rankings.  
There are obstacles for those Chinese scientists and engineers who stay here in the U.S.  
One factor covered well in the recent report “Beyond Fortress America” (and aired 
extensively in the Congressional hearings in February) is the restriction on foreign 
nationals studying or conducting research in the U.S.  While there are very legitimate 
security concerns, the atmosphere generated by the present regulations and the 
bureaucratic burden placed on universities and other research institutions in the U.S. are 
also reasons that we should not expect the historic level of contribution to our S&T 
capacity from Chinese scientists coming to and staying in the U.S.  A group leader at Cal 
Tech’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) told me last year that although quite often the 
best applicants for openings in this important laboratory are Chinese émigrés, he no 
longer considers them because the hiring and monitoring requirements are too onerous, 
and incompatible with the openness that characterizes a productive scientific 
environment.  The unwelcome outcome is that some of our leading national facilities may 
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tend to be staffed by second tier candidates. 
 
China 
The Chinese Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) is the prime mover in China’s 
S&T. MOST clearly sees science as important to the economy and sees its mandate as 
much more than increasing scientific knowledge. From the 863 plan, one of the series of 
five year plans for Chinese S&T:  
“Mega-projects of Science Research for the 10th Five-Year Plan 
To meet new challenges and demands after China’s WTO accession, and cater to 
domestic strategic economic restructuring, the Ministry of Science and Technology, with 
the approval of the 10th session of the State Science and Education Steering Group, has 
decided to organize and implement 12 mega-projects of science research based on the 
863 Program and the National Key Technologies R&D Program. Through the 
implementation of dedicated projects, the Ministry hopes to take favorable positions in 
the science frontier in the 21st century and achieve significant technical breakthroughs, 
leading to industrialization in major fields related to national socio-economic 
development, all within 3 to 5 years. 
Implementation Guidelines for the 12 Mega-projects are: 
Goal: Develop new products and nurture new industries” 
One of the four scientists who devised the 863 plan is Wang Daheng, widely revered as 
the father of optics in China. Dr. Daheng studied in the UK. The technical background of 
Cao Jailin is also in optics; he is Vice President of the Chinese Optical Society as well as 
the Vice Minister of Science and Technology. These may indicate the importance of 
optics or optoelectronics in China.    
Again showing the official view of the role of scientists, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, 
when presenting awards to Chinese scientists in January, “urged science and technology 
workers to help businesses and rural areas to speed up development and become 
productive. They should help improve management, develop new products and 
technologies, and actively involve themselves in economic development.” 
 
 
 
A different attitude to science in the U.S. 
So while the Chinese leadership is clearly behind science and its application to the 
economy, and while China has a ministry of science and technology, in recent years the 
U.S. Executive Branch moved the science advisor out from the White House.  Our 
science investment culture and the community eschew commercialization, and selection 
or direction of science to economic ends is resisted by some policymakers who decry 
“Industrial policy.”  Our hope is that a technology push will lead to favorable economic 
outcomes as indeed it did in a different era and global environment. To me, the advanced 
technology trade balance (Figures 3.a and 3.b), should be evidence that the old model no 
longer works. I find the data more disturbing if I use a $200k figure per FTE to translate 
the 2008 deficit in to 277,500 high technology jobs (–with of course the $200k spent in 
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the local community and on taxes.)  
When I became CEO of Cleveland Crystals, a company with roots in materials for sonar 
in the 1940s (materials that became very useful for laser applications), I was told that 
experience taught that any new crystal product took ten years (and several million 
dollars) to develop for the market. Though this might be an extreme example, most 
significant new optoelectronic products (as distinct from incrementally improved 
products) do indeed take some years before payback. Crossing what Dr.  Charles 
Wessner (Director, Technology, Innovation, and Entrepreneurship, U.S. National 
Academies) calls the idea to market “valley of death” is costly. Indeed, the route to 
product (the innovation process) is not the simple linear concept of idea to sales revenue, 
but much more complex and certainly not implementable to order. Though things may 
change, the recent expectations for short term financial return for U.S. corporations is 
incompatible with patient product R&D. When a CEO cuts R&D, the stock price rises 
and management is rewarded. That is not the case in Asia. In China it seems the financial 
structure and investments for technology are very focused and patient, not at the whim of 
meeting quarterly targets. Likewise, careers in S&T are more certain, more prestigious 
and valued.  
Optical materials are an area where the U.S. has lost position, and China has taken 
leadership. China is the preferred source of some optical crystals used with lasers, a 
somewhat unusual area where Chinese companies have intellectual property rights in the 
US.  
In 2008 I spoke with then SPIE member James Fergason, a liquid crystal pioneer, and the 
winner of both the 2006 Lemelson-MIT Prize, and the 1998 Ron Brown Technology 
Award from the U.S. Department of Commerce. (Sadly, Dr. Fergason died last 
December.) He received more than 130 U.S. and 500 foreign patents during his 
wonderfully creative career.   Our conversation centered on why almost all the jobs 
related to liquid crystal display (LCD) technology were in Asia, though most of the 
invention was in the U.S. He pointed out that the facile response, lower labor costs, was 
not correct, as the labor content of the typical LCD was tiny. His view was that it was the 
result of major U.S. corporations’ unwillingness to invest substantially and patiently.  He 
also commented on the lack of visionary leadership in U.S. blue chip companies, and in 
the particular case of LCDs, attempts to protect older display technology (at that time 
owned by then substantial U.S. suppliers to the consumer electronics markets). 
 
 
R&D in China. 
Figures 4.a and 4.b show the trends in R&D spending in the U.S., the EU, China, and 
Japan. They are shown on both a market exchange rate (MER), and at purchasing power 
parity (PPP). Some argue that PPP gives the true measure of R&D activity, and if so, then 
China recently passed Japan to become the second largest funder of R&D in the national 
stakes. The U.S. and the EU conglomerate still outspend China, but the rate of increase 
should be noted. Chinese R&D spending is estimated at 1.6% of its GDP, with targets of 
2% by 2010 and 2.5% by 2020. The EU’s difficulty in having industry invest more so 
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that it can reach its “Lisbon target” of 3% is in at least in a small way due to the 
preference of industry to invest in R&D in China. 
The nature of R&D expenditure in China differs from that of the U.S. in that there seems 
little spent in basic science, and less on the life sciences. Applications and engineering 
are favored.    
I have visited many optoelectronic laboratories including several of the key State 
laboratories in China, and can qualitatively compare them with laboratories in the U.S 
and elsewhere.  A small number of the premier universities in China have facilities and 
equipment on par with the best university laboratories in the U.S.  Outside the top tier, 
the equipment for experiments is older and more of it “home built.” Students seem well 
equipped with up-to-date computers and it is not usual to see rows of students reading 
sophisticated documents in English on the screen and yet be unable to understand spoken 
English.  Students have fewer options for study in China but my sense is that they pursue 
S&T with fervor, and not because that is all there is. Faculty at some universities in 
Beijing and Shanghai have mentioned that with affluence they are seeing less top flight 
local students, but there is a vast pool of talented students from the countryside. 
(Growing affluence is also driving labor intensive optics companies further from Beijing 
and Shanghai.) 
 
Scientific Publications  
Associations like SPIE see review, publication and archiving of research papers as part of 
our mission. The submission of research papers from China provides some measure of 
the open research activity. The number of papers from China has been growing so 
quickly that it threatens to overwhelm the capacity of the associations. Not all submitted 
papers are deemed suitable for publishing, and the ratio of submitted to published papers 
is lower for Chinese submissions than average, but it is trending upwards    (Figures 5.a, 
5.b, 5.c, and 6, from the American Institute of Physics (AIP) and SPIE’s flagship journal, 
the Journal of Optical Engineering).  Bear in mind that these are papers published in 
English. The lower quality and significant plagiarism problems are in part consequences 
of the extraordinarily rapid expansion of Chinese research and the openly stated policy of 
quantity first, quality second.  
Much scientific publishing has become electronic; SPIE has a Digital Library of close to 
300,000 scientific publications, all reports after 1990, and most classifiable as 
optoelectronic or nanotechnology. Downloads of scientific papers provide another 
measure of research activity.  China is second only to the U.S. in downloading from this 
library. (This SPIE body of work is the most highly cited source for patents at the 
USPTO in optoelectronic related fields.) 
 
Intellectual Property in China 
Although China has had extensive research programs and manufacturing operations in 
optoelectronics for a number of years, particularly in communications, there are as yet 
relatively few Chinese origin patents granted by the USPTO or EPO.  Patent numbers are 
growing more rapidly at the Chinese patent office and the World Intellectual Property 
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Organization (WIPO). Since neither of these bodies access SPIE’s prior art, the patent 
scrutiny in optoelectronics is suspect.  
Fit, form and finish copies of optoelectronic communications devices are entering supply 
chains in China and displacing legitimate company product (Figure 7). Anecdotes of 
companies being called for service under warranty only to find the product was not 
actually theirs are increasing, but there is no good data on how pervasive this problem 
may be.     
 
Manufacturing of optoelectronics in China 
China is the manufacturing or assembly base for many of the world’s leading 
optoelectronic manufacturing companies. Shenzhen and Wuhan are optoelectronic 
manufacturing hubs for communications products, and more recently light emitting 
diodes (LEDs). As for most high tech goods, China is chosen for assembly and packaging 
rather than for fabrication of key components. However, Chinese optoelectronic 
companies are springing up and quickly becoming competitive in world markets.    
Huawei is an indigenous company in the communication component and system sector, 
including optical networks. It had $12.6 billion in revenue in 2007, and has become a 
force in the world market.  Han’s Laser has grown quickly to become a top five “laser 
company” (with $100 million in annual revenue). Chinese companies and foreign owned 
plants producing solar panels (photovoltaics PV) are growing rapidly. (The Chinese 
government has identified this industry as one of the nation’s targets.) China’s PV 
production has been growing at 25.5% per year since 2001, and in 2008 China seemed to 
be the world’s largest producer of PV. The U.S., home to much of the original R&D for 
PV, had about 1/5 of China’s PV production output in 2007. Suntech is the largest of 
more than 50 PV companies in China, and is ranked as the third largest producer in the 
world.   
 
Recommendations 
The recently enacted American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) as well 
as the FY 2009 Omnibus Budget legislation include boosts for R&D in the U.S. This is a 
necessary and important step. However, in itself it is unlikely to bring us back to a 
healthy U.S. high technology economy. Undirected scientific research is deserving and 
important for the future. What we need to do is examine whether the conditions where 
R&D gave us economic leadership still exist, and if as I believe, we find they do not, then 
we must move aggressively to establish a new innovation infrastructure that will make us 
competitive again. We no longer have research powerhouses like Bell Labs that straddle 
academia and industry, but we do have small innovative companies, and support for 
science parks will strengthen that sector. Taiwan has brought this to a new level; way 
beyond what we envisaged for science parks.   
Many of our small companies scale up manufacturing in Asia, just as our admired larger 
innovators do. The value is added to the iPod and the iPhone in Asia, with components 
from around Asia and assembly in China, all far from Silicon Valley.  We need 
investment in key manufacturing technologies of the future. The TIP program at NIST is 
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a small step in the right direction, but its funding is totally inadequate. 
The excellent SBIR program should be expanded and the evaluation process should place 
more emphasis on local job creation. Repeat applicants who can show a record of local 
job creation should be strongly favored.  The part of the SBIR program that serves to 
support the DOD laboratories with their technology needs should be recognized as 
different and treated accordingly. 
We need a comprehensive informed review of our fragmented national technology 
portfolio and ongoing active guidance. Much more emphasis on capital investment in 
manufacturing technologies and training of people will be vital. Yes, we need the science 
base, but we will not remain competitive if the $200 billion or so currently spent by 
industry annually in the U.S. follows manufacturing to offshore places, as it inevitably 
will with the explosion in S&T capability in populous China.  
We may continue to be world leaders in the science of LEDs or the semiconductor lasers 
that power the internet, but the location of the semiconductor foundries and the know-
how to manufacture in volume suggest that the manufacturing jobs will be in Asia, many 
of these in China. We need to select key manufacturing technologies and do what is 
needed to have world leading “plants” in the U.S. The decades of work in the DOE 
laboratories, notably NREL, should lead to solar energy manufacturing here, not to 
installation and maintenance of imported panels and outflow of incentive dollars to 
support jobs elsewhere.  
Science, Technology, Engineering & Mathematics (STEM) education for our workforce 
will be vital, and in this we are no longer competitive. Excellent initiatives have been 
proposed in the “Rising Against the Gathering Storm” report.  We must also devise 
opportunities and strong incentives for career retraining; this is crucial for lifetime 
technology careers. Again these educational thrusts must be part of an overall plan for 
rebuilding our technology economy. We should not expect young people to pursue 
careers that will not exist in this nation.  
I have little doubt that my recommendations do not meet free market criteria, nor will 
they be to the liking of those opposed to government involvement.  My response is that I 
love the principles of the free market, but when I look at our trade deficit (especially the 
trend in high technology trade), I can’t help but think it is due in part to other 
governments attending to the economic wellbeing of their people. I suspect they are the 
strongest proponents of keeping the U.S. market “free.”       
Figure 1:   
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200
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 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  Thank you,  Doctor .  
 I  jus t  want  to  note  for  the  record  tha t  th is  Commiss ion v is i ted  
tha t  sc ience  park  outs ide  of  Bei j ing  about  three  years  ago.   And i t  
rea l ly  wakes  you up to  the  sense  of  the  chal lenge tha t ' s  in  f ront  of  us .  
 Thank you for  br inging that  up .  
 Dr .  Appelbaum.  
  
STATEMENT OF DR. RICHARD P.  APPELBAUM 
CENTER FOR NANOTECHNOLOGY IN SOCIETY, UNIVERSITY 
OF CALIFORNIA AT SANTA BARBARA, SANTA BARBARA, CA 
 
 DR.  APPELBAUM:  Fi rs t ,  I  want  to  thank the  Commiss ion for  
the  invi ta t ion  to  speak here  today.  
 I 'm going to  t ry  to  br ief ly  summarize  in  seven minutes  a  much 
longer  paper  tha t  you have.   I  want  to  g ive  you a  l i t t le  b i t  of  
background on nanotechnology very  br ief ly ,  then ta lk  about  China 's  
r i se  as  a  nanotech power ,  and then I 'm going to  f in ish  by ta lk ing about  
the  payoff  in  China ,  and my comments  echo very  c lose ly  the  ones  tha t  
jus t  preceded me.  
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 For  those  of  you who might  be  unfamil iar  wi th  nanotechnology,  
i t ' s  the  newest  emerging technology tha t  i s  supposed to  resul t  in  grea t  
changes  for  a l l  of  us .   Sor t  of  a  g lobal  s t imulus  package which 
according to  Lux Research would  genera te  a  $3 .1  t r i l l ion  economy by 
the  year  2015.  
 At  th is  sca le ,  quantum effec ts  g ive  r i se  to  new mater ia ls  wi th  
novel  proper t ies .   Super- fas t  carbon-based comput ing,  incredibly  
s t rong l ightweight  mater ia ls ,  p las t ic  pa in t -on solar  ce l l s ,  ta rgeted  drug 
del ivery ,  and-- I 'm not  making th is  up-- there 's  even research looking 
in to  making a  space  e levator  wi th  carbon nanof ibers  which would  lof t  
up  people  to  geos ta t ionary  sa te l l i tes .  
 S ince  the  U.S.  enacted  the  Nat ional  Nanotechnology In i t ia t ive  in  
the  year  2000,  some 40 nat ions  have fo l lowed sui t .   Global  nanotech 
inves tments  exceeded $12 bi l l ion  in  the  year  2007 divided fu l ly  evenly  
between governments  and pr ivate  enterpr ise  wi th  a  l i t t le  b i t  f rom 
venture  capi ta l ,  not  too  much.  
 The U.S.  government  i s  the  undisputed  wor ld  leader  in  publ ic  
inves tment  and nanotechnology,  having spent  some seven to  $8 b i l l ion  
s ince  2001.   This  year  i t ' s  spending 1 .5  to  $1.6  b i l l ion  for  the  Nat ional  
Nanotechnology In i t ia t ive ,  which i s  a  quar ter  of  the  g lobal  
governmenta l  to ta l .  
 Almost  a l l  of  th is ,  some 95 percent ,  i s  for  bas ic  research  under  
the  assumpt ion tha t ,  and th is  i s ,  I  th ink,  a  fa i r ly  correc t  assumpt ion,  in  
the  Uni ted  Sta tes ,  the  market  wi l l  commercia l ize  the  research  resul ts .  
 China  i s  a  d i f ferent  s tory .   China  lacks  in  venture  capi ta l  and 
much pr ivate  funding so  the  Chinese  government  has  p layed a  very  
large  ro le  in  funding nanotechnology development  across  the  value  
chain  f rom bas ic  research to  commercia l iza t ion .  
 As  I ’m sure  you 've  heard  f rom many speakers  today,  China 's  goal  
i s  to  become an “ innovat ion-or iented  socie ty”  by the  year  2020,  
emphasiz ing indigenous  innovat ion.   This  i s  the  approach tha t  i s  
supposed to  br ing economic  prosper i ty  in  the  fu ture .  
 I  ta lked about  th is  in  grea t  de ta i l  in  the  paper ,  but  jus t  a  couple  
of  h ighl ights .   In  China 's  las t  two Five  Year  Plans ,  and more  
impor tant ly  in  the  Medium and Long-Term Plan for  Technology 
Development  (MLP for  shor t ) ,  which I  know that  Denis  Simon ta lked 
about ,  China  wi th  the  b less ings  and encouragement  of  i t s  top  
leadership  has  made nanotechnology one of  four  sc ience  megaprojec ts  
s la ted  for  s igni f icant  publ ic  inves tment .   
 Under  the  MLP,  the  bets  are  on achieving what  China  ca l l s  
" leapfrog development ,"  tha t  i s  bypass ing the  usual  rungs  of  the  
development  ladder .   I t s  vas t  fore ign currency reserves  pay for  sc ience  
parks ,  univers i ty  campuses ,  advanced ins t rumenta t ion  and,  most  
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impor tant ly ,  human capi ta l .  
 Major  funding comes f rom Bei j ing-- the  Minis t ry  of  Science  and 
Technology (MIOST),  but  a lso  f rom the  Nat ional  Natura l  Science  
Foundat ion of  China ,  the  Chinese  Academy of  Sciences ,  and other  
government  agencies .  
 In  nanotechnology,  China  has  chosen to  focus  on those  areas  tha t  
promise  to  have  the  most  immedia te  payoff  both  commercia l ly  and,  
in teres t ingly ,  in  te rms of  environment  and energy,  nanoporous  a i r  and 
water  f i l t ra t ion ,  c rea t ing  mater ia ls  wi th  grea t  tens i le  s t rength ,  and 
targeted  drug del ivery .  
 China  a l ready sees  i t se l f  as  a  wor ld  leader  in  the  product ion of  
carbon nanotubes  which is  the  one  commodi ty  based on technology i t  
current ly  expor ts  in  fa i r ly  la rge  quant i t ies  to  companies  around the  
world .  
 Government  suppor t  in  China  i s  c rucia l  s ince  the  domest ic  
market  i s  dominated  by smal l  and medium enterpr ises  tha t  a re  i l l -
equipped to  make the  long- term kinds  of  inves tments  tha t  a re  needed 
for  commercia l iza t ion .   We es t imate  tha t  the  Chinese  government  i s  
spending around $250 mil l ion  a  year .  That ' s  low in  compar ison wi th  
the  1 .5  b i l l ion  the  U.S.  i s  spending,  but  i f  you adjus t  i t  for  purchas ing 
power  par i ty ,  i t  r i ses  to  about  $900 mi l l ion  making China  number  two 
in  the  wor ld .  
 I  should  a lso  emphasize  there  are  many programs under  the  
Minis t ry  of  Science  and Technology,  such as  the  Torch Program and 
the  863 Program,  which you 've  heard  about  ear l ier  today.  
 The Nat ional  and Natura l  Science  Foundat ion of  China  suppor ts  
fundamenta l  research.  As  of  summer  2007,  i t  had near ly  700 ongoing 
projec ts  wi th  "nano"  in  the  t i t le .   Local i t ies  a lso  p lay  an  ext remely  
impor tant  ro le ,  and a t  the  local  level ,  there  i s  much more  pressure  to  
commercia l ize  resul ts .   
 In  the  in teres t  of  t ime,  I  won ' t  go  in to  some of  the  p laces  tha t  we 
vis i ted ,  but  Shanghai  and Bei j ing  both  have nanotechnology promot ion 
centers ,  incubators  of  var ious  sor ts  tha t  a re  pa id  for  wi th  local  
funding.   Zhej iang Univers i ty  has  a  par tnership  wi th  UCLA, the  
Zhej iang-Cal i fornia  Nanosystems Ins t i tu te .   There 's  a  lo t  happening in  
tha t  a rea .  
 So what  i s  the  payoff?   In  terms of  academic  research ,  the  r i se  in  
publ ica t ions  in  top  peer  reviewed sc ient i f ic  and engineer ing journals  
has  been meteor ic .   China  has  come out  of  nowhere  to  now equal  ( in  
te rms of  quant i ty  a t  leas t )  the  number  of  U.S.  publ ica t ions  wi th  "nano"  
in  the  t i t le .  
 Many of  these  are  of  ques t ionable  or  der ivat ive  qual i ty ,  but  the  
vectors  are  a l l  unques t ionably  in  an  impress ive  d i rec t ion .  
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 Resul ts  a re  much more  mixed a t  the  commercia l  level .   Much of  
what  China  i s  doing in  terms of  ac tual  products  i s  fa i r ly  prosaic- -se l f -
c leaning ovens ,  a i r  f i l te rs ;  and so  for th .   My t ies  have  had much water  
poured on them in  var ious  contexts  to  show the  ef fec t iveness  of  
text i les  wi th  nanocoat ings ,  th ings  of  tha t  sor t - -but  nothing tha t  i s  
l ike ly  in  the  shor t - run to  rea l ly  lead  to  huge commercia l  payoff .  
 China  i s  ahead of  the  curve  in ternat ional ly  in  developing 
s tandardiza t ion  techniques  to  character ize  nanotechnology,  which i s  
very  impor tant .   They ' re  ac t ive  par t ic ipants  in  the  In ternat ional  
Standardiza t ion  Organiza t ion  in  th is  area .    
 In  the  long- term,  however ,  I  th ink China  wi l l  do  wel l .   Lux 
Research,  which moni tors  th is ,  predic ts  tha t  as  var ious  reforms,  
inc luding pr ivat iza t ion  and increas ing a t tent ion  to  in te l lec tual  proper ty  
protec t ions ,  take  hold ,  China  wi l l  move up in to  the  dominant  area  
a long wi th  the  U.S.  by 2015.  
 One th ing tha t  I  have  found especia l ly  impress ive ,  and I 'm sure  
you 've  heard  about  th is  a lso ,  i s  China 's  par tnerships  around the  wor ld .  
 There  are  many Chinese  sc ient is t s  opera t ing  in  labora tor ies  and 
centers ,  na t ional  labs ,  a round the  wor ld ,  tha t  par tner  wi th  researchers  
in  China .   Many Chinese  s tudents  and postdocs  tha t  come and s tudy in  
the  U.S. ,  Europe,  and Japan  not  only  carry  back wi th  them the  
knowledge they 've  gained but  new habi ts ,  which are  much more  
innovat ive  than the  ones  which h is tor ica l ly  have  been pract iced  in  
Chinese  labora tor ies .  
 China  has  many,  many weaknesses  in  th is  area .   Bai  Chunl i ,  who 
is  the  leading dr iver  behind China’s  nanotechnology ef for ts ,  has  
ident i f ied  such shor tcomings  as  the  lack of  government  spending,  the  
absnece  of  coordinat ion  across  agencies .   Commercia l iza t ion  i s  long 
way off .   Smal l  and medium-enterpr ises  are  loa the  to  inves t  in  
anything where  the  payoff  i sn ' t  evident .   So there  remains  a  gap in  
terms of  commercia l iza t ion .  
 IP  protec t ions  are  a  major  fac tor  which was  ment ioned to  me 
repeatedly  in  the  in terviews I 've  done there .   The number  of  pa tents  in  
China  has  grown enormously ,  but  as  one  person descr ibed i t  to  me--one 
sc ient is t - -most  of  those  patents  "s leep in  the  safe ."  
 Pat ients  are  repor tedly  of ten  taken out  to  prove to  funding 
agencies  tha t  a  lo t  i s  happening,  but  the i r  rea l ly  impress ive  invent ions  
are  not  pa tented  for  fear  tha t  the  ideas  wi l l  be  s to len .   So tha t  remains  
a  problem.  
 Xie  Sishen,  who runs  the  Nat ional  Nanoscience  and Technology 
Center  in  Bei j ing ,   Summarizes  China’s  s i tua t ion  as  fo l lows:    "As a  
whole ,  China  i s  in  the  rear  of  the  f i rs t  echelon or  the  f ront  of  the  
second echelon,  ranking f i f th  or  s ix th  in  the  wor ld  in  nanotech.   More ,  
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but  few.   More  sc ient i f ic  papers  but  few higher  c i ta t ion  papers .   More  
or ig inal  ideas  but  few or ig inal  achievements .   More  patents  but  less  
tech  t ransfer .   More  purchased advanced ins t ruments ;  few indigenously  
made."  
 Thank you very  much.  
  [The s ta tement  fo l lows:]  
 
Prepared Statement  of  Dr.  Richard P.  Appelbaum 
Center  for  Nanotechnology in  Society ,  Univers i ty  of  Cal i fornia  at  
Santa Barbara,  Santa Barbara,  CA 
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Center for Nanotechnology in Society  
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Before the 
US-China Economic and Security  
Review Commission 
March 24, 2009 
 
 
 
“China’s Industrial Policy and its Impact on U.S. Companies, Workers and the 
American Economy” 
CHINA’S (NOT SO HIDDEN) DEVELOPMENTAL STATE:  
BECOMING A LEADING NANOTECHNOLOGY INNOVATOR IN THE 21ST CENTURY 
 
 
Richard P. Appelbaum, Center for Nanotechnology in Society 
University of California at Santa Barbara 
 
                     
1 This testimony is based on “China’s (Not So Hidden) Developmental State: Becoming a 
Leading Nanotechnology Innovator in the 21st Century,” a forthcoming research paper co-
authored by Richard P. Appelbaum, Center for Nanotechnology in Society, University of 
California at Santa Barbara; Rachel Parker, Center for Nanotechnology in Society, University of 
California at Santa Barbara;  Cong Cao, State University of New York, Levin Institute; and Gary 
Gereffi, Department of Sociology, Duke University. 
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Abstract 
 
In this paper we examine the role of the Chinese Government in fostering advances in 
nanotechnology, looking at the promises and pitfalls of state-led development in the 
world’s fastest-growing major economy. Like many countries involved in catch-up 
development, China is convinced that manufacturing prowess alone is insufficient to 
becoming a leading economic power in the 21st century. Our concern is how the debate 
over innovation is reflected in China’s approach to national development, with a 
particular application to nanotechnology.  In many countries, including the United States, 
government spending on nanotechnology is seen as essential to creating world leadership 
in this emerging fielding.  The U.S, for example, is currently spending $1.5 billion 
annually on its National Nanotechnology Initiative – primarily to foster basic research 
and development. In comparison with the U.S. approach, in China – which has an 
economy that is transitioning from state-owned to privately-owned enterprises, and still 
suffers from a lack of private investment capital – nanotechnology is being funded 
largely through government sources. Moreover, in China, such funding extends more 
broadly across the value chain than in the United States, from fundamental research to 
commercialization. Through field research and extensive interviews, this paper 
documents China’s state-led efforts to become a global nanotech leader, evaluating the 
effectiveness of these efforts.   
Introduction: The Push for High-Tech Global Leadership 
Like many countries involved in catch-up development, China is convinced that 
manufacturing prowess alone is insufficient to becoming a leading economic power in 
the 21st century.  China’s overarching goal is to become an “innovation-oriented” society 
by the year 2020 (OECD 2007: 17).  Innovation is difficult to define, and even harder to 
operationalize.  The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
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defines innovation as “new products, business processes and organic changes that create 
wealth or social welfare,” while Richard Lyons, Dean of UC Berkeley’s Hass School of 
Business, offers an even more succinct formulation:  “fresh thinking that creates value” 
(The Economist 2007: 2).  How to become innovative in the contemporary global 
economy, and why it matters, has generated a plethora of ideas, concepts, and 
hypotheses.2  Our particular concern here is how the debate over innovation is reflected 
in China’s approach to national development, with a particular application to 
nanotechnology.3 
By way of background, China is not alone it its push to become a leader in 
nanotechnology: the United States, Germany, Japan, and some 40 other countries are 
betting that nanotechnology, among other high-tech approaches, will provide the key to a 
$2.6 trillion market by 2014– sufficient to confer global economic leadership on the 
country that attains first mover advantage through innovation (Holman et al 2007: iii).  It 
is estimated that $11.8 billion was invested globally in nanotechnology research and 
development (R&D) and commercialization in 2006 - $5.8 billion from governments, 
$5.3 billion from corporations, and $700 million from venture capital (Holman et al 
2007: 11-12).  Private investment slightly outstripped public investment for the first time 
in that year.  Governments worldwide have clearly been drivers of nanotechnology 
during its early stages, and private venture capital remains limited.   
In terms of government spending, the United States is the world leader, with 
$1.53 billion allocated for 2009, roughly a quarter of global central government 
investment in nanotechnology.  U.S. government spending is coordinated through the 
National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI), “a multi-agency U.S. government program 
aimed at accelerating the discovery, development, and deployment of nanometer-scale 
science, engineering, and technology” (US NNI 2008e).  Initiated during the last year of 
the Clinton Administration, the NNI has invested some $7.2 billion since it began 
funding programs and projects in 2001 (AZoNano 2008).  Today it encompasses 26 
Federal agencies with nanotechnology-related programs, providing funding for 13 of 
them.  More than half of the proposed FY 2009 funding ($818 million, or 54 percent) is 
directed at those agencies that fall under the American Competitiveness Initiative: the 
                     
2 See The Economist’s (2007) special report on innovation for a review of some of these views. 
3 The US National Nanotechnology Initiative defines nanotechnology as “the understanding and 
control of matter at dimensions of roughly 1 to 100 nanometers [where] the physical, chemical, 
and biological properties of materials differ in fundamental and valuable ways from the 
properties of atoms and molecules or bulk matter. Nanotechnology R&D s directed toward 
understanding and creating improved materials, devices, and systems that exploit these new 
properties” (US NNI 2008).  Lux Research (a private firm that tracks nanotechnology) offers a 
similar but pithier definition: “the purposeful engineering of matter at scales of less than 100 
nanometers to achieve size-dependent properties and functions” (Holman et al, 2007: Figure 
1.2). A nanometer is one billionth of a meter. Human hair averages roughly 100,000 nanometers 
thick (there is considerable variation depending on hair color and texture), while a DNA 
molecule is 2-3 nanometers in width.  
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National Science Foundation (NSF), the Department of Energy’s Office of Science 
(DOE-OS), and the Department of Commerce’s National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (DOC-NIST).  These  three agencies have seen their combined budgets grow 
by 22 percent during the three-year period since 2006, reflecting the Bush 
Administration’s plan to “double funding for key agencies supporting innovation-
enabling research in the physical sciences and engineering over the next ten years, as part 
of the American Competitiveness Initiative” (US NNI 2008a).4  
Apart from Defense and Homeland Security related applications, the principal 
force driving public investment in nanotechnology has been the goal of competitiveness: 
to make the U.S. a world leader in this emerging technology.  The NNI identifies four 
overarching goals on its website (US NNI 2008b): 
? Advance a world-class nanotechnology R&D program. 
? Foster the transfer of new technologies into products for commercial and public 
benefit. 
? Develop and sustain educational resources, a skilled workforce, and the 
supporting infrastructure and tools to advance nanotechnology. 
? Support responsible development of nanotechnology. 
NNI funding thus far has been largely directed at supporting basic R&D, for 
example, through the funding of more than 60 multidisciplinary research and education 
centers across the United States – primarily universities, but also the National 
Laboratories and some government agency facilities (US NNI 2008c).5  The budget 
proposed for 2009 identifies eight different program component areas, almost all of 
which are primarily directed at basic research (US NNI 2008d).  While there is clearly 
spill-over from basic R&D to commercialization, the U.S. approach has largely been on 
government support for the former.  The NNI has called for working with industry to 
foster technology transfer and commercialization.  For example, its Nanoscale Science, 
Engineering, and Technology (NSET) Subcommittee in 2006 announced plans to 
“expand its activities to reach out to U.S. industry for input on research needs and to 
identify opportunities for technology transfer from NNI-funded research activities” (US 
                     
4  The overall growth in NNI funding during the same period was 13%. Among the 13 agencies 
funded under the NNI, the largest share proposed for 2009 goes to the Department of Defense 
($431 million, 28.2% of the total); NSF is to receive $397 million (26.0%), DOE $311 million 
(20.4%), NIH $226 million (14.8%), and NIST $110 million (7.2%). The other eight agencies 
(NASA, EPA, NIOSH, USDA Forest Service, USDA Extension, DOJ, DHS, and DOT) share 
the remaining $52 million (3.4%). Source: calculated from US NNI 2008, 2009. 
5 The principal vehicle for NSF funding (as of October 2008) has been 15 Nanoscale Science and 
Engineering Centers (NSECs) on 15 university campuses, and 22 university-based Materials 
Research Science and Engineering Centers (MERSECs), 4 of which are fully dedicated to 
nanotechnology research, with while 18 have one or more nanotechnology research groups. The 
DOE has Nanoscale Science Research Centers at 5 National Laboratories (Argonne, Lawrence 
Berkeley, Sandia/Los Alamos, Brookhaven, and Oak Ridge). For a complete listing (and 
websites) of NNI centers, networks, and facilities, see 
http://www.nano.gov/html/centers/nnicenters.html.  
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NNI 2006: 41), as well as “increase Federal-State coordination and improve knowledge 
management of and access to NNI assets [such as] user facilities and instrumentation” 
(vi).  
Some limited U.S. federal funding has gone to directly promote the 
commercialization of nanotechnology, primarily through Small Business Innovation 
Research (SBIR) and Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) grants, made to 
businesses with fewer than 500 employees (Holman et al 2008: 29).  Between 2007 and 
2007, federal government SBIR/STTR programs provided between $80 and $90 million 
in nanotechnology-related grants each year, about 17 percent coming from the NSF 6 (US 
NNI 2006: Tables 7 and 8; Rudd 2007).  While these grants are seen as an important 
source for the commercialization of nanotechnology, they are minor in relation to total 
funding. 
In comparison with the US approach, in China – which has an economy that is 
transitioning from state-owned to privately-owned enterprises, and still suffers from a 
lack of private investment capital – nanotechnology is being funded largely through 
government sources. Moreover, in China, such funding extends more broadly across the 
value chain than in the United States, from fundamental research to commercialization. 
In this paper we shall examine the role of the Chinese Government in fostering 
advances in this emerging technology area, looking at the promises and pitfalls of state-
led development in the world’s fastest-growing major economy.   
 
Data Sources 
The following analysis is based on an examination of Chinese government 
publications (in Chinese and English), as well as field interviews conducted during five 
weeks of research carried out during the summers of 2006 and 2007. To date we have 
conducted 59 interviews: 38 in China (Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Suzhou, 
and Dalian), six in Hong Kong, eight in Taiwan, and seven in the United States.  One of 
the authors (Cong Cao) has done extensive previous research on China’s high technology 
policy.7  The breakdown of our interviews, by type of organization, is summarized in 
Table 1: 
 
Table 1: Organizational Setting of Interviews 
                     
6 In 2005, for example, under the NNI seven agencies granted a total of $87.4 million in SBIR 
and STTR awards. Nearly half (47.7%) were made by the Department of Defense.  Other 
agencies included NIH (18.6%), NSF (16.3%), DOE (9.3%), NASA (6.9%), EPA (1.1%), and 
NIST (0.1%). 
7 Cong Cao, China’s Scientific Elite, London and New York: Routledge 2004; Cong Cao and 
Denis Fred Simon, Talent and China's Technological Edge, Cambridge and New York: 
Cambridge University Press, forthcoming; Richard Suttmeier, Cong Cao, and Denis Fred 
Simon, “China’s Innovation Challenge and  the Remaking of the Chinese Academy of 
Sciences,” Innovations (summer 2006): 78-97); Cong Cao, Richard P. Suttmeier, and Denis 
Fred Simon 2006, “China's 15-year Science and Technology Plan,” Physics Today 59: 12  
(December 2006): 8-120 
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Type of organization Number of Interviews 
Governmental 10 
Quasi-governmental (semi-private)   3 
Government-funded Incubator   5 
University, including labs 19 
Companies 17 
Other   5 
Total 59 
 
China’s Emphasis on Government Support for Indigenous Innovation  
During the past 20 years China has invested heavily in science and technology 
(S&T), using reforms in the S&T management system, including higher education, to 
boost the emergence of a national innovation system that could generate indigenous 
innovation (zizhu chuangxin) of technologies in areas including biology, information 
technology, and nanotechnology.  Beginning with the Third National Conference on 
Science and Technology in 1995 when the “Decision on Accelerating Scientific and 
Technological Progress” was announced (U.S. 1996), “indigenous innovation”8 has been 
heralded as a major source of China’s future economic development.  Science, 
technology and education were identified as the tools that will create national prosperity. 
 In October 2000, Chinese Communist Party Secretary and Chinese President Jiang 
Zemin pointed out in his report in the fifth plenary session of the fifteenth party central 
committee: “We should concentrate our efforts to make breakthroughs on such fields as 
genome science, information science, nano-science, life science and geosciences” (NIBC 
2006, p. 14).  By the time the 11th Five-Year Plan (2006-2011) was unveiled in 2005, 
innovation had become the centerpiece of China’s economic strategy, and the goal was to 
harness China’s human capital to promote indigenous innovation through S&T in order 
to address the country’s social, environmental and global competitive challenges. 
In our project, the emphasis is not on whether the development of nanotechnology 
will be successful in an ultimate sense (“revolutionary breakthroughs” are rare in such 
early-stage technologies), nor do we even need to demonstrate China’s relative 
accomplishments vis-à-vis the United States and other advanced economies.  Rather, our 
analytical focus is twofold:  To better understand China’s current development strategy, 
which both designates nanotechnology as a major national priority and provides 
substantial resources to achieve its objectives, and to shed light on some of the 
                     
8 While the 1995 Conference did not formally use the term “indigenous innovation,” it did call for 
an increased capacity “to create technology indigenously and master key industrial technologies 
and systems design technologies” (section 4, as reported in U.S. 1996). At the same time it also 
stated that “while developing scientific and technological capabilities primarily on our 
indigenous efforts, adequate attention should also be assigned to the acquisition and 
assimilation of foreign technology. On the basis of equality and mutual benefit, a significantly 
greater level of international S & T cooperation and exchange through official, non-
governmental, bilateral and multilateral channels should be vigorously assumed” (PRC 2003).  
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institutional and policy challenges that must be addressed for technological leapfrogging 
to work.  A key question is whether China’s seemingly top-down and government-
centered approach toward S&T policy can succeed in creating the bases for genuine 
innovation, in the current absence of strong market signals and private capital support for 
high-tech commercialization.  Whether or not the Chinese government is in a position to 
target certain technology areas as frontrunners for funding is a hotly contested topic.   
As we shall show, such concerns may be at odds with several distinctive features 
of the innovation process, including China’s approach to technological leapfrogging, the 
institutional features of China’s innovation system (which in practice blur the top 
down/bottom up distinction), and nanotechnology’s status as an early stage emerging 
technology.   
 
Leapfrogging Development:  the New “Great Leap” Forward? 
The concept of technological leapfrogging (essentially taking an industrialization 
short cut) was coined in 1985 by Luc Soete with specific reference to the international 
diffusion of technology and the industrial development of economic growth associated 
with the microelectronics industry. Soete (1985) highlights the significant advantages 
that can be felt by “late industrializers” in terms of catching up to global technological 
leaders, citing Japan as the most apt example (at the time). More recently, it has been 
linked to countries such as China, which has explicitly jettisoned the traditional notion of 
sequential or “catch up” industrialization typically advocated for developing economies -
- notions dating back a half a century or more (see, for example, Rostow 1960).   
China in particular is racing toward high-technology development, while 
continuing to exploit its comparative advantage in labor-intensive industries (Friedman 
2006).  In doing so, China – and by implication other developing countries, if they follow 
China’s example – could potentially prompt considerable shifts in the global economy.  
What makes China unique, however, is its attempt to combine its low-cost advantage in 
export-oriented industrialization, its large domestic market for advanced manufactures 
via import-substituting industrialization, and its burgeoning talent pool of scientists and 
engineers associated with the R&D process in high-technology development into a single 
development strategy.  
Two powerful forces, globalization and the rapid advance of information 
technologies, have made China’s distinctive approach to technological leapfrogging 
possible.  These forces have compressed both space and time to the point where China is 
able to upgrade on several very different levels simultaneously: labor-intensive exports 
(e.g., nondurable consumer goods), advanced manufacturing (e.g., autos and electronics), 
infrastructure development (e.g., highways, ports, logistics, and communications), and 
knowledge industries (e.g., biotechnology and nanotechnology).  The choice of this 
development strategy can only be explained by China’s expansive vision of its role as an 
emerging global power and its domestic politics oriented toward rapid economic growth 
and so-called “market socialism.”  Whether China can successfully sustain this strategy is 
an open question, but it will require a complex and evolving set of policies and 
institutions to concurrently manage everything from exchange rates and industrial 
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incentives, to education, migration, labor market, and S&T policies.    Nanotechnology in 
China illustrates both the potential and difficulties of this leapfrogging strategy, which 
ultimately seeks to bypass the traditional movement up the value chain.      
In the eyes of some China-watchers, technological leapfrogging – driven by 
initiatives that originate in the central government – is doomed to fail.  Efforts to create 
an “innovative society” via leapfrogging are seen as hampered by a lack of private sector 
resources in China, as well as by bureaucratic rivalries among key state agencies 
(Suttmeier, Cao, and Simon 2006b).  Innovation is said to require market-driven 
incentives, while China’s investment- and export-driven growth is said to have been at 
the expense of consumption, and hence is a drag on the economy (Lardy 2006).  
Furthermore, as a strategy for growth, “indigenous innovation” is viewed as suffering 
from “techno-nationalism,” which is largely at odds with the FDI-oriented development 
model China has thus far used effectively to bring in new technologies (Serger and 
Breidne 2007). 
We question the dismissal of China’s innovation potential on the grounds that it is 
based on an exclusively Beijing-led model of development.   We prefer more nuanced 
formulations that emphasize modular,  loosely coupled approaches to innovation – for 
example, John Hagel III and John Seely Brown’s focus on “creation nets,” “open 
innovation,” and “process networks” (Brown and Hagel 2005; Hagel and Brown 2006).  
Such approaches favor open over closed systems, recognizing that a balance needs to be 
struck between open “pull” and closed “push.”  Similarly, Lynn and Salzman (2007a; 
2007b) argue that real “innovation shifts” are occurring in places like China, but that to 
understand these we need to look at the role of cumulative and incremental innovations, 
the dynamics of collaborative advantage, and the role of local technology entrepreneurs.   
Finally, we need to consider the distinction between “technology push” and 
“demand pull” as it relates to nanotechnological innovation in China.  The implication is 
that new or unexpected sources of demand can help a technology take off.9  The flip side 
of this argument is that potential roadblocks to expected demand can arise, such as the 
concerns about potential environmental and/or health risks of nanotechnologies or that a 
backlash to consumer goods similar to the controversy surrounding genetically modified 
organisms (GMOs) might occcur.  In either case, we would need a more open-ended and 
flexible understanding of how innovation occurs in the real world. 
 
 
China’s Developmental State: Science and Technology Policy  
Technological leapfrogging requires state investment in areas where the market is 
unable or unwilling to provide the resources for growth, such as promising technologies 
with longer-term commercial horizons, such as nanotechnology.  Given the importance of 
the central government as a driver of S&T in China, in this section we focus on the role 
of the key central governmental institutions in shaping China’s efforts.  The National 
                     
9 This is a key element in Clayton Christensen’s influential notion of “disruptive technologies” 
(see Christensen, 2000). 
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People’s Congress (NPC), China’s highest organ of the state power and legislature, 
through its Standing Committee and the Committee on Science, Technology, Education, 
and Health, has the authority to enact and amend an S&T related law, which is typically 
drafted by a government agency.  The NPC also monitors the implementation of such 
laws and approves state budget on S&T.  Constituting ministries of the State Council, 
China’s cabinet, such as the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST), Education 
(MOE), Agriculture (MOA), Health (MOH), Industry and Information Technology 
(MIIT), Environmental Protection (MOEP), the National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC), the now defunct Commission of Science, Technology, and 
Industry for National Defense (COSTIND), and so on, allocate resources to programs 
related to their respective ministerial missions.   
The Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), an entity with multiple functions in 
research, high-tech industrialization, technology transfer, and training, plays a significant 
role in S&T policy-making through its honorific members, along with members of the 
Chinese Academy of Engineering (CAE), an advisory institution providing services for 
decision-making of the nation’s key issues in engineering and technological sciences 
(Cao 2004).  The National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC) mainly supports 
basic research and mission-oriented research projects through a competitive peer review 
process.  Finally, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) has become increasingly important in 
scrutinizing budgets put forward by ministries and monitoring the usage of the funds.  
During the policy-making process, members of the Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Conference (CPPCC), an advisory body, also voice their opinions; this body 
includes many who are not members of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). 
Nevertheless, it is the CCP that has final say in S&T policy formulation, as it does 
in virtually all matters in China.  Although the CCP Central Committee does not set S&T 
policy directly, it inserts influence through the State’s leading group mechanism.  A 
leading group usually is set up within the State Council to tackle issues involving more 
than one government agency and it is chaired at least by a vice premier who is likely a 
member of the CCP Central Committee Politburo or its Standing Committee – China’s de 
facto governing body – so as to mobilize resources and coordinate efforts.  Given the 
importance attached to “strengthening the nation through science, technology, and 
education” (kejiao xingguo), China’s S&T policy has became a national development 
strategy since the mid-1990s, and the State Leading Group for Science, Technology, and 
Education has been led by the premier.   
In May 2000, a group of experts jointly proposed to the CPC Central Committee 
and the State Council that “our country should accelerate the industrialization of the 
nanotechnology and occupy this world-wide frontier area as soon as possible,” which 
was quickly taken up as a priority research area by members of the CPC Central 
Committee (NIBC 2006).  A vice premier or a state councilor runs the operations of the 
leading group, which is also composed of the chiefs of the leading science, education, 
and economic agencies from MOST, NDRC, MOE, MOA, MOH, MII, MOEP, 
COSTIND, and MOF; the presidents of CAS and CAE; and a deputy secretary-general 
from the State Council.  Many of the bureaucrats working at this level are scientists or 
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engineers by training. 
The State Leading Group for Science, Technology, and Education is responsible 
for studying and reviewing the nation’s strategy and key policies, and for discussing and 
reviewing major tasks and programs, related to these three areas, and for coordinating 
important issues related to science education involving agencies under the State Council 
and regions.  The Leading Group seems to be considerably more active and important in 
setting the nation’s science, technology, and education policy.  It meets a couple of times 
a year, usually prior to major national policy announcements or conferences, to discuss 
critical issues the nation faces in science and education, and to approve important 
initiatives and programs.  The Leading Group also has invited leading scientists to update 
its members and members of the State Council on “hot” science, technology, and 
education related topics, including nanotechnology. 
The drafting of the Medium and Long-Term Plan for the Development of Science 
and Technology toward 2020 (MLP) was the most important task of the Leading Group 
and one of the major tasks of the State Council and the CCP between 2003 and 2006.  
Soon after Wen Jiabao assumed the premiership at the Tenth National Party Congress in 
March 2003, he convened a Leading Group meeting on 30 May to launch the drafting of 
the MLP (in fact, the MLP was first discussed at a Leading Group meeting early the year 
when Zhu Rongji was still the premier and chair of the Leading Group).  Premier Wen 
also chaired the leading group of the MLP drafting with MOST coordinating the process. 
 He presided over a series of State Council sessions on results of strategic research for the 
MLP between April and August 2004 and convened an MLP leading group meeting and 
a State Council meeting on 10 May and 8 June, 2005 respectively to deliberate on the 
plan.   
The CCP Central Committee Politburo not only devoted a late December 2004 
study session to the discussion on China’s S&T development strategy toward 2020, but 
also approved the MLP in late June 2005.  In February 2006, the State Council formally 
issued the MLP, presumably after intensive negotiations between governmental agencies, 
especially on mega science and engineering programs which may involve some billion 
yuan for each.  In May 2006, Premier Wen convened another Leading Group meeting to 
discuss how to implement the MLP, after which the State Council issued a series of 
detailed implementation measures assigned to various government agencies. 
As previously noted, one of the themes underlining the MLP and indeed China’s 
S&T policy in recent decades is that China should achieve leapfrog development in S&T. 
 With such rapid economic growth over the past three decades, the reasoning goes, China 
can afford to invest previously unthinkable sums of money in S&T areas whose long 
range breakthroughs may not only significantly change the scientific landscape but also 
bring about significant economic benefit.  Nonetheless, given its limited financial and 
human resources, it is impossible for China to launch an effort on all fronts; instead, 
China should “do what it needs and attempt nothing where it does not” (you suo wei, you 
suo bu wei), which has been another important theme of China’s S&T policy.10  China 
                     
10 This theme was taken from the then CCP General Secretary Jiang Zemin’s report to the 15th 
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arguably has little choice but to be selective in supporting research endeavors to 
concentrate and best utilize scarce resources.  The challenge then becomes how to make 
the right choices that not only embraces a global strategy of S&T development, but also 
leverages China’s existing advantages to realize its potential.   
Although MOST gets the mandate for China’s S&T related matters, reinforced by 
its power over the implementation of mega science programs authorized by the MLP, it is 
not the only government ministry that plays a significant role in China’s S&T policy 
making and implementation.  In fact, according to some estimates, MOST controls only 
about 15 percent of R&D expenditure appropriated by the Chinese government, which 
means other government agencies are as important as (if not more important than) MOST 
in planning, budgeting, and organizing S&T and R&D activities.   
Nevertheless, there is risk associated with the Chinese approach.  If the bet is 
wrongly placed, as Japan did for its fifth generation computer program in the 1980s, the 
policy could be detrimental.  In the MLP case, if the areas most critical to the basic 
scientific breakthrough are not the four chosen, not only would China be wasting 
enormous amounts of resources – both financial and human – and missing a new 
scientific revolution, the nation would also be trapped at its current level of S&T 
development for a prolonged period.  This is why some Chinese scientists – especially 
those working overseas, who presumably had a better understanding of how science is 
“supposed to work” – were critical of the approach of picking champions.  Unhappy with 
the way that MOST organized the State High-Tech Research and Development Program 
(also known as the 863 Program) 11 and the State Key Basic Research and Development 
Program (also known as the 973 Program),12 whose achievements were viewed by some 
as incommensurate with the amount of investment, skeptical scientists proposed limiting 
MOST’s power or even dissolving MOST and replacing it with an Office of Science and 
Technology under the premier which would be responsible for formulating China’s S&T 
policy only.  They also campaigned to divert MOST’s funding power to mission-oriented 
                                                             
CCP Congress in 1997, which reads, “We should formulate a long-term plan for the 
development of science from the needs of long-range development of the country, taking a 
panoramic view of the situation, emphasizing key points, doing what we need and attempting 
nothing where we do not, strengthening fundamental research, and accelerating the 
transformation of achievements from high-tech research into industrialization” (emphasis 
added).  This was in turn adapted from the May 1995 decision of the CCP and the State Council 
to push forward China’s S&T progress, although the wording was slight different – “catching 
up what we need and attempting nothing where we do not” (you suo gan, you suo bu gan). 
11 The 863 Program was seen as a key vehicle for improving China’s high-tech competitiveness, 
through the development of six advanced technologies selected as central to promoting 
economic growth: electronics, supercomputers, telecommunications, avionics, GPS, and 
nanotechnology (MOST 863 2001, Larson, 2004). 
12 The 973 Program sought “to strengthen the original innovations and to address the important 
scientific issues concerning the national economic and social development at a deeper level and 
in a wider scope, so as to improve China's capabilities of independent innovations and to 
provide scientific support for the future development of the country” (MOST 973 2004).   
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government agencies and to increase funding to NSFC, which has been doing relatively 
well in administering resources for basic research in China.  As it turns out, their 
opinions were not taken seriously in the final deliberation (Suttmeier, Cao, and Simon 
2006).13 
 
China’s Nanotechnology Initiative: Top Down or Bottom Up?   
It has been argued that China, as a state-centered economy, is trying to drive 
nanotechnology development from the top through large government investments.  As 
early as 2001, addressing an international forum on nanomaterials, President Jiang Zemin 
stated explicitly that “the development of nanotechnology and new materials should be 
regarded as an important task of the development and innovation in S&T. The 
development and application of nanomaterials and nanotechnology is of strategic 
significance to the development of high technology and national economy in China” 
(NIBC 2006).   
Yet this exclusively state-centered, top down view of China’s high-tech planning 
does not adequately take into account the complexities of China’s approach.  China’s 
approach is a hybrid model blending government and market forces (Xu et al 2006).  
Moreover, there are large and growing scientific and professional communities that are 
heavily invested in promoting the advance of nanotechnology.  These include the 
physicists and chemists who have long worked in such areas as carbon nanotubes and 
nanopowders, the applied scientists and engineers who are transforming nanomaterials 
into commercial products, and the rising class of entrepreneurs and venture capitalists 
who are concerned about bringing new nano-enabled products to the market. In many 
regards, the innovation and commercialization ends of the R&D spectrum have been 
working in relative isolation from each other in nanotechnology.  Each group has its own 
agenda.  In between are the engineers, who often seem to be working alongside the 
applied scientists, but who often have close communications with potential customers as 
well, linking the R&D aspects of the innovation process – for example, in biomedical 
engineering, where the drug delivery prospects of nanotech are most apparent. The 
complex ties between these different communities of scientists, engineers, and business 
people make it difficult to think of innovation exclusively in terms of top-down versus 
bottom-up or even government versus market influences. 
In broader institutional terms, it is not accurate to simply equate “top down” with 
governmental and “bottom up” with market-led investments in nanotechnology; China’s 
                     
13 In recent years, MOST also has been criticized for its inaction in handling misconduct in 
scientific research in China.  The appointment of Wan Gang, a non-CCP member, as the 
minister of science and technology in April 2007, bypassing another non-CCP member high-
ranking vice minister, seems not only to signal that the importance of non-CCP members in 
government but also to indicate that the government may not be satisfied with MOST 
leadership, and in turn the progress of Chinese science, in spite of tremendous money put into it. 
They may want someone with no previous relations with the ministry to bring in new ways of 
thinking and management. 
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approach is more complex than this simple dichotomy suggests.  Different levels of 
governmental support (central, provincial and local) and different government agencies 
vary in the degree to which they can be accurately characterized as either top down or 
bottom up.  Nanotechnology is supported by a variety of public sector ministries and 
agencies that operate at diverse levels of government.  These governmental actors have 
different agendas and incentive structures, and as a result nanotechnology projects are 
subject to conflicting and sometimes contradictory performance criteria.  There is a 
division of labor in what and how they fund projects (e.g., people, equipment, cheap land, 
tax reductions).  They also tend to have very different time horizons and attitudes toward 
financial risk:  as one moves from central to provincial to local levels of government 
funding, the time horizon for return on investment becomes shorter, and there is a 
tendency to move from intangible (basic research) to tangible (commercial products) 
results.  At the local level especially, government officials expect a quick turn-around in 
terms of technological development and market applications (Cheng 2007).   
The central government is the principal funder of nanotechnology.  The largest 
source of funds, and the biggest individual grants, come from the Ministry of Science and 
Technology (MOST).  The National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC) 
provides much smaller grants (roughly equivalent to $30,000-$45,000 over three years), 
which are administered using more objective and universal criteria.   The Chinese 
Academy of Sciences (CAS) also supports nanotechnology initiatives, but it has a more 
diversified funding philosophy than MOST.  Even within central government support for 
R&D in China, there is a contrast between MOST (top down, “mega science”) vs. CAS 
(bottom up, including its Knowledge Innovation Program, which is touted as a bottom-up 
initiative).14  Provincial governments can also be significant – not only in those 
containing the major cities (such as Beijing and Shanghai), but also provinces such as 
Zhejiang, which neighbors Shanghai, that hope to promote their regional universities as 
major players by setting up collaborative university science centers (Zhejiang, for 
example, has partnered with UCLA to set up the Zhejiang-California International 
Nanosystems Institute, although with mixed results).  Finally, local governments also 
frequently play a key role, particularly in major cities (examples include the Shanghai 
Nanotechnology Promotion Center and the Suzhou Industrial Park).  Both provincial and 
local governments can also partner with foreign investors, as with the China-Singapore 
Suzhou Industrial Park Development Corporation. 
When choices have been made for public investment, they often address the most 
pressing challenges facing China in agriculture, the environment, population, health, and 
national defense.  The selection of four mega programs in basic science areas by the MLP 
– nanotechnology, development and reproductive biology, protein science, and quantum 
research – in fact represents an effort to do this.  Within nanotechnology, China plans to 
                     
14 Many CAS members privately report that this is in fact a “ top design” (ding ceng she ji) 
approach, originating under the initiative of Lu Yongxian who was president of the CAS in 
1998 (for a discussion of the CAs and Knowledge Innovation Program, see Suttmeier, Cao, and 
Simon 2006a, 2006b). 
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focus on those nanomaterials and nanodevices that promise to have the most immediate 
payoff in addressing such immediate problems as air and water purification, materials 
with great tensile strength that can be used in a variety of industrial applications, as well 
as targeted drug delivery.  China is already a world leader in the production of carbon 
nanotubes, for example (Fan 2007).  According to Liu Zhongfan, Professor of Physical 
Chemistry at Peking University, “China is far better now than it was ten years ago – more 
people are working here and more [and better] instrumentation is appearing in China… 
policymakers are beginning to understand that nanodevices are actually the most 
important part of nanotechnology, not synthesis or incorporation” (Liu 2006).   
China’s political leadership has lent its support for nanotechnology, with an added 
push from leading scientists both inside and outside of China.  CAS Executive Vice 
President Bai Chunli, a pioneer and champion of nanotechnology research in China, has 
been an alternate member of the CCP Central Committee,15 whose lecture to the 
Politburo and the State Council in 2000 was deemed to be an influential one.  Yet China 
did not realize the value and significance of nanotechnology to science as well as 
application potentials for the economy until much later than other, more technologically 
advanced countries.  The fact that countries such as the United States had formulated 
national nanotechnology initiatives made it easier for Chinese scientists to make their 
case to the scientific and political leadership.  Xie Sishen, who now heads up the 
National Center for Nanoscience and Technology in Beijing, explained that well-
respected foreign scientists suggested to Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and others that 
nanotechnology was worth paying attention to: 
Governments around the world and delegations from other countries, especially 
those from advanced countries, frequently mentioned nanotechnology and 
conducted exchanges and collaborations with China... [this] provided information 
continuously, which made the Government realize its importance from pure basic 
research to application to impacts on economy and society (Xie 2007a). 
  The connection of Chinese scientists to the international nanotechnology 
community, and especially to Chinese-origin nano-scientists and engineers overseas, has 
helped China move toward the frontier of international nanotechnology research.  
Chinese nanotechnology researchers have thus far achieved some impressive results, 
especially in nanomaterials.  Furthermore, returnees and exchanges with overseas 
Chinese scholars have brought new ideas into the laboratory, along with increased 
participation by Chinese scientists and engineers in international exchanges, widespread 
international collaborations, and attendance at high-level symposiums (Xie 2007a). 
In nanotechnology, it was MOST, the State Planning Commission (the 
                     
15Bai, executive vice president of the CAS with the rank of a full minister, is in line to succeed Lu 
Yongxiang as president.  But Bai, an alternate member of the CCP Central Committee since the 
15th CCP Congress in 1997, was not promoted a full member in the recently concluded 17th 
CCP Congress while Lu kept his full membership, which is rare as he is over 65, the age limit 
for being a full member.  Therefore, it will be interesting to see whether a changing of the guard 
will happen at the CAS. 
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predecessor of NDRC), MOE, NSFC, and CAS that jointly analyzed the strength, 
weakness, opportunities, and threats in the development of nanotechnology in China 
(Diagram 1).  The outcome of the exercise was to establish a national steering committee 
on nanotechnology in 2001, which in turn formulated an Outline for the National Nano 
Science and Technology Development (2001-2010) as a roadmap.  Under the guidance 
and coordination of the national steering committee, chaired by the Minister of Science 
and Technology, various nanotechnology related programs have been supported and 
implemented at MOST, MOE, CAS, and NSFC; in the meantime, NDRC has provided 
funds for infrastructure building and innovation activities at enterprises.  A new national 
steering committee was appointed in June 2007. 
[Diagram 1 about here] 
There is a division of labor among these state institutional players.  MOST, for 
example, through the 863 Program and the 973 Program, funds mission-oriented 
nanotechnology projects (the 973 Program no longer supports nanotech projects as they 
are now under the aegis of the MLP, also administered by MOST); CAS positions itself 
in the national nanotech landscape with its forward-looking and strategic advantage; 
universities have the responsibility of not only conducting cutting-edge research 
themselves but also turning out students with the capabilities to do so; and NSFC awards 
grants to the best projects and researchers with possibility to achieve breakthrough at 
frontier of international research, mainly on the basis of scientific merit judged by peer 
review.  Nevertheless, such a division is not rigorously observed.  With competition for 
funding getting intense, leading nanotechnology scientists and institutions are likely to 
receive funding from many available sources, which then outsource or subcontract the 
projects. 
In the first two years of the MLP implementation, 22 institutions have been 
selected to lead 29 projects (Table 2).  Of them, 12 are CAS institutes, including the 
Chinese University of Science and Technology and the National Center for Nano Science 
and Technology (NCNST) which are also CAS affiliates; the rest are key (zhongdian) 
universities, with the CAS Institute of Chemistry, Beijing University, the CAS Institute 
of Physics, NCNST, and Tsinghua University having more than one project.  Beijing, 
Shanghai, Jiangsu, and Anhui stand out as the leading centers of nanotechnology and 
well-known nanotech scientists, such as Jiang Lei at the CAS Institute of Chemistry, 
Peng Lianmao and Liu Zhongfan at Beijing University, Li Yadong at Tsinghua 
University, Yang Hui at the CAS Suzhou Institute of Nano-Tech and Nano-Bionics, 
among others, are among the chief scientists leading the efforts.  The projects are in the 
categories of nanomaterials, devices and electronics, biology and medicine, and 
characterization and structure. 
[Table 2 about here] 
While it remains to be seen whether the projects selected will contribute to 
China’s ability to leapfrog in nanotechnology, it is arguable that there is a resource 
concentration factor in the current arrangement.  The first two-year fund of 262 million 
RMB($38 million) has been allocated for the 29 projects which presumably are 
composed of researchers from more than one institution, and the funding intensity for 
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each project – less than 5 million RMB per year on average ($721,000) – is hardly 
significant.  Also of concern is how scientists working on different projects collaborate 
with each other to generate synergy and what benchmark will be used to evaluate the first 
two-year performance and determine their continuous funding (in fact, one would also be 
interested in knowing how these projects have been selected and whether scientists were 
on equal footing in the process).  Although the projects are supposed to be basic-research 
oriented under the MLP, some deal with applied nanotechnology.  There are further 
questions about how they are related to other MOST-administered programs related to 
nanotechnology, especially the 863 Program and the Torch Program,16 which are focused 
on high-tech industrialization, and presumably some are led by the same chief scientists. 
 
Private Capital: A Limited Resource 
In our focus on the developmental state in China, we have not directly addressed 
the role of private capital, in part because the bulk of nanotechnology’s global 
commercial promise remains in the future, and thus commercialization prospects remain 
limited.  Nonetheless, we can offer some preliminary thoughts of the role of market 
investments, based on our research to date.  These include centralized investments by 
large vertically integrated multinationals, various forms of network-based international 
collaborations, and small-scale new firm startups that focus on commercial products. 
Multinationals:  A great deal of attention has been given to the more than 1,000 
R&D centers that have been established by foreign multinationals in China during the 
past decade.  In many cases, these R&D centers seem much closer to the “D” of 
development than the “R” of research (e.g., localization and de-bugging of products).  
However, the Microsoft Research Center in Beijing has been touted as “the Bell Labs of 
China” for its pioneering research activities (see Buderi and Huang 2006), and IBM, 
General Electric, Siemens, and other top multinationals are also doing innovative projects 
in China.   Lynn and Salzman (2007a) make the case that significant innovation is taking 
place in emerging economies, but often this is in the form of “process innovations” rather 
than the functionality of products. 
International collaborations: There are many forms of international collaboration, 
including: formal institutional partnerships involving universities and corporations; study 
abroad programs, in particular post-graduate degrees earned by Chinese in the USA, 
Japan, and Europe; ethnic ties, most notably the recruitment of overseas Chinese 
scientists and engineers to return to China; and informal personal ties, such as the 
mentoring of former graduate students.  Universities are an important component of 
China’s nanotechnology initiative because it is first and foremost a science-based 
                     
16The Torch Program is intended to produce high-tech products involving new materials, 
biotechnology, electronic information, integrative mechanical-electrical technology, and 
advanced and energy-saving technology – products that have commercial potential for both 
Chinese and foreign markets. It involves, among other things, the creation of high-tech 
industrial development zones.  
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program.17   
Entrepreneurial initiatives, such as small firm startups: These are most common 
in Hong Kong and Taiwan, although we have seen examples of these in China as well.  It 
is also clear that investors, including venture capitalists and local governments, expect to 
see real products as a tangible result of their investments. This is a relatively weak area in 
China, although we identified more cases in Taiwan and Hong Kong.  In the 
nanotechnology value chain, companies occupy different positions on the innovation ? 
applied research ? commercialization spectrum. 
 
The Long March Through the Valley of Death: The Central Role of Public Funding  
In business terms, the “valley of death” refers to the transitional period between 
basic R&D for a new technology (technology creation) – when public funding typically 
provides support – and commercialization, when a marketable product attracts private 
sector support.  In China, the valley is long and deep. State-run firms – which still 
account for an estimated 43 percent of GDP, despite China’s commitment to 
privatization18 – tend to be bureaucratic and conservative, shunning potentially risky 
investments in favor of short-term, more predictable returns. The emerging private sector, 
including many small and medium enterprises (SMEs), remains small, under-capitalized, 
and generally risk-averse. This poses a challenge for the Chinese government’s 
heightened emphasis on leapfrogging development through nanotechnology, whose 
major payback remains ten or more years in the future.  The amount of money allocated 
from Beijing for nanotechnology is not large by international standards (Xie 2007b), 
although it is difficult to accurately estimate total public spending for nanotechnology in 
China, given the wide range of funding sources and the difficulty of defining what 
qualifies as nanotechnology, and as a result estimates vary widely.  Estimates range from 
as little as $230 million for the five-year period 2000-2004 (Bai 2005: 63), to $160 
million in 2005 alone (Bai and Wang 2007: 75), to $250 million in that same year 
(Holman et al 2006: 25). Although even the highest figures are still considerably less 
than the U.S. is publicly investing (as noted previously, $1.5 billion in 2008), China’s 
governmental spending on nanotechnology may not be far off when adjusted for 
purchasing power parity, by taking into account labor and infrastructure cost differences 
(nanotechwire.com 2005).  As noted by one of China’s nanotechnology leaders: 
                     
17 Why should we consider international collaborations as a form of market investment in high 
technology development?  If we view nanotechnology as a value chain that has distinctive 
governance structures, then international collaborations may be a form of relational governance, 
which has different characteristics than hierarchies (vertical firms) and markets (entrepreneurial 
start ups).  “Captive” and “modular” forms of governance, which complete the fivefold global 
value chains typology, may also have analogues in nanotechnology (see Gereffi et al., 2006). 
18 OECD (1995) “Policy Brief: China’s Governance in Transition” (September) 
(http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/49/13/35312075.pdf).  In 1997 President Jiang Zemin called for 
privatization (feigongyou, or “non-public ownership”) of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), a plan 
that was ratified by the 9th National People’s Congress the following year. 
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The Chinese government should develop nanotechnology and at least aid in the 
national program, but there are so many important issues that should be 
considered, so I don’t think that nanotechnology will be the top priority.  
Nanotechnology is in the basic research stage right now. So, nanotechnology 
cannot bring the benefits immediately (Xie 2006). 
Throughout our interviews, the most pervasive theme to emerge was that of the 
importance of government funding and support for nanotechnology throughout the value 
chain, not only for basic research, but well into commercialization (this topic came up in 
more than half of our interviews). Esther Levy, editor of the journal Advanced Materials, 
who has reviewed numerous submissions to her journal by Chinese scientists, saw the 
question of government funding as key: “The Chinese are very hard working, As long as 
the government keeps funding them, they will progress.  The question is, will the 
government funding be patient long enough”(Levy 2006)? As one interviewee 
commented, “there is a saying in China that those who do research on atomic bombs 
(yuanzi dan) don’t make as much as those who sell tea eggs (chaye dan)” (Xu 2006).  He 
noted that this situation has to change, since economic returns (rather than pure 
patriotism) will be required if China is to achieve its high-tech aspirations. Another 
informant – an Academician with the Chinese Academy of Engineering, and Chairman of 
China’s Desalination and Water Reuse Society – explained the challenges of developing 
seawater filtration that employs nanotechnology, a NSFC-funded project that has yielded 
promising results in the laboratory:19 
However, it is a little hard to estimate the timeframe for industrializing the new 
process. China Water Tech is currently working on optimizing the process. And 
speed for it to move to industrialization will depend on government funding and 
industrial interest.  Government funding is usually not at all enough to 
industrialize a technological process, industrial involvement is crucial. However, 
larger scale demonstration of this process needs to be done (likely via government 
funding) before industry would become interested (Gao 2006).  
Usually, different government funding sources are used for each step on the chain 
of technology towards industrialization.  The 973 program of MOST is dedicated to 
fundamental research, the 863 program (also of MOST) funds applied research, while the 
“Industrialization Support Plan” (also of MOST) supports projects in initial stages of 
industrialization.  For real industrialization projects, usually the central and local 
Commission of Development and Reform provides funding.   However, usually the 
Commission only provides 15% of the total of what is needed to set up the company, and 
85% has to be raised by the company (which is yet to be formed).   
At the level of basic research, funding comes primarily from the central 
government agencies mentioned earlier. For example, NSFC provides growing support 
for nanoscience and technology through both its General Program, as well as its Major 
Program (focused on major scientific and technological issues that are interdisciplinary in 
                     
19 Dr. Gao is one of the founders for membrane technology in China. He is also the first one who 
introduced the term nano filtration to China in 1993. 
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nature, such as nanotechnology).  As of summer 2007, there were some 670 ongoing 
projects with “nano” in the title, totaling 800 million RMB (roughly $115 million), 8% of 
the total budget (Li 2007).  Most of these were relatively small grants (300,000 RMB, 
approximately $43,000) for three years of project funding, in such areas as 
nanomechanics, novel nanostructures, quantum dots, carbon nanotubes, and novel cancer 
and gene therapies. Proposals are peer reviewed, and awards issued on a competitive 
basis.  One challenge, we were told, is that since nanotechnology is multidisciplinary, it 
is sometimes difficult to know where to apply.  On the other hand, this also provides new 
opportunities for funding, if researchers are able to identify their work as nanotechnology 
(Liu 2006).20 
At the local level, various forms of incubation play a key role. For the Beijing 
region, the Nanotechnology Industrialization Base of China (NIBC) – located 100 km 
from Beijing, in the Tianjin Economic and Technological Development Area – serves 
this role.  NIBC was established by MOST in December 2000, in conjunction with CAS, 
universities, and private enterprises.  Its distinguishing feature is that it is essentially “a 
government organization run by market forces,” reflecting the belief that  
…pure state ownership does not work well for technology innovation or 
management… What the NIBC does is to take results from university and 
institutes, and help scientists to commercialize the results. It takes a systematic 
approach that goes to the end of the commercialization pipeline.21 
The NIBC Entrepreneurship Investment Co. Ltd is the vehicle for incubating new 
companies, acquiring existing companies, and preparing initial public offerings. In 2005, 
the Chinese National Academy of Nanoscience and Engineering (CNANE) was 
established under the same administration, with a primary focus on R&D rather than 
commercialization. It is unclear to us how large a role these institutions actually play; 
during our visit in 2006, the principal operation we observed was the manufacturing of 
non-nano pharmaceuticals, as a form of income generation for the facility. 
Shanghai has its own incubator in the form of the Shanghai Nanotechnology 
Promotion Center (SNPC), which is funded largely by government initiative, particularly 
the Shanghai municipal government as well as the NDRC, although local enterprises 
have also contributed.22 It was founded in July 2000, with the Center’s formal 
establishment in 2001.  SNPC is subordinate to the Science and Technology 
Commission, the lead organization in Shanghai concerned with advancing the city’s 
                     
20 The relabeling of earlier work as nanotechnology, in pursuit of the increased funding that 
available for this emerging technology, is something we have not yet explored in China. We 
suspect, however, that it may be significant – as it likely is in the United States and other 
countries that have directed increased funding into this area. 
21 Handout from NIBC (August 3, 2006) 
22 Information was obtained in interviews at the SNPC with LI Xiaoli (Project Manager), SHI 
Liyi, and Min Guoquan (August 7, 2006), and with ZHU Simon (SNPC Chinese Industry 
Association for Antimicrobial Materials & Products; Shanghai NML Nanotechnology Co., Ltd), 
ZHANG Bo (Shanghai AJ Nano-Science Development Co., Ltd), and Fu Lefeng (Shanghai 
Sunrise Chemical Company) (August 3, 2007).  
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high-technology profile. The SNPC provides training for scientists and engineers on the 
specialized instruments used in nanoscale research, and has several university-affiliated 
‘industrialization bases’ for the purpose of transferring research on nanomaterials and 
nanoparticles to the estimated 100-200 SMEs reportedly engaged in nano-related R&D in 
the Shanghai area. Roughly a third of its 25 person staff are science and engineering 
professionals. 
The Center’s main focus is to promote commercialization This is achieved in 
various ways: by funding basic application research;23 through a research platform 
designed to help with the commercialization process; through the provision of nano 
materials testing; through the hosting of workshops and international conferences on 
nanotechnology; and through education (including a certificate program) and outreach to 
raise public awareness about nanotechnology.  As an incubator,24 the SNPC provides 
services for startups before and as they enter the market – services that include legal 
advice for establishing a company, a variety of technology-related services, and help with 
marketing products. The Center also loans out lab and office space as well as a testing 
center that provides the costly equipment required for nanomaterial characterization – 
equipment that most startups could not afford. It currently supports some 70-80 
companies, of which perhaps half are nano-related, with grants ranging from 50,000 
RMB for smaller projects to 1 million RMB for large ones. 
While there is some private industry investment in nanotechnology (local 
examples include limited investments by Baosteel and Shanghai Electronics), it is clear 
that local government funding plays a key role. During our visit to the SNPC, we saw a 
number of examples of such support – firms housed within the Center’s complex that 
receive public funding as well as access to Center support and services. Three examples 
are illustrative. The Shanghai Sunrise Chemical Company, which employs about 80 
people making nano-coatings and nano-photo catalysts, received two-fifths of its initial 
capitalization of 5 million RMB ($721,000) from government sources. The Shanghai 
NML Nanotechnology Co., Ltd develops anti-bacterial and photo catalysts for use in 
textiles and plastics.  Last year they began exporting the final products employing their 
materials (such as coffee cups that use nanopowders) to the U.S. and Australia.  While 
the company has not received money from SNPC, it does have access to the Center’s 
training and information services. One final example is the Shanghai AJ Nano-Science 
Development Company, which manufactures Atomic and Scanning Tunneling 
Microscopes, two key instruments used in nanotechnology. AJ Nanoscience’s principal 
funding comes from the Shanghai Aijian Trust Investment Company, a Chinese firm with 
                     
23 As one prominent example, we were told that SNPC helped to fund and manage a project 
involving the use of atomic force microscope tips to locate DNA molecules that involved CAS 
and Shanghai Jiao Tong University, which was featured on the cover of Nano Letters. 
24 The SNPC has three incubators, each associated with a university: one affiliated with Shanghai 
University, and two with the Hua Dong Science and Technology University (East China 
University of Science and Technology). 
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significant Hong Kong ownership25 that invests in SMEs.  The company gets public 
support as well: it receives funding from the Shanghai municipal government for R&D, 
relies on technology developed initially in CAS’s Institute of Applied Physics, and has 
some projects with the Shanghai branch of CAS.26 AJ Nanoscience, which was 
established in 2001, reportedly has 60 percent of the domestic market in their area of 
instrumentation – although the market is dominated by international players such as the 
U.S.-based Veeco Instruments.27 
Shanghai also supports the “Climbing Mountain” (Dengshan) Action Plan, which 
provides dedicated funding for joint projects that must be led by companies in 
collaboration with an academic partner.  Within the plan, most work is contracted 
between university researchers and engineers/business partners from companies.  The 
Plan specifically earmarks funding for nanotechnology, with projects divided between 
basic and applied research intended for nanotechnology commercialization (Jia 2006).  In 
Shanghai, as is typical of funding at the local level, the government provides funding 
both for local players and local collaboration with foreign companies such as Unilever 
(Li and Wang 2006).  Particularly at the provincial and local levels, funding for 
nanotechnology R&D thus blurs the line between top-down and bottom-up approaches 
(Li, Shi, and Min 2006).   
 
Conclusion: China’s Developmental State 
China’s dedication to high-technology growth is evident in its policies supporting 
efforts to leapfrog development through targeted science megaprojects in 
nanotechnology, development and reproductive biology, protein science, and quantum 
research.  As we have shown, China’s approach to nanotechnology is heavily state-
centered, with public investment originating at all levels of government, and ranging 
from support for basic research to funding intended to promote commercialization.  
While the United States has not been a focus of this paper, we noted in the introduction 
that the U.S. National Nanotechnology Initiative is primarily directed at the research end 
of the value chain, with more limited inroads into direct support for bringing products to 
market.  In this China clearly differs from the United States – a divergence that is not 
surprising, given the more restricted business environment for “indigenous development” 
in China. 
While the CCP Central Committee does not have its mandate to set S&T policy 
directly, it does maintain a significant level of influence vis-à-vis a state leading group 
mechanism.  The leading group for S&T policy formation has been set up within the 
                     
25 Hong Kong Mingli Co. bought more than 40 percent of Shanghai Aijian Trust Company in 
2004, signaling a much greater openness to foreign investors on the part of Chinese trust 
companies. See Zhao 2005. 
26 We were told that when profits are realized, they are shared with CAS members who created 
the technology. 
27 AJ Nano-Science’s instruments typically sell for roughly one-quarter the price of their foreign 
counterparts. Interview with ZHANG Bo, Manager of Research & Production Department, 
Shanghai AJ Nano-Science Development Company (August 3, 2007). 
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State Council to tackle issues involved with large-scale planning involving more than one 
government agencies.  There is a National Steering Committee for Nanotechnology, 
chaired by the Minister of Science and Technology, that coordinates the efforts in 
nanotech research and industrialization and determines the priority areas for support.  
Under the Medium and Long-Term Plan, the money comes from MOST, although the 
chief scientist, Bai Chunli, is from CAS.     
The Chinese model is not as clear cut as the “top down/bottom up” debate would 
suggest, since both are seen in the development of nanotechnology.  For example, the 
Chinese Academy of Science’s Knowledge Innovation Program (KIP) is typically treated 
as a “bottom up” example, but it in fact involves something called “top design” within 
the academy.  While the 863 and 973 Programs are primarily bottom up, they would 
never have gone forth without the support from the top leadership, Deng Xiaoping in the 
case of the 863 Program and Jiang Zemin in the case of KIP (which is funded largely 
through the 973 Program). On the other hand, the management of these programs, 
especially those under MOST, is top down, with significant input/decision-making from 
bureaucrats, which has been criticized within the Chinese scientific community 
(Suttmeier and Cao 2004) 
Whether China’s efforts to achieve first-mover status in nanotechnology are 
successful remains to be seen.  Whether there will be any large-scale pay off also remains 
an outstanding issue in the future development of nanotechnology-enabled market 
applications.  However, China has clearly shown itself to be very committed to adding 
high-technology initiatives like nanotechnology to its top national priorities, thereby 
showing the dynamism of its contemporary developmental state. 
228
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
Diagram 1 The Framework of Nanotechnology Research in China 
 
 
Table 2 Nanotechnology Projects under the MLP (2006-2007) 
Leading Institution Location 
Number 
of 
projects 
Funding 
(RMB 
million) 
Dongnan University Jiangsu 1 4.9
Chinese University of Science and Technology Anhui 1 4.8
CAS Shanghai Institute of Applied Physics Shanghai 1 11.2
CAS Shanghai Institute of Microsystems and Information 
Technology Shanghai 1 14.0
CAS Institute of Chemistry Beijing 3 35.5
CAS Institute of Semiconductor Beijing 1 4.6
CAS Hefei Institute of Physical Science Anhui 1 13.6
CAS Institute of Physics Beijing 2 13.3
CAS Technical Institute of Physics and Chemistry Beijing 1 5.0
CAS Institute of Theoretical Physics Beijing 1 9.0
CAS Institute of Metal Research Liaoning 1 5.8
Sun Yat-sen University Guangdong 1 11.7
Beijing University Beijing 3 31.3
Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics Beijing 1 9.3
Nanjing University Jiangsu 1 8.7
Nankai University Tianjin 1 4.8
National Steering Committee
Government Agencies Roadmap 
MOST NSFC CAS 
973, 863, 
Torch, 
gongguan, and 
now the MLP 
NDRC MOE
800 univ, insts, 600+ corps, 3,000 
scientists
Materials
Biology & 
medicine 
Characterizat
ion & 
standards 
Devices & 
electronics 
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Sichuan University Sichuan 1 10.8
National Center for Nano Science and Technology Beijing 2 16.2
Fudan University Shanghai 1 11.2
Wuhan University Hubei 1 5.5
Tsinghua University Beijing 2 17.3
CAS Suzhou Institute of Nano-Tech and Nano-Bionics Jiangsu 1 13.6
 Total   29 261.8
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Panel  IV:   Discuss ion,  Quest ions  and Answers  
 
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  Thank you.   Thank you,  
Doctor .  
 Commiss ioner  Slane .  
 
 HEARING COCHAIR SLANE:  My f i rs t  ques t ion  i s  for  Dr .  
Lebby and Dr .  Ar thurs .   The optoelec t ronics  indust ry  in  the  Uni ted  
Sta tes  seems to  be  moving lock,  s tock and barre l  to  China .   I  would  be  
in teres ted  in  hear ing what  you th ink the  federa l  government  should  do 
to  s tem that  and how we can keep tha t  indust ry  here  in  the  Uni ted  
Sta tes?  
 
 And then for  Dr .  Appelbaum, you know,  I 'd  l ike  you to  address  
what  are  the  i ssues  in  nanotechnology in  tha t  a rea?    
 
 And we can s tar t  wi th  you,  Dr .  Lebby.  
 
 DR.  LEBBY:  Yes .   That  i s  indeed t rue .   I f  you look across  our  
membership ,  many of  our  members  have manufactur ing,  packaging,  and 
assembly fac i l i t ies  in  China .   A lo t  of  these  companies  were  drawn to  
do th is ,  going back,  in  the  2000 dot-com bubble ,  where  we had a  lo t  of  
euphor ic  behavior ,  and a  lo t  of  the  optoelec t ronic  companies ,  
especia l ly  in  the  communicat ion  space ,  geared up and put  a  lo t  of  
automat ic  tool ing  fac i l i t ies  in  th is  country ,  companies  l ike  Lucent ,  and 
we had a  b ig ,  a  b ig  ef fec t  by  Norte l  in  Canada.  
 
 And when that  bubble  burs t  in  2001-2002,  there  was  no volume 
there  to  rea l ly  dr ive  these  fac tor ies  so  a  lo t  of  these  companies  looked 
for  a  low-labor  solu t ion ,  and i t  was  l ike  a  herd  menta l i ty .   Everybody 
went  across  to  Asia ,  and so  a  lo t  of  the  packaging and the  back end has  
gone there .   
 
 And now what  we ' re  beginning to  see ,  a f ter  I  in terviewed a  
number  of  our  companies  in  the  las t  two or  three  weeks ,  i s  tha t  some 
of  the  R&D is  going over  there ,  too .   So i t ' s  not  jus t  manufactur ing.  
 
 And one of  the  lessons  tha t  we ' re  beginning to  unders tand here  i s  
tha t  i f  you ' re  not  c lose  to  the  manufactur ing process  and opt imizing 
the  y ie ld ,  then you rea l ly  can ' t  des ign your  next  genera t ion  products .   
And so  what  we ' re  beginning to  see  i s  tha t  the  engineers  who tweak the  
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manufactur ing l ines  to  get  the  maximum yie ld ,  i f  they don ' t  pass  tha t  
informat ion back to  the  R&D designers  here  in  the  U.S. ,  you jus t  
cannot  des ign the  next  genera t ion  products .  
 
 And so  what  tha t  means  i s  you rea l ly  want  to  have  a  rea l ly  t ight  
connect ion between R&D and your  manufactur ing fac i l i ty  so ,  hence ,  
we ' re  see ing R&D faci l i t ies  crop up ac tual ly  in  the  same places  as  the  
manufactur ing centers .  
 
 So f rom an optoelec t ronics  U.S.  s tandpoint ,  yes ,  th ings  are  
leaving th is  country .   But  there  are  some th ings  tha t  we can do here .   I  
l i s ted  those  in  the  d i f ferent  sec tors  of  the  s ta tement ,  and when I  asked 
th is  ques t ion  to  a  lo t  of  our  members ,  yes ,  c lear ly ,  I  had a  lo t  of  
responses ,  but  one  of  the  th ings  people  would  rea l ly  l ike  to  see  in  the  
optoelec t ronics  f ie ld  i s  the  d i rec t  government  suppor t  as  opposed to  
indi rec t  government  suppor t  because  many of  the  companies  in  our  
f ie ld  are  rea l ly  unprof i table ,  la rge  or  smal l ,  and they ' re  rea l ly  
s t ruggl ing.  
  
 You could  argue they were  prof i table  before  the  dot -com bubble ,  
but  s ince  2002-2003,  a  lo t  of  them have rea l ly  been s t ruggl ing,  and so  
I  th ink i f  you rea l ly  want  to  have  a  b ig  impact  in  the  optoelec t ronics  
indust ry  in  the  U.S. ,  you need di rec t  government  suppor t .  
 
 Now,  the  ideas  tha t  we have been f loa t ing  around ourse lves  
between our  members  and OIDA is  what  does  tha t  rea l ly  mean?  We 
have a  lo t  of  government  agencies  tha t  do  fund optoelec t ronics  in  a  
sor t  of  f ragmented s ty le .  
 
 We have DARPA doing some th ings .   We have NSF doing some 
th ings .   Academia .   We have DOE,  NIST.   And so  the  l i s t  i s  qui te  long,  
but  what  we would  l ike  to  see  i s  more  focused programs,  and focused 
programs wi l l  ac tual ly  help  our  indust ry  rea l ly  do some innovat ion and 
R&D back here .   And that  wi l l  a l low us  to  come up wi th  some new 
ideas  l ike  the  ro l l - to- ro l l  manufactur ing I  sugges ted  or  PICs.   That  
would  a lso  be  a  good way to  es tabl ish  leadership ,  even mainta in  tha t  
leadership .  
 
 Quickly ,  before  I  s top ,  one  th ing we did  not ice  when we cal led  
up some of  these  companies  i s  tha t  the  las t  remaining optoelec t ronics  
manufacturer  these  companies  have  i s  the  chip  fabs ,  and in  the  whole  
length  of  the  process ,  the  back end,  the  assembly and the  
manufactur ing is  over  in  China ,  but  the  fab  tha t  ac tual ly  makes  the  
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laser  d iodes  and the  LEDs and the  photo  detec tors  remains  in  the  U.S.  
 
 So the  ques t ion  was  why are  these  p laces  s t i l l  in  the  U.S.?   Wel l ,  
the  answer  tha t  came back was  because  they ' re  very  complex.   They 
have complex IP ,  and i f  these  fac i l i t ies  went  to  China ,  we ' l l  be  dead.   
So c l inging on to  the  fabs  wi th  the i r  f ingernai ls  i s  what 's  happening to  
a  lo t  of  these  companies .  
 
 I f  we can provide  some focused government ,  d i rec t  government ,  
suppor t ,  we would  rea l ly  bui ld  upon that .  
 
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  Thank you,  Dr .  Lebby.  
 Let  me jus t  pause  for  a  minute .   Senator  Sherrod Brown is  here ,  
and we want  to  in t roduce  h im now and le t  h im make his  s ta tement .  
  
 Thank you,  Senator .  
 
 HEARING COCHAIR SLANE:  Today,  we ' re  p leased to  hear  
f rom Senator  Sherrod Brown of  Ohio .  Senator  Brown was  f i rs t  e lec ted  
to  the  Uni ted  Sta tes  Senate  in  2006 and is  current ly  serving his  f i r s t  
te rm.   Pr ior  to  h is  t ime in  the  Senate,  Senator  Brown served in  the  U.S.  
House  of  Representa t ives  s ince  1992 as  a  member  f rom the  13th  
d is t r ic t  of  Ohio .  
 
 In  the  House  of  Representa t ives ,  Representa t ive  Brown increased 
funding for  the  In ternat ional  Trade  Adminis t ra t ion 's  Off ice  of  China  
Compl iance  by $3 mi l l ion .   In  both  the  House  and the  Senate ,  he  has  
been an  outspoken advocate  of  h is  be l iefs  in  fa i r  t rade ,  which he  a lso  
out l ined in  h is  2004 book ent i t led  Myths  of  Free  Trade .  
 
 I  unders tand you have to  leave  immedia te ly  af ter  you 've  g iven 
your  s ta tement  due  to  your  schedul ing const ra in ts .   As  a lways ,  we 
apprecia te  your  t ime and look forward to  hear ing your  perspect ives  on 
the  ef fec ts  of  China 's  indust r ia l  pol icy  on U.S.  workers ,  bus iness  and 
the  American economy.  
 
 
 
PANEL V:  CONGRESSIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
STATEMENT OF SHERROD BROWN, A U.S.  SENATOR FROM 
THE STATE OF OHIO 
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 SENATOR BROWN:  Good.   Commiss ioner  Slane ,  thank you,  
and Pat r ick  and Carolyn,  a l l  of  you,  thank you.   Thank you for  your  
publ ic  service  and thanks  for  a l lowing me to  appear  here  severa l  t imes  
over  the  years  and apprecia te  the  work th is  Commiss ion does  and good 
to  see  an  Ohio  boy do wel l .   Thank you,  Commiss ioner  Slane .  
 I  apologize  for  the  in ter rupt ion ,  and thank you for  s tepping as ide  
for  a  moment- - I  rea l ly  apprecia te  tha t .  
 The  current  f inancia l  c r i s i s  pa in ts  our  economic  re la t ionship  
wi th  China  in  perhaps  broader  re l ief  than we have in  the  pas t .   I  know 
th is  Commiss ion has  a  much deeper  and bet ter  and broader  
unders tanding of  what  China 's  economy is  a l l  about ,  what  ours  i s ,  and 
the i r  in terac t ion ,  than most  of  the  res t  of  th is  country .   But  I  th ink tha t  
people  are  unders tanding i t  a  l i t t le  be t ter  as  th is  f inancia l  c r i s i s  wears  
on.  
 Our  economies ,  Chinese  economy,  our  economy,  nei ther  i s  
par t icular ly  heal thy  now and worse  tha t  they are  codependent .   The 
U.S.  of f ic ia l  unemployment  ra te  i s  8 .1  percent .   My s ta te  of  Ohio ,  
which has  been in  recess ion,  we th ink,  probably  a  year  longer  than the  
off ic ia l ly  recognized nat ional  recess ion,  i s  about  9 .4  percent .   I t ' s  the  
h ighes t  ra te  we 've  seen in  25 years .  
 Meanwhi le ,  thousands  of  fac tor ies  in  China  have c losed over  the  
pas t  s ix  months .   China  i s  one  enormous expor t  p la t form,  and the  
Uni ted  Sta tes ,  i t s  b igges t  cus tomer ,  has  in  some sense  s topped buying.  
 Morgan Stanley  economis ts  repor t  tha t  expor ts  account  for  47  percent  
of  the  economy of  China  and other  Eas t  Asian  nat ions ,  whi le  in  the  
Uni ted  Sta tes ,  consumpt ion accounts  for  more  than 70 percent  of  our  
GDP.   Put  tha t  together .  
 This  economic  codependency has  bred a  dangerously  skewed 
f inancia l  re la t ionship .   As  revenues  f low in to  China  and out  of  the  
Uni ted  Sta tes ,  China  becomes our  b igges t  lender .   I  don ' t  need to  deta i l  
the  r i sks  th is  re la t ionship  breeds .  We know more  and more  about  
sovere ign weal th  funds  and the  r i sks ,  the  shor t - term,  medium and long-
term r isks  tha t  debt  can  br ing.   But  our  roots  l ie  in  our  economic  
codependency,  and our  economic  codependency is  rooted  in  our  
na t ion 's  pass ive  t rade  pol icy .  
 Ohio  i s  one  of  the  great  manufactur ing s ta tes  in  th is  country .   
We make paper  and s tee l  and a luminum and glass  and cars  and t i res .   
We are  f i rs t  or  second in  the  nat ion  in  number  of  so lar  energy workers .  
 We make solar  panels  and polymers  and wind turbines  and more .   
Look around you today;  you ' l l  f ind  something tha t  was  made in  my 
s ta te .  
 Let ' s  for  purposes  of  i l lus t ra t ion  look a t  a  typica l  Ohio  
manufacturer  and compare  tha t  manufacturer  wi th  a  typica l  Chinese  
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manufacturer .   The Ohio  manufacturer  has  a  minimum wage to  pay his  
workers .   He has  c lean a i r  and workplace  and product  safe ty  s tandards  
by which to  abide ,  he lp ing to  keep his  workers  heal thy  and product ive  
and his  consumers  and his  cus tomers  safe .   The Chinese  manufacturer  
has  no minimum wage to  mainta in ,  i s  a l lowed to  pol lu te  local  water  
sources  and le t  workers  use  perhaps  even dangerous  and faul ty  
machinery .  
 The Ohio  manufacturer  pays  taxes ,  heal th  benef i t s ,  pays  in to  
Socia l  Secur i ty  and Medicare .   He typica l ly  a l lows family  leave .   He 's  
required  to  g ive  WARN not ices  when there  i s  a  p lant  c los ing.   The 
Chinese  manufacturer ,  on  the  o ther  hand,  somet imes  a l lows chi ld  
labor .  
 The Ohio  manufacturer  receives  no government  subs id ies  in  most  
cases ,  a l though th ings  have changed recent ly .   The Chinese  
manufacturer  of ten  receives  subsidies  for  development  of  new 
technology or  for  expor t  ass is tance .  
 The Chinese  manufacturer  benef i t s  f rom China 's  manipula t ion  of  
i t s  currency,  which g ives  i t ,  depending on what  economis t  s tudy,  a t  
anywhere  f rom 15 to  40.   I  remember  Clyde Pres towi tz  somet ime ago 
sa id  far  in  excess  of  40  percent  even advantage .  
 The Ohio  manufacturer  i s  increas ingly  going green and inves t ing  
in  new technologies  and ef f ic iencies  to  crea te  more  sus ta inable  
product ion pract ices .   Ohio  manufacturers  are  par t  of  the  movement  to  
become more  energy ef f ic ient .   Join ing manufacturers  in  the  o ther  49  
s ta tes ,  they wi l l  do  the i r  par t  to  reduce  carbon emiss ions ,  but  not  a t  
the  expense  of  jobs  i f  China  and other  countr ies  do  not  take  
comparable  ac t ion .  
 Now when the  Ohio  manufacturer  pe t i t ions  for  re l ief ,  when he  
says  I  can ' t  compete--when he  says  I  can  compete  wi th  anyone,  but  th is  
i s  not  a  level  p laying f ie ld ,  the  Chinese  government  cr ies  
protec t ionism.   Or  when the  Ohio  manufacturer  says  he  wants  to  emit  
less  carbon but  needs  to  see  h is  compet i tors  f rom China  bear  the  same 
cos ts  on  s imi lar  t imel ines ,  what  does  the  Chinese  government  say?   
Again ,  the  government  ca l l s  i t  protec t ionism.  
 Jus t  las t  week,  our  new Energy Secre tary ,  Nobel  Pr ize  winner  
Secre tary  Chu,  noted  in  a  hear ing tha t  unless  o ther  countr ies  a lso  bear  
a  cos t  for  carbon emiss ions ,  the  Uni ted  Sta tes  wi l l  be  a t  a  
d isadvantage .   The response  f rom a  Chinese  off ic ia l ,  again ,  he  sa id  I  
wi l l  oppose  us ing c l imate  change as  an  excuse  to  prac t ice  
protec t ionism on t rade .  
 Chinese  off ic ia ls  are  quick  to  cal l  the  U.S.  protec t ionis t  despi te  
a l l  the  protec t ions  i t  a f fords  i t s  own manufacturers ,  whi le  our  country  
has  the  wor ld 's - -as  we should--has  the  wor ld 's  most  open economy.  
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 And,  of  course ,  Chinese  off ic ia ls  are  of ten  jo ined by 
mul t ina t ional  CEOs,  by  Ivy League economis ts ,  by  people  in  the  h igh 
echelons  of  our  own government ,  and by most  edi tor ia l  boards ,  in  
cas t ing  any ef for ts  to  rebui ld  Amer ican manufactur ing protec t ionis t .   
Argument  over .  
 That  i s  why I  fee l  such a  sense  of  urgency wi th  the  hear ing 
you ' re  holding today.   China 's  indust r ia l  pol icy  i s  based on unfa i r  t rade  
prac t ices  and involves  d i rec t  expor t  subs id ies ,  indi rec t  subs id ies  l ike  
currency manipula t ion  and copyr ight  p i racy,  and hidden subsid ies  l ike  
lax  s tandards  and low labor  cos ts .   In  to ta l ,  i t  resul t s  in  the  loss  of  
mi l l ions  of  American jobs .  
 I t  i s  depress ing wages  and income levels  wor ldwide ,  whi le  
China 's  exploi ta t ion  of  environmenta l  and heal th  and safe ty  s tandards  
i s  k i l l ing  Chinese  workers  and c i t izens ,  adding to  our  own c l imate  
change chal lenges ,  and in  some cases ,  harming chi ldren  and other  
consumers  around the  wor ld .  
 The heal th  of  our  economy and s t rength  of  our  middle  c lass  
depend on how Congress  and the  Obama adminis t ra t ion  engage wi th  
China  on a l l  of  these  i ssues .  
 I  thank you for  inves t iga t ing  these  and for  the  leadership  and the  
publ ic  service  tha t  you a l l  have  shown.  
 HEARING COCHAIR SLANE:  Thank you,  Senator .  
 SENATOR BROWN:  Thanks .  
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  Thank you for  being here ,  
Senator .  
 SENATOR BROWN:  Thanks ,  Dan.   Thanks .   Good to  see  you 
again .   Thanks ,  Carolyn.  
 
PANEL IV:  (Resumes discuss ion,  quest ions  and answers)  
 
 HEARING COCHAIR SLANE:  Dr .  Ar thurs ,  we ' l l  cont inue .  
 DR.  ARTHURS:   The ques t ion was ,  I  th ink,  i f  the  
optoelec t ronics  indust ry  i s  moving out  of  the  Uni ted  Sta tes ,  how do we 
prevent  tha t  or  how do we reverse  tha t?  
 I  would  say  tha t  cer ta in ly  for  any volume appl ica t ion ,  once  
anything was  in to  volume,  i t  moves  offshore ,  par t icular ly  to  China ,  
now Shenzhen being perhaps  the  grea t  hub of  optoelec t ronics  
manufactur ing in  the  wor ld .   There 's  a  la rge  par t  of  the  indust ry  tha t  i s  
low volume and more  ac tual ly  h igh tech tha t  i s  s t i l l  s taying here  and 
s t i l l  providing something of  an  advantage  in  the  U.S. ,  but  tha t  i s  not  
growing.  
 I  th ink tha t  we rea l ly  have  to  f igure  out  how to  do volume 
manufactur ing in  the  U.S.   Now,  we have not  inves ted  in  the  
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manufactur ing technology,  and i t ' s  not  in teres t ing  to  the  sc ience  
communi ty .   I  see  in  Taiwan,  for  example ,  the  univers i t ies  where  
Taiwan has  got  the  most  MOCVD reactors  in  the  wor ld .   These  are  b ig  
machines  for  deposi t ing  th in  f i laments  crucia l  to  optoelec t ronic  
components .  
 The univers i t ies  have  people  doing research on those  and 
opera t ing  them as  undergraduates .   They ' re  prepar ing a  manufactur ing 
workforce  wi th  an  edge.   We don ' t  have tha t  type  of  th inking here .   We 
need a  s t ra tegy.    
 The Europeans  have produced a  s t ra tegy on photonics .   The 
Canadians  have  jus t  done i t .   We are  ac tual ly- -and Mike 's - -we 're  now 
t ry ing to  get  the  funds  to  do a  s tudy on the  economic  impact  of  what  
we ca l l  photonics ,  but  i t ' s  the  same word as  optoelec t ronics ,  in  the  
U.S. ,  and get t ing  even the  funds  to  do a  s t ra tegy once  you ment ion 
"economic  impact ,"  to  people- - there  i s  no  rea l  mechanism for  doing 
tha t .  
 The NSF,  who actual ly  to  the i r  c redi t  a re  coming up wi th  hal f  of  
the  funds ,  had di f f icul ty  in  doing tha t  because  once  you ment ion 
commercia l iza t ion ,  then i t  somehow is  impure  sc ience  and not  to  be  
suppor ted .  
 That ' s  a  rea l  i ssue  for  our  sc ient i f ic  communi ty  here .   I  th ink 
we 've  got  to  change the  metr ics .   We 've  got  to  change the  incent ive  
sys tem and the  reward sys tem for  our  sc ient i f ic  and technica l  
communi ty ,  count ing jobs  and economic  impact  here .  
 DR.  APPELBAUM:  I ' l l  comment  br ief ly  on the  loss  of  jobs  in  
nanotechnology,  and then ’ I ' l l  propose  a  k ind of  a  four-point  program 
for  th is  indust ry ,  but  I  want  to  f i rs t  make a  response  to  Senator  
Brown's  comments .   He 's  not  here ,  of  course ,  but  I ' l l  do  i t  anyhow.  
 In  an  ear l ier  l i fe  before  I  began s tudying China 's  r i se  as  a  
technology power ,  my focus  was  on China 's  labor  condi t ions .   And I  
spent  a  lo t  of  t ime in  Chinese  fac tor ies  looking a t  sweatshop 
product ion,  environmenta l  problems,  and so  for th .   So I 'm very  
sympathet ic  wi th  h is  comments .  
 But  I  th ink there 's  a  danger  in  a t t r ibut ing  China 's  success  only  to  
tha t  s ide  of  the  equat ion.   And I  a lso  want  to  say  tha t  one  of  the i r  top  
pr ior i t ies  now has  to  do wi th  envi ronmenta l  i ssues .   They ' re  qui te  
conscious  of  the  environment  des t ruct ion  tha t  i s  occurr ing  in  the i r  
fac tor ies  and in  the i r  c i t ies .    
 They 've  a lso  enacted  a  new Contrac t  Labor  Law which took 
ef fec t  las t  year ,  which has  dr iven some businesses  out  of  China ,  
because  i t  g ives  workers  r ights  they 've  never  had before .   I t  wi l l  not  be  
honored ent i re ly ,  obviously ,  but  i t ' s  a  s tep  in  the  r ight  d i rec t ion .  
 So whi le  I  th ink the  p laying f ie ld  has  to  be  leveled ,  I  th ink the  
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impor tant  th ing to  know is  tha t  China  i s  a lso  making a  fu l l -cour t  press  
when i t  comes to  inves t ing  i t s  huge fore ign currency surpluses  and 
becoming a  g lobal  compet i tor .   And that  I  th ink i s  where  we rea l ly  
should  be  focusing our  ef for ts .  
 In  terms of  the  loss  of  jobs  in  nanotechnology,  there  aren ' t  tha t  
many jobs  in  th is  indust ry  yet  so  there  haven ' t  been many jobs  los t .  So 
I  guess  in  a  way that  tha t ' s  good news.   Whi le  I  th ink tha t  some 
projec t ions  of  the  fu ture  commercia l  impact  of  nanotechnology may be  
exaggera ted ,  i f  i t  does ,  in  fac t ,  c rea te  a  $3 .1  t r i l l ion  economy,  as  Lux 
Research (which t racks  nanotechnology)  c la ims i t  wi l l  by  2015—much 
of  tha t  economic  growth wi l l  be  through the  addi t ion  of  components  
made through nanotechnology to  exis t ing  products  such as  tennis  
rackets ,  gol f  c lubs ,  l ightweight  b icycles ,  a i r f rames ,  and th ings  of  tha t  
sor t .   As  I  reca l l ,  Lux a lso  predic ts  tha t  the  number  of  jobs  crea ted  by 
nanotechnology may not  be  a l l  tha t  grea t .  
 Ul t imate ly ,  as  China  moves  up the  value  chain ,  which i t  wi l l ,  
and s tar ts  to  ac tual ly  make those  products  i t se l f ,  could  those  indust r ies  
be  kept  in  the  Uni ted  Sta tes?   I  think tha t ' s  the  way I  would  f rame the  
ques t ion .  
 Now,  my four-point  program.   Wel l ,  the  f i rs t  th ing I  would  do is  
revise  immigra t ion  laws.  I  know many people  today have ta lked about  
tha t .   At  my campus,  as  many as  hal f  the  appl icants  to  the  Depar tment  
of  Elec t r ica l  and Computer  Engineer ing,  are  f rom China  or  o ther  
countr ies :   an  increas ing number  of  them are  l ike ly  to  re turn  to  China  
af ter  they graduate .     
 Tom Fr iedman,  wi th  character is t ic  verve  in  h is  la tes t  book,  Hot ,  
Flat  and Crowded ,  says  tha t  we should  p in  a  green card  to  every  
fore ign graduate  of  a  U.S.  univers i ty .   A recent  survey of  Si l icon 
Val ley  ent repreneurs  done by Vivek Wadhwa and his  col league,  (Gary  
Gereff i ,  who has  tes t i f ied  before  th is  Commiss ion) ,  c la ims tha t  
something l ike  a  ha l f  of  a l l  S i l icon Val ley  s tar t -ups  over  the  las t  ten  
years  were  crea ted  by immigrants- -mainly  f rom India ,  some f rom 
China ,  some f rom elsewhere .  
 According to  the  same s tudy,  roughly  a  quar ter  of  a l l  technology 
s tar t -ups  in  the  Uni ted  Sta tes  between 1995 and 2005,  account ing for  
450,000 jobs ,  were  s tar ted  by immigrants ,  and I  th ink a lso  the  same 
s tudy found that  a  near ly  quar ter  of  a l l  in ternat ional  pa tents  came f rom 
companies  in  which e i ther  the  CEO or  the  Chief  Technology Off icer  
were  immigrants .   So I  th ink we are  shoot ing ourse lves  in  the  foot  by  
making i t  so  d i f f icul t  for  immigrant  ent repreneurs  to  s tay  here .   
Immigrants  have  a lways  been a  r ich  par t  of  American h is tory;  I  don ' t  
see  them compet ing for  jobs  in  nanotechnology.   
 That  leads  me to  my second point .   I t  would  be  n ice  i f  we were  
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producing s tudents  who would  compete  wi th  immigrants  for  these  
k inds  of  technology jobs .   And there  I  th ink we 've  rea l ly  fa l len  down.   
I 'm to ld  tha t  the  second par t  of  the  s t imulus  package wi l l  focus  on 
educat ion  in  sc ience ,  technology and math  educat ion,  engineer ing and 
math  (STEM 
)  educat ion .   I  th ink tha t ' s  an  impor tant  th ing to  do.   I 'm not  an  exper t  
in  th is  a rea ,  but  jus t  in tu i t ive ly  i t  seems to  me that  we should  somehow 
make i t  eas ier  and more  encouraging for  U.S.  s tudents  to  advance  in  
STEM educat ion.    The U.S.  remains  the  wor ld’s  leading innovat ion-
or iented  socie ty .   The Economis t  magazine  recent ly  had a  fea ture  
ar t ic le  on the  U.S. ,  which provides  ample  evidence  tha t  the  U.S.  
remains  the  most  innovat ive  country  in  the  wor ld  in  terms of  pre t ty  
much every  measure--even though a  lo t  of  the  innovat ion current ly  i s  
be ing done by immigrants .  
 We need to  encourage  our  own ta lent  to  move in to  tha t  a rea  and 
not  jus t  a t  Ivy  League col leges .   Kids  who aren ' t  f in ishing high school  
today const i tu te  a  huge wasted  ta lent  pool ,  qui te  apar t  f rom the  human 
cos t .  
 The  th i rd  th ing i s  a  l i t t le  more  d i rec t .   I  ment ioned ear l ie r  in  my 
remarks  tha t  95  percent  of  the  funding of  the  $1.5  b i l l ion  in  the  U.S.  
Nat ional  Nanotechnology In i t ia t ive  goes  for  bas ic  research.   There  are  
some smal l  programs that  a re  more  c lose ly  t ied  to  funding 
commercia l iza t ion:    the  Smal l  Business  Innovat ion Research (SBIR)  
program;  the  Smal l  Business  Technology Transfer  (STTR) program,  
which encourages  technology t ransfer ,  and the  EPSCoR program in  the  
Nat ional  Science  Foundat ion,  which i s  the  Exper imenta l  Program to  
St imula te  Compet i t ive  Research.   We could  be  put t ing  much more  
money in to  suppor t ing  commercia l iza t ion .   I  know that  tha t ' s  a  
debatable  point  in  terms of  the  U.S.   The not ion of  indust r ia l  pol icy  
has  a  b i t  of  a  bad reputa t ion ,  but  I  th ink more  could  be  done.  
 Jus t  to  g ive  you one  example ,  in  the  text i le  indust ry ,  which I 've  
done some research on,  a  grea t  deal  of  research is  be ing done now on 
nanofabr ics ,  us ing nanotechnology to  make Kevlar ,  for  example ,  or ,  
you know,  swimsui ts  or  t ies  tha t  wick off  s ta ins  and water .  
 Money could  be  put  in to  tha t  so  we could  ac tual ly  compete  wi th  
the  Chinese  who are  cer ta in ly  going to  do i t ,  and moving up the  value  
chain  in to  the  des ign and manufacture  of  nono-enabled fabr ics .   Hong 
Kong Polytechnic  Univers i ty  has  crea ted  an  innovat ive  program in  th is  
area  –  one  tha t  was  inspi red  by a  s imi lar  program at  Nor th  Carol ina  
Sta te  Univers i ty’s  Col lege  of  Text i les .  
 So the  bas ic  idea  here  i s  to  inves t  publ ic  funds  to  developing 
nanotechnologies  tha t  have  commercia l  payoff  in  now-decl in ing 
indust r ies ,  such as  text i les  and appare l .   Providing the  job  re t ra in ing 
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for  people  who could  then work in  those  indust r ies  could  make us  
compet i t ive .   In  o ther  words ,  protec t ionism is  not  the  answer  making 
our  own indust r ies  more  compet i t ive  i s .    
 F inal ly ,  the  four th  th ing I  would  do would  be  to  encourage more  
in ternat ional  exchanges  and col labora t ions .   I t  i s  of ten  sa id  tha t  “good 
ideas  have  no borders .”   This  i s  cer ta in ly  t rue  of  nanotechnology,  
which emerged a t  a  t ime when sc ient i f ic  research had a l ready become 
highly  in ternat ional ized .   In  recent  years  there  has  been an  explos ion 
of  h igh- impact  sc ient i f ic  ar t ic les ,  publ ished in  var ious  f ie lds  of  
nanotechnology,  authored by Chinese  nat ionals  –authored by Chinese  
nat ionals  –  to  the  point  where  the  quant i ty  ( i f  not  the  qual i ty)  now 
equals  tha t  of  the  U.S.   Many of  these  are  co-authored wi th  col leagues  
in  the  U.S. ,  Europe,  and Japan.   There  are  some (but  in  my view 
insuff ic ient )  programs that  encourage  in ternat ional  coopera t ion  and 
mutual  learning.   One,  for  example ,  i s  the  Nat ional  Science  
Foundat ion’s  Par tnership  in  In ternat ional  Research and Educat ion 
(PIRE) ,  which encourages  s tudent  and facul ty  exchanges  and 
col labora t ions .   Our  own campus has  such a  program wi th  the  Dal ian  
Ins t i tu te  of  Chemical  Physics ,  in  the  area  of  nano-cata lys is .   Such 
exchanges  should  be  encouraged:   we a l l  benef i t  to  the  extent  tha t  
knowledge advances  across  a  level  p laying f ie ld  
  
 HEARING COCHAIR SLANE:  I  have  one fo l low up.   I  s t ruggle  
wi th  th is  i ssue  of  manufactur ing.   When you look a t  the  iPod,  the  iPod 
was  des igned and developed by Apple .   I t ' s  a l l  manufactured  in  China .  
 The manufacturer  ge ts  $4;  Apple  gets  $80.   Does  th is  apply  to  
optoelec t ronics?   
 Are  we going down the  wrong road here ;  my focus  i s  we ' re  
los ing these  jobs .   This  i s  $160 bi l l ion  indust ry  i t ' s  projec ted  to  
become,  but  a  lo t  of  the  manufactur ing seems to  be  on the  low-end 
s ide .  
 DR.  LEBBY:  I  th ink i f  I  can  t ry  and address  tha t  ques t ion .   The 
iPod or  the  iPhone is  des igned here  and manufactured in  China ,  
agreed.   Optoelec t ronics ,  once  the  R&D goes ,  you won ' t  be  able  to  do 
any des ign.   So the  whole  th ing goes .  
 HEARING COCHAIR SLANE:  That ' s  the  problem.  
 DR.  LEBBY:  So you lose  the  value .  
 HEARING COCHAIR SLANE:  Thank you.  
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  Commiss ioner  Wortzel .  
 VICE CHAIRMAN WORTZEL:  I  have  a  ques t ion  I  would  pose  
to  Dr .  Lebby and Dr .  Appelbaum,  and then a  broader  one  for  Dr .  
Ar thurs .  
 For  Dr .  Lebby and Dr .  Appelbaum,  would  your  companies  or  
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your  socie ty  objec t  i f  the  U.S.  government  suppor t  tha t  you seem to  
require  was  legis la ted  to  be  conducted  in  the  Uni ted  Sta tes  by 
Americans?   Would  you object  i f  these  funds  you ask  for  was  
legis la ted  to  be  so  tha t  the  research had to  be  conducted  in  the  Uni ted  
Sta tes  by  Americans?  
 And then,  Dr .  Ar thurs ,  I  wonder  i f  I  could  take  advantage  of  the  
fac t  tha t  you have focused on th ings  l ike  lasers ,  and i f  you could  
character ize  for  us  where  China  i s  on  weaponiz ing lasers?   They have 
dazzled  a  U.S.  sa te l l i te  wi th  a  ground-based laser .   Thei r  mi l i ta ry  
l i te ra ture  d iscusses  the  potent ia l  for  space-based laser  and ant i -
sa te l l i te  weapons ,  but  tha t  requires  s igni f icant  minia tur iza t ion ,  I  th ink.  
 And then they have done qui te  a  b i t  of  work on undersea  laser  
communicat ions  and submarine  laser  sensors .   So I  wonder  i f  you 
could  ta lk  about  what  you may know in  those  areas .   I ' l l  turn  i t  over  to  
you,  f i rs t .  
 DR.  LEBBY:  In  reference  to  your  ques t ion on would  our  
members  objec t  i f  funds  were  legis la ted  to  do R&D, and le t ' s  ca l l  i s  
now innovat ive  manufactur ing techniques  in  the  U.S. ,  I  do  not  th ink so  
a t  a l l .   Many of  our  members  do have  fac i l i t ies ,  manufactur ing 
fac i l i t ies  in  China  and Asia ,  Taiwan,  and I  th ink you ' re  refer r ing  to  
Gene 's  comment  on high volume manufactur ing.  I  don ' t  th ink you ' re  
going to  see  those  processes  come back a t  a l l .   So  once  the  
manufactur ing is  gone,  i t ' s  gone.  
 I  th ink what  we rea l ly  need to  do,  what  our  members  rea l ly  want  
f rom government  agencies  i s  he lp  in  des igning and innovat ing the  next  
genera t ion  products .   And rea l ly  when you do that ,  look for  the  new 
manufactur ing pla t forms that  we can es tabl ish  here .  
 So I ' l l  g ive  you two examples .   The PICs,  the  photonic  in tegra ted  
c i rcui ts ,  i s  a  b i t  l ike  the  o ld  s i l icon IC 50 years  ago,  when i t  had l ike  
ten  t rans is tors  and now i t ' s  l ike  ten  mi l l ion .   Wel l ,  in  photonics ,  we ' re  
in  about  50  to  100 photonic  devices  on a  p iece  of  indium phosphate  or  
s i l icon,  and i t ' s  sor t  of  beginning,  and companies  l ike  Inf inera ,  they 
c la im they ' re  four  years  ahead.   Other  people  c la im they ' re  a  couple  
years  ahead.  
 But  the  fac t  remains  i s  we ' re  ahead.   And so  the  ques t ion  i s ,  can  
we keep that  lead  and can we mainta in  the  manufactur ing of  those  
chips  here  in  the  U.S. ,  and the  answer  i s  yes .   And so  I  th ink to  resolve  
and to  answer  your  ques t ion  I  don ' t  th ink you ' l l  see  any of  our  
members  complain  a t  a l l .  
 DR.  APPELBAUM:  I  can ' t  speak on behal f  of  any members ,  but  
I ' l l  te l l  you my own thoughts  on th is .   I f  I  unders tood your  ques t ion  
correc t ly ,  I  don ' t  th ink legis la t ion  to  keep research,  development ,  or  
more  genera l ly  innovat ion in  the  U.S.  i s  a  good idea .   I  th ink the  
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approach ins tead should  be  to  suppor t  innovat ive  work here  so  more  
h igh school  and col lege  graduates  become innovators ,  so  fore ign-born  
innovators  choose  to  come to  (and remain  in)  the  U.S. ,  ra ther  than 
re turn  to  China  or  India .    
 In  terms of  the  manufactur ing jobs  in  nanotechnology,  I  don’ t  
th ink i t  makes  sense  to  t ry  to  develop the  low-end jobs .   I ' l l  g ive  you 
one i l lus t ra t ion .   Shenzhen Nanotech Por t  Company was  a  p ioneer  in  
the  product ion of  carbon nanotubes ,  which are  bas ic  mater ia ls  used in  
many nano-enabled products .   I t ' s  sor t  of  the  bot tom of  the  value  
chain ,  and they had a  lock on that .   Now,  they ' re  s t ruggl ing.   Why?   
Because   carbon nanotubes  have become a  commodi ty .   There  are  how 
many companies  making th is  bas ic  nano mater ia l ,  and when a  product  
becomes a  commodi ty  ra ther  than something unique,  I  th ink those  jobs  
should  go e lsewhere .  
 I  don ' t  th ink tha t ' s  what  we should  be  bui ld ing.   We should  be  
bui ld ing a t  the  h igher  end of  the  value  chain .   Only  a  smal l  percentage  
of  the  value-added of  the  iPod is  in  the  manufactur ing;  most  of  the  
value  comes a t  the  h igh end of  the  value  chain--des ign,  market ing ,  
innovat ion.   That 's  where  we should  be  focusing.  
 VICE CHAIRMAN WORTZEL:   Dr .  Arthurs .  
 DR.  ARTHURS:  Okay.   In  answer  to  your  ques t ion ,  when given 
a  pre t ty  comprehensive  tour  of  Fudan Univers i ty ,  which is  the  number  
three  or  so  in  China ,  they sa id  they were  sorry  they couldn ' t  take  me 
in to  th is  par t icular  area  because  tha t  ac tual ly  was  a  c lass i f ied  area  for  
opt ics ,  and they pointed  out  tha t  th is ,  in  fac t ,  was  one  of  the  only  areas  
tha t  had survived dur ing the  Cul tura l  Revolut ion  when in te l lec tuals  
were  dr iven to  the  countrys ide .  
 I  sense  tha t  there 's  a  lo t  of  intense  laser  work going on in  China;  
we know that .   We a lso  know what  papers  are  of  in teres t .   They do not  
have ,  to  my knowledge,  r ight  now the  capabi l i ty  of  manufactur ing the  
chips  tha t  Mike was  ta lk ing about ,  par t icular ly  for  pumping the  
smal ler  and more  powerful ,  more  compact  lasers  tha t  I  th ink wi l l  be  
v i ta l ly  impor tant  for  fu ture  secur i ty  reasons .  
 So they don ' t  have  them now,  but  the  semiconductor  p lants  there  
can adapt  to  have  them as  they are  t ry ing to  adapt  r ight  now to  do 
solar  panels  in  the  current  downturn  in  the  semiconductor  indust ry .  
 I  th ink there  i s  a  chal lenge  as  to  how we 're  going to  keep them 
here .   I  don ' t  th ink they ' re  jus t  going to s tay  here  i f  we s imply  go on as  
we ' re  going.   I  th ink we need in tervent ion to  ensure  tha t  they don ' t  
fo l low the  ent i re  l i thography indust ry  out  of  the  country ,  and that  does  
need in tervent ion.  
 To the  ques t ion  as  to  whether  our  members  would  regard  the i r  
research  must  be  done in  the  Uni ted  Sta tes ,  I  would  say  cer ta in ly  the  
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U.S.  members  would  have absolute ly  no problem wi th  tha t .  The 
European members  could  not  have  a  problem wi th  i t  because  the  whole  
Framework 7  Program is  only  open to  Europeans .  
 There 's  a  smal l  l i t t le  th ing for  coopera t ion ,  but  essent ia l ly ,  and I  
don ' t  th ink tha t  China  i s  doing much funding or  Taiwan or  o ther  
countr ies- - I 'm not  harping on China  here--of  research in  the  U.S.  or  by  
non-nat ives .   So  I  don ' t  th ink tha t  there  would  be  a  par t icular  objec t ion  
to  tha t  a t  a l l .  
 Our  corpora te  members ,  by  and large ,  would  see  the  
reasonableness  in  tha t .   They jus t  could  not  le t  tha t  go  to  there ,  i f  they 
were  large  and have labs  in  Shanghai  or  Bangalore ,  they could  not  le t  
i t  go  there ,  but  they have  p lenty  of  researchers  s t i l l  in  the  U.S. ,  and 
th is  might  encourage  them to  keep a  few more .  
 DR.  LEBBY:  Actual ly  I ' l l  jus t  add to  tha t .   We do receive  a  lo t  
of  ca l l s  f rom our  members  here  in  Washington for  access  to  
government  agencies .   They ca l l  up  and say  we 'd  rea l ly  l ike  to  get  
involved wi th  a  photonics  based program that  could  leverage  our  next  
genera t ion  products ,  but  there  i s  only  a  few people  in  DARPA and one 
of  two people  in  NSF.   And they ask  us  who they are .   Can we 
in t roduce  them?  Can we show them how to  get  a  government  program? 
 And of  course ,  i t ' s  ext remely  compet i t ive  r ight  now.   There  are  very  
few programs.  
 And so  I  th ink the  reques t  we have,  very  few of  those  people  are  
rea l ly  successful  in  ac tual ly  secur ing what  I  would  ca l l  d i rec t  
government  suppor t  for  the i r  photonics  work.   I  th ink we can rea l ly  
change th is .  
 DR.  ARTHURS:   I f  I  could  re turn  for  a  moment  to  the  s t ra tegy 
ques t ion ,  I  th ink Mike pointed  out  tha t  optoelec t ronics  in  the  U.S.  i s  
spread across  a l l  sor ts  of  agencies .   NASA does  a  lo t  of  i t .   DARPA, 
NSF,  NIH,  pract ica l ly  everybody.  But  there  i s  no  one  over looking the  
ent i re  ac t iv i ty  and saying what 's  good for  the  economic  in teres ts  of  the  
U.S.  
 And when you go around and t ry  and f ind  someone,  i t ' s  a lways  
“not  my job.”   But  there  i s ,  I  th ink,  in  many of  these  p laces  and in  the  
defense  labs  s igni f icant  concern  about  no one  doing anything about  i t .  
 VICE CHAIRMAN WORTZEL:  Where  would  tha t  s t ra tegy be?   
I s  tha t  the  Nat ional  Science  Foundat ion?   Is  tha t  the  Off ice  of  the  
Science  Advisor  to  the  Pres ident  and the  Whi te  House?  
 CHAIRMAN BARTHOLOMEW:  Nat ional  Economic--  
 DR.  ARTHURS:  I 'm f rom the  other  Washington so  I  can ' t  answer  
tha t  ques t ion .  
 DR.  LEBBY:  Wel l ,  le t  me give  you an  example .   I  don ' t  th ink I  
can  answer  your  ques t ion  c lear ly ,  but  I  jus t  re turned f rom Brusse ls  las t  
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week.   I  gave  a  ta lk  on green photonics  energy ef f ic iency a t  the  
European Commiss ion,  and both  Gene and mysel f  are  very  aware  tha t  
three  years  ago the  Europeans  put  together  a  program cal led  Photonics  
21,  and tha t  brought  together  the  whole  of  the  indust ry  as  wel l  as  
academia  to  ac tual ly  put  a  s t ra tegic  road map together .  
 This  i s  three  years  ago,  and I  th ink tha t  there  i s  probably  90 to  
100 mi l l ion  euro  funding,  and I  met  some of  the  senior  people  of  tha t  
organiza t ion  las t  week,  and they ' re  very  focused.   They brought  
together  photonics  f rom many di f ferent  d isc ip l ines  and di f ferent  areas ,  
and they ac tual ly  have  ra ised  the  prof i le  of  the  indust ry .  
 VICE CHAIRMAN WORTZEL:  So the  legis la ture  essent ia l ly  
es tabl ished the  s t ra tegy and funded i t?  
 DR.  LEBBY:  Yes ,  correc t .  
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  No.   Did  you say that?   Or  you 
sa id  the  Commiss ion;  d idn ' t  you?  
 DR.  LEBBY:  This  i s  under  the  European Commiss ion,  yes .  
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  That 's  more  l ike  the i r  
execut ive .  
 DR.  APPELBAUM:  I  wonder  i f  the  Nat ional  Nanotechnology 
In i t ia t ive  might  be  an  example  of  the  k ind of  coordinat ion .   You 're  a l l  
fami l iar  wi th  how that  opera tes?   Should  I  say  a  word about  tha t?  I  
don ' t  want  to- -  
 CHAIRMAN BARTHOLOMEW:  Go ahead.  
 DR.  APPELBAUM:  The Nat ional  Nanotechnology Ini t ia t ive  
(NNI) ,   Headed by Mike Roco,  was  es tabl ished in  f i sca l  year  2001.   I t  
current ly  spans  federa l  government  agencies ,  13  or  which have budgets  
re la t ing  to  nanotechnology.   Coordinat ion ,  p lanning,  budget ing,  review 
and so  for th  are  the  responsibi l i ty  of  the  Nanoscale  Science  
Engineer ing and Technology (NSET) subcommit tee  of  the  Pres ident ’s  
cabinet - level  Nat ional  Science  and Technology Counci l  (NSTC).   
NSET,  in  turn ,  i s  suppor ted  by the  Nat ional  Nanotechnology 
Coordinat ion Off ice  (NNC),  which –  l ike  the  NNI –  was  crea ted  in  
j2001.   Al l  of  th is  represents  an  ef for t  to  provide  some degree  of  
coordinated  federa l  suppor t  for  nanotechnology –  suppor t  which,  as  I  
ment ioned ear l ier ,  has  grown to  $1.5  b i l l ion  annual ly .   Whether  th is  
r i ses  to  the  level  of  indust r ia l  pol icy  i s  debatable ,  s ince  a lmost  a l l  of  
the  NNI’s  ef for ts  are  d i rec ted  a t  bas ic  research  ra ther  than 
commercia l iza t ion .   But  i t  i s  an  example  of  how focused governmenta l  
resources  can be  focused on a  par t icular  technology,  one  a im of  which 
i s  to  make the  U.S.  a  g lobal  leader  in  th is  emerging technology.   I  
don ' t  know i f  th is  would  work in  o ther  areas  (such as  optoelec t ronics) ,  
but  a t  leas t  i t  g ives  some publ ic  face  and accountabi l i ty  to  government  
suppor t  for  innovat ion.  
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 DR.  ARTHURS:   I  th ink Mike Roco has  done a  grea t  job  wi th  the  
Nat ional  Nanotechnology In i t ia t ive .   However ,  i t  i s  not  dr iven by 
economics ,  and tha t ' s  the  miss ing p iece .   I  th ink i f  we were  ta lk ing 
here  about  a  program to  coordinate  sc ient i f ic  ef for t  or  technical  ef for t  
across  optoelec t ronics ,  the  NSF would  be  a  good home,  but  i t ' s  not  
what  I 'm ta lk ing about .  
 DR.  LEBBY:  When we look a t  NSF,  they ' re  very  b iased toward 
the  academic  suppor t .   And one of  the  miss ing areas  i s  what  I  would  
ca l l  indust r ia l  research  or  indust r ia l  development ,  or  appl ied  research .  
 In  fac t ,  one  anecdote  would  be  about  me and how I  cut  my tee th  a t  
Bel l  Labs  back in  the  la te  '80s ,  and doing corpora te  research.   And i f  I  
wanted to  go back in to  corpora te  research today in  th is  country ,  I 'm 
not  sure  there 's  any place  I  could  go.  
 Al l  the  fac i l i t ies  tha t  Lucent  had,  which was  or ig inal ly  AT&T,  
and there  was  IBM and Motorola  and H-P,  they 've  d ivers i f ied  the i r  
optoelec t ronic  fac i l i t ies  to  smal ler  companies  and rea l ly  the  corpora te  
research tha t  was  done in  those  areas  i s  gone.   And so  i f  we could  sor t  
of  encourage  agencies  l ike  the  NSF or  even DARPA to  rea l ly  focus  on 
suppor t ing  the  commercia l  R&D as  opposed to  pure  academic  research.  
 I  th ink we would  see  next  genera t ion  products  and innovat ion rea l ly  
come back in  th is  f ie ld .  
 DR.  APPELBAUM:  One vehic le  for  tha t  would  be  these  exis t ing  
smal l  bus iness  programs tha t  a re  pre t ty  smal l ,  less  than $100 mi l l ion  
to ta l ,  but  they could  be  a  vehic le  to  expand commercia l  suppor t .   But  I  
th ink you would  have to  change the  cul ture ,  not  jus t  in  the  NSF,  but  
genera l ly  in  the  U.S.  government ,  which seems to  be  genera l ly  opposed 
to  funding anything a t  the  commercia l  end.  
 CHAIRMAN BARTHOLOMEW:  Not  so much these  days .   That ' s  
changing these  days .    
 DR.  APPELBAUM:  That 's  another  s tory .   Let ' s  hope so .  
 DR.  ARTHURS:  The SBIR program,  which is  about  2 .5  b i l l ion  
overa l l ,  I  th ink has  the  cent ra l  idea ,  i s  wonderful .   However ,  i t  has  
got ten  somewhat  over taken by SBIR foundr ies  ra ther  than companies  
crea t ing  jobs ,  to  my mind,  and that  does  need a t tent ion .  
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  Commiss ioner  Bar tholomew.  
 CHAIRMAN BARTHOLOMEW:  Thank you.  
 COMMISSIONER VIDENIEKS:   I  want  to  get  one  in ,  too .  
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  And then you ' l l  come in ,  Pete .  
 CHAIRMAN BARTHOLOMEW:  Gent lemen,  thank you.  
 This  i s  very  in teres t ing  and a lso  very  t roubl ing.   I  look a t  you 
and I  th ink essent ia l ly  the  product ,  the  research,  the  technology 
sec tors  tha t  you are  represent ing  here  are  probably  two- th i rds  of  what  
we see  i s  sunr ise  indust r ies .  
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 You are  here  and you are  represent ing what  i s  supposed to  be  the  
economic  fu ture  for  th is  country ,  and as  I  hear ,  we had thought  about  
put t ing  th is  together  in  par t  because  we wanted to  focus  some on 
sunr ise  indust r ies  and what  are  the  chal lenges  tha t  they ' re  going to  be  
fac ing f rom China  so  tha t  f ive  years  f rom now,  ten  years  f rom now,  
you don ' t  s i t  in  f ront  of  a  body l ike  this  and say,  wel l ,  we had th is  
oppor tuni ty  and we missed i t ,  and look what 's  happened.  
 So I  th ink your  contr ibut ions  are  rea l ly  impor tant .   I 'm t roubled  
because  i t  sounds  l ike  we are  miss ing the  boat  a l ready on a  lo t  of  
th ings .  
 Dr .  Ar thurs ,  I  th ink tha t  your  comment  about  needing some focus  
tha t ' s  dr iven by economics  i s  par t icular ly  impor tant .   Dr .  Appelbaum,  I  
have  found that  as  we have heard  f rom sc ient is ts ,  the i r  focus  on the  
fac t  tha t  sc ience  has  no boundar ies  i s  impor tant  for  knowledge 
acquis i t ion ,  but  especia l ly  when we ask  the  U.S.  taxpayer  to  be  paying 
for  some of  th is ,  we need to  make sure ,  and for  our  own economic  
fu ture ,  tha t  we accrue  some of  the  benef i t s  f rom the  inves tments  tha t  
a re  being made on the  research.  
 That  as ide ,  I 'd  l ike  to  go back to  th is  i ssue  of  the  connect ion 
between R&D and manufactur ing.   Because  you a l l  have  spoken of  the  
need for  government  suppor t ,  for  R&D, but  do  you a lso  see  a  need for  
U.S.  government  f inancia l  suppor t  for  manufactur ing?  
 DR.  LEBBY:  I  th ink one of  the  th ings  I  personal ly  would  l ike  to  
address ,  and I  th ink i t  comes f rom some of  our  members ,  i s  tha t  they ' re  
taking manufactur ing to  Asia  because  there 's  rea l ly  no o ther  choice .   I f  
they had a  choice  to  do something here ,  they would  g ladly  do i t .  
 And so  one of  the  areas  I  focused on in  my tes t imony is  g iv ing 
you a  couple  of  examples .   One is  the  photonic  in tegra ted  c i rcui ts ,  
where  we are  doing the  manufactur ing in  the  f ront  end and we could  
ac tual ly  do a  lo t  more .   
 The  second one  i s  the  ro l l - to- rol l  manufactur ing.   I f  you can jus t  
imagine  for  a  second when you make an  LCD display ,  l ike  in  a  
te levis ion  or  in  a  computer  moni tor ,  Asia  rea l ly  owns the  whole  
manufactur ing process  of  tha t  g lass  and how you deal  wi th  the  g lass  
panel  and how you put  the  l iquid  crys ta l  in to  i t  and you seal  i t  up .  
 I f  we look forward f ive  or  ten  years ,  some of  the  d isplays  are  
going to  be  organic ,  organic  LED’s.   You may have seen the  new 
te levis ion by Sony.   I t ' s  jus t  11  inches .   I t  cos ts  $2 ,500,  but  i f  you 
look a t  the  screen,  i t ' s  jus t  beaut i fu l ,  a  mi l l ion- to-one  contras t  ra t io .   
And th is  technology,  th is  organic  LED technology,  can be  used for  
l ight ing .  
 So you can imagine  those  whi te  panels .   Ten years  t ime,  you ' re  
jus t  going to  ro l l  the  s tuff  on  l ike  wal lpaper .   You can put  i t  on  your  
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windows.   I  saw a  demonst ra t ion  in  Brusse ls  las t  week.   You turn  i t  on  
and i t  turns  whi te  wi th  l ight ,  and you turn  i t  of f  and i t ' s  c lear .  
 So here 's  the  technology that ' s  going to  change the  way we look 
a t  d isplays  in  f ive  to  ten  years  t ime.   I f  we do th is  on  newspaper  ree l  
ro l l - to- ro l l  manufactur ing,  which i s  what  the  Europeans  are  doing 
some research a l ready,  we don ' t  have  to  manufacture  tha t  in  Asia .   We 
can manufacture  tha t  here .   
 So I  th ink the  message is  i f  we ' re  crea t ive  about  what  we th ink 
we 're  going to  do,  and how we see  the  technology going in  the  next  
decade,  we can ac tual ly  th ink about  inves t ing  in  technologies  tha t  
don ' t  need to  be  manufactured in  Asia .  
 I f  you 've  got  a  h igh volume t radi t ional  l ine ,  you may want  to  
take  i t  over  there  because  tha t ' s  the  r ight  th ing to  do,  and they have  
the  inf ras t ructure  se t  up .   But  for  th ings  l ike  ro l l - to- ro l l ,  the  
inf ras t ructure  i s  not  se t  up .   We can qui te  eas i ly  do tha t  here .  
 So le t ' s  th ink outs ide  of  the  box here .   So i t ' s  not  jus t  R&D.  I t ' s  
R&D plus  rea l ly  crea t ive  manufactur ing techniques .  
 CHAIRMAN BARTHOLOMEW:  Dr .  Arthurs .  
 DR.  ARTHURS:   I  th ink cer ta inly  cont inued inves tment  in  
sc ience;  I  have  no ques t ion  about  tha t .   That ' s  v i ta l .   But  unless  we 
s tar t  to  do  th ings  l ike  p i lo t  p lants ,  (companies  aren ' t  necessar i ly  going 
to  do them) I  th ink tha t ' s  got  to  be  in tervent ion again  by the  
government  to  se t  up  p i lo t  p lants ,  say ,  for  something l ike  th is  OLED 
product ion on ro l l - to- ro l l ,  and work around that ,  suppor t  for  tha t .  
 Kodak,  one  of  the  p ioneers  of  th is  technology,  and they were  
p ioneers  of  much e lse  in  th is  country ,  but  now they don ' t  make a  
camera .   I t ' s  made by Flext ronics  in  Asia .   But  I  don ' t  see  Kodak rea l ly  
put t ing  any ef for t - -maybe they ' re  not  incent iv ized to  develop OLED 
technology plants  in  the  Uni ted  Sta tes .  
 CHAIRMAN BARTHOLOMEW:  Dr .  Appelbaum.  
 DR.  APPELBAUM:  Wel l ,  I  don ' t  have  a  speci f ic  proposal ,  but  I  
complete ly  agree .   China ,  Taiwan,  South  Korea ,  a l l  these  Asian  
economies ,  came out  of  nowhere  to  be  compet i t ive  because  of  
indust r ia l  pol icy  because  the i r  governments  in  var ious  ways  were  
wi l l ing  to  inves t  more  d i rec t ly  a t  the  manufactur ing end.  
 I  th ink tha t  we need to  do the  same i f  we ' re  going to  compete  
wi th  them.   You ment ioned solar  energy;  Suntech,  a  Chinese  f i rm,  i s  
the  four th  larges t  manufacturer .  
 DR.  ARTHURS:  Third  now.  
 DR.  APPELBAUM:  Now i t ' s  the  thi rd  larges t .   They 've  opened 
off ices  in  San Francisco.  Thei r  s tory  i s  the i r  founder  and CEO,  Dr .  Shi  
Zhengrong,  was  educated  a t  the  Univers i ty  of  New South  Wales  in  
Aust ra l ia ,  re turned to  China ,  launched Suntech,  and now he 's  a  very  
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r ich  man.   They ' re  incorpora ted ,  I  am to ld ,  in  the  Cayman Is lands .   So 
they are  t ru ly  a  cosmopol i tan  company,  and they 've  h i red  as  Direc tor  
of  External  Rela t ions  for  the i r  Cal i fornia  off ice  a  woman who was  
previously  a  Senior  Regula tory  Analys t  for  the  Cal i fornia  Publ ic  
Ut i l i t ies  Commiss ion,  whose  job  was  to  implement  the  PUC’s  por t ion  
of  Cal i fornia’s  mul t ib i l l ion  dol lar  solar  in i t ia t ive .   So Suntech knows 
what  i t  needs  to  do to  compete .  
 CHAIRMAN BARTHOLOMEW:  They ' re  going to  be  
manufactur ing in  the  Uni ted  Sta tes?   No?  
 DR.  APPELBAUM:  No.  
 DR.  ARTHURS:   Not  a t  th is  s tage .  
 DR.  APPELBAUM:  Right .   Not  a t  th is  s tage .  Also ,  in teres t ingly ,  
as  near  as  I  can  te l l ,  they ' re  not  moving to  th i rd  genera t ion  th in-f i lm 
solar ,  employs  nanotechnology.   They have the i r  own technology.  
 CHAIRMAN BARTHOLOMEW:  Mr.  Chairman,  jus t  one  
comment .   What  I  a lso  th ink tha t  we forget  when we ta lk  about  
focusing on the  h igh end of  the  value  chain  here ,  i s  tha t  we l ike  
everywhere  e lse  have  a  mixed popula t ion .   Not  everybody in  th is  
country  i s  going to  be  able  to  be  engineers ,  sc ient is t s ,  mathemat ic ians ,  
and we need to  make sure  tha t  we have a  d iverse  economy that  reaches  
everybody,  and I  th ink that ' s  some of  what  we 're  see ing r ight  now.  
 DR.  APPELBAUM:  Right .   But  i f  the  Georgia  text i le  indust ry  
were  to  upgrade  suff ic ient ly  and produce  compet i t ive  products  us ing 
nanotechnology as  appropr ia te  to  text i les  and fabr ics ,  and i f  the  
workers  there  were  t ra ined to  use  tha t  technology,  you could  have  i t  a t  
both  ends ,  I  th ink.  
 So tha t ' s  why I  th ink i t  has  to  involve  job  t ra in ing,  sk i l l s  
upgrading.   
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  Thank you.  
 I 'm going to  ca l l  on  now Commiss ioner  Videnieks .  
 COMMISSIONER VIDENIEKS:   I  th ink Dr .  Lebby a l luded that  
the  process  doesn ' t  go  f rom bas ic  research to  manufactur ing.   You’ve  
got  appl ied  research;  you’ve  got  development ;  you’ve  got  des ign;  
you’ve  got  prototype  fabr ica t ion .   Then,  i f  th ings  work out ,  one  goes  
to  manufactur ing.  
 Maybe i f  the  reques ts  to  the  government  agencies  were  for  o ther  
than bas ic  research i f  one  were  to  s t ruc ture  these  reques ts  more  
funct ional ly ,  and maybe lead to  a  prototype  or  development  of  an  
improvement  to  a  process ,  i f  people  could  see  th ings  bet ter ,  maybe the  
reques t  would  se l l  be t ter  than bas ic  research.    A contrac t  for  
development-speci f ic  methods  i s  a  d i f ferent  mat ter .   Bas ica l ly  I  want  
to  make tha t  comment ,  tha t  maybe tha t ' s  where  we 're  fa l l ing  shor t  wi th  
i t .   I t  could  be  the  problem.   I  don ' t  know.  
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 DR.  LEBBY:  I  can give  you an example .   I 've  worked wi th  
DARPA programs,  and yes ,  tha t ' s  defense  re la ted ,  but  tha t ' s  a  projec t -
based agency,  and i t  i s  looked upon by Asia  as  wel l  as  Europe as  a  sor t  
of  the  gold  s tandard  of  ac tual ly  doing appl ied  research and rea l ly  
se t t ing  go/no go and speci f ic  goals  for  prototypes  and brand new 
technology.  
 And I  th ink i f  you look back a t  DARPA over  the  las t  50  years ,  
there 's  been a  rea l ly  good t rack record .   
 In  fac t ,  personal ly ,  I 'm qui te  exci ted  to  hear  and ta lk  about  
ARPA-E,  which is  the  Energy ARPA,  and hopeful ly  tha t  wi l l  be  a  
projec t  re la ted  agency tha t  looks  a t  energy ef f ic iency which I  guess  
goes  in  l ine  wi th  the  current  adminis t ra t ion .  
 But  what  we would  l ike  to  see  as  OIDA is  these  types  of  projec ts  
wi th  c lear  proto type  type  goals  tha t  would  rea l ly  sor t  of  focus  th ings  
in  photonics .  
 COMMISSIONER VIDENIEKS:   Something vis ib le .  
 DR.  LEBBY:  Yes .  
 COMMISSIONER VIDENIEKS:   Basic  research in  my mind,  not  
be ing technica l ly  educated ,  i t  seems l ike  something hard  to  se l l  maybe 
in  t imes  of  hard  money,  d i f f icul t  money.    
 DR.  ARTHURS:   I  agree  there  should  be  much more  backing for  
tha t  type  of  approach.   Bas ic  research i s  adding to  the  s tore  of  
knowledge and then moving on.   And I  am a  b ig  suppor ter  of  i t .   I t ' s  
necessary ,  but  i t ' s  not  suff ic ient .   
 I  th ink a lso  we should  explore  the  concept  of  sc ience  parks  much 
more  aggress ively .   We have some lessons ,  I  th ink,  to  learn  f rom--  
 COMMISSIONER VIDENIEKS:   Quick ques t ion.   Should  they be  
ca l led  something e lse  than R&D parks?    
 DR.  ARTHURS:   Oh,  yes ,  I  th ink so .   I  th ink so .  
 COMMISSIONER VIDENIEKS:   Because  everything is  there .  
 DR.  ARTHURS:   As I  look a t  both  Taiwan and China ,  they have 
Minis t r ies  of  Science  and Technology that  look af ter  sc ience  parks  
among other  th ings .  
 COMMISSIONER VIDENIEKS:   Yes .  
 DR.  ARTHURS:   In  Taiwan,  for  example ,  the  Minis t ry  has ,  i t ' s  
not  jus t  l ike  our  NSF,  though they do contro l  sc ience ,  they are  looking 
a t  the i r  metr ics ;  how much income did  the  sc ience  park  in  Hsinchu get  
th is  year  and how is  i t  going to  be  15 percent  more  next  year?   And 
Hsinchu Science  Park ,  tha t  one  sc ience  park  in  Taiwan,  expor ts  more  
h igh tech s tuff  than the  whole  of  Cal i fornia .  
 CHAIRMAN BARTHOLOMEW:  Gee.   Think about  tha t .   
Cal i fornia ,  the  p lace  tha t  led  the  nat ion in  innovat ion for  a  new 
economy.  
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 HEARING COHAIR MULLOY:   I t ' s  depress ing.  
 CHAIRMAN BARTHOLOMEW:  I t ' s  very  depress ing.  
  
 DR.  APPELBAUM:  Was that  de l ibera te ly  pas t  tense?  
 CHAIRMAN BARTHOLOMEW:  Wel l ,  tha t ' s  what  I  th ink we--  
 DR.  ARTHURS:   Numbers  say i t  i s .  
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  Yes ,  we ' re  paying a  pr ice .  
 COMMISSIONER VIDENIEKS:   Thank you.   I ’m f in ished.  
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  Okay.   I  have  a  ques t ion  or  
two.   Dr .  Ar thurs ,  when you were  ta lk ing about  R&D, and you sa id  the  
new money we 're  put t ing  in to  R&D,  we may be  bas ing that  on  a  
concept  of  how to  move a  socie ty  forward tha t  i s  no  longer  re levant .  
 Could  you expand on that  point  for  us?    DR.  ARTHURS:   I  hear  
the  economic  argument  tha t  R&D is  bas ic  to  the  economy and our  
economic  success ,  and there  i s  no  doubt  tha t  in  h is tory  there  are  
examples ,  there  are  very  s t rong corre la t ions  between our  inves tment  in  
R&D and our  economic  prowess ,  our  technology leadership ,  and our  
na t ional  secur i ty  leadership .  
 That ,  however ,  was  in  days  when the  wor ld  was  an  ent i re ly  
d i f ferent  p lace  and the  U.S.  was  a  re la t ive ly  c losed sys tem in  the  
sc ient i f ic  sense .   We no longer  have the  Bel l  Labs  tha t  Mike  ta lked 
about .   We no longer  have  these ,  the  RCA Labs ,  the  Hewlet t -Packard  
Labs  tha t  were  rea l ly  turning out  innovat ive  products .  
 I f  we don ' t  have  those ,  and I  th ink recent  evidence  shows,  and 
the  s igni f icant  def ic i t  in  advanced technology products  shows,  even 
though we 've  been spending $360 bi l l ion  or  even though $360 bi l l ion  
i s  be ing spent  in  the  country  each year ,  130,  whatever  i t  i s ,  f rom 
federa l  sources ,  on  R&D, i t  would  indica te  to  me tha t  tha t  model  i s  no  
longer  working.  
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  Let  me take  you the  next  s tep .  
 I t  used to  be  tha t  the  R&D was  done in  pr ivate  companies ,  Bel l  Labs  
and other  th ings .   Most  of  i t  now is  done in  the  univers i t ies ,  f rom what  
I  unders tand.    
 DR.  ARTHURS:   I 'd  say  most  of  the  R is  done in  univers i t ies .  
   A good por t ion  of  the  D is  s t i l l  done in  indust ry  here .  
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  My thought  i s ,  and I ' l l  be  
happy i f  you take  th is  on ,  tha t  when you put  a l l  th is  money in to  the  
univers i t ies ,  and then you have your  sc ience  depar tments  a l l  wi th  
Chinese  who are  there ,  who are  going back,  we ' re  funding the  
compet i t ion .   I  th ink there  i s  some sense  of  tha t  going on in  me.  
 Let  me jus t  couple  i t  wi th  one  o ther  thought .   I  remember  
reading Tom Fr iedman 's  book The World  i s  Flat .   I  don ' t  th ink he  
unders tands  what 's  going on,  to  be  honest  wi th  you.   And i t  was  l ike ,  
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oh,  wow,  wonderful .   What  I  don ' t  unders tand,  there 's  t remendous  
publ ic  pol icy  dr iv ing some of  these  t rends .  
 I  thought  Clyde Pres towi tz '  book Three  Bi l l ion  New Capi ta l i s t s  
was  a  much bet ter  assessment  of  what  i s  going on.   But  anyway,  I  th ink 
i t  was  on page 164 of  the  Fr iedman book,  the  pres ident  of  Johns  
Hopkins  Univers i ty ,  some parents  were  saying to  h im,  my son can ' t  
unders tand the  c lassroom teacher ,  and tha t ' s  when he  rea l ized  tha t  a l l  
the  mathemat ics  depar tments  were  Chinese  immigrants .  
 Nothing wrong wi th  tha t .   My own son went  to  an  Ivy League 
univers i ty ,  was  in  the  mathemat ics  and engineer ing,  and he  says  I  can ' t  
unders tand these  guys .   I  remember  when I  was  a  s tudent ,  professors  
would  p ick  out  the  smar t  k ids  and nur ture  them and t ry  to  br ing them 
in to  the i r  f ie ld .   I  don ' t  th ink tha t ' s  going on in  the  sc iences  and 
engineer ing l ike  i t  used to  in  th is  country  30 years  ago.  
 I  th ink the  guys  who are  making the  decis ions  sa id ,  wel l ,  we ' l l  
br ing  in  the  k ids  f rom China .   I  don ' t  know whether  tha t ' s  t rue  or  not ,  
but  i t  would  be  in teres t ing  to  hear  what  you th ink.  
 DR.  ARTHURS:   I  th ink in  many ways  we should  be  gra teful  we 
have non-U.S.  people  teaching in  our  sc ience  and math  facul ty  
throughout  the  nat ion because  o therwise  we 'd  have nobody.  
 But  I  do  th ink we need to  do something about  changing that .   We 
are  to  a  la rge  extent  funding indi rec t ly  the  economic  success  of  
Taiwan,  Korea ,  and other  nat ions .   They have many people  in  our  
univers i t ies ,  and there  i s  grea t  technology leakage,  inc luding many of  
them going back and s tar t ing  up companies  the i r  ent repreneurship  back 
a t  home where  they 've  got  good advantages  to  be  ent repreneurs ,  I  
th ink,  now.   They ' re  get t ing  the  suppor t .  
 But  how we get  f rom here  i s  going to  take  qui te  some t ime,  and 
we 're  going to  have  to  not  jus t  change the  funding.  That ' s  not  the  i ssue  
here .   When my members  by and large  would  not  advise  the i r  chi ldren  
to  go in to  sc ience  and engineer ing,  we have a  problem.  
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  Yes .  
 CHAIRMAN BARTHOLOMEW:  Yes .  
 DR.  ARTHURS:   When I  was  in  Taiwan in  December ,  and the  
economic  downturn  happened,  and engineers  were  being le t  go ,  the  
government  came to  the  univers i t ies  and sa id  we wi l l  pay you to  take  
these  people  for  one  year  a t  leas t .   
 This  sends  a  s ignal  tha t  engineer ing and sc ience  i s  impor tant ,  
tha t  i t ' s  a  va lued profess ion.   These  people  get  t ra ined to  the  la tes t  
degree  in  univers i ty ,  ge t t ing  updated  on the i r  sk i l l s ,  an  ent i re ly  
d i f ferent  a t t i tude  and an  ent i re ly  d i f ferent  e thos ,  and tha t ' s  par t  of  the  
i ssue  here .  
 One of  my goals  i s  tha t  my members  wi l l  say  to  the i r  chi ldren  
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“you 've  got  to  go in to  sc ience  and technology,  i t ' s  exci t ing ,  and i t ' s  
going to  offer  you a  great  career .”  
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  Yes .   One las t  point ,  and then 
I ' l l  turn  i t .   Yes ,  Dr .  Appelbaum.  
 DR.  APPELBAUM:  China  has  been descr ibed by Demos,  a  
European th ink tank,  as  the  wor ld 's  la rges t  technocracy.   Jus t  to  bui ld  
on what  you sa id ,  sc ience  and engineer ing are  h ighly  valued there ,  and 
they ' re  seen as  keys  to  economic  success ,  and they ' re  va lued in  terms 
of  pres t ige .  
 I  th ink the  fac t  tha t  our  col leges  and univers i t ies  are  popula ted  
by Chinese  and Indians  i s  not  a  problem of  China  and India ;  I  th ink i t ' s  
our  problem.   Our  s tudents  aren ' t  doing tha t .   They see  o ther  
oppor tuni t ies  and that ' s  what  has  to  change.  
 In  October  1957,  when Russ ia  launched Sputnik ,  we changed:   
we developed a  genera t ion  of  sc ient is ts  and engineers ,  and we got  in to  
the  space  race .   We saw i t  as  a  na t ional  compet i t iveness  th ing wi th in  
the  context  of  the  Cold  War .   We have to  change the  cul ture .  
 Our  k ids  aren ' t  going in to  these  d isc ip l ines ,  and i t ' s  not  the  faul t  
of  China  and India .   I  th ink th is  provides  an  oppor tuni ty  for  us ,  but  we 
have to  have  a  cul tura l  change,  and I 'm not  exact ly  sure  about  how to  
do tha t .   My own kids  cer ta in ly  d idn ' t  go  in  tha t  d i rec t ion .  
 CHAIRMAN BARTHOLOMEW:  I t ' s  in teres t ing ,  th is  cul tura l  
change,  because  I 'm not  sure  when I  went  in to  col lege  tha t  I  made any 
economic  ra t ional  decis ions ,  but - - in  terms of  what  I  was  s tudying,  but  
the  rea l i ty  i s  a t  the  same t ime tha t  we have  new government  programs 
to  emphasize  STEM teaching and STEM educat ion,  we have people  
who are  looking and seeing tha t  there  i sn ' t  an  economic  fu ture  for  
themselves  in  those  indust r ies .  
 And so  i t  becomes very  c i rcular ,  doesn ' t  i t?  
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  Yes .  
 CHAIRMAN BARTHOLOMEW:  What  should  a  young person 
embark on a  career  pa th  i f  they th ink tha t  there 's  not  going to  be  any 
oppor tuni ty ,  and i f  they see  a l l  the  R&D, the  in teres t ing ,  exci t ing  
th ings  tha t  they want  to  be  working on taking place  in  another  
country?  
 A lo t  of  our  young people  do th ink more  g lobal ly ,  and so  they 
could  see  a  fu ture  where  they would  spend t ime in  another  country ,  but  
I  th ink how we crea te  i t  so  tha t  there  i s  a  reason for  them to  bel ieve  
tha t  there 's  an  economic  fu ture  i s  going to  be  a  rea l ly  impor tant  p iece  
of  how we convince  them to  make the  inves tment  of  the i r  t ime and 
the i r  parents '  money of ten  in  the i r  educat ions .  
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:    Thank you,  Commiss ioner  
Bar tholomew.  
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 One las t  point  and then I ' l l  turn  i t  to  Commiss ioner  Slane .   
Commiss ioner  Slane  ta lked about  the  Apple .   I  want  to  make sure  I  
unders tood what  tha t  was  about .   The Apple--say  i t  was  $84 and Apple  
i s  ge t t ing  $80,  and the  people  there  in  China  who make the  th ing are  
get t ing  $4.  
 HEARING COCHAIR SLANE:  Get t ing four--yes .  
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  And you sa id  tha t ' s  th is  
genera t ion .   The next  genera t ion  could  be  d i f ferent  because  the  
innovat ion  wi l l  be  taking p lace  there  ra ther  than here .   Was tha t  a  
point  you were  making?  
 HEARING COCHAIR SLANE:  That ' s  what  Dr .  Lebby--  
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  Is  tha t  what  you were  saying,  
Dr .  Lebby?  
 DR.  LEBBY:  In  the  optoelec t ronics  indust ry ,  yes .   I f  the  R&D 
of  optoelec t ronic  devices  and sys tems goes  to  Asia  or  goes  to  China ,  
then the  value  goes  wi th  i t .  
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  And you 're  saying that ' s  what 's  
happening?  
 DR.  LEBBY:  Yes .  
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  Okay.   I  thought  that .  
 DR.  ARTHURS:   I 'm not  c lear  about  the  numbers .   The Chinese  
might  be  get t ing-- i t ' s  ac tual ly  made by Hon Hai  Precis ion,  a  $54 
bi l l ion  company,  Taiwan based,  tha t  had unt i l  the  downturn  a lmost  ha l f  
a  mi l l ion  employees  in  China ,  in  mainland China .   
 The assembly i s  done in  China  f rom components  f rom Japan,  I  
th ink Korea ,  poss ib ly  Taiwan.   I 'm not  sure .   So I 'm not  sure  tha t  the  
to ta l  manufactur ing-- the  to ta l  par ts  cos t  and so  on p lus  assembly-- is  
only  $4 and Apple  i s  ge t t ing  $80.  I 'm not  sure  i f  tha t ' s  the  rea l i ty .  
 But  cer ta in ly ,  the  Apple  iPod and the  iPhone,  I 'd  say ,  are  
des igned in  the  U.S. ,  assembled in  China ,  and I  th ink i t  might  be  
Mike 's  point ,  how long are  they going to  be  able  to  say  tha t?  
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  Yes .  
 DR.  LEBBY:  Wel l ,  ac tual ly  I 'd  add one th ing.   I f  you look a t  the  
iPhone,  I  th ink about  30  percent  of  the  bui ld ing mater ia ls  are  
photonics  components .   You rea l ly  don ' t  th ink about  photonics  in- -but  
there 's  LEDs to  l ight  up  the  keypad and there 's  a  d isplay  l ight .   There 's  
LEDs behind the  LCD display ,  and i f  you add a l l  these  par ts  up ,  there 's  
an  image sensor ,  tha t ' s  the  camera ,  and tha t ' s  bas ica l ly  ar ray  of  s i l icon 
photo  detec tors .  
 And so  i f  you add up the  photonics  components  in  one  of  these  
products ,  there 's  ac tual ly  qui te  a  b i t .   I t ' s  sor t  of  surpr is ing .   You don ' t  
rea l ize ,  I  th ink one  of  the  messages  I 'm t ry ing to  g ive  i s  the  
optoelec t ronics  enables  many di f ferent  products  tha t  you rea l ly  on the  
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surface  you don ' t  th ink about ,  but  they ' re  ac tual ly  there  working,  sor t  
of  the  p lumbing,  as  i t  were .  
 DR.  APPELBAUM:  I  wonder  i f  I  could  g ive  br ief ly  a  lower- tech 
example  of  what  you ' re  ta lk ing about .   Athle t ic  shoes .   One out  of  
every  s ix  branded a th le t ic  shoes  in  the  wor ld  i s  made in  a  Yuyuan 
fac tory  owned by the  Pao Chen Company based in  Taiwan.    
 I  v is i ted  a  fac tory  in  Dongguan that  employs  110,000 workers ;  
21 ,000 in  the  Nike  sec tor ;  12 ,000 in  the  Adidas  sec tor ;  and so  for th ,  
for  near ly  a l l  major  brands  of  a th le t ic  shoes .   They have fac tor ies  
throughout  China  as  wel l  as  in  Vie tnam.  
  Now,  so  far  they ' re  a  suppl ier ,  a l though a  prof i table  one .   How long 
wi l l  i t  be  before  they take  the  knowledge tha t  they 've  gained making 
a th le t ic  shoes  to  s tar t  market ing  to  the  three  b i l l ion  new consumers  
tha t  Clyde Pres towi tz  ta lks  about?   And we haven ' t  rea l ly  ta lked about  
the  in ternal  market .   But  a  h igh pr ior i ty  in  China  now is  to  begin  
producing for  the i r  own in ternal  market ,  and tha t  i s  going to  dr ive  
the i r  technology very  fas t .  
 I  wonder  i f  we ' l l  have  an  oppor tuni ty  then to  market  to  China?  
 CHAIRMAN BARTHOLOMEW:  Because  par t  of  the  reason that  
the  companies  have  taken the i r  product ion and the i r  R&D over  there- -  
 DR.  APPELBAUM:  To help  them get  a  foot  in  the  door .  
 CHAIRMAN BARTHOLOMEW:  - -was  the  v is ion of  be ing able  
to  se l l .   So  the  whole  t rade  s t ructure  tha t  was  crea ted  tha t  was  sold  up 
here  to  the  Congress  was  about  increasing U.S.  expor ts  to  China .   So 
what  i s  there  lef t  to  expor t?   That ,  to  me is  the  ques t ion .   I f  you a l l  a re  
not  even able  to  sus ta in  or  to  grow your  innovat ion in to  a  point  tha t  we 
can expor t  product  around the  wor ld ,  we ' re- -  
 DR.  APPELBAUM:  But  what  i s  an  expor t?   I f  a  company 
des igns  a  product ,  and then se l l s  i t  in  China ,  and i t ' s  made in  China ,  i f  
i t ' s  an  American company,  i s  tha t  an  American expor t  or  i s  tha t  a  
Chinese  product?   Who prof i t s  f rom that?  
 CHAIRMAN BARTHOLOMEW:  Wel l ,  I 'm concerned about  the  
American workforce  as  wel l  as- -  
 DR.  APPELBAUM:  Right .  
 CHAIRMAN BARTHOLOMEW:  - -everything e lse .  
 So are  there  economic  oppor tuni t ies  tha t  a r i se  for  American 
workers  whose  wel l -being we need to  be  th inking about?   But  whose  
generos i ty  has  a lso  funded much of  the  good that  has  been done in  
o ther  p laces  in  the  wor ld?   Somebody needs  to  be  keeping an  eye  on 
what 's  happening wi th  them.   And I  th ink,  Dr .  Ar thurs ,  tha t ' s  some of  
what  you ' re  ta lk ing about ,  the  economics  of  a l l  of  th is .  
 DR.  ARTHURS:   Exact ly .   My members  would  probably  k i l l  me,  
but  as  a  taxpayer ,  I  have  to  ask  why are  my tax  dol lars  going to  R&D 
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tha t  i s  not  benef i t ing ,  turning around and benef i t ing  essent ia l ly  me the  
taxpayer?   That  used to  be  the  model  here .   I t ' s  no  longer  the  model .  
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  Commiss ioner  Slane.  
 HEARING COCHAIR SLANE:  Real  quickly ,  when you look a t  
optoelec t ronics ,  i t ' s  moved to  China  because  China  incent iv ized them 
to  come over  and subsidize  many of  the i r  manufactur ing components .  
 My ques t ion ,  and I 'm bra ins torming wi th  you here ,  what  i f  the  
U.S.  government  or  the  s ta te  government ,  s tar ted  to  bui ld  p i lo t  p lants ,  
and s tar ted  to  do the  same th ing tha t  the  Chinese  were  doing,  to  keep 
the  next  genera t ion  of  optoelec t ronics  here?  
 To me the  ro le  of  the  government  in  economic  development  i s  
inf ras t ructure ,  and the  federa l  government  has  des ignated  areas  as  
federa l  empowerment  zones ,  depressed areas .   Youngstown,  Fl in t ,  
Gary ,  a l l  over .   And what  i f  we bui l t  p i lo t  p lants  in  these  areas?  
 DR.  LEBBY:  I ' l l  g ive  you an  example .   I  mean there 's  one  in  the  
s ta tement .   Take h igh br ightness  LEDs.   We do have a  couple  of  
companies  here .   We have Phi l ips  Lumileds  in  Cal i fornia ,  and we have 
Cree  in  Nor th  Carol ina  tha t  ac tual ly  make the  devices .  
 But  i f  you look a t  most  of  the  product ion l ines  for  these  LEDs,  
i t ' s  not  l ike  s i l icon.   S i l icon is  e ight  inch or  even 300 mi l l imeter ,  12  
inch wafers .   And LEDs are  two inch wafers .   And some companies  are  
moving to  three .   And so  le t ' s  say  you wanted to  se t  something up in  
the  U.S.   You say,  le t ' s  rea l ly  do the  job  proper ly ,  do  i t  on  s ix  or  
e ight - inch wafers .   Let ' s  rea l ly  make the  wafers  b ig .   Ins tead of  ge t t ing  
10,000 LEDs on a  wafer ,  le t ' s  make i t  100,000.   Let ' s  rea l ly  work the  
y ie ld  i ssues  and br ing the  cos t  down,  because  one wafer  going through 
wi th  a  good yie ld  br ings  the  cos t  down.  
 So then you can make an  argument ,  i t ' s  not  rea l ly  a  labor  i ssue  
anymore .   So i f  you ' re  crea t ive  about  how you do the  manufactur ing,  I  
th ink you can win.   
 This  i s  my message:   don ' t  jus t  br ing  back what 's  over  there  
because  they have two inch fabs  tha t  a re  fu l ly  deprecia ted  capi ta l  
equipment .  That ' s  not  going to  work.   What  we have to  br ing back,  i f  
you want  to  br ing something back,  i s  to  do  the  next  s tep ,  take  i t  to  the  
next  level .  
 DR.  ARTHURS:   I  th ink bes ides  the  volume,  as  I  sa id ,  there 's  a  
la rge  number  of  companies  who do low volume here  in  optoelec t ronics  
inc luding the  defense  sec tor .   And I  th ink we should  look a t  how we 're  
going to  keep tha t  here .   That  i s  something e lse  we should  be  looking 
a t  in  addi t ion  to  the  very  h igh volume consumer  products .  
 
 HEARING COCHAIR SLANE:  From a  nat ional  secur i ty  point  of  
v iew? 
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 DR.  ARTHURS:   Not  jus t  f rom a  nat ional  secur i ty  point  of  v iew,  
f rom a  jobs  point  of  v iew.  
 
 HEARING COCHAIR SLANE:  Great .  
 
 HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  Does  anybody have anything 
e lse  they want  to  add?   I  th ink i t ' s  the  Book of  Proverbs ,  the  quote ,  
"Without  a  v is ion ,  the  people  wi l l  per ish ."   I  don ' t  th ink we have a  
v is ion tha t  we ' re  offer ing our  people  of  what  i s  happening to  us ,  what  
a  g lobal ized economy means ,  and what  we have to  do.  
 And so  your  help  today in  get t ing  th is  down on the  record ,  which 
we put  up  on the  Web s i te ,  and in  our  repor t  to  the  Congress  la ter  on ,  
so  tha t  o thers   able  to  read and unders tand the  concepts  tha t  we 've  
d iscussed today.  
 So I  can ' t  thank you a l l  enough for  coming and spending your  
t ime wi th  us  today.  
 
 CHAIRMAN BARTHOLOMEW:  Gent lemen,  thank you.  
 
 HEARING COCHAIR SLANE:  You have been great .   Thank you 
very  much.  
 
 DR.  APPELBAUM:  Thank you very  much.  
 
  HEARING COCHAIR MULLOY:  Thank you.  
 
 [Whereupon,  a t  5 :15 p .m. ,  the  hear ing was  adjourned. ]  
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China's Trade by Type of Enterprise
Millions of US$ 2006 2007 2008
State-owned enterprise -33,898 -44,301 -96,274
Sino-foreign contractual joint venture 7,782 9,237 9,518
Sino-foreign equity joint venture 28,107 43,950 45,084
Foreign-invested enterprise 55,345 81,783 115,999
Collective enterprise 21,148 23,700 25,971
Private enterprise 97,940 147,238 199,223
Private firm 1,827 1,815 1,686
Other, including foreign embassy, foreign 
company’s office in China, etc. -722 -1,529 -3,807
TOTAL 177,530 261,894 297,401
1 State-owned enterprise 191,382 225,376 257,229
2 Sino-foreign contractual joint venture 17,714 18,116 18,349
3 Sino-foreign equity joint venture 163,801 198,972 227,006
4 Foreign-invested enterprise 382,497 478,834 545,477
5 Collective enterprise 41,098 46,920 54,679
6 Private enterprise 170,764 247,551 323,985
7 Private firm 1,878 1,913 1,860
9
Other, including foreign embassy, foreign 
company’s office in China, etc. 190 473 284
TOTAL 969,324 1,218,155 1,428,869
1 State-owned enterprise 225,281 269,677 353,503
2 Sino-foreign contractual joint venture 9,932 8,879 8,831
3 Sino-foreign equity joint venture 135,693 155,021 181,922
4 Foreign-invested enterprise 327,152 397,051 429,478
5 Collective enterprise 19,949 23,220 28,709
6 Private enterprise 72,824 100,313 124,762
7 Private firm 51 98 174
9 Other, including foreign embassy, foreign 
company’s office in China, etc. 912 2,002 4,091
TOTAL 791,794 956,261 1,131,469
Source:  China Customs
Exports
Imports
Trade Balance
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Sector Identification 
 
Sector HS Chapter of Individual 4-digit HS Subheading 
Coal HS 2701 
Civil Aviation HS 8802, 8803 
Equipment Manufacturing HS Chapter 84 
 (note some of the categories for IT Products contain 
 individual 4-digit HS categories from Chapter 84 as well) 
Auto HS 8703, 8706, 8707, and 8708 
Steel HS Chapters 72 & 73 
Chemical HS Chapters 28 to 38 
Non ferrous metal HS Chapters 74 to 83 
New Pneumatic Tires, Of 
Rubber 
HS 4011 
Paper and Paperboard HS Chapter 48 
  
IT Products This category is the aggregate of the categories listed below. 
Consumer Electronics HS 8518 to 8522, 8524, 8527 & 8528 
  
Communications Equipment HS 8517, 8525, 8533 to 8536 & 8540 
  
Computer & Office Equipment HS 8443, 8469 to 8473 
Semiconductors HS 8541 & 8542 
Electrical Components HS 8504, 8532 to 8536, and 8540 
  
Industrial Electronics HS 8419, 8456, 8526, 8543, 8548, 9012, 9014, 9015, 9024, 
 9025, 9027 to 9032 
Photonics HS 9001, 9002, 9007 to 9011 & 9013 
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